Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

Volume I Introduction and the Concept of Religion

G. W. F. HEGEL

Edited by Peter C. Hodgson

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION
and
THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION

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PREFACE

The appearance of the first volume of this new English edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* is the result of a dream and of a journey. Nearly a decade ago, I began dreaming of the possibility of an alternative to the outmoded translation of an outmoded edition of a work of seminal importance for the whole of modern theology, philosophy of religion, and religious thought. One summer I began on my own a translation of the third volume of Lasson's edition, thinking primarily of a classroom text for courses like mine on Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. When others heard of my work through the Nineteenth Century Theology Group of the American Academy of Religion, the plan was expanded to include the entire work, to be prepared by a team of translators for publication in the new Texts and Translations Series of the Academy.

Such a project could have been launched only in a state of innocence respecting current Hegel scholarship. Through the good offices of Professor Richard Crouter, I was put in touch with the Hegel Archive, located at the Ruhr University in Bochum, West Germany, and in particular with Dr. Walter Jaeschke, a member of the editorial staff, who in 1970 had written an unpublished thesis on Hegel's philosophy of religion at the Free University of Berlin, demonstrating that not only the original *Werke* editions of 1832 and 1840, on which the 1895 English translation was based, but also Lasson's supposedly more critical edition of 1925–1929, were marred by serious defects. About the same time, I learned that two other scholars had been planning for several years to publish a new

edition of the lectures in both German and English—a plan that, as it turned out, never materialized. After several months of indecision, it was agreed that I would complete my translation of the third part, for which Lasson provided a more adequate text, correcting the most serious problems on the basis of materials to be furnished by Jaeschke. This would be a study edition, designed merely to fill the gap until the newly edited texts could appear in the historical-critical edition, being prepared at the Hegel Archive, in the 1990s. This study edition was published by Scholars Press in 1979 under the title *The Christian Religion,* and will be reissued in thoroughly revised and retranslated form as volume 3 of the present edition.

However, there was widely shared dissatisfaction with having to wait another fifteen years before the project could be resumed. A century and a half after the appearance of the first edition of Hegel's philosophy-of-religion lectures in 1832, there was still lacking an edition of these lectures adequate to the demands of critical interpretative scholarship. This lack had been expressed rather sharply during the preceding decade of Hegel scholarship, especially in Germany. But the need could not have been met even today were it not for a fortunate development, namely, the recent discovery of important new sources. A decade earlier, only Hegel's original manuscript of 1821 and the lecture series of 1824 could have been included in a new edition, but today the last two series, those of 1827 and 1831, can also be taken into account (the latter only in outline form). Just at the time that photocopies of the newly discovered manuscripts were being acquired by the Archive, strong interest was being expressed not only in a new English edition (on my part) but also in a new Spanish edition, on the part of Professor Ricardo Ferrara of the University of Buenos Aires. In the fall of 1980, Walter Jaeschke, Ricardo Ferrara, and I met in Bochum and agreed to proceed immediately with plans for a new edition to be published concurrently in German, English, and Spanish. Jaeschke was completing his work on the critical edition of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* and would have time to devote to the new project. The key editorial work would be done by him, with as much assistance as possible from Ferrara and me. Not only would the editorial

burden be lightened somewhat, but this would be a unique venture in international collaboration.

We agreed that the fundamental principle of the new edition should be that the four lecture series—1821, 1824, 1827, 1831—would be separated and published as autonomous units on the basis of a complete reediting of the sources. Hegel's conception and execution of the lectures differed so significantly on each of the occasions he delivered them that it was impossible to conflate materials from different years into an editorially constructed text, as was attempted both in the *Werke* and by Lasson, without destroying the structural integrity of the lectures and thus emasculating the textual context in terms of which valid interpretative judgments could be rendered. This basic weakness has skewed all previous attempts at interpreting Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion.

We also agreed that our editorial methods would be similar to, or at least congruent with, those being employed by the historical-critical edition, the *Gesammelte Werke,* which is being prepared at the Hegel Archive in Bochum on behalf of the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and being published by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. From the point of view of the critical edition, it would be advantageous to acquire experience in editing Hegel's lectures (none of which he published himself) in advance of the definitive treatment they would receive in the *Gesammelte Werke,* since in fact the critical principles for this task remained to be worked out. Moreover, editions of two different sorts were needed in any case. In the *Gesammelte Werke,* Hegel's lectures will be dispersed into several volumes. One volume, for which Walter Jaeschke has been assigned editorial responsibility, will contain all of Hegel's own lecture manuscripts, including not only that on the philosophy of religion but also manuscripts on philosophy of right, philosophy of history, logic and metaphysics, aesthetics, etc. Several other volumes will contain the student transcripts or notebooks of lectures given over a period of years. Because of this dispersal in the critical edition, the texts on a specific topic such as the philosophy of religion will need to be drawn together in another series and pub-

lished as a unit. Normally this would be done after the critical edition had appeared. But in view of the urgent demand for these materials, and in order to gain the requisite experience, Meiner Verlag agreed to launch without delay a second series. *G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte* ("Hegel's Lectures: Selected Transcripts and Manuscripts"). Part 1 of the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* was the first volume to appear in this series in 1983, with Parts 2 and 3 scheduled for publication in 1984 and 1985.

The English translation of this work is intended as the one and only critical edition in English. It will be unnecessary and inappropriate to reproduce the German historical-critical edition with its massive apparatus and dispersed chronological arrangement, not only on the grounds of practicality but also because scholars needing such specialized information should be competent in German. Future revisions of the English edition will be needed only if significant new manuscript finds occur. Rather than a yet more critical edition in English, we intend to issue an abridged edition in paperback when the three volumes of the present work have been completed, probably in 1986 or 1987.

In 1981, the National Endowment for the Humanities awarded a three-year translation grant to underwrite the basic expenses of preparing the English edition, of which I was designated project director and editor. A translation team was assembled, the permanent members of which are: Professor Robert F. Brown of the University of Delaware, whose previous scholarly work has been in the area of Schelling studies; Mr. J. Michael Stewart of Farnham, England, formerly acting chief of the English translation section of UNESCO, Paris, and an interested student of Hegel since his studies in German and philosophy at Cambridge and London; and the editor, who was introduced to Hegel research through earlier studies on Ferdinand Christian Baur and David Friedrich Strauss. Brown has translated the 1827 lectures and the appendix on religion and state; Stewart has translated the 1824 lectures and the Strauss excerpts of 1831, checking the other translations as well; while the editor's responsibility has been for Hegel's lecture manuscript. During the 1981–82 academic year, Professor Joseph P. Fitzer of St. John's University, Jamaica, N.Y., shared in the translation of the

1824 lectures. Professor H. S. Harris of Glendon College, York University, Toronto, a distinguished Hegel scholar and translator, has served as a demanding and faithful consultant to the project by thoroughly criticizing and revising all our translation drafts. His contribution has been indispensable, but the editor must assume final responsibility for the form in which the materials appear in print. A detailed account of translation principles is provided in Sec. 6 of the Editorial Introduction.

Financial support has been provided by several other sources in addition to the Endowment. In 1980–81, my research leave at the Hegel Archive was supported by the German Fulbright Commission, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, the Association of Theological Schools, and the Vanderbilt University Research Council. I am appreciative of the hospitality afforded by the Archive and its staff during this period. The Fritz Thyssen Stiftung of Cologne generously provided the matching gift required by NEH, which permitted a further leave in the fall of 1983. Additional research expenses have been met by the Vanderbilt Research Council, by the University of Delaware's General University Research Program, and by supplementary grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities. For the generosity of support from all these sources I am profoundly grateful.

The many persons who have contributed in so many different ways to this project evoke an awareness that the association of Hegel's friends is not limited to that group of colleagues and students who gathered shortly after his death to bring out an edition of his works. Above all, I am indebted to the friendship of Walter Jaeschke, who was so receptive and willing to share this project with non-Germans, who worked so unremittingly to make it succeed, and who was so personally hospitable during my visits to Bochum; and to that of Ricardo Ferrara, whose philological skills, scholarly expertise, and collegial spirit made an invaluable contribution. The English translators and the consultant—Robert Brown, Michael Stewart, H. S. Harris—have worked harmoniously and with the utmost dedication, although for the most part the mails and the telephone have been our only link, dispersed as we are in three countries and four cities. Indispensable support was provided in Bochum by Gudrun Kilian, who prepared numerous typescripts

of the original documents and the final text. In Nashville, Daniel Jamros, S.J., helped with the source-critical analysis, while Elouise Renich Fraser was a superb editorial assistant; both are completing Ph.D degrees in religion at Vanderbilt University. Others have contributed directly and indirectly: Susan Mango of the NEH staff, John R. Miles of the University of California Press, Richard Meiner of Meiner Verlag, Robert Appleson and Stephen Smartt of Vanderbilt's Office of Sponsored Research, Jack Forstman, Dean of Vanderbilt Divinity School, and, at an earlier phase of the work, Kem Luther and Arnold Miller. At the final phase, my son, David Hodgson, and daughter, Jennifer Hodgson, helped with proofreading.

Dr. Jaeschke, Professor Ferrara, and I wish to express our appreciation to the following individuals and institutions for placing at our disposal copies of the original manuscripts, lecture transcripts, and other documents on which this edition is based: Professor Karl Larenz; Pastor Bernd Raebel; the Manuscript Division of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin; Houghton Library of Harvard University; the Universitätsbibliothek, Jena; the Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cracow; the Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar; the Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Warsaw; Professor A. Gulyga and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Finally, a word to the reader. Given the innovative character of this edition, the Editorial Introduction must necessarily attend at some length to the sources, the previous editions, the critical principles, and the methodological procedures that have been instrumental in our work. These matters have an intrinsic interest and importance of their own. But in the final analysis they are not essential to an understanding of Hegel's thought. For that, one must simply begin reading. As Hegel himself points out, the only way to learn to swim is to go into the water. If you do not wish to wade through the whole of our introduction before taking the first plunge, I suggest that you at least familiarize yourself with the first section, which provides a general orientation, and the last two, which outline the structure and contents of the texts contained in this volume.

PETER C. HODGSON

ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

[. . .] = Editorial insertions in the text.

⟨ . . . ⟩ = Passages in the margins of the *Ms.*, including both passages integrated into the main text and unintegrated passages that are footnoted.

˜ . . . ˜ = Passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings. These symbols are used only in the case of textual variants, which offer a different version of the designated passage, usually from a different source, not textual additions, which occur at the point marked by the note number in the main text. Normally the variant is placed in the notes at the end of the parallel in the main text; exceptions are noted.

— = Freestanding en dash indicating a grammatical break between sentence fragments in footnoted *Ms.* marginal materials.

[1] [2] [3] etc. = Footnotes containing (a) unintegrated marginal materials from the *Ms.;* (b) textual variants, additions, and deletions; (c) special materials from *W* and *L*, both variant readings and additions; (d) editorial annotations. The type of note is designated by an initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Notes are at the bottoms of the pages and are numbered consecutively through each text unit.

[*Ed.*] = Editorial annotations in the footnotes; materials following this symbol are editorial.

34 | = Page numbers of the German edition, on the outer margins with page breaks marked by vertical slash in text. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.* Part I: *Einleitung, Der Begriff der Religion.* Edited by Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg, 1983.

[12a] = Sheet numbers of the *Ms.*, in the text at the point of occurrence; "a" and "b" refer to the recto and verso sides of the sheets.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

W W_1 W_2 = *Werke.* Complete Edition Edited by an Association of Friends. Vols. 11–12 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.* 1st ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke (Berlin, 1832) (W_1); 2d ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke and Bruno Bauer (Berlin, 1840) (W_2). When no subscript is used, the reference is to both editions. The *Einleitung* and *Begriff der Religion* are contained in vol. 11 of both editions.

L = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.* Edited by Georg Lasson. 2 vols. in 4 parts. Leipzig, 1925–1929 (reprint, Hamburg, 1966). The *Einleitung* and *Begriff der Religion* are contained in vol. 1/1.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Ms. = Hegel's lecture manuscript of 1821
D = Deiters transcript of the 1824 lectures
G = Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures
Ho = Hotho transcript of the 1824 lectures
K = Kehler transcript of the 1824 lectures
P = Pastenaci transcript of the 1824 lectures

An = Anonymous transcript of the 1827 lectures
B = Boerner transcript of the 1827 lectures
Hu = Hube transcript of the 1827 lectures
S = Strauss excerpts from a transcript of the 1831 lectures

SPECIAL MATERIALS IN W AND L

These are given in parentheses and identify the no-longer-extant sources of the variant readings and additions making up the special materials found in *W* and *L*. Since the source of special materials in *W* relating to the *Ms.* cannot be identified with certainty in each instance, the source designation is omitted from these passages, although the probability in most cases is that it is from *Hn.*

(Hn) = Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures
(MiscP) = Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own hand
(1827?) = Unverified transcripts of the 1827 lectures
(1831) = Transcripts of the 1831 lectures
(HgG) = Notes by Hegel in the copy of *G* used by W_1 and W_2
(Ed) = Editorial passages in W_1 and W_2
(Var) = Variant readings in *W* or *L*

FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS

WORKS BY HEGEL

Werke = *Werke.* Complete Edition Edited by an Association of Friends. 18 vols. Berlin, 1832 ff. Some volumes issued in second editions.

SW = *Sämtliche Werke.* "Jubilee" Edition, edited by H. Glockner. 22 vols. Stuttgart, 1927–1930. Based on, and largely a reprint of, the original *Werke.*

GW = *Gesammelte Werke.* Edited by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in Association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 40 vols. projected. Hamburg, 1968 ff.

Berliner Schriften = *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831.* Edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1956.

Briefe = *Briefe von und an Hegel.* Edited by J. Hoffmeister and J. Nicolin. 4 vols. 3d ed. Hamburg, 1969–1981.

Early Theological Writings = *Early Theological Writings.* Partial translation of H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften,* by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner. Chicago, 1948.

Encyclopedia (1817, 1830) = *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.* Translated from the 3d German ed., with additions based on student transcripts and

lecture manuscripts, by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. 3 vols. Oxford, 1892 (reissued 1975), 1970, 1971. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse.* 1st ed. Heidelberg, 1817: *SW,* vol. 6; forthcoming in *GW,* vol. 13. 3d ed., Berlin, 1830: *Werke,* vols. 6–7; *SW,* vols. 8–11 (both containing additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts); forthcoming in *GW,* vol. 19. 6th ed., based on the 3d ed. without additions, edited by F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959. Citations given by section numbers in the 1817 or 1830 editions.

Faith and Knowledge = *Faith and Knowledge.* Translated by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, 1977. *Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie.* Tübingen, 1802. *GW,* vol. 4 (edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler).

History of Philosophy = *Lectures on the History of Philosophy.* Translated from the 2d German ed. (1840) by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. 3 vols. London, 1892. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.* Edited by K. L. Michelet. 1st ed., Berlin, 1833: *Werke,* vols. 13–15; *SW,* vols. 17–19. Because of variations between the two German editions, the English translation often does not correspond exactly to the cited German texts. A new German edition is being prepared by P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke.

Nohl, *Jugendschriften* = *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften.* Edited by H. Nohl. Tübingen, 1907 (reprint, Frankfurt, 1966). These and other early

writings will be newly edited and appear in *GW*, vols. 1–2.

Phenomenology of Spirit = *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford, 1977. *Phänomenologie des Geistes.* Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807. *GW*, vol. 9 (edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede).

Science of Logic = *Science of Logic.* Translated by A. V. Miller. London, 1969. *Wissenschaft der Logik.* Vol. 1, *Die objektive Logik.* Nuremberg, 1812–13. *GW*, vol. 11 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). Vol. 2, *Die subjektive Logik.* Nuremberg, 1816. *GW*, vol. 12 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, *Die Lehre vom Sein.* Berlin, 1832. Forthcoming in *GW*, vol. 20 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). The English translation uses the 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, hence there is not an exact correspondence between it and *GW*, vol. 11, Book 1.

WORKS BY OTHER AUTHORS

Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* = A. G. Baumgarten. *Metaphysica.* 7th ed. Halle and Magdeburg, 1779.

Descartes, *Discourse on Method, Meditations, Principles of Philosophy* = René Descartes. *A Discourse on Method and Selected Writings.* Translated by John Veitch. New York and London, 1951. Contains: *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (1637); *Meditations on the First Philosophy* (1641); *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644).

Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* = Johann Gottlieb Fichte. *Gesamtausgabe.* Edited by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. 30 vols. Stuttgart–Bad Canstatt, 1962 ff.

Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza* = Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn.* 2d ed. Breslau, 1789. *Werke,* vol. 4/1–2.

Jacobi, *David Hume* = Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus and Realismus: Ein Gespräch.* Breslau, 1787.

Jacobi, *Werke* = Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. *Werke.* 6 vols. Leipzig, 1812–1825.

Kant, *Critique of Judgment* = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment.* Translated by J. C. Meredith. Oxford, 1952. *Kritik der Urteilskraft.* 1st ed., Berlin and Libau, 1790; 2d ed., Berlin and Libau, 1793. *Werke,* vol. 5.

Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Practical Reason.* Translated by L. W. Beck. New York, 1956. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.* Riga, 1788. *Werke,* vol. 5.

Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason.* Translated from R. Schmidt's collation of editions A and B by N. Kemp Smith. London, 1930. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* 1st ed., Riga, 1781 (A); 2d ed., Riga, 1787 (B).

Kant, *Werke* = Immanuel Kant. *Gesammelte Schriften.* Edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. 24 vols. Berlin, 1902–1938.

Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften* = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Die philosophische Schriften.* Edited by C. J. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 1875–1890.

Leibniz, *Theodicy* = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil* (1734). Edited by Austin Farrer. Translated by E. M. Huggard from Gerhardt edition. New Haven, 1952.

Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften* = Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. *Sämtliche Schriften.* Edited by K. Lachmann and F. Muncker. 3d ed. Leipzig, 1886–1924.

Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke* = Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. *Sämtliche Werke.* Edited by K. F. A. Schelling. 1st Div. 10 vols. Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–1861.

Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube or Glaubenslehre* = Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelische Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt.* 1st ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1821–22 (cf. Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* Div. 1, vol. 7/1–2, edited by H. Peiter [Berlin and New York, 1980]). 2d ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1830–31. The two editions differ considerably; Hegel knew only the first. Comparative references to the 2d ed. may be checked by paragraph number in the English edition: *The Christian Faith.* Translated from the 2d German ed. by H. R. Mackintosh, J. S. Stewart, et al. Edinburgh, 1928.

Spinoza, *Chief Works* = Benedictus de Spinoza. *Chief Works.* Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. New York, 1951. Contains: *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670); *The Ethics* (1677); *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (1677); *Correspondence.*

Wolff, *Theologia naturalis* = Christian Wolff. *Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars prior, integrum systema complectens, qua existentia et attributa Dei a posteriori demonstrantur.* Editio nova. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1739. *Pars posterior, qua existentia et attributa Dei ex notione entis perfectissimi et natura animae demonstrantur.* 2nd ed. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1741.

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION[1]

1. Hegel's Lectures and the Philosophy of Religion

From the beginning of his academic career at the University of Jena in 1801, Hegel lectured frequently on a broad range of themes—philosophical encyclopedia, logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, anthropology and psychology, natural law, world history, aesthetics, and history of philosophy. But it was only after some twenty years, in the summer semester of 1821 at the University of Berlin, that Hegel lectured for the first time on the philosophy of religion—lectures that he was to repeat on three occasions, in 1824, 1827, and 1831, but which he himself never published.

Hegel's delay in addressing the topic of religion was not a sign of lack of interest. On the contrary, there was no topic in which he had a deeper and more abiding concern, as evidenced from his days as a theological student in Tübingen through the years spent in Jena and Nuremberg. Upon his departure from Jena, he wrote to a friend: "I was eager to lecture on theology at a university and might well have done so after some years of continuing to lecture on philosophy."[2] As headmaster at the Gymnasium in Nuremberg

1. Portions of this Introduction (Secs. 1–3, 4.a, 5) represent an abridgment and adaptation of the Introduction written by Walter Jaeschke for the German edition. For a more detailed and technical treatment of the matters here considered, the reader is referred to the German edition. Other portions (Secs. 4.b, 6–8) have been prepared exclusively for the English edition. Responsibility for the whole is assumed by the English editor, who wishes to express his appreciation for the permission to use Jaeschke's work, and for the assistance rendered by J. M. Stewart. The key to abbreviations, symbols, and short titles precedes this Introduction.

2. Hegel to I. Niethammer, November 1807, *Briefe* 1:196.

he gave religious instruction to the pupils, but when he returned to a university post at Heidelberg, from 1816 to 1818, he did not lecture on either philosophy of religion or theology, nor did he during the first years in Berlin. Philosophy of religion was in fact a novel topic at the beginning of the nineteenth century, not part of the ordinary agenda of the philosopher. Insofar as philosophy dealt with God, it was customarily in the form of rational theology, as a special branch of metaphysics. There were few precedents for treating philosophy of religion as an autonomous philosophical discipline, and Hegel's 1821 lectures represented an important step toward making it such. But the step was not an easy one to take, as successive efforts over the course of a decade to refine the treatment of the subject testify.

What actually led to Hegel's decision to take this step at the time he did can only be surmised. It was known that Hegel's colleague—and rival—on the theological faculty in Berlin, Friedrich Schleiermacher, had been preparing a major work in dogmatics at least since the time of Hegel's arrival at the University in 1818. Political and personal as well as intellectual conflicts had already developed between these two powerful figures.[3] Some twenty years earlier, in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802), at the end of a devastating analysis of F. H. Jacobi's philosophy of faith, Hegel had advanced a brief but perceptive critique of Schleiermacher's *Speeches on Religion*.[4] As the time approached for the actual publication of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, the first volume of which appeared at the end of June 1821,[5] Hegel may well have concluded that it was necessary to provide a counterweight to a theological position about which he had reason to believe he would have deep reservations.

3. See Richard Crouter, "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-sided Debate," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (March 1980), 19–43.

4. *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 150–152 (*GW* 4:385–386).

5. Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed. (1821–22) (*Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 7/1, ed. H. Peiter [Berlin and New York, 1980], pp. xxx, xxxiv). Schleiermacher received the first copies on 27 June 1821, and during the next two months distributed copies to a number of friends. Vol. 1 contained only the Introduction and Part I of the system (about a third of the whole). The second and larger volume was not completed until December 1821, and it was published almost exactly a year after the first, on 29 June 1822 (pp. xxxi–xxxv).

While Schleiermacher and Hegel were not in direct contact, many students heard them both lecture, and Hegel could readily have learned from students the general orientation of Schleiermacher's theological program as well as his publication plans. Information would also have been available from Philipp Marheineke, a member of the theological faculty in Berlin, who was in close touch with both of them, and from Carl Daub, a former colleague at Heidelberg, who was familiar with Schleiermacher's thought and on friendly terms with Hegel. Schleiermacher's association with Wilhelm de Wette and J. F. Fries would have been a further clue to his position. It is evident that Hegel's decision to lecture on the philosophy of religion occurred rather suddenly,[6] and the lecture manuscript was written hurriedly just before and during the course of the lectures. On 9 May 1821, shortly after the lectures had begun, but before the appearance of Schleiermacher's first volume, Hegel indicated what his expectations were in this revealing note to Carl Daub: "I hear Schleiermacher is also in process of having a work printed on dogmatics. The epigram occurs to me, 'One can go on paying for a long time with chips, but in the end one has to pull out one's purse all the same.' We'll have to wait and see whether this purse too will yield nothing more than chips."[7]

After volume 1 of the *Glaubenslehre* had appeared, Hegel wrote H. W. F. Hinrichs: "From Daub I look for an open declaration whether this really is the dogmatics of the United Evangelical Church that one has had the brazen effrontery to offer as such—admittedly only in a preliminary first part."[8] Hegel's Preface to the

6. In a memorandum addressed to the Rector of the University of Berlin on 5 May 1820 concerning the appropriate topics for a philosophical curriculum, no mention is made of philosophy of religion as an independent discipline. See Hegel, *Nürnberger Schriften*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1938), pp. xxxiii–xxxiv, n. 1.

7. Hegel to C. Daub, 9 May 1821, *Briefe* 2:262.

8. Hegel to H. W. F. Hinrichs, 4 April 1822, *Briefe* 2:303; cf. the letter of 7 April 1822, *ibid.*, p. 305. The full title of Schleiermacher's work is: "The Christian Faith According to the Fundamental Principles of the Evangelical Church, Cohesively Set Forth." In the Preface to the first edition he remarks that this is the first dogmatics that attempts to set forth the fundamental principles of the Evangelical Church as a whole, including both the Reformed and the Lutheran communions. It is intended to serve as a theological basis for the union of the two Protestant confessions. Thus the terms "Protestant" and "Evangelical" are used synonymously. *Gesamtausgabe* 7/1:6–7.

treatise on philosophy of religion by Hinrichs[9] should be viewed in the same light. Its well-known polemic directed against Schleiermacher should be read not as private disparagement of a colleague but as a means to discussion of religious policy in regard to the fundamental theological principles of the Evangelical Church of the Prussian Union. In the 1824 lectures, Hegel's controversy with Schleiermacher's theology of feeling was brought into the open,[10] but thereafter it subsided as new issues came to the fore.

According to the faculty records, Hegel's first series of lectures on the philosophy of religion lasted from 30 April to 25 August 1821—four hours per week for seventeen weeks—and had 49 auditors. The 1824 series lasted from 26 April to 26 August, and the number in the class rose to 63. By 1827, when the course lasted from 7 May to 10 August, Hegel was lecturing to 119 students, which made this one of the best-attended series of lectures he gave. The last series was offered in the summer of 1831, but no data are available.[11] The philosophy-of-religion lectures were always delivered in conjunction with those on logic and metaphysics, and there was in fact a close connection between the two disciplines in Hegel's mind, although their conjunction was due to the external fact that these less extensive lectures were scheduled during the shorter summer semester, while longer series, such as those on the history of philosophy, were reserved for the winter. But the fact that Hegel was addressing the two topics simultaneously reinforces the substantive connection between them and helps to account for the increasingly logical structure assumed by the lectures on religion.

Hegel was by no means an eloquent lecturer,[12] and it must be assumed that his delivery was particularly halting in those lectures he gave from manuscripts, as compared with those for which he could use an already printed compendium or text, such as the

9. See. H. W. F. Hinrichs, *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1822), pp. xviii-xix; cf. *Berliner Schriften*, p. 74.

10. See below, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 52, and 1824 *Concept*, n. 37.

11. *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 744–749.

12. There is abundant testimony to this effect. See *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, ed. G. Nicolin (Hamburg, 1970), pp. 181, 203, 207, 246, 274, 276, 376–377, 421–422, 548.

Encyclopedia. He spoke slowly and repetitiously, with much pausing to clear his throat, to find his place as he thumbed through sheets, and to express his thoughts in the right words. But one distinct advantage of speaking from manuscripts—as in the case not only of the philosophy of religion but also of the philosophies of history and art and the history of philosophy—was that it allowed free rein to improve and rearrange the material, even to the point of complete reformulation. It is also the case that many more student transcripts were made of the manuscript lectures than of those for which a printed outline already existed, since the transcripts were the only permanent record available to students, and copies were in heavy demand. Hegel's slow pace of delivery made it possible for students to take verbatim notes. It was a common practice of the time for three students to sit beside one another, in turn writing down as exactly as possible what the lecturer said, subsequently combining their notes into a transcript of the whole. Some transcripts clearly were prepared in collaboration, while others derived from a common source. Still other students worked alone, either writing down the lectures in class or taking notes from which they later prepared a fair copy or a more freely edited copy. In any case, these transcripts (*Nachschriften*) were much more detailed and accurate records than student lecture notes customarily are today. They were more than what we would call "notebooks" but of course not exact reproductions.

Not only were copies of student transcripts in heavy demand and sometimes sold for a price, but also Hegel made use of the best of such transcripts for his own purposes. Marheineke reports, in his Preface to the first edition of the *Werke,* that Hegel made use of a copy of the transcript of the 1824 lectures prepared by K. G. von Griesheim (a military officer) when he lectured in 1827, and that he used a transcript of the 1827 lectures prepared by a Herr Meyer of Switzerland when he lectured in 1831—in each case jotting down his own additions and revisions in the margins of the fair copy at his disposal.[13] As the present edition demonstrates,

13. Preface to W_1; in W_2 11:xi–xii.

because of extensive changes in the later series, Hegel's original lecture manuscript of 1821, which he partly utilized in 1824 on the basis of extensive marginal additions and revisions, was no longer serviceable for the 1827 and 1831 lectures apart from a few small sections. Each new series of lectures was based on a revised copy of the preceding series, as well as additional miscellaneous papers; but especially in the last years much of the actual presentation must have been extemporaneous.

The three later series differed substantially from the 1821 series. As will be shown in detail in Secs. 7–8 below, the entire conception of the lectures changed over the period of a few years, changes that were reflected in both organization and substance even though Hegel's basic philosophical vision remained relatively constant. This is not very surprising when we consider that philosophy of religion was still a novel subject for Hegel, whereas he had already published major works on other topics covered by his Berlin lectures, such as logic and metaphysics, encyclopedia, and philosophy of right. Although religion had been partially and briefly addressed within the framework of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and the first edition of the *Encyclopedia* (1817), when Hegel began preparing his lectures on the philosophy of religion his task was nothing less than that of adumbrating for the first time a systematic overview of the subject. For the other disciplines on which he lectured, including the history of philosophy and the philosophies of history and art, as well as those for which published compendia were available, the stage of comprehensive systematization and codification had already been attained by the time Hegel moved to Berlin, but this was not the case with the philosophy of religion prior to the 1827 lectures. In other words, philosophy of religion was the last discipline for which this one-time student of theology developed a comprehensive framework of interpretation, and the several series of Berlin lectures provide a unique opportunity for tracing the development of Hegel's thought—but it is just this that the previous editions prevent us from doing. The development is not just of historical or biographical interest. Fundamental philosophical and theological questions are exposed as Hegel wrestles with alternative

formulations, arrangements, and connections, and the content is much expanded as he strives for a comprehensive treatment of all the major historical forms of religion. The lectures point to a continuous drawing on new sources and a constant reworking such that even parts in which the systematic conception remains unchanged are continually formulated anew. On the one hand the content is enriched from series to series, while on the other the whole design and architectonic is revised with a view to finding a form that matches the concept. We might go so far as to say that the only factor remaining constant through all the successive changes is the main division into "Concept of Religion," "Determinate Religion," and "Consummate Religion."

Two other factors contributed to the recasting of these lectures. The first was the concurrent series on other disciplines, notably the lectures on the history of philosophy, the philosophies of world history and art, and the proofs of the existence of God, which had a significant impact on the formulation of themes for the philosophy of religion. The second factor was the increasing criticism that Hegel's philosophy of religion was encountering from the side of theology. Just as concern over the implications of Schleiermacher's forthcoming *Glaubenslehre* for religious policy in Prussia may have been the instigating factor in Hegel's decision to lecture on philosophy of religion in 1821, so the dispute with contemporary theology runs like a red thread through the later lectures, as well as through the lesser writings of the Berlin period. Together with Hegel's Preface to Hinrichs' *Religionswissenschaft* in 1822, the second lecture series is where the dispute with Schleiermacher reaches its culmination. But from the mid-1820s there was another theological opponent to do battle with, in the shape of neopietism combined with Oriental studies as represented by F. A. Tholuck. While this theology may have seemed to offer welcome assistance in the struggle against latter-day rationalism, as is clear from Hegel's parting words to Tholuck, in fact a more bitter competitor for the Hegelian philosophy of religion was here emerging than rationalism and the theology of feeling had been. The 1827 lectures show Hegel less as an assailant than on the defensive—on the defensive, that is, against

the charge of Spinozism, by which was meant pantheism and atheism.[14]

Hegel's efforts in the lecture hall had little effect in stemming these attacks, and his most prominent supporters at the time—Hinrichs, Rust, Daub, Marheineke, Conradi, Göschel—had not actually attended his lectures on the philosophy of religion.[15] It was only after Philipp Marheineke had edited and published them in 1832, a few months after Hegel's death on 14 November 1831, that these lectures first attained a public impact. It is an impact that continues to be felt a century and a half later, although the form conferred upon them by Marheineke (and by Bruno Bauer in the second edition of 1840) has long been recognized as inadequate.

2. The Sources of the Lectures

The task of improving upon the original editions is not lightened by the fact that during these same intervening years many of the best sources have been lost or destroyed. However, in recent years the situation has improved to the point that it is possible to put in hand an edition such as the one here presented.

The sources may be divided into three groups: (a) papers in Hegel's own handwriting, used for the preparation of the lectures; (b) student transcripts of the lectures as delivered; (c) previous editions, which preserve sources that otherwise are no longer available. A table correlating sources and editions, showing which

14. This charge appears to have been raised publicly for the first time by F. A. G. Tholuck, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner, oder: Die wahre Weihe des Zweiflers*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), p. 231. Toward the end of the 1820s, the pietistic attacks on Hegel's "pantheism" and "atheism" increased. Among others, see Anonymous [Hülsemann], *Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: Absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus* (Leipzig, 1829); and *Ueber die Wissenschaft der Idee, Erste Abtheilung: Die neueste Identitätsphilosophie und Atheismus, oder über immanente Polemik* (Breslau, 1831).

15. The only evidence for an early impact of the lectures points ahead to a later phase of the dispute centering on the philosophy of religion. It is contained in Ludwig Feuerbach's letter to Hegel of 22 November 1828 (*Briefe* 3:244 ff.), where what he says about the relation between philosophy and Christianity stems essentially from his recollection of the 1824 lectures, which he heard. Feuerbach's later preoccupation with the sensible basis of religion in feeling, as found, e.g., in *The Essence of Christianity*, could well reflect an inversion of what Hegel said about feeling in 1824.

sources were used by which editions, is found at the end of the present section on p. 22–23; readers will find it helpful to keep it before them as they work through the next two sections.

a. Handwritten Papers

(1) The Manuscript (*Ms.*) (Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Ms. germ. qu. 397)

The manuscript is dated 30 April–25 August 1821 (the first and last days of the summer semester) but does not bear Hegel's signature; it was Philipp Marheineke who added Hegel's name when he deposited it in the Royal Library of Berlin (now the State Library of Prussian Culture). The manuscript has been preserved in reasonably good quality. It consists of 104 sheets, written on both sides for a total of 208 pages. Each sheet is creased down the middle to form an inner and an outer half; the original text is written on the inner halves front and back, while the outer margins are filled with extensive additions. Sheet 3 (according to the former numeration cited by Lasson, No. 2) was interleaved at a later date and is of smaller size and different texture (see *Ms. Intro.*, n. 14). Between sheets 13 and 15, sheet 14 is interposed, which, as shown by internal reference marks, should be inserted on sheet 18a (see *Ms. Concept*, n. 57). The pagination by sheets was inserted subsequently by the Library; Hegel himself wrote numbers at the beginning of each of twenty-five folded signatures. While most of the signatures contain two double sheets, one laid inside the other, for a total of four single sheets or eight pages, the manuscript is not consistently made up in this way.

Originally the entire text was written in ink, as are most of the marginal additions, only a few being in pencil. Because of the cramped and irregular handwriting, the frequent occurrence of abbreviations, strikeovers, and incomplete sentences, and the extensive marginal additions, only some of which are keyed to the main text by reference marks or lines, the manuscript is exceedingly difficult to decipher and properly arrange. This complex task has been accomplished by Ricardo Ferrara and Walter Jaeschke, improving upon the earlier work of K.-H. Ilting and Georg Lasson.

There are now only relatively few passages about which uncertainty remains.

We do not know precisely when the manuscript was written. It is unlikely to have been composed much in advance, or to have been completed before delivery of the lectures began on 30 April, since to an increasing extent as one approaches the end it gives the impression of having been very hastily composed. It is more probable that it was begun shortly before the summer semester and completed during it. One of the sheets containing preparatory materials for the 1821 lectures, now deposited in Houghton Library of Harvard University, has the date 16 July and a calculation of the number of hours remaining for lectures before the end of the semester. Since this sheet undoubtedly predates the manuscript, 16 July would be the earliest possible date for compiling the concluding sections, dealing with the Christian religion.[16]

The original text, written on the inner halves of the pages, was almost certainly composed within the time frame indicated above (with the exception of sheet 3, the dating of which is uncertain). But, as we have noted, extensive additions are found on the outer halves of the pages. Some of these are marginal notes in the strict sense (letters to help articulate the text and keywords to act as signposts), while others are quite substantial amplifications of the text. Many of the latter are keyed to the main text by reference marks; sometimes the original text is struck out or enclosed in brackets and replaced by a new formulation in the margin.

Since Hegel did have recourse to the *Ms.* for the later lectures, especially in 1824, there are grounds for assuming subsequent revisions, which would have been made in the margins. This can be confirmed with certainty when either (a) Hegel refers to works that were published after 1821, or (b) there are reasons for assigning a specific marginal passage to one of the later lectures and not the first. With respect to the latter, for example, (i) an addition may only be intelligible in a context pertaining to one of the later series, or (ii) the substance of a marginal passage may not be reflected in

16. This hypothesis has been advanced by K.-H. Ilting in his edition of Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*, vol. 1, *Die Vorlesung von 1821* (Naples, 1978), pp. 750–751.

student transcripts of the first series but only of a later series. There are instances of all three cases. For example, with reference to (a), Hegel refers to the second volume of Goethe's *Morphologie,* which appeared in 1823, in the margin of *Ms.* 58a (vol. 2). Two allusions to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* at *Ms.* 83a and 103a must have been written at a later time, probably in preparation for the 1824 lectures. Even if the later passages of the main text were written after Schleiermacher's work appeared in July 1821, there is no evidence that Hegel immediately became familiar with it. References to the actual content of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* are found only in the margins of the *Ms.* and must be regarded as later additions. An instance of (b) (i) is found at *Ms.* 76a (vol. 3) where Hegel revises a section heading to conform to the structure of the later lectures; the revision makes no sense in the context of the 1821 lectures. And an instance of (b) (ii) is found in the present volume at *Ms.* 2a (see below, *Ms. Intro.,* n. 5), where a marginal addition is not corroborated even by transcripts of the 1824 lectures but only of the 1827 series.

The fact that there are demonstrable instances where Hegel made later revisions to the *Ms.* (and we could cite other examples as well) suggests that this was a practice of his and that other instances also exist. But since we lack student transcripts of the 1821 lectures as delivered, with which the *Ms.* could be compared, any comprehensive dating of the marginal additions is impossible. In any event, it is a mistake to think of the *Ms.* in its complete form as simply coterminous with the 1821 lectures. It is important, therefore, to be able to distinguish the marginal passages from the main text, since these passages contain not only revisions made concurrently with the original composition but also later additions.

However, *too* great a scope should not be assigned to marginal additions made at a later date. As we have noted, Hegel's conception changed radically, especially in Part I, *The Concept of Religion.* Thus in the 1824 *Concept* there is only one topic for which it is likely that Hegel drew upon the *Ms.* in a comprehensive way, namely, Sec. B.2, "The Necessity of the Religious Standpoint." To be sure, thematic continuities occur in dispersed fashion in different contexts, but it is not likely that Hegel lectured from the *Ms.* in

these places; and in the 1827 *Concept* not a single passage is to be found where Hegel used the *Ms.* directly. Consequently, most of the marginal additions contained in Part I must date from 1821. The divergence between the different series is less in the case of the *Introduction* and Parts II and III, and here it is more probable that the revisions are of later date. But the number of changes introduced into the *Ms.* only for the 1827 series must be small, since Hegel based his 1827 lectures primarily on a copy of Griesheim's transcript of the 1824 lectures and on miscellaneous papers composed after 1821.

(2) The Miscellaneous Papers (*MiscP*)

A second handwritten source for the philosophy-of-religion lectures, one that unfortunately is no longer in existence, was made up of a large collection of miscellaneous drafts and notes, varying in their degree of completion, which we know about through Marheineke's Prefaces to the *Werke*. Marheineke distinguishes between (a) additional student transcripts of the 1824, 1827, and 1831 lectures; (b) Leopold von Henning's transcript of the 1821 lectures (now lost); (c) the lecture *Ms.* (referred to as Hegel's "first draft"); and (d) "a sizable bundle [*ein ansehnliches Convolut*] of preparatory materials Hegel had assembled for the lectures, materials in which some of the most difficult and detailed developments figured substantially, in some cases fully."[17] In German this "bundle" has come to be known as the "Convolut," but on the assumption that in English neither this strange word nor its translation would make sense, we prefer to refer instead to the "miscellaneous papers" or *MiscP*.

Marheineke assigns no dates to the miscellaneous papers, and in all probability they cannot be dated, since they consisted of material from different years. However, there are a number of reasons for assigning the great majority of these papers to the later lectures rather than to 1821.[18] The *Ms.*, as we have seen, was

17. W_2 11:vii; cf. pp. vi, xii.

18. Ilting's hypothesis, which is of great importance for the conception underlying his edition, namely that *MiscP* is to be assigned in large part to 1821, is unwarranted. See *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 744. Some few miscellaneous papers may indeed date from 1821, such as *Ms.* sheet 3 mentioned earlier, and the papers contained in the Houghton Library described below.

evidently composed only shortly before and during the lectures, and it is unlikely that a large quantity of additional materials would have been produced between the compilation and oral delivery, or that such materials, had they existed, would not have been placed in the margins of the *Ms.* like other additions. Nor is it very plausible to regard *MiscP* as preparatory work for the *Ms.*, since Hegel generally destroyed preparatory outlines once they had been included in new, more extensive compositions. On the other hand, as we have also seen, the later lectures departed considerably from the 1821 series, and since Hegel could no longer have used the *Ms.* as the basis for his oral delivery in whole sections, he would have needed to have written papers or notes in place of the original *Ms.* both in 1824 and 1827, and also, as far as can be judged, in 1831. If we did not know about the miscellaneous papers from Marheineke, we would have to postulate the existence of such papers for preparing the later lecture series. A further consideration, which simply reinforces the conclusion already reached, is that Hegel employed a similar practice of writing out additions and revisions for subsequent lectures on separate sheets in the case of the lectures on the history of philosophy and on aesthetics.[19]

(3) Other Relevant Handwritten Materials

From the literary estate of Karl Rosenkranz, Houghton Library of Harvard University possesses several sheets (one single, three double) containing preliminary materials relating to the treatment of Greek, Roman, and Christian religion in the philosophy-of-religion lectures.[20] The probability is that these are the sorts of sheets Hegel normally destroyed once he had composed his lecture manuscripts, since they are more schematic and contain allusions and references that did not find their way into any of the actual lectures;

19. Information to this effect is provided by the editors of these lectures for the *Werke* editions, namely C. L. Michelet and H. G. Hotho, respectively; cf. *Werke* 13:vi; 10/1:vii.

20. They have been published by Helmut Schneider in *Hegel-Studien* 7 (Bonn, 1972), 28–31, 32–46. On their identification with the philosophy of religion, see R. Heede, "Hegel-Bilanz: Hegels Religionsphilosophie als Aufgabe und Problem der Forschung," in *Hegel-Bilanz: Zur Aktualität und Inaktualität der Philosophie Hegels*, ed. R. Heede and J. Ritter (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 70; and Ilting, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 747.

thus it is also likely that they did not belong to what Marheineke identified as "miscellaneous papers." How they came into Rosenkranz's hands is not clear; but since they do relate in a preparatory way to present the lectures, they will be included as appendices to volumes 2 and 3.

b. Transcripts of the Lectures

Altogether twenty-one student transcripts (*Nachschriften*) of the four series of philosophy-of-religion lectures are known to have existed; of these, eight have survived to the present—two in the State Library of Prussian Culture, West Berlin, one in East Germany, three in Poland, and two in private possession. While some of the best transcripts have been lost—indeed, all of those that were utilized by the original editors with the exception of Griesheim and Hotho—the situation is not as bad as might otherwise be expected, and it is relatively good when compared with others of Hegel's lectures read from manuscript.

The transcripts fall into three distinct types: (1) Verbatim transcripts (*Mitschriften*), taken down as Hegel was speaking. They have the advantage of immediately recording the actual words and sequences of a lecture series but are for the most part defective in that the text does not form a continuous syntactic whole (incomplete sentences, etc.). Only a few transcripts are of this type. (2) Fair copies (*Reinschriften*). This group is numerically the largest. While they were written up and edited from a syntactic point of view at home from notes and possibly shorthand taken in the lectures (sometimes by a small group of collaborators), these transcripts nevertheless seek to adhere to the original wording of the lectures and reconstruct it as far as possible. (3) Freely edited transcripts (*Ausarbeitungen*). These were completely rephrased by the student, working at home after the lectures, not intending to reconstruct them systematically as delivered by Hegel himself, but rather to grasp and reformulate the central argument in a distinctive personal form, often improving upon Hegel's oral delivery in the process.

The following transcripts have been used in the present edition:

(1) The Lectures of 1821

(a) Leopold von Henning (Hn). Unfortunately this transcript has been lost, but fragments of it can be reconstructed from the *Werke* and are printed as footnotes. According to Marheineke, it was of high quality; and if it is similar to a transcript prepared by Henning of Hegel's history-of-philosophy lectures, which has been preserved in the form of a copy made by Moritz Carriere, it was a fair copy. Marheineke made only slight use of *Hn* in W_1, but it was extensively employed in W_2, woven together with passages from the *Ms.* For reasons to be explained in Sec. 5.e, we have not specifically designated the special materials footnoted in relation to the *Ms.* as deriving from *Hn,* although most of them undoubtedly do. Two other transcripts of the 1821 lectures are known to have existed, by Carl Ludwig Michelet and Johannes Schulze, but both have been lost and neither was used in previous editions. Fragments of Michelet's transcript are recoverable, and, together with fragments of his transcript of the 1824 lectures, also lost, will be given in volume 3 of this edition.[21]

(2) The Lectures of 1824

(b) Karl Gustav von Griesheim (G). (Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Ms. germ. qu. 548, 549.) This is the best transcript of the 1824 lectures and serves as the basis of our text for the second series. It is a very comprehensive fair copy, totaling 648 pages of elegant script in two volumes, reflecting considerable revision from a stylistic point of view. It omits a large number of repetitions, and there are some minor gaps and errors of hearing or understanding. It does not seem to be the work of a single auditor, and possibly for this reason does not bear the name of the compiler, Griesheim, a Prussian military officer who made detailed transcripts of Hegel's lectures in the mid-1820s. According to Marheineke, Hegel utilized a copy of Griesheim's transcript when

21. These fragments are found in Michelet's *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel,* Part 2 (Berlin, 1838), pp. 649–650, 652.

he lectured in 1827, adding a few notes and revisions of his own. This was the copy used by Marheineke and Bauer for the *Werke,* but the copy deposited in the Staatsbibliothek bears no such annotations and thus is a different copy, although the text is probably the same.

(c) Carl Pastenaci (P). (Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Warsaw.) This verbatim transcript of 256 pages in difficult script usefully supplements *G* in several respects. It is frequently more detailed and a closer approximation of Hegel's actual words, although complete sentences are sometimes lacking, and it breaks off toward the beginning of Part III. It was not used by the *Werke,* but Lasson employed it for parts of his edition.

(d) P. F. (or F. P.) Deiters (D). (Privately owned by Professor Karl Larenz.) This is a complete, careful fair copy that has also been used to supplement *G,* although it is considerably shorter (232 pages). Since it came to light relatively recently, it was not used by any of the previous editions, although the third part has been published.

(e) F. C. H. von Kehler (K). (Universitätsbibliothek, Jena.) An incomplete fair copy, covering only the *Introduction* and the beginning of Part I, but almost identical throughout with *G.* Since we must assume that they were prepared together, *K* does not provide an independent corroboration of *G.* The probable reason why *K* breaks off after twenty-four pages is that it was intended in any case to have copies made of *G;* if so, there may have been an original, unedited, possibly complete verbatim transcript forming the basis of *K.* Lasson makes some use of this transcript.

(f) Heinrich Gustav Hotho (Ho). (Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Ms. Germ. qu. 1301.) This is a complete and for the most part extremely well edited text from the stylistic point of view, but it is not an authentic reproduction of Hegel's lectures as delivered. To supplement the painstakingly elaborated arrangement, keywords and brief summaries have been inserted in the margin. Both W_1 and W_2 as well as *L* made extensive use of

Ho, but we have limited its inclusion to selected passages in the footnotes.

Two other well-prepared transcripts used for the second edition of the *Werke*—namely, those by Friedrich Foerster and Carl Ludwig Michelet—have been lost. A free French version of a few themes from Part I, prepared by Jules Correvon, is still available but has not been used by this or any edition.

(3) The Lectures of 1827

The situation with respect to the lectures of 1827 is much less satisfactory than for 1824 since all of the transcripts used by both the original editors and by Lasson have been lost. According to Marheineke, a detailed transcript prepared by a Herr Meyer from Switzerland was used in both editions of the *Werke*, and furthermore a copy was given to Hegel, which he supplemented with marginal notes and revisions and used as the basis of his 1831 presentation. For the second edition of the *Werke*, Meyer was supplemented with a transcript by Gustav Droysen.[22] When Lasson set to work after the First World War, both Meyer and Droysen had been lost, but Lasson was fortunate to discover two excellent transcripts in the Stadtbibliothek of Königsberg, which were in turn destroyed in 1945. One of these was an anonymous fair copy, the other a verbatim transcript made by Johann Eduard Erdmann. According to Lasson, these two transcripts agreed with each other to an astonishing degree and also with the text of the *Werke*.[23] Lasson's text, which is based on these transcripts, in fact agrees closely with the *Werke*, which makes us confident that the 1827 lectures can be accurately reconstructed from Lasson, using a method to be described in Sec. 5.c. The reconstruction is greatly assisted by the recent discovery of three additional transcripts of the 1827 lectures, all of which are inferior in quality to those employed by Lasson and the *Werke*, but which are essential to establishing the proper order of the text and to correcting and supplementing Lasson. These transcripts are as follows:

22. W_2 11:vii, xii.
23. *L* 1/2:317–318.

(g) Anonymous (An). (Privately owned by Pastor B. Raebel.) A complete and neatly written fair copy (109 pages) with a few minor transpositions in the text and a few additions in the margin, probably added later in the light of other transcripts. By comparison with *B* and *Hu,* the expression already seems colored by the compiler's own reflections.

(h) Ignacy Boerner (B). (Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Warsaw, Evangelical-Reformed Church Library Collection, No. 934.)[24] This is a complete verbatim transcript of the lectures as delivered, totaling seventy-eight pages, in small script, very difficult to read. Many of the sentences are syntactically incomplete, and some passages are transcribed only in rapid, fragmentary fashion. However, the transcript often shows a word-for-word agreement with the text in *L* or *W*. One of the most valuable features of *B* is that it provides a marginal indication of dates for the lectures, thus helping to secure the proper order of the text. These dates essentially confirm those reproduced by Lasson from Erdmann (without the gaps evidenced by the latter, at least as reproduced by Lasson); and they indicate that during the last week of the course Hegel introduced an additional lecture on Wednesday, 8 August, whereas he normally lectured on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays.

(i) Joseph Hube (Hu). (Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cracow.) A complete fair copy, numbering 365 pages. Hube was a Pole whose German was often stylistically awkward and sometimes grammatically incorrect, but his transcript is very valuable in terms of content.

(4) The Lectures of 1831

A smaller number of known transcripts were made of the 1831 lectures, but they have all been lost and were not available even to Lasson. The only one to be used for both editions of the *Werke* was prepared by the philosopher's son, Karl Hegel, which Hegel himself also approved (according to Marheineke); in the second edition additional transcripts by Geyer, Reichenow, and Rutenberg

24. Information about this transcript was furnished by K.-H. Ilting.

were consulted.[25] The compiler of the latter was probably Adolph Rutenberg, who later belonged to the circle surrounding Bruno and Edgar Bauer and Karl Marx. In the absence of original transcripts, the recent discovery of the existence of a set of *excerpts* from a transcript of the 1831 lectures is of considerable import.

(j) David Friedrich Strauss (S). (Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Schiller-Nationalmuseum, Marbach.)[26] This consists of forty-nine pages of excerpts from an unidentified transcript of Hegel's 1831 lectures. Strauss went to Berlin for the express purpose of hearing Hegel, who died shortly after his arrival. During the winter of 1831–32, Strauss busied himself by making excerpts from transcripts of Hegel's lectures on logic, history of philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion—transcripts apparently given him by an unnamed jurist and long-time student of Hegel.[27] The excerpts of the philosophy-of-religion lectures are complete but not very extensive, especially for the *Introduction* and *Concept of Religion.* Thus they cannot replace the fragmentary 1831 texts that are identifiable among the special materials in the *Werke.* By comparing the final section of Strauss's excerpts from Part I on "The Relationship of Religion to the State" with the same section in the *Werke* drawn directly from an 1831 transcript (see below, pp. 451–460), we may assume that what Strauss offers is not so much actual excerpts from the notebook available to him as a paraphrase in his own words of the main themes. Since the excerpts summarize the contents of this section reasonably accurately, we may be confident about the reliability of the whole, even though the form has been shaped by Strauss's own literary style. The chief advantage of Strauss's excerpts is that they enable us to obtain for the first time a clear picture of the overall structure of the 1831 lectures, and to

25. W_2 11:vi–vii, xii.

26. This manuscript has long been owned and catalogued by the Schiller-Nationalmuseum but only recently came to the attention of the Hegel Archive. Lasson was unaware of it.

27. Strauss to Christian Märklin, 15 November 1831, 6 February 1832. Quoted in J. F. Sandberger, *D.F. Strauss als theologischer Hegelianer* (Göttingen, 1972), pp. 192, 194.

discover, therefore, that structural differences between the 1827 and 1831 series are greater than had once been thought.

3. Previous Editions

a. Werke: First Edition, 1832 (W_1)

During the 1820s, Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion had little public impact beyond the small circle of students and associates who heard them. This situation changed rapidly less than a year after his death when the first edition of the lectures was published by Hegel's friend and colleague on the theological faculty, Konrad Philipp Marheineke. The work was published remarkably quickly. By 17 November 1831, a mere three days after Hegel's death on the 14th, an Association of Friends of the Deceased had been formed, agreement had been reached on the general design of a publication of his works, starting with the Berlin lectures on various topics, editors for the latter had been assigned, and Marheineke had begun to assemble Hegel's handwritten materials and relevant student transcripts.[28] The philosophy of religion was the first lecture series to be published, and by 6 May 1832 Marheineke was already in a position to sign the Preface to the first volume, despite the fact that as Rector of the University of Berlin he doubtless had heavy responsibilities. This rapid work can perhaps best be explained by the fact that the task of publishing these materials was invested with nothing less than religious significance. In his funeral oration, Marheineke stated that Hegel, now released from his earthly shell, lives on refined in the hearts and minds of all those who recognize his immortal worth, or who will come to recognize it in the future. In this context, the publication was designed to confer a lasting character to the resurrection of which Marheineke spoke, and this was served by Hegel's rapid canonization.[29]

28. This is according to the testimony of Hegel's wife, Marie Hegel, in a letter to her sister-in-law, Christiane Hegel, 17 November 1831 (*Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, p. 483). On 12 December 1831 she reported to C. Daub that printing would begin shortly after the new year (*ibid.*, p. 505).

29. *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, pp. 474–475, cf. p. 672.

In the Preface to W_2, Marheineke states that "the basic principle which guided me in editing the first edition was to confine myself primarily to Hegel's latest lectures on this subject as the most mature evidence of his mind."[30] He was vague about what he meant by the word "primarily." There are in fact several passages in W_1 where Marheineke made use of Hegel's own manuscript, and one where he employed Henning's transcript of the first lectures.[31] Apart from these instances, the sources used by Marheineke for W_1 were the transcripts for the 1824, 1827, and 1831 lectures compiled by Griesheim, Meyer, and Karl Hegel, respectively, plus Hotho's freely edited transcript of 1824. Marheineke's stated editorial objective was to achieve a mean between the form of a book that Hegel himself might have published on the subject (in other words, eliminating everything unsuitable for publication) and the form of oral lectures.[32]

One distinct advantage of Marheineke's method is that, as the result of being based on the later sources, this first edition is more homogeneous than the others, and there is less interference with the flow of Hegel's thought. But the price paid for basing the edition on the later lectures, especially in conjunction with the principle of fusing the different series together and avoiding doublets, was an appreciable impoverishment of content. A wealth of detail, including some from the later series, was sacrificed in the interest of textual coherence. Marheineke's claim to have worked in a spirit of impartiality is supported by the fact that rival factions had not yet broken out among Hegel's followers, and that when they did break out, he could not easily be identified with any of them, nor could his edition.

If for no other reason than lack of time, Marheineke worked with a very broad brush. He simply juxtaposed lengthy related texts from the three later series without attempting to combine them into

30. W_2 11:vi.

31. Ilting was the first to call attention to this (*Religionsphilosophie*, p. 374), but he did not identify all of the passages.

32. W_2 11:xiv.

SOURCES AND EDITIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

EDITIONS:	*Werke*$_1$ (1832)	*Werke*$_2$ (1840)	*Lasson* (1925–1929)	*This edition* (1983–1985)
SOURCES:				
1821 Lectures				
Hegel's own manuscript (*Ms.*) [Berlin]	*	*	*	*
Henning (*Hn*)		* (In this edition: special materials from W_2)		
1824 Lectures				
Griesheim – fair copy 1 with Hegel's notes	*	*		
Griesheim (G) [Berlin] – fair copy 2			*	*
Foerster		*		
Michelet		*		
Pastenaci (*P*) [Warsaw] – verbatim transcript			*	*
Deiters (*D*) [private possession] – fair copy				*
Kehler (*K*) [Jena] – incomplete fair copy			*	*
Hotho (*Ho*) [Berlin] – freely edited	*	*	*	*
Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own hand (MiscP)		* (In this edition: special materials from W_2)		

SOURCES AND EDITIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (*continued*)

EDITIONS:	*Werke*$_1$ (1832)	*Werke*$_2$ (1840)	*Lasson* (1925–1929)	*This edition* (1983–1985)
SOURCES:				
1827 Lectures				
Meyer	*	*		
Droysen		*		
Königsberg Anonymous (possibly Meyer?)			* (Used for this edition in Lasson's text)	
Erdmann			*	
Anonymous (*An*) [private possession] – fair copy				*
Boerner (*B*) [Warsaw] – verbatim transcript				*
Hube (*Hu*) [Cracow] – fair copy				*
1831 Lectures				
Karl Hegel	*	* (In this edition: special materials from W_2)		
Geyer		*		
Reichenow		*		
Rutenberg		*		
Strauss (*S*) [Marbach] – excerpts				*

* = Source available and used by the edition(s) specified

a unified text. This principle of alternation between sources is evident even within a single series such as 1824, where Marheineke sometimes added passages from *Ho* to G's text or used them instead of *G*. He did not attempt a comprehensive, detailed collation of several transcripts from one lecture series, nor of the three lectures—1824, 1827, 1831—into a single, editorially constructed unit.

b. Werke: Second Edition, 1840 (W_2)

D. F. Strauss's *Life of Jesus* (1835) brought into the open an emerging conflict among the followers of Hegel between theistic and nontheistic (pantheistic, atheistic, or humanistic) interpretations of his thought. Strauss attempted to demonstrate that certain ambivalences were to be found in Hegel's philosophy of religion, and especially his Christology, that could lend support to more than one line of interpretation; and in his essays defending *The Life of Jesus* he was the first to identify specifically the "right" and "left" wings of the Hegelian school.[33] Already reviews critical of Hegel's "pantheism" as evidenced in the first edition of the *Religionsphilosophie* had appeared from C. H. Weisse and F. A. Staudenmaier,[34] but these reviewers attributed the problems to Hegel's conception, not to the edition. But now the suspicion grew that the ambivalences mentioned by Strauss and others, such as Karl Rosenkranz, might be traced, at least in part, to the way the lectures had been edited.[35] These suspicions were shared by members of the Hegel family. The

33. David Friedrich Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, trans. George Eliot, ed. P. C. Hodgson (Philadelphia and London, 1972), esp. §§ 150–152; *Streitschriften zur Vertheidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie* (Tübingen, 1837), 3:94–95.

34. C. H. Weisse, "Über die eigentliche Grenze des Pantheismus und des philosophischen Theismus," *Religiöse Zeitschrift für das katholische Deutschland*, 1833, 1:31–51, 143–153, 227–239; 2:99–119, 244–269. F. A. Staudenmaier, review in *Jahrbücher für Theologie und christliche Philosophie* 1/1 (1834), 97–158.

35. As early as 5 January 1833 Strauss wrote to G. Binder that the *Religionsphilosophie* would not be well received because it was poorly edited. Quoted by T. Ziegler, "Zur Biographie von David Friedrich Strauss," *Deutsche Revue* 30/2 (1905), 344. See also Rosenkranz's review of W_1 in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 1833, pp. 561–581, 641–656.

younger son Immanuel wrote his mother, severely criticizing Marheineke's work and urging that a new edition be requested.[36]

These considerations, together with the fact that editorial principles had continued to be discussed by the Association of Friends as new volumes were prepared, led to the decision to issue a new edition of the *Religionsphilosophie.* Immanuel Hegel preferred that the work be entrusted to Hotho or Rosenkranz, or as a last resort to Bruno Bauer. At that time Bauer was still identified as belonging to the extreme right wing of the Hegelian school, and Immanuel was fearful that he would prove to be too partisan and unphilosophical. But Hotho was unavailable, and the fact that only a little later Bauer was selected may be related to Marheineke's willingness to appear also as editor of the second edition, even though the entire work fell to Bauer.

Bauer had not only to do the actual work on the new edition; he was also free to determine the principles and procedures himself.[37] He took apart a copy of the first edition, inserting additions and corrections in the margin and interleaving single handwritten sheets with additional text, keyed by reference marks to W_1. Some parts of the original text were struck out and replaced by handwritten material.[38] The additions bear no references of any kind to the sources used by Bauer. While regrettable, this is consistent with the practice of the first edition in giving no information about sources other than general and imprecise indications in the Prefaces.

From the Preface to W_2 we learn, on the one hand, that additional transcripts were drawn on for the later lectures: for the 1824 series,

36. W. F. Becker, "Fragen und Quellen zur Geschichte von Hegels Nachlass, II: Hegels hinterlassene Schriften im Briefwechsel seines Sohnes Immanuel," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 34/3–4:603, 604.

37. This is evident from the fact that, when Marheineke was ready to write the Preface to W_2, he asked Edgar Bauer to find out from Bruno the principles he had followed in the revision and the use made of various sources, etc. See Edgar Bauer to Bruno Bauer, 29 December 1839, in *Briefwechsel während der Jahre 1839–1842 aus Bonn und Berlin* (Charlottenburg, 1844), p. 22.

38. The copy sent to press by Bauer for composition purposes has been preserved and is now in the possession of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The editors are grateful to the Academy for having made available to the Hegel Archive, through the intermediary of Professor A. Gulyga, a complete copy of these materials.

Foerster and Michelet; for 1827, Droysen; and for 1831, Geyer, Reichenow, and Rutenberg. These were used principally for purposes of collation with the transcripts already used in W_1 and did not result in a great expansion of the text. The new material in W_2 comes primarily from the first lecture series (i.e., Henning's transcript), of which extensive use is now made, as well as from Hegel's own handwritten materials—the manuscript and the miscellaneous papers—which are also extensively employed in accord with the intent of the Association of Friends to go back to Hegel's own manuscripts in revised editions of the *Werke*.

On the whole Bauer remained faithful to the conception to which Marheineke refers in his first Preface, that of holding the mean between a book and lectures. He tried to work the materials from the different series into one another to a greater extent than did Marheineke. But by attempting to insert materials from the quite differently conceived 1821 lectures *(Hn* and *Ms.)* into the structural fabric of the later lectures, Bauer introduced marked tensions that disrupt Hegel's train of thought and often make it appear to be illogical, inconsistent, and worst of all, ambivalent (the very problem that was to be overcome by the new edition). In this respect, Lasson's attack on Bauer's method is not so wide of the mark: the transpositions in the proper order of one or more of the lecture series to achieve the goal of integration are unjustified and result in just the opposite of integration, namely fragmentation. Moreover, Lasson was correct in criticizing the way that Bauer edited *Ms.* passages, which he worked into complete sentences of his own, sometimes even changing words. For example, he replaced "sensibility" (*Empfindung*) wherever it occurred in the *Ms.* by "feeling" (*Gefühl*). It was necessary for him to do so because he transposed the relevant passages from Part I of the *Ms.* to the last section of the *Introduction* treating the "division of the subject," and in order to establish the relation between that section and the discussion proper of feeling drawn from 1824 materials, he had to use the term "feeling" consistently in both places. It might appear that this is a harmless change on the grounds that, after Hegel had taken full cognizance of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* in the 1824 lectures, he simply substituted "feeling" for "sensibility" in his polemic

against theologies based on feeling.[39] This is true despite the fact that there are subtle differences between *Empfindung* and *Gefühl*, which Hegel himself recognized in the *Encyclopedia*. Thus when he polemicized against Schleiermacher's theology of *Gefühl* in 1824, he tended to construe *Gefühl* as though it were *Empfindung*, which added to the difficulty of grasping the distinctive nuances of Schleiermacher's theology. In other words, Hegel was reading Schleiermacher's "feeling" in light of his own earlier discussion of "sensibility" in the *Ms.*, and it is just this that is concealed by Bauer's editorial change.[40]

The question has been much discussed again recently whether W_2 tends more to the right or left faction of the Hegel school, or is, on the contrary, neutral in character. This question can, in turn, be understood in one of two ways: it can refer to deliberate manipulation or to what is possibly an unintentional tendency of the second edition. The first option, deliberate manipulation, is ruled out by an analysis of the sources used by the two editions. The distinctive characteristic of each edition is readily explicable by the underlying editorial decisions, which it makes no sense to assume were determined by a specific interpretative slant: on the one hand, Marheineke's decision to make virtually no use of the *Ms.*, *MiscP*, and *Hn* in W_1, and, on the other, Bauer's decision to draw on these very sources for W_2. The latter decision was probably not Bauer's alone; in drawing on the surviving handwritten materials he was simply following the practice of other volumes of the *Werke* that had appeared in the interval. Marheineke's original decision not to use the sources he excluded was probably due to his accurate perception that they resisted integration into a whole. For where they do *not* agree with the later lecture series, these materials undermine the consistency of the thought process; and where they *do* agree, they lead for the most part to parallels, which Marheineke was at pains to avoid. However, once published editions of the other Berlin

39. See R. Heede, "Die göttliche Idee und ihre Erscheinung in der Religion: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Logik und Religionsphilosophie bei Hegel" (Doctoral dissertation, Münster, 1972), pp. 102–103. This is also the view taken by Walter Jaeschke in the Introduction to the German edition.

40. On this matter, see below, 1824 *Concept*, n. 20.

lectures had drawn on Hegel's handwritten materials, and once a lively conflict of interpretations had broken out in regard to precisely the philosophy of religion, the moment was opportune for a second edition that would draw on these materials both for the sake of completeness and in the hope of settling some of the interpretative issues.

During the time that Bruno Bauer was editing the second edition—from the summer of 1839 to early spring 1840[41]—he was undergoing a conversion from a former adherence to the Hegelian right to atheism. His public identification with the right-wing theologians led to contemporary charges that he had given the philosophy of religion a rightward twist, while his conversion to atheism, when it became known, led to later charges that he had given it a leftward twist. But there is no textual evidence for either charge, and it is quite conceivable that, given the state of flux in which he found himself, he resolved to adopt a purely neutral, critical stance, and to allow whatever ambivalences appeared to be present in the text to stand. Toward the end of his editorial work, for example, after the time when it is alleged he had converted to atheism (December, 1839),[42] Bauer included a passage in which Hegel speaks affirmatively of the resurrection, and he appended an editorial note (the only such one in the entire work) stating that this text is found in Hegel's own handwritten manuscript—in other words, that it is indubitably authentic.[43] Thus there is no reason for doubting the accuracy of his own description of his procedure:

> I have done the work with complete and utter impartiality, i.e., without any practical regard to this or that school. The times when Göschel and his opponents turned to Hegel to find a few keywords in support of their opposing propositions are past. I carried out the work without any partisan sympathy and with a purely theoretical interest. To the left and the right alike, I allowed the most radical critical arguments

41. This may be established from correspondence with his brother Edgar; see *Briefwechsel*, pp. 10, 22, 50.

42. See E. Barnikol, *Bruno Bauer: Studien und Materialien*, ed. P. Reiner and H. M. Sass (Assen, 1972), pp. 30 ff.

43. W_2 12:300.

and the most orthodox turns of speech to stand in rude juxtaposition—as indeed they must stand, given the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy of religion.[44]

With this principle Bauer consciously disappointed all expections that the new edition would decide the dispute over Hegel's philosophy of religion, not with arguments, but as the result of editing. To be sure, Bauer did devote particular editorial attention to the topics that were in dispute, such as Christology and "pantheism," but the new material brought about no real resolution of these issues.[45] Perhaps nothing bears out Bauer's claim to impartiality so well as the fact that down to the present day, continuing attempts have been made to push or pull the edition in one direction or the other. These attempts began immediately after the first volume appeared with the charge, in a Hamburg periodical, that the new edition falsified the work in the interests of the interpretation advanced by the Hegelian right.[46] This attack obviously provoked Bauer's tongue-in-cheek retort that the new edition differed from the first "only in the greater prominence given to atheism."[47] Two decades later, in the controversy as to whether logic has a speculative-theological character, C. L. Michelet argued that the theistic interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of religion was refuted by W_2,[48] while Karl Rosenkranz could see no difference between the editions.[49] I. H. Fichte, on the other hand, thought he recognized a tendency toward the theistic and historical view in W_2, and saw in this the only possible explanation of why the right believed it could invoke Hegel himself in support of its interpretation.[50] All of these

44. Bruno Bauer to Edgar Bauer, 15 March 1840, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 49–50.

45. See E. Zeller's view of W_2 in *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst* 4 (1841), 219.

46. See Bauer, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 48–49.

47. Anonymous [B. Bauer], *Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel den Atheisten und Antichristen: Ein Ultimatum* (Leipzig, 1841), p. 149.

48. C. L. Michelet, "Logik und Metaphysik: Rosenkranz und Hegel," *Der Gedanke* 1 (1860–61), 44.

49. K. Rosenkranz, *Epilegomena zu meiner Wissenschaft der logischen Idee* (Königsberg, 1862), p. 107.

50. I. H. Fichte, *Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie*, 2d ed. (Sulzbach, 1841), pp. 992 ff.

attempts have in common a characteristic already deplored by Bauer, namely, proof-texting. That is, an attempt was made to establish the dominant tendency of Hegel's work by citing isolated passages and ignoring the context and sources of these passages.[51] But it is just the latter—namely, valid judgments respecting the context and sources of the materials composing the philosophy-of-religion lectures—that the two editions of the *Werke* are calculated to frustrate. Since the different lecture series are woven into a common structure, which is necessarily one established by the editor, and since no indication is given of the sources, it is impossible for an interpreter to establish the framework that is essential to valid interpretation.

When such a framework is established, we believe it will be evident that neither a leftward nor a rightward drift is discernible in Hegel's thought about religion during the Berlin years, but rather an attempt to work out the discipline of philosophy of religion in more rigorous fashion. Left- and right-wing interpretations would have been alien to his central intention of overcoming unproductive antitheses between tradition and criticism, faith and knowledge, revelation and reason, infinite and finite, theism and a-theism. But for those who could think only in such alternatives, Hegel must have appeared (and still does appear) to be a bundle of conflicting tendencies and contradictions. Undoubtedly this was Bruno Bauer's own final judgment, reinforced perhaps by the resistance of Hegel's materials to his smooth editorial touch.

c. The Lasson Edition (1925–1929) (L)

In his edition Georg Lasson sharply criticized W_1, but above all W_2—not least, it may be supposed, because the later interpretation of the philosophy of religion by Bruno Bauer was strictly anathema to him. Despite his evident aversion to Bauer, Lasson's criticism of his procedure is not without justification. This makes it all the less intelligible that Lasson's own procedure corresponds broadly to

51. A recent attempt along similar lines is made by G. Lämmermann, "Redaktion und Redaktionsprinzip der Vorlesung über Religionsphilosophie in ihrer zweiten Ausgabe," in *Die Flucht in den Begriff: Materialien zu Hegels Religionsphilosophie*, ed. F. W. Graf and F. Wagner (Stuttgart, 1982), pp. 156 ff.

that of the first two editors, and almost the only difference is that he further accentuates their faults. Apparently he did not consider their procedure to be wrong in principle but only incompetently executed. Thus he shared their illusory belief that all the student transcripts available to him could be combined into an editorially constructed train of thought. He did attempt to identify his sources in an apparatus at the back of each volume, but the information is often imprecise or incorrect, and he fragmented the materials to a much greater degree than the *Werke,* especially in Part II. His structural organization is based on the lecture manuscript, which is given in full and clearly identified at the beginning of each new section. But as far as Part I and to a considerable extent Part II are concerned, the *Ms.* is wholly unsuitable as a means of combining the other series, whereas in Part III, where the *Ms. could* have been used for this purpose, Lasson bases himself on the later lectures and in relation to W_2 introduces a number of changes especially at the beginning and end such as to confuse the still-acceptable way the material was arranged in W_2. Nevertheless, his editorial conception worked best in Part III because here, despite the structural differences that still persisted between the *Ms.* and the subsequent lectures, the actual *order* in which topics were taken up did not vary significantly from 1821 to 1831. Thus it was possible to correlate the different lecture series under common section-headings without doing fundamental violence to them, even though their distinctive structural nuances were lost. However, Lasson's similar attempts in Parts I and II can only be regarded as disastrous, and his detailed editing of Part III left much to be desired.

For these reasons Lasson's edition, unlike the *Werke,* has had little abiding significance for the history of the influence of Hegel's philosophy of religion. Nor is it as important a source for a new edition as the *Werke.* The main loss of original source materials occurred *before* Lasson set to work. Of the sources used by the *Werke,* only the *Ms.*, *G*, and *Ho* were available to Lasson. The new, previously unknown sources on which Lasson could draw instead were not such as to replace the loss of *MiscP* and the transcripts from 1821 and 1831. For the 1824 lectures, Lasson was able to employ *K* (nearly identifical with *G*) and *P* (used by Lasson only

from volume 2 on) in addition to G and *Ho.* For the 1827 lectures, Lasson was fortunate in having available two new transcripts, the Königsberg Anonymous and Erdmann, which were comparable in quality to those used by the *Werke,* Meyer and Droysen (by then lost). The principal losses that have occurred *since* Lasson are precisely the transcripts he used for 1827, which cannot be replaced by those presently available to us. Thus for our edition of the 1827 lectures, Lasson takes on the character of a source, although 1827 text could be extracted from his editorial conflation only by a painstaking process of source-criticism. Lasson's indisputable advantage over the *Werke* lies in his having published for the first time the complete *Ms.,* but the way he edited it introduced serious problems. Still, he was the first to attempt to decipher it *in toto,* and subsequent efforts have built upon his pioneering work in this regard.

d. Other Editions

At the beginning of this century, a reprint of the *Werke* was published by G. J. P. J. Bolland (1901) and an abridged version was issued by A. Drews (1905), but they have had no impact. The reissue of the lectures as volumes 15–16 of the Jubilee Edition produced by H. Glockner in the mid-twenties, and most recently that edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (1969) as volumes 16–17 of the Suhrkamp edition of Hegel's works, have been widely disseminated, but they are of no scholarly significance. They are merely reprints of W_2; Moldenhauer and Michel append a few footnotes, but these involve no major change.

K.-H. Ilting's publication of Hegel's lecture manuscript[52] is different in character and doubtless represents a major advance in deciphering the *Ms.* as compared with Lasson. At the same time, serious questions can be raised about the principles underlying the way the *Ms.* has been edited and also about the synoptic juxtaposition of text from W_2.[53] Ilting's decipherment of the *Ms.* has

52. G. W. F. Hegel, *Religionsphilosophie,* vol. 1, *Die Vorlesung von 1821,* ed. K.-H. Ilting (Naples, 1978).

53. See W. Jaeschke, "Die Flucht vor dem Begriff: Ein Jahrzehnt Literatur zur Religionsphilosophie (1971–1981)," *Hegel-Studien* 18 (Bonn, 1983).

been thoroughly compared in the preparation of the present edition. However, our text is based directly on the *Ms.* itself and in no way uses Ilting as a source.

Portions of the second edition of the *Werke*—the *Introduction* and Part III, *The Absolute Religion*—were first translated into English by F. Louis Soldan. The translation appeared in successive issues of *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* between 1881 (vol. 15) and 1887 (vol. 21). In this fragmented and incomplete form it never had much impact, but it was a superior translation, both technically and philosophically, to the complete three-volume version published by E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson in 1895.[54] This translation has been kept in print down to the present day and has had a considerable impact on Hegel studies in English. However, apart from the fact that it shares all the limitations of W_2 itself, it does not provide a felicitous or precise rendering of Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie* into English. Technical terminology is handled with a disconcerting looseness, and, in later portions especially, the translation has a rather stilted, awkward character. The work was begun by Sanderson—a more skillful translater than Speirs—but she died after completing only the first half, containing the *Concept of Religion* and the *Religion of Nature.*

4. Basic Principles of the Present Edition

a. Arrangement of the Texts

The fundamental principle guiding this edition, which distinguishes it from all previous ones, is that the texts of the several lecture series are given as separate and autonomous units in each of the three major divisions of the work, rather than being conflated into an editorially constructed text. The structure, arrangement, and to some degree even the total conception of the lectures changes too greatly from year to year to permit integration into a common text without utterly destroying the context in which specific passages occur as well as the design of the whole. And without an under-

54. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, trans. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson, 3 vols. (London, 1895, reprinted several times).

standing of context and design, responsible interpretative judgments are exceedingly difficult to render. It is precisely this problem that has plagued all previous scholarly study of the *Religionsphilosophie*, limited as it has been to the two editions of the *Werke* and Lasson. We may regard it as regrettable that a unified text cannot be produced—even, as in the case of others of Hegel's lectures, such as those on the history of philosophy, by taking one series as a basis and achieving a partial integration by appending individual passages from other series.[55] While we may be required to read through texts on the "same" topic three or four different times, this situation offers the unique advantage of seeing Hegel's mind at work as he struggled to achieve an adequate treatment of this subject, experimenting with different options and also responding to shifting interpretative exigencies.[56]

The structural divergence between the lectures is greatest in the *Introduction* and Part I of the work, somewhat less in Part II, and least in Part III. While it might be possible to achieve an integration in Part III, since the *order* in which topics are treated in the four lectures is relatively constant, shifts in *design* would be obscured by doing so, and of course for the sake of consistency the materials must be edited according to the same principles in all three parts.[57] Thus our procedure is as follows: In each of the major divisions of the work—*Introduction, Concept of Religion, Determinate Religion,* and *Consummate Religion*—we give first the text of Hegel's own lecture manuscript, followed by the texts of the 1824 and 1827 lectures, and concluding with the excerpts by Strauss of the 1831 lectures. Special materials from the *Werke* are appended as foot-

55. See W. Jaeschke, "Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 5/3 (1980), 54–55.

56. Perhaps the reader may derive some comfort from Marheineke's remark in the Preface to the first edition (W_2 11:xv) that the burden imposed by repetitions is "compensated by the author's infinite richness of thought, since he is capable of grasping and portraying one and the same content continually in a new and different manner."

57. Therefore my earlier translation of the third part, based on Lasson's text, *The Christian Religion*, AAR Texts and Translations Series, no. 2 (Missoula, Mont., 1979), must be thoroughly revised and retranslated on the basis of the newly edited sources and the structural principles of this edition.

notes to the main texts at appropriate points: fragments from the Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures are appended to the *Ms.;* materials from the miscellaneous papers are attached primarily to the 1824 lectures, but some relate also to the 1827 lectures and possibly even to the *Ms.;* and identifiable passages from the 1831 lectures are appended to the 1827 text at corresponding points. Passages in both the *Werke* and Lasson that cannot be *verified* as based on 1827 transcripts are footnoted in relation to the 1827 texts. Variants from the sources have been held to a minimum and are normally given only in two cases: when the reading of the main text remains uncertain, and when it is impossible to differentiate with certainty between variants and special materials. These procedures will be fully described in Sec. 5.

Although Hegel's lectures are divided into three main parts—*Concept of Religion, Determinate Religion,* and *Consummate Religion*—and although this remains a constant feature from 1821 to 1831, previous editions have been divided in two and published as two volumes (strictly speaking, in Lasson's case, as four half-volumes in two bound volumes). In each case, Part II, *Determinate Religion,* has been cut in half, one half being appended to volume 1 and the other prefixed to volume 2. But this had the effect of utterly distorting Hegel's conception of *Determinate Religion.* For, contrary to the impression created by both the *Werke* and Lasson, Hegel himself did not give a twofold structure to *Determinate Religion* but a *triadic* structure. In the first three lectures he shows it as articulated into a triad consisting of (1) Nature Religion (primitive religion and Oriental religion), (2) Religion of Spiritual Individuality (Jewish and Greek religions), and (3) Religion of Purposiveness (Roman religion). In 1831 the triad undergoes a significant shift and is divided according to the schema of (1) Unity (primitive religion), (2) Cleavage (Oriental religions, including now Jewish religion), and (3) Reconciliation (Greek and Roman religions). Even among the first three lectures, significant variations occur within the basic triad. The 1821 lectures lack a treatment of primitive religion (the "religion of magic") entirely, while in 1827 the order of treating Jewish and Greek religion is reversed, so that now Jewish religion follows Greek. In 1824, Hegel coupled together

Jewish, Greek, and Roman religions as the second element in a triad consisting of Nature Religion, Religion of Spiritual Individuality, and Christian Religion. Thus *Determinate Religion* appears to take on a twofold structure, and it is this 1824 arrangement that is adopted by the *Werke* and Lasson. But in fact the "religion of spiritual individuality" always refers only to Jewish and Greek religion; the Roman deities, according to Hegel, are *not* spiritual individualities but abstractions lacking individuality. Thus even in 1824 Roman religion must be treated under a separate category, and the triadic structure within *Determinate Religion* remains; it is only when Hegel attempted to establish a schematic linkage among *all* the historical religions, including Christianity, that Roman religion fell into a kind of appendage to Jewish and Greek at the end of the second moment.

The restoration of Hegel's triadic design opens up new perspectives for interpreting the history of religion and the relationship of the determinate religions to Christianity. Conceived as a triad, the history of determinate religion appears as self-contained, and there is no longer any reason for characterizing the Christian religion as a third element following upon nature religion and the religion of spiritual individuality, or for having to think of Roman religion as somehow a "higher" stage of spiritual religion than Jewish and Greek, which it certainly is not in Hegel's treatment. In other words, the picture is not that of a steady rise of determinate religion into Christian, but a cycling back of determinacy into finitude, immediacy, and expediency. The "reconciliation" offered by Roman religion is finite, self-centered, and thus unfulfilling. Because of the triadic structure of Part II as well as the complex variations Hegel played on the triad, it is essential that *Determinate Religion* be presented as a self-contained unit in the second volume of our edition.

b. Characteristics of the English Edition

Before proceeding to a more detailed description of how the various elements of the text have been edited, it is necessary to clarify the relationship of the English edition to the German. While the text of the English edition is identical with that of the German, it has

been edited in a somewhat different format. The German edition is intended as preparatory work for the historical-critical edition of the *Religionsphilosophie* materials in forthcoming volumes of the *Gesammelte Werke,* which is being published by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Thus, while it does not contain the massive text-critical apparatus that will be necessary for the critical edition, and while it modernizes spelling and punctuation whereas the critical edition will preserve original usage, it does anticipate the historical-critical edition in ways that are unnecessary for the English edition. The present edition is as "critical" as an English version needs to be—too much so, perhaps, in the eyes of our readers!—and scholars engaged in advanced specialized work will want to use the German in any case.

The principal difference is that the German uses a line-count system to key the textual apparatus and the editorial annotations to the main text. Such systems are more common in German scholarly works than in English, but regrettably they are expensive to produce. They have the distinct advantage of keeping the main text clear of footnote numbers and other needed editorial symbols. But they result in a more cumbersome apparatus, since every reference has to be keyed by line-count numbers followed by the text lemma. They are also difficult to use in the sense that the reader is not alerted by a mark in the text that a note occurs in the apparatus.

Instead of line counts we have used a footnote system, including all types of notes, textual and editorial, in a single numerical sequence at the bottoms of the pages, numbered consecutively through each major text unit. The type of note is designated by a brief initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Into the text we have introduced three sorts of symbols: (a) Square brackets [. . .] designate editorial insertions into the text. The German also uses these but more sparingly since it is not concerned to render the fragmentary character of Hegel's lecture *Ms.* into syntactically complete sentences, as seems necessary for the English edition. All editorial additions to the *Ms.* are bracketed with the exception of articles and conjunctions. Editorial brackets are also used occasionally in the 1824 and 1827 transcripts. Section headings in the

Ms. are original unless bracketed; however, section headings for the 1824 and 1827 lectures are routinely editorial without being specially noted. (b) Angle brackets ⟨ . . . ⟩ designate passages found in the margins of the *Ms.*, which are integrated into the text wherever possible. The German edition identifies integrated passages not by marks in the text but by a notation in the apparatus in each case, keyed by line count and text lemma. Marginal passages that are relegated to the footnotes rather than being integrated into the main text are keyed to the text by a note number, and the note itself is prefaced, *Ms. margin.* Here the German uses a superscript ^{R} in the main text (meaning *Rand*, margin) and places the passage in the apparatus. In the case of both integrated and unintegrated marginal passages, the German edition often adds a phrase in the apparatus describing the location of the passage in the margin or how it is linked to the main text (whether by reference marks, insertion marks, or some other means). We have omitted all of this information. (c) Tilde marks (intended as variant signs) ˜ . . . ˜ designate passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings from sources such as *W*, *L*, different transcripts, or even the original source when it has a variant or incorrect reading. The note number usually occurs at the end rather than at the beginning of the corresponding passage in the main text (exceptions are noted), and the note itself is prefaced, e.g., W_2 *reads.* When the footnoted material represents an *addition* to the main text rather than a different version of it, it is simply keyed by a note number at the point of occurrence, and the note itself is prefaced, W_2 *adds.* Again, the German edition identifies all such passages by line counts and text lemmas in the apparatus.

In summary, then, while our main text contains more editorial marks than the German edition (especially in the *Ms.* sections), our footnotes are simpler and more efficient. Moreover, we have combined editorial annotations with other types of notes in a single sequence, whereas the German edition places editorial annotations in a separate section at the back of the volume, keyed to the text by page number, line count, text lemma, and marginal asterisks. Not only did we wish to avoid using more than one reference

system, but we thought it more convenient to have the notes at the bottoms of the pages where they are ready to hand. Our editorial notes, prefaced in each case by the symbol [*Ed.*], are of two types: (a) Notes containing information on references or allusions in the text. These are based on the annotations in the German edition and reflect the exhaustive reference work of Walter Jaeschke; however, we have frequently abbreviated the German version, since we do not give the extensive quotations from original sources provided by Jaeschke. Books listed in the "Frequently Cited Works" are cited only by short title in the footnotes. (b) Notes that help to clarify the structure and arrangement of the text and the development of the argument. Such notes are not found in the German edition and are the work of the English editor. They are not intended to provide an interpretative commentary on the text. We have not been as purist as the German edition in segregating textual material and editorial material (the German not only segregates the latter but also prints it in italic type); however, we believe that all of our editorial contributions are clearly distinguished.

The two editions have in common the modernization of spelling and punctuation, and the standardization of names and expressions in foreign languages. Additionally, in the English edition italicized emphasis is entirely the work of the editor. Hegel's lecture manuscript contains many emphasized words, which the German edition dutifully preserves but which we have ignored except when emphasis helps to bring out the meaning or structure in English. Conversely, the German edition hardly ever emphasizes words in the transcripts and materials from *W* and *L*, although W_2 contains abundant emphasis, most probably the work of Bruno Bauer. We have struck a middle course, italicizing only those words that are helpful for the conveyance of meaning and structure in English.

To facilitate comparison of the translation with the German text, the page numbers of the German edition are given on the outer margins, and the page breaks are noted by a vertical slash | in the text. Page numbers of the original sources—of the *Ms.*, of the Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures, of Lasson's text for the 1827 lectures, and of the second edition of the *Werke* for footnoted

special materials—are correlated with our section headings and footnote numbers in a table at the back. The German edition gives the original pagination on the inner margins at the tops of its pages.

5. The Method of Editing the Texts

a. Editing Hegel's Lecture Manuscript

Decipherment of the *Ms.* has been accomplished by the detailed text-critical work of R. Ferrara and W. Jaeschke.[58] Only a few passages remain about which there is uncertainty. Thus, while the work of previous editors (Ilting and Lasson) has been carefully compared, there is no need to indicate where their readings diverge from ours except at a few points where we have had to insert something into the text on a conjectural basis. This is not to make light of the extreme complexities of this text but only to say that we are confident of the final results.

The most difficult editorial decision concerns the handling of the large number of marginal additions. To relegate all of these passages mechanically to the footnotes would be a consistent procedure but would not do justice to their character. For the great majority of them represent subsequent expansions of the text, such as must be included in the text even if the fact of their not having originally formed part of it must also be indicated. They are not in the nature of marginalia but form component parts of the text itself, albeit formulated at a later time (even if not much later). Accordingly, these marginal additions are integrated into the text wherever possible and are designated by the marginal symbol ⟨ . . . ⟩, without a footnote reference.[59] On the other hand, some marginal annotations have the character of outlining the argument (sometimes in an alternative pattern) or of providing keywords for oral delivery and

58. For Vol. 1, typed transcriptions were prepared from photocopies of the original *Ms.* and checked against the original document as necessary. For Vols. 2 and 3, the text was established on the basis of the original, on loan from the State Library of Prussian Culture, Berlin.

59. We thus avoid the two extremes represented by Lasson and Ilting. Lasson integrated as many passages into the text as he could, but without any notation. Only the footnoted marginal additions are identifiable in his edition. Iltingfootnoted *all* marginal passages, thus producing an extremely fragmented text.

occasional references. These are not incorporated into the text but are placed in the footnotes. Likewise, it has been necessary to footnote certain marginal passages, which in terms of their character could have been incorporated into the main text, but which would have interrupted its train of thought had we done so. Footnoted marginal additions are keyed to the main text by a note number. In most cases they are keyed to the first word of the *Ms.* line beside which they begin, except when they refer to a new sentence that begins within the line, or to an identical keyword that occurs in the main text. When Hegel provides reference marks or insertion marks for the marginal materials, whether integrated or unintegrated, these are always followed. The most difficult editorial decisions occur at points where marginal additions must be integrated but no reference or insertion marks are provided; here the sense of the text as well as the physical location of the marginal passage must be taken into account.

Hegel's deletions and insertions, in both the main text and the marginal passages, are for the most part not taken into consideration in the English edition; we simply give the text in its final form. The only exceptions are more extensive deleted passages, which have an informative value even if Hegel rejected them, and which are reproduced in the footnotes with the prefix, *Ms. canceled.* Hegel's frequently abbreviated words have been completed without notation. However, all words *added* to the text to complete sentences syntactically, with the exception of articles and conjunctions, are enclosed in square brackets. These occur quite frequently, especially in portions of the *Ms.* where Hegel composed rapidly. We concluded that it was both awkward and useless to transpose syntactically incomplete German into comparably incomplete English, and that our task rather was to convey meaning as precisely as possible in fluent English; but this required indicating where the words are the editor's rather than Hegel's. We have followed a minimalist policy in this regard, avoiding unnecessary embellishment of Hegel's expression and content. Punctuation helps in the construal of meaning, and the German edition's modernization of punctuation—replacing the *Ms.*'s indiscriminate use of dashes with commas, semicolons, and periods—has been of great assistance.

We have gone further, though, by inserting periods and starting new sentences in place of long strings of semicolons. Only in some of the more fragmentary footnoted marginal passages, where a syntactic framework can no longer be established, have we allowed Hegel's dashes to stand in their original form, i.e., as en-dashes with a space preceding and following.

Finally it should be noted that the pagination of the *Ms.* sheets is inserted into the text with square brackets; recto and verso sides of the sheets are designated by "a" and "b" respectively.

b. Editing the 1824 Lectures

Griesheim *(G)* is used as the *basic* text because its content is quite rich, it covers the entire course of the lectures, its sentences are complete, it compares favorably with the other transcripts, and Hegel himself selected it as the basis of his 1827 lectures, at least in part. Despite *G*'s evident quality, however, it is insufficient to base an edited text on a single transcript when others are available. To have a secure text for a given series, it is first necessary to collate several good, i.e., comprehensive and reliable, transcripts.[60]

Accordingly, therefore, Pastenaci *(P)*, Deiters *(D)*, and Kehler *(K)* are used as *control* texts, in descending order of importance. Comparison between the verbatim transcript *P* and the fair copy *G* reveals that *G* has already done a certain amount of stylistic revision, such as omitting repetitions that commonly occur in oral delivery. *P* has preserved the character of an oral lecture much better than *G*, but since *P* is not complete and frequently does not provide whole sentences it cannot function as the basic text, although it serves as an excellent complement to *G*. *D* is of lesser importance since it is a stylistically revised fair copy and is not as rich in content as either *G* or *P*. Finally, *K* is of little use since it appears to be largely identical to *G* and covers only the *Introduction* and the beginning of Part I.

60. The collation required the preparation of complete typed transcriptions of all of the handwritten sources used, namely, *G*, *P*, *D*, *K*, and *Ho*. This time-consuming work was carried out by W. Jaeschke. The typescripts are now, however, available for the critical edition and for future scholarly use.

The 1824 text has been established by supplementing or correcting *G* with material from *P*, *D*, and only occasionally *K*. Since *P* is a verbatim transcript of the lectures as delivered, all passages in which it goes beyond *G* could unhesitatingly be used to supplement the text of *G* since these detailed formulations could not have been added later. But because *D* is a fair copy, supplementary material could be accepted from it only when there are grounds for assuming that a particular thought has not been fully transmitted by either *G* or *P*. Where *P* diverges from *G* and *D* provides no parallel formulation, *G* is usually retained except where *P* is more detailed. But where *P* and *D* agree in opposition to *G*, the text follows *P* and *D*. In view of the large number of cases where supplementary material has been taken into the text from *P* or corrections made in light of *P* and *D*, it has not been possible to flag editorial changes in the basic text, *G*. Over 2,000 such changes occur in volume 1, and there will be a larger number in volume 2, although the figure will be smaller in volume 3 since *P* breaks off shortly after the beginning and the remainder of the text is based only on *G* and *D*. Variant readings are given in the footnotes only in the few places where doubts remain concerning the correctness of our text; in these cases the source of the main text is identified as well as the source of the variant.

Finally, Hotho *(Ho)* serves as a supplementary text. This is a freely edited, quite ambitious reworking of Hegel's lectures. While it is a suggestive interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of religion, it is not a reliable record of the words actually used by Hegel when lecturing. Thus it cannot be introduced into the main text or combined with the other transcripts, and certainly not substituted for other sources, as was the practice of Lasson in Part I and of the *Werke* throughout.

Hence in our edition *Ho* is given only in the footnotes and only when one of the following conditions applies. In some cases it furnishes an alternative reading of a text for which *G*, *P*, and *D* afford unsatisfactory evidence (e.g., 1824 *Intro.*, n. 7). In other cases, it offers an expansion of the text given by other sources (e.g., 1824 *Intro.*, n. 12). Keeping in mind *Ho*'s general tendency to

condense, in the few places where it enlarges upon the other sources it is conceivable that it transmits an idea they have failed to retain. Finally, *Ho* is reproduced where its formulations have become so well known, have in fact become such fundamental propositions of the Hegelian philosophy of religion, that in the interests of research it would be difficult to ignore them. The most prominent of these is the statement, "Without the world God is not God" (1824 *Concept,* n. 97), a statement in which Hotho draws consequences from Hegel's presentation that were not drawn by Hegel himself, at least not in this pregnant form. Yet ever since the lectures were first published a century and a half ago, this statement has been one of the most commonly quoted. A similar embellishment by Hotho of Hegel's formulation of the speculative concept of religion as "the self-consciousness of absolute spirit" occurs in n. 120 of the 1824 *Concept.*

Editorial insertions into the 1824 text have been necessary only rarely, primarily to complete sentences in passages taken from *P.* However, sectional headings are entirely editorial. *G* and *P* have no such headings; *D* and *Ho* do, but these are clearly the result of later deliberation. The matter is complicated by the fact that Hegel modified the structure during the course of the series (see Sec. 8 below); thus the headings we have provided reflect the way the lectures actually developed, not their original plan.

c. Editing the 1827 Lectures

The 1827 lectures present an entirely different and much more difficult situation since all of the sources used by the *Werke* and Lasson have been lost. Even though three previously unknown transcripts have been discovered in recent years—Anonymous *(An),* Boerner *(B),* and Hube *(Hu)*—the text they provide, even when collated, is not remotely comparable to that of *W* or *L.* Moreover, the texts of *W* and *L* are in large part identical. Had we attempted to establish a text on the basis of the extant transcripts, it would have been markedly inferior to that of the earlier editions, to which scholars would have had to return in any case. Hence the text offered here derives essentially from Lasson.

The first step was to identify 1827 text in *L*, a task complicated by the fact that Lasson frequently conflated passages from the 1824 and 1827 lectures and rearranged the order of 1827 passages to suit his own editorial structure.[61] Once *L*'s 1827 text had been identified and properly ordered, it was checked from start to finish with the extant sources for accuracy and completeness, corrected accordingly, and, where necessary, supplemented. On the one hand, all sentences for which there is no support in *An*, *B*, or *Hu* are removed from the main text of *L* and reproduced in the footnotes at the appropriate point, with the notation *1827?* enclosed in parentheses. This is not meant to dispute their authenticity as 1827 text but only to indicate that confirmation of them is lacking in the currently extant transcripts. It remains a possibility that *L* included passages at these points that do not belong to the 1827 lectures, even when a similar text is found in *W*, since *L* could also have borrowed from *W*.

On the other hand, the sources have been used to correct and supplement the text of *L*. A correction has been made whenever *B*,

61. To complete this task, a line-by-line source-critical analysis of *L* was required. *L* clearly distinguishes only the *Ms.* text. 1824 text could be identified by comparing *L* with extant transcripts of the 1824 lectures (notably *G*, but also *P* and *Ho*). The remaining material in *L's* main text was presumably 1827, and this material could be both confirmed and properly ordered by comparing it with *An*, *B*, and *Hu*. Once *L's* 1827 text had been identified, a similar source-critical analysis of W_2 was possible, using the *Ms.*, the 1824 transcripts, and the reconstructed 1827 text to identify corresponding materials in W_2. When these were subtracted, the remaining passages in W_2 constituted the so-called special materials, and these could be identified as deriving from the Henning transcript of 1821, the miscellaneous papers, or the 1831 lectures by using principles to be described in Sec. 5.e. Finally, on the basis of the analysis of W_2, the sources used by W_1 could be readily identified. Confirmation of the accuracy of the work is provided by the fact that finally every passage in *L*, W_2, and W_1 could be identified as probably deriving from either the *Ms.*, 1824, 1827, or special materials available to *W*. This painstaking analysis was carried out by W. Jaeschke over a period of several years. For Parts I and III of the lectures, he relied in part on his earlier study, "Der Aufbau und die bisherigen Editionen von Hegels Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion" (M.A. thesis, Free University of Berlin, 1970). For Part II, he was assisted by P. Hodgson. Additionally, of course, in order to use the extant 1827 transcripts source-critically, complete typed transcriptions had to be prepared of each of them, and this too was done by Jaeschke.

as a verbatim transcript of the lectures as delivered, gives a different reading, or when at least *Hu* and *An* are in agreement against *L*. All three sources have been used to supplement *L*, especially at those places (which occur frequently in Part II of the lectures) where *L* has omitted material in order to avoid repetitions between 1824 and 1827 text, or where in the process of combining the 1824 and 1827 series *L* found 1827 material that seemed to resist integration. Of the three sources, *B*, which is an unedited verbatim transcript of the lectures, is the most important. As fair copies, *Hu* and *An* are used as secondary evidence; while they do show considerable agreement, this does not extend to the word-for-word agreement that frequently exists between *B* and *L*. In the English edition it is not possible to designate the many places where *L*'s 1827 text has been corrected or supplemented by one or another of the extant sources.

The question could be raised why *L* and not *W* is used as the basis of the 1827 text, especially since the two editions agree so closely. The reason is that the editors of *W* also had available to them source material from 1831 as well as the miscellaneous papers. The fact that *W* furnishes relatively few self-contained passages from 1831 makes it likely that some 1831 material was incorporated into parallel sections of the 1827 series; thus we could not be as certain of 1827 text in *W* as in *L*. However, our reconstructed 1827 text has been compared from beginning to end with W_1 and W_2, and any significant divergences other than mere variant readings are indicated in the footnotes.

Lasson advanced the hypothesis that his anonymous transcript found in the Königsberg city library might have been identical with the transcript by Droysen used in W_2, given the close parallels between the texts, except that comparison with Droysen's handwriting ruled out this possibility.[62] As a matter of fact, however, the agreement between *L* and W_1 is even closer than that between *L* and W_2. Accordingly, it is not the points of agreement between *L* and W_2 but the divergences that are explained by Bauer's use of Droysen. If, therefore, the Königsberg Anonymous is identical with

62. *L* 1/1:317–318.

anything, it must be with the Meyer transcript, which was utilized by W_1, even though it could not be the same *copy* of Meyer as that used by W_1, since the latter included notes in Hegel's own handwriting in preparation for the 1831 lectures. While the identification of the Königsberg Anonymous with Meyer is not proved (they might, for example, have derived from a common third source, or they might have been the result of a collaborative effort), the textual evidence supports it. While the hypothesis of a common source for *W* and *L* reduces the number of independent witnesses from two to only one, this is offset by the possibility that our text may in fact be based on a copy of the transcript approved by Hegel himself.

Section headings are the responsibility of the editor, even though their wording derives in part from suggestions contained in the transcripts. It is unlikely that Hegel himself dictated headings, but the 1827 lectures, unlike those of 1824, are structured in a rigorously systematic fashion, and there can be no doubt about their actual course. Further confirmation is provided by the dates found in the margins of *B*, and in a few cases also of *Hu;* these have been reproduced in our footnotes.

d. Editing the 1831 Lectures

The present situation is better than that at the time of Lasson, since, while no actual transcripts are available, the excerpts prepared by David Friedrich Strauss permit us to understand the course and structure of the 1831 lectures for the first time. It might have been possible to attach these excerpts to the 1827 text as footnotes, but this would have resulted not only in the fragmentation of the excerpts and a loss of the sense of the 1831 structure, but also in repetitions, since the excerpts could not replace the special materials from the *Werke*. Hence it was determined to present the Strauss excerpts as a whole at the end of each volume. Strauss offers such an altered conception of Part II of the lectures that questions about the authenticity of the excerpts might be raised. But such doubts must remain mere suppositions until such time as other, possibly divergent sources for the last lecture series come to light. Moreover, elements of this new conception are discernible in both editions of the *Werke*.

e. Editing the Special Materials in the Werke

After identifying all the known sources, we are left with a large body of "special materials" in the two editions of the *Werke*, i.e., materials that cannot be attributed to the *Ms.* or to the 1824 or 1827 lectures.[63] The special materials do not include variants of the latter two lectures. Variants are reproduced only where the main text is defective or a clear dividing line between special materials and variants is lacking. From the Prefaces to W_1 and W_2, it is evident that the special materials fall into three main groups: the miscellaneous handwritten papers of Hegel *(MiscP)*, Henning's transcripts of the 1821 lectures *(Hn)*, and transcripts of the 1831 lectures. Source-critical principles permit a reasonably successful attribution of the special materials to one or another of these sources, although the reconstruction must remain hypothetical since these sources are no longer extant. We proceed by means of a sequence of criteria.

1. *Special materials from W_1 belong to the 1831 lectures.* Marheineke's Prefaces indicate as sources for W_1 essentially the 1824, 1827, and 1831 lectures. If materials from the 1824 and 1827 series, which are known, are subtracted, one is left essentially with special materials from 1831. However, two or three exceptions must be acknowledged. While Marheineke stated that "slight" use was made of Henning, only one such passage can be identified with certainty (W_1 12:245). There may also be a few passages attributable to *MiscP*, e.g., W_1 11:143–148. But by and large the special materials in W_1 derive from the 1831 lectures; this is especially the case where these passages have been slightly modified by W_2 in light of the additional 1831 transcripts to which it had access.

2. *Special materials that are found only in W_2 are quite probably from Henning or the miscellaneous papers.* Since according to Marheineke the distinguishing characteristic of W_2 is that it incorporates *Ms.*, *Hn*, and *MiscP*, and also that it avoids the repetitions of W_1, which are probably due to the duplication of material from the later series, it is most unlikely that, apart from revising the 1831 text in the light of other sources as described above, W_2 should have incorporated yet other additional materials from 1831.

63. See above, n. 61.

These are the only two formal criteria for assigning the special materials. A distinction has still to be drawn between *Hn* and *MiscP*, but this can only be done on the basis of content.

3. *Special materials that are found only in* W_2 *and are related in terms of content to the 1824 and 1827 lectures probably represent part of the preparatory work for these series and therefore belong to MiscP.* This is especially the case where such materials replace passages in W_1 from 1824 or 1827, since here it is obvious that Bruno Bauer is following the practice adopted in other volumes of the *Werke*, namely, that of replacing or correcting the text derived from student transcripts by recourse to papers in Hegel's own handwriting. In all these cases the text of W_2 can be readily seen as a written preparation for the oral presentation that has come down to us in W_1 through the transcripts.

4. *Special materials from* W_2 *whose content is not related to the later lectures but to the Ms. are probably from Hn or from Ms.-related MiscP.* On the basis of materials presently available, it is not possible to determine with certainty which of these passages are attributable to *Hn* and which to *MiscP*. Some passages loosely parallel the *Ms.*, in the way one would expect an oral presentation to parallel a written lecture manuscript, and these seem clearly to derive from *Hn*. Others, however, represent a development of isolated keywords, such as those found in the margins of the *Ms.*, and these could be attributed either to a written basis, i.e., *MiscP*, or to an oral development without the benefit of written notes, i.e., *Hn*. As things stand at present it is not possible, therefore, to differentiate between *Hn* and *MiscP* relating to 1821. Regrettable though this is, it does not affect the attribution of these special materials to the *Ms.* It must be stressed, however, as explained in our discussion of sources, that it is highly unlikely that lengthy portions of *MiscP* relate to the 1821 lectures. Thus, although we have not so designated them in the footnotes, the special materials relating to the *Ms.* are for the most part derived from *Hn*.

5. *Passages in* W_2 *that remain after the removal of 1824 and 1827 materials and are virtually identical with the Ms. must be attributed to the Ms.* In order to identify the special materials in W_2 it is also necessary to subtract all those passages in which W_2

follows the *Ms.*—even if it does not completely coincide with it. We know from Marheineke's Preface that the greater quantity of new material in the second edition came precisely from the *Ms.*[64] However, in accord with the conventions of the time, Bruno Bauer edited this material much more freely than would now be acceptable, forming an easily readable, smooth text out of Hegel's often contorted fragments. His method can be seen clearly from the well-known footnote on the resurrection, to which Bauer appended: "From the 1821 notebook in Hegel's own hand."[65] In fact, however, his text differs substantially from the corresponding passage in the *Ms.* (sheet 94b). Taking this divergence as a paradigm, one can detect lengthy passages in W_2 that reproduce the *Ms.* with similar modifications. Obviously these passages should not be regarded as special materials—i.e., materials that stem from other sources such as *Hn* or *MiscP* and that might accordingly be used to clarify obscure matters in the *Ms.*

We have ignored all those divergences between W_2 and the *Ms.* that seem to represent more or less minor editorial modifications on Bauer's part. But those that contain more extensive amplifications cannot reasonably be attributed to Bauer's editorial activity, and these have been put into the footnotes as special material when the divergence is independent, i.e., not suggested by actual formulations in the *Ms.* It is unlikely that extensive parallel formulations from *Hn*, or even *MiscP*, would have been used to edit the *Ms.* since Hegel's oral delivery seems for the most part to have been very freely based on the *Ms.* itself, and in these cases the *Ms.* text would have been the better source. Hence it may be assumed that, in order to complete the text of the *Ms.*, Bauer for the most part inserted relatively independent formulations from *Hn* (or *MiscP*) at places where Hegel lectured extemporaneously. However, since it is likely that some of Bauer's editorial changes were more extensive than this criterion recognizes, it is possible that some of what is reproduced in the footnotes as "special materials" is in fact just Bauer's version of the *Ms.* This is especially the case with shorter

64. W_2 11:viii.
65. W_2 12:300.

passages; the more extensive the reproduced special materials are, the more probable is their derivation from an independent source (*Hn*, only rarely *MiscP*).

6. *In the 1824 and 1827 lectures, where the text of* W_2 *diverges from* W_1*, and where the source could be either MiscP or variant readings, passages should be attributed to MiscP when their length exceeds what would be expected of variants.* Divergences in regard to individual words or phrases are more probably merely variant readings from different student transcripts that were available to W_2 but not to us. The attempt to differentiate on the basis of length leaves a gray zone in which either case could be argued. These are designated by the notation *MiscP/Var?* or vice versa.

7. *Phrases that are identical in* W_1 *and* W_2*, but diverge from G within a context formed by G, and are not supported by wording in other 1824 transcripts, probably derive from Hegel's own notes in his personal copy of G (HgG).* These are quite short, consisting mostly of single words and sentences that could be further developed orally. They are distinguishable from *MiscP* because they occur already in W_1 (and W_2 is certain to have reproduced them), and from variants from other transcripts of the 1824 series since W_1 used only *G* and *Ho*. Where the postulated identity of W_1 and W_2 cannot be verified because of a lack of context, a question mark is attached to the symbol *HgG*.

8. *Transitions between different lecture series and outlines of the argument that accord with the structure of W probably stem from Marheineke and Bauer.* These additions by the original editors are, of course, omitted from the present edition except in a few cases where the source attribution is uncertain; when included they are noted as *(Ed)*, often with a question mark.

For the most part the special materials identified by the above criteria are reproduced in our footnotes at the point corresponding to where they occur in the *Werke*. The only exception to this concerns the materials assigned to 1831 that are occasionally adjoined to 1824 text by *W*. Since we are presenting the lectures in separate units, and since the 1827 and 1831 series are closely related (Hegel having used the Meyer transcript of 1827 as the basis of his last series), our principle is to attach special materials from 1831 to the

1827 series; if their position is altered from what it is in W_1 or W_2 the fact is noted. In general the wording of the special materials in W follows W_2. Minor divergences between the two editions are noted as W_2 *reads (similar in* W_1*);* in the case of substantive differences, both versions are given. Page numbers of all passages from the *Werke* are given at the back, keyed to our footnote numbers. The objective of the present edition has been to extract all special materials that are found in the *Werke*, and thereby to do justice not only to the extant sources but also to the source character of the earlier editions.

6. Principles of Translation

Each member of the translation team has assumed primary responsibility for a specific lecture series running through the entire work in order to become familiar with the peculiarities and problems associated with that set of texts. These assignments are indicated in the Preface. All translations have been thoroughly checked and revised by our consultant and put into final form by the editor. Members of the team have read each others' drafts and made numerous suggestions. The checking process has, it is hoped, achieved both accuracy and consistency of style.

To achieve uniformity in the translation of terms, we have worked from a common glossary, which has gradually been elaborated as the project advanced. As a convenience to readers who know German and are interested in such matters, the German–English glossary will be printed at the back of volume 3. The index for each volume serves as an English–German glossary in the sense that the German is given in parentheses for key concepts. We must stress that our primary objective has been to achieve fluent as well as precise English, and there are obviously contexts in which the equivalences we have established do not work.

Several basic principles have guided translation policy:

(1) All English words that normally occur in lower case according to current English style are given in lower case without exception, including philosophical references to divinity and the absolute. Once one begins capitalizing Hegel's technical terminology—idea, spirit, concept, reason, etc.—there is no end to it. Nor

is capitalization an appropriate means to make conceptual or terminological distinctions (e.g., "existence" for *Dasein* and "Existence" for *Existenz*). The "down" style of contemporary English—at least American English—prohibits such artifices.

(2) Most English terms render one and only one technical German term, with a few unavoidable exceptions. For example, "idea" always translates *Idee*, never *Vorstellung* (for which "representation" is used, or occasionally "impression"or "notion" [the latter term never translates *Begriff*]). However, it is impossible to avoid using "know" for both *kennen* and *wissen*, or "thought" for both *Denken* and *Gedanke*. The distinction between *Anerkenntnis*, *Erkenntnis*, and *Kenntnis* is maintained by "recognition," "cognition," and "information," respectively. But we have despaired of maintaining whatever distinctions Hegel intended between *Beziehung*, *Verhältnis*, and *Zusammenhang*, using "connection," "relation," "relationship," etc., more in terms of context and idiom than exact equivalence.

(3) As few English terms as possible are used for each German term, although a one-to-one equivalence cannot be insisted upon in many cases. A notorious instance of this is *Bestimmung*, which is an unusually fluid concept in German, especially Hegel's; although "determination" is our basic rendering, we regularly use three or four others as context and nuance require. Sometimes words shift from technical to colloquial connotations; e.g., the technical sense of *Gemüt* is "mood," but colloquially it can mean "mind," "soul," "heart."

(4) Hegel ordinarily uses terms with great precision and often intends quite exact distinctions and nuances, which we have attempted to preserve. The fault of many English translations of Hegel has been a readiness to sacrifice terminological rigor to a misguided quest for fluency. Generally speaking, the more precisely Hegel's thought is rendered, the more intelligible it becomes. Despite his conceptual precision, however, Hegel does not invent terms or employ them in idiosyncratic ways, nor have we done so in translation; for example, *Dasein* means "existence," or more technically, "determinate being," but not "there-being." Sometimes, however, without indulging in Heideggerian wordplay, he clearly has in mind the

etymology of terms, and when this is important for meaning we have attempted to convey it in translation.

(5) The materials constituting the philosophy of religion are either transcripts of lectures as delivered or notes in preparation of the same. We have attempted to preserve a sense of the spoken word and of Hegel's oral style. In the continual search for the right word or expression, Hegel frequently repeated himself, placing phrases into apposition, varying formulations slightly to bring out distinctive nuances. In referring to devotion, for example, he says, "But if we are of the opinion that we are finding God here, if we think to find God in this way, we must bear in mind that precisely in this devotion, in this relationless relating, where the separation has fallen away, the object of observation vanishes for us at this standpoint." Or: "I have a feeling of hardness, that is, I feel something hard, it becomes at the same time an object for me, it becomes a content." Our newly edited texts preserve all of these nuances as exactly as possible, and so does our translation. Moreover, it should be stressed that Hegel did not use language in abstract, abstruse, colorless ways. For him it was a powerful, sometimes earthy instrument of expression, and he exploited its potential to the fullest, mixing images, metaphors, and idioms in along with technical concepts. His polemic could be brilliant, his illustrations striking—such as his description of rationalist theologians as countinghouse clerks who keep the accounts of other people's wealth, or his reference to the Scholastic who won't go into the water until he has learned to swim. We have attempted to avoid as much as possible the risk that Gadamer says faces every translation: to be both clearer and flatter than the original.[66] Hegel has been flattened out in English often enough, but probably not much clarified!

(6) We have used generic terms for "human being" whenever appropriate. Hegel's intentionality is usually generic when employing such terms as *Mensch* and *Menschheit,* and we have translated

66. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik,* 2d ed. (Tübingen, 1965), p. 364: "Every translation that takes seriously its task is both clearer and flatter than the original. Even when it is a masterly reproduction, it must lack something of the overtones that reverberate in the original."

accordingly. In instances when this is clearly not the case, we have used sex-specific terms. The situation with pronouns is more complex. Hegel of course uses the masculine personal pronoun when the antecedent is *der Mensch* and the feminine when it is *die Menschheit;* to solve this problem we have frequently switched to the plural when the German uses the singular. To avoid the monotonous repetition of "human being" and "humanity" we have sometimes used "person" or "people." We construe "subject" and "spirit" as neuter. These and other adjustments do not seriously disturb the sense and syntax of Hegel's language, and we believe they are in accord with his fundamental philosophical convictions, although we recognize that he like everyone else was shaped by prevailing linguistic and social conventions. We have not found a satisfactory alternative to the use of "his," "him," "himself," etc., with reference to God, primarily because of the highly reflexive character of Hegel's language about God. This is ironic because the German reflexive *sich* or *sich selbst,* so favored by Hegel, is not gender-specific. To render *Gott hat sich selbst geoffenbart* as "God has revealed self" or "God has revealed godself" was just too modernizing, and to write "God's self-revelation has occurred" was tampering too much with the precise syntactic form of Hegel's expression. Of course, since the word *Gott* is grammatically masculine in German, Hegel uses masculine personal pronouns when referring to it, and these are preserved in translation unless the word "God" can be tolerably repeated. But the reader should remember that it was above all Hegel who knew that the symbol "Father" is a mere *Vorstellung,* and that to speak of God as though he were a male being is conceptually inadequate.

Some specific translation problems have been discussed in editorial footnotes—for example, the distinction between *Empfindung* ("sensibility") and *Gefühl* ("feeling") (1824 *Concept,* n. 20), or the wordplay between *Andacht* ("devotion") and *Denken* ("thought") (*Ms. Concept,* n. 66). The latter term, *Denken,* normally refers to the *process* or *activity* of thinking as distinguished from what results from this process, namely "a thought" or "thoughts," "the thought of" something (for which Hegel normally employs *Gedanke*). The English word "thought" can be used in both senses and is often a

more idiomatic rendering of *Denken* than the more literal "thinking." When it occurs in the singular without an article, it generally translates *Denken.*

S. T. Coleridge[67] has given us terms by which to express two sets of Hegelian distinctions that are often confused in English—namely, the distinctions between *Phantasie* and *Einbildung* and between *Verstand* and *Vernunft.* Hegel's *Phantasie* is similar to Coleridge's "fancy," namely, the primary, inchoate moment of image-making in which the mind assembles and juxtaposes sensuous images but without fusing them into a unity. In Hegel's epistemology it is the moment of "intuition" *(Anschauung)* that precedes "representation" *(Vorstellung).* This is what Hegel has in mind when he defines Hinduism as the *Religion der Phantasie.* But because "fancy" has taken on other connotations in modern English, and because what is intended is not "fantasy" in the sense of psychological illusion, we retrieve the older spelling "phantasy" to render Hegel's meaning in English. "Imagination" *(Einbildung)* by contrast molds images into a synthetic unity; for Coleridge this appears to be an anticipation of "reason," but for Hegel it remains a function of "understanding." This brings us to the second set of terms, *Verstand* and *Vernunft. Verstand* or "understanding" is the faculty by which we generalize and arrange the recollected phenomena of sense intuition. It is analytic, abstractive, and merely reflective; it can synthesize only momentarily through the power of imagination. When we name something we refer it by means of some common character to a known class or familiar image. Thereby we "understand" it, we make it "stand under" a category or image. But we do not understand it in itself; we are unable to grasp and define a thing in itself, in a conceptually complete way, but merely name and represent it (often metaphorically) in terms of the various sensible ways it presents itself. The "grasping-together" or "conceiving" *(begreifen)* of a thing in the totality of its aspects and in terms of the universal logical principles by which actuality as such is known is "conceptual" thinking or "reason" *(Vernunft).* "Representation"

67. See especially *Biographia Literaria* (London, 1817), chaps. 4 ff.; and *Aids to Reflection* (London, 1825), Aphorism 8.

(Vorstellung), or thought in terms of the categories of the understanding, is the characteristic mode of cognition in religion; while it may have access to the true *content,* the *form* adequate to the content is that of the "concept" *(Begriff)* or speculative reason *(Vernunft).* It is important to recognize that representational thinking is not simply left behind but rather taken up into and preserved (*aufgehoben,* "sublated") in conceptual thinking. Feeling, intuition, phantasy, imagination, understanding, representation—these are all valid and essential moments in the total process of knowing, according to Hegel, but *absolute* knowledge is achieved only in the form of purely conceptual or rational thought.

To the distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft,* and to that between *Vorstellung* and *Begriff,* corresponds yet another between *Reflexion* and *Spekulation.* While the latter terms are often used synonymously in English, for Hegel they designate diametrically opposed modes of philosophical thinking—the one referring to the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity," i.e., Kantian rationalism, which construes reality in terms of the finite categories of the understanding, the other referring to speculative idealism, which, in the form of meditative thought *(Nachdenken),* is a "mirror" *(speculum)* of the rational structure of actuality itself.

The most complex translation problem we have faced focuses on the simple verb *sein* ("to be") and related forms: the present participle *seiend* and the nouns *Sein, Seiende,* and *Dasein.* Hegel clearly intends a distinction between "being" *(Sein)* as the most empty, indeterminate, and immediate philosophical category, referring to the pure possibility of being, and "existence" *(Dasein),* which is concrete, actual, determinate being.[68] Between these, *Seiende* has the connotation of "actually having being." It is formed from the participle *seiend,* not meaning "existing," as we would more naturally say in English, but "having being." Thus *ein Seiendes* is more "actual" than *Sein,* which is pure possibility, but it lacks the concrete, worldly, existential determinacy of *Dasein.* We can preserve these distinctions by translating *Sein* as "being," *Seiende* as "actual being," and *Dasein* as "existence" or "determinate

68. See 1824 *Concept,* pp. 265 ff. (esp. n. 11).

being." The problem arises especially in the third person of the verb *sein, ist* ("is") and *sind* ("are"). Often the more idiomatic renderings in English are "exists" and "exist." Because German lacks a verb corresponding to *Dasein,* but has only the loanword *existieren, sein* often does double duty for "to be" and "to exist," and when the reference is to finite objects, both translations are appropriate. Yet the infinite object, God, the absolute, the universal, the concept, cannot properly be said to "exist"; it has being or actuality, but not determinate worldly existence (except insofar as God *assumes* finitude in the moment of worldly diremption, but that is another matter). God "is," but God does not "exist"; and to speak of the "existence of God" is to think representationally.[69]

How then shall we translate such expressions as *Gott ist wesentlich in seiner Gemeinde, Gott ist für mich in der Andacht, dies Objektive ist als Affirmatives?* For the reasons given, we have had to use "is" in these contexts, but to prevent the verb from becoming a mere copula, an empty link, we have sometimes italicized it or added a predicate such as "present," "known," "found": "God *is* essentially in his community," "God is [present] for me in devotion," "this objective [element] is [known] as affirmative." Finally, we have avoided "exists" or "existing" for the participle *seiend;* thus, *eine anundfürsichseiende Wahrheit* is given as "a truth that has being in and for itself," not as "a truth existing in and for itself." We hope that the somewhat jarring effect of these renderings will soften as they become familiar.

7. The Structure and Development of Hegel's "Introduction"

Our edition makes possible for the first time a comprehensive comparison of the structure of the four series of lectures Hegel presented on the philosophy of religion, as well as an analysis of the development in his conceptualization and treatment of this subject. We use the term "development" intentionally, since we wish to avoid two misleading views: that the first, incomplete, and "immature" version found in the *Ms.* is worked out with greater "maturity" in

69. Hegel is quite explicit about this in the 1827 *Concept,* pp. 415 ff. (cf. n. 111).

the later lectures; or that Hegel's originally fresh and creative insights give way to an increasing "scholasticism of the concept" during his latter days in Berlin. In our view, the *Ms.* is by no means a philosophically immature document, despite its external form. On the other hand it is a mistake to suggest that Hegel became increasingly rigid and set in his ways of thinking as he repeated the lectures. Just the opposite is the case: the later lectures display an unusual vitality and flexibility, a willingness to rework the whole in order to take into consideration new materials and new issues, and to find a form that matches the concept of religion itself. But the concept is already present, both germinally and explicitly, in the original *Ms.*, and thus Hegel's basic philosophical conception of *religion* does not significantly change during the Berlin period, even though his conception of the *philosophy of religion* does.

In this section and the next, we shall call attention to some of the main characteristics of structure and development in Hegel's *Introduction* and in Part I of the lectures, *The Concept of Religion*. A similar analysis of the structure and development of Parts II and III will constitute the editorial introductions to those two volumes. These introductory sections are in no way intended as a commentary on the text or as an attempt to interpret the philosophy-of-religion lectures within the larger framework of Hegel's thought. The analysis is purely internal, making no reference to other writings of Hegel or to secondary literature. For what follows, readers will be helped by referring to the tables providing a synopsis of the structure of the *Introduction* and the *Concept*, which are found on pp. 66–67, 78–79 respectively. It should be recalled that section numbers and headings in all of the documents except the *Concept of Religion* in the *Ms.* are the work of the editor and are not attributable to Hegel himself, although frequently wording in the text suggests the formulation used for headings. Reference will be made to the more detailed discussion of specific matters in the editorial footnotes, so as to avoid repetition between the introduction and the notes.[70]

70. These references are cited not by page numbers but by note numbers, which run consecutively through each text unit. By using the running heads, readers can readily identify the appropriate text units.

All four lecture series begin with a brief prefatory depiction, couched in rather poetic terms, of what religion is wherever it is found, namely, the consciousness of God and occupation or concern *(Beschäftigung)* with God. This is the only part of the original manuscript repeated without much change in the subsequent lectures. Following these opening remarks, the introductions all address several themes in a similar order: the relation of philosophy of religion to philosophy and religion; the theological and philosophical situation of the time, which furnishes specific issues to be addressed by these lectures; and a survey of the three main parts of the ensuing treatment. But the specific way these themes are articulated differs considerably from one year to the next, with only occasional reliance on the original manuscript after 1821.

a. The Manuscript

Following the prefatory remarks, the *Ms.* inserts a special sheet (3a-b), arguing that the purpose of the philosophy of religion is to know God despite the widely held prejudice of the time that nothing can be known of God (see *Ms. Intro.*, n. 14). Following this insertion, which we have designated as Sec. 1, the *Ms.* returns to what was originally intended as the first task of the *Introduction,* namely, to treat the relation of the philosophy of religion to religion (Sec. 2). This relation consists in philosophy's recognition that religion is already everywhere present and presupposed in human experience, and that therefore philosophy's task is to *comprehend* religion, not *produce* it. While the existence of religion may be self-evident, in another sense it must be demonstrated, but that is a task reserved for Part I. For the moment the most important question facing the philosophy of religion is how religion as such or religious consciousness is *related* to everything else in human experience and consciousness. If the "theoretical" task of the philosophy of religion is to cognize God and religion, then its "practical" task is that of addressing the profound conflict that has developed in the modern world between the sacred and the secular. This is what is taken up in the longest section of the *Introduction,* Sec. 3 (n. 28). While Hegel's primary concern is to analyze this conflict or opposition, the analysis also contains an implicit criticism of the prevailing

theological tendencies of the Enlightenment and its aftermath—deism, rationalism, pietism—which in Hegel's view utterly failed to heal the conflict. The conflict comes down, finally, to an opposition between religion and scientific cognition (Sec. 4): religion tends to withdraw into the realm of the noncognitive, i.e., feeling, intuition, piety, "faith." This is the "discord of our time," which it is the task of speculative philosophy of religion to heal (n. 58). The theologians cannot heal it since, in defending themselves against the onslaughts of science and criticism, they have given up all content in religion: they are like blind men, able to describe everything about a painting but the picture itself. The *Introduction* concludes with a brief "division of the subject" (Sec. 5), which offers not so much a survey of the ensuing parts of the lecture as a summary of the moments of the concept of religion, which serve as the speculative basis of the "division" (n. 71).

b. The 1824 Lectures

Following the Preface, the 1824 lectures introduce a new Sec. 1 (see 1824 *Intro.*, n. 5), which is concerned to define the subject matter of this "new" discipline (n. 7): its content is not just God as such but *religion*. However, "God" and "religion" are intimately associated. (Here Hegel draws into the 1824 *Introduction* a theme already set forth in Sec. A of the *Ms. Concept*.) Therefore the idea of God is also the concern of the philosophy of religion. But the idea of God is the "result" of the whole of philosophy that precedes the philosophy of religion, and is given to the latter discipline as a kind of presupposition—to be considered now, however, not as an abstract but as an utterly concrete idea, as infinitely appearing *spirit*.

In Sec. 2 (n. 25) Hegel develops more explicitly the polemic against the theological and philosophical views of his time that is already implicit in Sec. 3 of the *Ms. Introduction*. Although his target is ostensibly rationalist theology and historicist theology, it is evident that the real polemic is being increasingly directed against Schleiermacher (nn. 34, 35). After a brief interlude on the relationship of the philosophy of religion to positive religion (Sec. 3, n. 37), Hegel abruptly returns to the conflict with prevailing philosophical and theological views. In Sec. 4 he takes this up under the

theme of certain "preliminary questions" (n. 45) that seemingly must be disposed of before philosophy of religion can turn to its proper object, namely, religion as such and religious knowledge of God. After briefly treating the matter of double truth (faith versus reason), Hegel focuses on two positions to which he is diametrically opposed—the view that reason is limited to objects of sense experience, and that the objects of reason cannot be known as they are in themselves but only as they appear; and the view that religion has its proper domain in the realm of feeling. The two views share in common the conviction that God cannot be known cognitively. The first view is preeminently represented by Kant (n. 51), the second by Schleiermacher (n. 52); Jacobi combines the two in an especially unconvincing fashion (see 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27). But these preliminary questions must finally be set aside. They all assume that we must first investigate reason and establish its cognitive capacity (or incapacity) before proceeding to cognition. But the only way to investigate reason is to engage in the act of thinking, just as the only way to learn to swim is to go into the water. Thus the philosophy of religion has to start, not with an epistemological or experiential or affective prolegomenon, but with its own true and proper object, which is the object of religion, *God*. But because God is essentially rational, is rationality itself in the form of vitality and self-relating spirit, by starting with God we are also starting with reason, and the cognition of reason is not a prolegomenon but engagement with the subject matter itself. Religion is precisely the relationship of finite spirit to infinite spirit that is engendered by infinite spirit's self-knowing. Here we are brought to the brink of the speculative insight. But its insertion into the *Introduction* at this point disrupts Hegel's original plan for three parts: the relationship of the philosophy of religion to the whole of philosophy, its position vis-à-vis the needs of our time, and its relationship to positive religion. The third part was cut short by Hegel's preoccupation with the challenge to religious cognition and religious content offered by Schleiermacher's theology of feeling, which he now fully engages for the first time.

This engagement appears to have represented a kind of break-

through for Hegel to the properly speculative conception and treatment of the subject. In the "survey of the stages of our discussion" offered in Sec. 5, the mature systematic presentation of the whole of the philosophy of religion is articulated (n. 64), even though the actual execution of the first part, the *Concept of Religion*, in 1824 does not conform to the structure here envisioned. It should be noted that in 1824 as in 1821 the several proofs of the existence of God are associated with determinate stages of religious consciousness and therefore with the concept of God present in different historical religions (n. 72).

c. The 1827 Lectures

At the outset Hegel states that he will consider two topics: the relation of the philosophy of religion to the whole of philosophy, and the relationship of the science (or philosophy) of religion to the needs of our time. These two headings are obviously derived from the 1824 lectures, which is not surprising since Hegel was using the Griesheim transcript of 1824 as a partial basis of the 1827 lectures (see 1827 *Intro.*, n. 1). But as he proceeds, he departs considerably from this basis. As in 1824, Hegel's concern in Sec. 1 is to establish the appropriate subject matter for the discipline of philosophy of religion. He does so, however, not by showing that "God" is coimplicated in "religion," and that the idea of God is the result of the whole of philosophy preceding philosophy of religion. Rather, the argument now is that philosophy and religion have one and the same object, namely, "the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God." Hence we have given this section a heading different from the one indicated by Hegel. Religion and philosophy coincide in one, each is "the service of God" in a way peculiar to it. This linkage is deeply rooted in the theological tradition, starting with the church fathers (the Alexandrines in particular) and reaching a high point in the Middle Ages (Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas). We should note that a deeper appreciation of the Catholic tradition (as preserving speculative truth over against Protestant subjectivism) is characteristic of the 1827

lectures at several points. This section as a whole is new, having been worked out in detail in one of the miscellaneous papers (n. 6); but it draws upon fragments found in earlier lectures (the *Ms.* Preface, parts of Sec. 3 of the 1824 *Introduction*).

Sec. 2, "The Relationship of the Science of Religion to the Needs of Our Time," is the longest of the 1827 *Introduction.* It is not clearly organized, and, as we suggest in n. 11, it is something of a grab bag of themes taken over and highlighted from the corresponding Sec. 2 of 1824, in part also from Sec. 4 of the latter (for a summary of its contents, see n. 11). The battle with Schleiermacher is no longer so hot and fresh. Rather a new theological challenge is appearing on the scene, potentially a more bitter rival to speculative philosophy than rationalism and the theology of feeling had been, namely, neopietism combined with Oriental studies in the writings of F. A. G. Tholuck (n. 17). Tholuck dismissed the doctrine of the Trinity as foundational to Christian faith since it derives from Greek, Islamic, and Oriental speculation; for Hegel, by contrast, it is "the fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion." Hegel's defense of the doctrines of the Incarnation and Trinity is more prominent in the last two lectures, possibly because the philosophy of religion has now taken on a strictly logical structure, corresponding to the three moments of the self-mediation of the concept of God. The Trinity is the representational expression of the fundamental structure of actuality itself.

Sec. 3, the "Survey of Our Subject," is longer and more detailed in the 1827 lectures than in the earlier series (n. 61). The systematic structure of the subject is now clearly in view for Hegel, and he lays it out with precision. Prior to the detailed survey, he offers a speculative description of the moments of the concept of religion—self-identity, self-differentiation, self-return—which serve as the logical, rational basis for the actual historical appearance of the religions and the division of the subject into three parts. This description bears some similarities to the summary of the moments of the concept of religion at the end of the *Introduction* in the *Ms.*, and it could be one of the few points where the 1827 lectures go back to the *Ms.*, not to *G*. If so, this simply reinforces the evident


fact that Hegel did not suddenly discover the speculative, logical basis for the science of religion in 1827; it was already present in 1821 but had not yet been worked out in a formally satisfactory way.


d. The 1831 Lectures

Strauss's synopsis of the *Introduction* in the 1831 lectures is quite brief, and we cannot be confident that he has given a complete or balanced picture of it. It is evident that Hegel began the lectures once again with the rhetorical flourishes constituting the Preface (Strauss's first paragraph). However, Strauss's second paragraph seems to collapse Secs. 1 and 2 of the 1827 lectures into a single unit, concerned generally with the relations between philosophy, religion, and theology (see 1831 *Excerpts,* n. 2). Philosophy and religion have the same object, God, although today it is customary to oppose theology and philosophy. Theology is represented as being divided into two camps, rationalism and supernaturalism, both of which have relegated basic dogmas such as the Trinity to the background; here speculative philosophy can perform the service of protecting and interpreting these doctrines once provided by theologians. Philosophy can also agree to the coupling of God-consciousness and self-consciousness, as maintained by faith and piety, insisting only that this must be verified rationally, not just affectively. Hegel's temper seems to be more irenic, as though he were seeking an accommodation of sorts with his opponents—but this could be an entirely misleading impression, resulting from what Strauss selected to excerpt.

The excerpts provide much fuller detail on the "division of the subject." We have seen that already in 1827 the survey was much enlarged, and this trajectory might have been carried even further in 1831; but on the other hand it would be understandable if Strauss had regarded the outline of the entire lecture series of special importance and had focused attention on it. As in 1827, the speculative description of the moments of the concept of religion precedes the actual survey as its foundation. The striking changes in the ar-

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S "INTRODUCTION"*





*Solid lines designate direct dependence on an earlier lecture series. Broken lines designate thematic similarities but no direct dependence.

**Reconstruction based on the Strauss excerpts; therefore not certain.

***The 1824 *Concept* does not actually conform to this structure until the last section.

rangement of Part II, *Determinate Religion,* have already been mentioned above in Sec. 4.a of the Editorial Introduction (see also n. 3 of the text), and will be examined in detail in the Introduction to volume 2.

8. The Structure and Development of "The Concept of Religion"

a. The Manuscript

Hegel originally intended only a twofold division of *The Concept of Religion* (see *Ms. Concept,* n. 1), the second part of which was to take up the matter already alluded to in the *Introduction* (Sec. 2), namely, the speculative demonstration of the *necessity* of the religious standpoint, whose existence must in the first instance be presupposed by philosophy; this was to be a "proof" of *religion,* not of God. In process of elaboration, the two sections grew to four.

The first section (Sec. A) was intended to provide a foundation for the demonstration in the sense of offering a preliminary description of religion and a derivation of its concept from its appearance in religious representation (n. 2). There are two main themes. The first is that religion is composed of two essential moments or elements, the objective side, which is God, and the subjective side, which is human consciousness. Religion consists essentially of the *relationship* between the two. The object sets itself into relationship and is not to be known simply abstractly; this is what it means to say that God is *spirit.* The subjective side does not merely remain locked into subjectivity but, in authentically religious experience, is "elevated" or "passes over" to the object. This is what happens in the actual observances and practices of religion, or *cultus,* and Hegel here offers the only discussion of the cultus to be provided in Part I of the *Ms.* In the later lectures, the discussion of the cultus is transferred to the very end, while in the 1824 lectures the cothematization of "God" and "religion" is drawn forward into the *Introduction.* The second main theme, beginning with the last paragraph of *Ms.* sheet 14b, is that the concept of religion appears and develops in the history of religion—seemingly

in contingent fashion, although "scientific" comprehension will grasp the meaning and rationality of this development, and thus be "reconciled" to it (n. 37).

The next two sections (Secs. B and C) should be read as constituting a single sustained, though complex, argument; it is clear that Hegel himself intended it thus, although he himself divided the one section into two. The scientific (or speculative) conception of the religous standpoint entails demonstrating its *internal* necessity by showing how finite consciousness raises itself to religion through an inward teleology. Internal necessity must be distinguished from *external* (Sec. B.1), which regards religion in functional terms as a means, as useful or expedient in the achieving of some end other than religion itself, whether it be ethical, political, or personal (n. 47). Having disposed of external necessity, Hegel discovers that he cannot proceed with the matter of internal necessity and its demonstration without first having an adequate definition of religion with which to work, a definition that recognizes that religion itself entails a process of "looking away," "rising above," and "passing over" from the finite to the infinite, and thus is not something posited by us but is an action of the object of religion itself (n. 54). At this point he inserts a special sheet, 14a-b (Sec. B.2, nn. 55, 57), which elaborates this speculative definition of religion, "speculative" because it grasps the unity of our consciousness *of* the absolute with the absolute's *self*-consciousness as "the absolutely self-determining true that has being in and for itself." Upon returning to the main text (Sec. B.3), Hegel further elaborates this speculative definition under the twin themes of "absolute universality" (thought, devotion) and "absolute singularity" (feeling, sensibility), which together constitute the religious relationship and the religious subject (n. 61). Here for the first time he introduces categories that will be of central importance for the depiction of religious consciousness in the later lectures.

On the basis of this definition, Hegel returns to the task of demonstrating the internal necessity of religion in Sec. C (n. 99). "Necessity" has to do with derivation from something other, in this case the finite world. The task is to trace phenomenologically the

movement of the natural and spiritual worlds as they return of themselves to the source of their truth in the absolute. This is the task of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (nn. 119, 120). But when we arrive at the goal, we discover that what appears to be the result is actually the foundation of the entire process, namely, the dialectic of differentiation and return that constitutes the divine life. The rise of finite consciousness to the absolute is at the same time the return of absolute consciousness to itself. The ultimate demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint is that religion does not merely *follow* from the natural-spiritual world but is its *truth,* its foundation. In *Hn* (or possibly *MiscP*), this "speculative reversal" is described metaphorically as "a stream *flowing in opposite directions,* leading forward to the other, but at the same time working backward, so that what appears to be the *last,* founded on what precedes, appears rather to be the *first*—the foundation" (n. 115).

Precisely why Hegel continued on into the fourth section (Sec. D) of the *Ms.* after attaining these speculative heights and thus fulfilling his initial objective of "proving" religion is unclear (n. 128). It appears that the religious standpoint is a *universal* standpoint, common to art, religion, and philosophy, and that part of the definition of the concept of religion is to establish its relationship to these three realms of absolute consciousness. If so, this is an agenda inherited from Hegel's earlier treatments of religion in the *Phenomenology* and *Encyclopedia.* But unlike these earlier works, Hegel does not at this point discuss Oriental religion, Greek religion, and Christian religion, but rather launches into an analysis of the forms of religious consciousness correlated to these forms of absolute spirit, namely intuition, representation, and thought. Some of this material found its way into the later lectures, but not in the rich, complex, and suggestive form in which it is presented in the *Ms.*

b. The 1824 Lectures

These lectures are of particular interest because they represent a transition from Hegel's first attempt at working out his treatment of the "concept of religion" in the *Ms.* to his mature systematization that is fully attained only in the 1827 lectures. Out of the exigency

of finding an alternative to the Schleiermacherian grounding of religion in feeling, Hegel achieved in 1824 a creative breakthrough to an adequate formulation of the speculative definition of the concept of religion—a formulation that eluded him in the *Ms.* although the insight was already present. But he arrived at it only at the end of a lengthy critique of inadequate understandings of religious consciousness, and the discovery came too late to permit an actual structuring of the 1824 *Concept* according to this formulation. So the 1824 lectures remain fluid and transitional, but just for that reason also vital and interesting.

Hegel begins with what apparently was originally intended only as an introduction to the main body of the presentation, analogous to Sec. A of the *Ms.* But the introduction grew to such proportions, despite his insistence at the outset that the matter was not worth a great deal of attention (see 1824 *Concept,* n. 3), that it consumed nearly three-fifths of the whole of Part I of the lectures. It was a classic instance of scarcely getting beyond the introduction before having to conclude. But the time was not wasted, and the material is rich and suggestive. For in this "introduction" Hegel sets out to show that the "empirical approach," which starts with religion as it is given in immediate experience, and which limits itself to finite categories of consciousness, can never arrive at what is distinctively religious, namely the *relationship* of finite and infinite spirit. This is not to say that immediate experience is irrelevant. On the contrary, it represents the beginning of all knowledge—but it is only the beginning of knowledge, not the totality of it. Religion finally is not merely an empirical reality, something that can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of sense-based experience or immediate self-consciousness; rather it is a "speculative" reality because it is a "mirroring" (*speculum*) of the absolute precisely in the religious relationship to the absolute, precisely in the feeling and consciousness of the absolute. Therefore religion can be properly or adequately grasped only speculatively, not empirically. This is what Hegel finds lacking in Schleiermacher.

Hegel's method in this first section on "Empirical Observation" (Sec. A) is not itself empirical. Rather he offers what might be described as a phenomenology of the empirical approach, viewing

religion as it appears to empirical consciousness, showing how this point of view arrives at its own limits and must be transcended. The point of view from which the phenomenology is carried out is already speculative; it proceeds within "speculative brackets." Thus in 1827 these materials could be transposed into Sec. B, which would describe the knowledge of God in terms of the second moment of the divine self-mediation, the moment of differentiation or consciousness. And these materials represent a quite thorough revision of the discussion of the religious relationship already undertaken from the speculative standpoint in Sec. B.3 of the *Ms.* The stages of religious consciousness traced in this section are immediate knowledge (the "faith" or "certainty" that God *is*), feeling (n. 20), reflection (in the form of understanding and representation), and finally reason or thought. We cannot do justice to the wealth of content in this brief summary. But we do wish to clarify the rather confusing form of presentation in Secs. A.3 and A.4 (nn. 35, 49). The two sections constitute a single argument. Empirical observation knows that, although God and myself *appear* to be undividedly one in feeling, in fact religious consciousness "in more determinate form" is aware of the antithesis between myself as a finite, feeling, particular subject and God as the infinite, independent, universal object. It is these distinct elements that constitute the religious relationship. But how is such a relationship between the finite and the infinite possible? From the point of view of empirical observation, only two options appear to be possible: either God remains what is totally other and beyond, the negation of finitude, of which I can have no cognitive knowledge; or finitude itself is what is exhaustively real and good, existing solely for itself. Finitude is related either *negatively* to God or *affirmatively* to itself; it cannot be related *affirmatively* to God. Finitude attempts to bridge this gulf in the form of "reflective" knowledge, which appears philosophically as "understanding" and religiously as "representation," but from this point of view the infinite remains either an incomprehensible beyond or a mere projection of the finite. Only from the point of view of reason or thought is it possible to conceive the infinite as that which "overreaches" the finite, both encompassing and transcending it as an "affirmative infinitude." Here the

perspective shifts from finite consciousness to the infinite self-mediation of spirit. There is no way of "passing over" from the finite to the true infinite unless the infinite itself constitutes the passage; but this is already the speculative insight.

The first two parts of Sec. B, "The Speculative Concept of Religion," are transitional in character and draw upon material from Secs. B.2 and C of the *Ms.* (n. 117). In Sec. B.1 Hegel offers his most complete definition of religion as "the *self*-consciousness of *absolute* spirit," mediated in and through finite consciousness. Thus "religion is not the affair of the single human being; rather it is essentially the highest determination of the absolute idea itself" (see not only the main text for this section but also the variant in *Ho*, n. 120). Philosophy requires that the necessity of this definition be *demonstrated*, and Hegel turns to this task in Sec. B.2, drawing rather directly upon Sec. C of the *Ms.* and arriving at the same conclusion, namely, that absolute truth cannot be the "result" of a demonstration but is "what is purely and simply first, unique." Therefore absolute spirit develops a "counterthrust," so to speak, against the teleological thrust of finite spirit and shows itself to be "the first and alone true."

We are ready at long last to pass on to an *exposition* of the concept of religion. This is really the proper subject matter of Part II of the lectures, but, with only a small portion of the allotted time left for its treatment, the whole of what remains is condensed into a single section, Sec. B.3 (n. 131). If the concept of religion is absolute spirit in its self-mediation, then we can expect that religion will reflect the development or self-realization of absolute spirit in the three moments of its substantial self-unity, its self-differentiation, and its self-reaffirmation or return to self. These moments of the life of the eternal *God* are definitive of the moments of *religion*: the abstract concept of God (God as abstract, universal, self-identical substance—an idea present in some form in all religions), religious consciousness or the knowledge of God, and religious practice or cultus (participation in the being of God). Finally, *philosophy of religion* must also be structured according to these moments. The second and third constitute what Hegel calls the theoretical and practical religious relationships, and the remainder

of the 1824 *Concept* is devoted to an exposition of these two relationships. Actually the first *relationship* encompasses the first *two moments*—the substantial, unitary God and differentiated human consciousness—and in the 1824 lectures Hegel does not treat the abstract concept of God as a separate theme (nn. 133, 136). Nor in Sec. B.3.a does he discuss the various forms of the knowledge of God since he has already treated them in Sec. A. Rather he offers a survey of different modalities of the "appearance" of God in the history of religion, from nature religion to the consummate religion, adapting and expanding some themes from Sec. A of the *Ms.* (n. 137). And in Sec. B.3.b he offers a kind of phenomenological history of the cultus in its various determinate forms, as well as considering "faith" as the characteristic activity of the cultus, and even throwing in a brief response to the charge of "pantheism"—an emerging issue, just on the horizon in 1824 (n. 146). Thus the transitional character of the 1824 lectures remains evident to the end.

c. The 1827 Lectures

In the third lecture series, Hegel begins at a point corresponding to the third and last section of the 1824 series, that is, with an exposition of the realization of the concept of religion in its three moments, which correspond to the moments of the self-explication of the concept of God (see 1827 *Concept,* n. 6). All preliminaries have been dispensed with other than a brief discussion of the problem of securing a beginning, in which there are discernible traces of the proof of the necessity of the religious standpoint from Sec. B.2 of the 1824 *Concept,* and of the relation of the philosophy of religion to the whole of philosophy from Sec. 1 of the 1824 *Introduction.*

Sec. A, "The Concept of God," has no parallel in the earlier lectures since Hegel now addresses this topic for the first time within the framework of Part I. The God that appears as the "result" of the whole of philosophy is an abstraction—abstract, universal, self-identical substance, "the self-enclosed." The alleged advocacy of such a God by "identity-philosophy" has led to the charge of "Spinozism" or "pantheism" (nn. 11, 18). Hegel encountered such charges directed against his own philosophy for the first time in

the mid-1820s (n. 20), and he took the occasion of this new section of the *Concept* to refute them. In the first place, he argues, God's substantiality does not exclude God's subjectivity or spirituality. Not only is substance merely one moment, the first, in the definition of God as spirit; even in this first moment, the divine universality is not an undifferentiated monad but an "abiding unity," which includes distinctions within itself (n. 16). In the second place, no serious philosophy has ever simply identified God with everything that is. Authentic pantheism (whether Spinozistic or Oriental) identified God with the *essence,* the *universal power,* that is in all things, not with things as such. Since this essence is what, philosophically speaking, is actual or real, the world in the strict sense has no "actuality," although it does of course "exist." The tendency of Spinoza's philosophy is toward acosmism rather than atheism (nn. 27, 28), since above all it is the actuality of God that is affirmed by this philosophy rather than the actuality of the world. Those who accuse Spinoza (and Hegel) of "atheism" merely prove that they are unable to liberate themselves from finitude (since for them the "actual" must be the empirical), nor are they able to understand that the whole of philosophy is "a study of the definition of unity," i.e., of identity in difference.

Sec. B, "The Knowledge of God," is quite lengthy. Into it Hegel incorporates and systematically arranges a large body of material treating the various forms of religious consciousness—immediate knowledge (faith), feeling, representation, thought—inherited primarily from Sec. A of the 1824 lectures and Sec. B.3 of the *Ms.* The theme of religious knowledge corresponds to the second moment of the divine life, namely differentiation or distinction, which is the precondition of relationship. A God who is known and represented in the world is a concrete, differentiated God, not an abstract God. While there is considerable duplication of the 1824 lectures at this point, the material is more clearly organized. Feeling and representation are understood as *forms* or *modalities* of the immediate knowledge of faith (n. 49). Only representation can make judgments as to the *content* of what is known, but it does so imagistically or reflectively and thus is driven on to thought (n. 75).

The section on thought is unusually full, and in the third part

of it, on "Religious Knowledge as Elevation to God" (Sec. B.4.c), Hegel introduces another of his surprising innovations. Since thought must concern itself with the objectivity or reality-status of what is known, its primary task with reference to God is to demonstrate the necessity of God's "existence," a demonstration that constitutes the cognitive dimension of the religious "elevation to God" (n. 109). Philosophy of religion must concern itself not only with the proof of religion (the necessity of the religious standpoint) but also with the proof of God. In the 1827 lectures, Hegel brings his treatment of the various proofs—cosmological, teleological, and ontological, which in earlier lectures were considered in relation to the specific religions—together into the *Concept* at this point (n. 133). One can only hypothesize as to his reasons for doing so. The proofs clearly have a greater impact when they are considered together and shown to be intrinsic to the cognitive relationship to God. Perhaps this is partly Hegel's attempt to refute the charge of atheism directed against himself, perhaps also partly his attempt to repulse the *threat* of atheism that he rightly sensed to be just below the surface of the modern bourgeois-secular world. Hegel seems to have been preoccupied with the question of the reality-status of God during his last years in Berlin; he gave separate lectures on the proofs of the existence of God in the summer of 1829 and was preparing them for publication when he died in 1831. In his presentation Hegel is concerned among other things to overcome two sorts of "distortion" that are present in traditional versions of the proofs: the distortion that God "exists" like other finite entities (n. 111), and the distortion that finitude is the ground from which God's being could be demonstrated as a result (n. 132). The insight of the ontological proof is that the "elevation" to God is not an autonomous self-elevation of finite spirit into what could only be a spurious infinite, but, speculatively expressed, the return of true and infinite spirit to itself. The only genuine proof of the reality of God is God's self-proof.

The 1827 "Cultus" (Sec. C) is much abbreviated by contrast with that of 1824 (n. 169). It eliminates the historical survey, focusing instead on the essential elements of cultus, all of which are


rooted in the act of "enjoyment" or "partaking" (*Genuss,* n. 174) in God, both a sensible partaking and a higher, "mystical" partaking. The elements are devotion (not mere faith but an immersion in the spirit of God), the sacraments and sacrifice (elevation through negation sensibly accomplished), and the inward renunciation of oneself in repentance and purity of heart. When the latter is properly "cultivated," it becomes the basis of "ethical life," which is "the most genuine cultus." This hinted connection between the religio-cultic and the ethico-political is developed only in the last lectures, those of 1831.


d. The 1831 Lectures

The basic organization of the *Concept of Religion* in the last lecture series is similar to that of 1827, but interesting variations are introduced nonetheless. If Strauss can be relied upon, the central theme of Sec. A is the relationship between the concept of religion and the concept of God, which means that a proof of the existence of God takes the form of a demonstration of the necessity of religion. Both of these are matters that have been discussed in various places in the earlier lectures (see 1831 *Excerpts,* n. 4). The defense against the charge of pantheism and atheism that occupied so much of Sec. A of the 1827 *Concept* is lacking completely, replaced, so it seems, by a discussion of thought as the soil of religion and of absolute spirit's self-knowing in and through the knowing of finite spirit: "God knows himself in spirit, and spirit knows itself in God."

Sec. B is not oriented to the theme of the knowledge of God, with the focus on representation and thought, as in 1827, but rather to "the single forms of religion," namely, feeling, representation, and faith (n. 5). Rather than being the most primitive form, associated with immediate knowledge, faith now appears to be the highest before arriving at the speculative thinking of philosophy. Feeling and representation *issue* in faith rather than being *forms* or *modalities* of faith (n. 6). Hegel first considers the *grounds* of faith, the question whether it derives from outer authority or inner witness of the spirit, revising material that first appeared in Sec. B.3.b of

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF "THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION"*





*Solid lines designate direct dependence on an earlier lecture series. Broken lines designate thematic similarities but no direct dependence.

**Reconstruction based on the Strauss excerpts; therefore not certain.

the 1824 *Concept* and Sec. D.2 of the *Ms.* He then considers several relationships of faith: to the inner essence of the believer, to determinate modifications of spirit, to historical foundations, and to thought. Thought itself is seemingly not discussed in this section, and the lengthy treatment of the proofs of the existence of God is once again returned to the various determinate religions, as the division of the subject for the 1831 lectures already indicates.

Sec. C, the cultus, seems to be organized much as it was in 1827, although, if Strauss's excerpts are a reliable guide, it is considerably longer in proportion to other parts of the *Concept.* Hegel's central theme is that the cultus involves the conscious actualization of the reconciliation already implicitly accomplished within divinity, and therefore an overcoming in practice of the natural and spiritual cleavage that has arisen as the result of evil.

The most significant innovation in the 1831 *Concept* is the introduction of a new section on the relationship of religion to the state (Sec. D). Fortunately we have this not only in Strauss's excerpted version but also in the full text provided by W_2, printed on pp. 451–460 (see *Religion and State,* n. 1). Hegel was especially interested in recent political developments in France and Great Britain, namely, the July Revolution of 1830 and the introduction of the Reform Bill into Parliament in 1831, and his last published writing was an essay on the Reform Bill and its implications for English democracy. In the philosophy-of-religion lectures he wants to show both that ethical life is the most genuine cultus, i.e., the true service of God, and that religion is the true foundation of the state. But only a religion that recognizes that human beings are free in and through God is capable of founding the state, because what a people realizes in a state is precisely the consciousness of its freedom. The laws or principles of a state derive from God, but that is to say that they are laws of freedom, and freedom has its truth in religion. An unfree religion and an unfree state are perversions of the truth; that is what concerned Hegel about the recent developments in France and Great Britain. It is of great importance to work out a proper understanding of the relation between religion and the state. Medieval Catholicism set religion at odds with the

state by demanding "holiness" (celibacy, poverty, obedience) rather than "ethical life" (marriage, work, rational freedom). Protestantism affirmed ethical life and sanctified it, but tended to espouse an abstract freedom and equality, not attending to the political structures that would maximize freedom concretely despite the inequality of function necessarily introduced by organizational relationships. Religion and constitution, inner conviction and external law, must be unified in ways that thus far have been only dimly imagined.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION 3

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

[2a]
[Preface]
Gentlemen![1]

The object of these lectures is the philosophy of religion, which in general[2] has the same purpose as the earlier type of metaphysical science, which was called *theologia naturalis*.[3] This term included everything that could be known of God by reason alone, as distinct from a positive, revealed religion, a religion that is known from some source other than reason. The object of religion itself is the highest, the absolute,[4] that which is absolutely true or the truth itself. This is the region in which all the riddles of the world, all contradictions of thought, are resolved, and all griefs are healed, the region of eternal truth and eternal peace, of absolute satisfaction, of truth itself.

1. [*Ed.*] Hegel's sheet 2a lacks any headings and simply begins with the word "Gentlemen!" The prefatory remarks are the only part of the *Introduction* from the *Ms.* repeated without much change in 1824 and 1827. The opening paragraphs of W_2 also parallel the *Ms.* but with some variations, resulting from the interweaving of 1824 and 1827 materials.

2. *Ms. adds:* [on] the whole

3. [*Ed.*] In the school philosophy of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, natural theology was considered a philosophical discipline. Hegel was familiar with it primarily in its Leibnizian-Wolffian form, according to which the third and final part of *metaphysica specialis*, following rational psychology and cosmology, was *theologia naturalis*. Wolff defined it as "the science of what is possible through God, i.e., of what is in God, and of what can be known through what is in God." See Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata*, Part I, § 1. See also A. G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§ 800, 802.

4. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(a) Object. (b) Purpose of the philosophy of religion – on both in preliminary fashion this first hour⟩

Consciousness or thought is what distinguishes human beings from the animals. All that proceeds from thought—all the distinctions of the arts and sciences and of the endless interweavings of human relationships, habits and customs, activities, skills, and enjoyments[5]—find their ultimate center in the *one* thought of *God*. God is the beginning of all things and the end of all things; [everything] starts from God and returns to God. God is the one and only object of philosophy. [Its concern is] to occupy itself with God, to apprehend everything in him, to lead everything back to him, as well as to derive everything particular from God and to justify everything only insofar as it stems from God, is sustained through
4 its relationship with him, lives by his | radiance and has [within itself] the mind of God. Thus philosophy *is* theology, and [one's] occupation with philosophy—or rather *in* philosophy—is of itself the service of God.[6]

This object exists solely through itself and for its own sake. It is something that is ˜absolutely self-sufficient, unconditioned, independent, free, as well as being the supreme end unto itself.˜[7] [8] Occupation with it can have no other end than this object itself. Such occupation is itself the freest activity; ⟨through it spirit [is] liberated⟩; it is the activity in which spirit is disburdened of all finitude and is secured and protected against everything. It [is] occupation [2b] [with] the eternal. We may and must, therefore, contemplate a life in and with the eternal, and to the extent that

5. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[–all] that we value and esteem, everything in terms of which humanity finds its vocation and happiness, and through which its art and science have their pride and glory—all . . .⟩

[*Ed.*] This marginal note was used in 1827.

6. [*Ed.*] *Gottesdienst* is the customary word for "worship," which is a "divine service." In this context the more literal rendering "service of God" seems appropriate since philosophy is the "worship" of God not in a cultic but in a serving sense.

7. W_2 *reads:* In religion, human beings place themselves in relationship to this center, in which all other relationships coalesce, and in so doing they raise themselves to the highest stage of consciousness and into the region that is free from connection with what is other [than itself]—the absolutely sufficient, the unconditioned, that which is free for itself, its own end and purpose.

8. *Ms. adds:* As the object is, so then is . . .

we sense this life and feel it, ⟨this sensation⟩ is the dissolution of everything imperfect and finite. It is the sensation of blessedness, ⟨and nothing else [is to be] understood by blessedness.⟩

⟨Since God is in this way the principle and goal, the truth of each and every deed, initiative, and effort,⟩ all persons have therefore a consciousness of God, or of the absolute substance, as the truth of everything and so also of themselves, of everything that they are and do. They regard this occupation, the knowing and feeling of God as their higher life, as their true dignity, as the Sunday[9] of their lives. Finite purposes, ⟨disgust at⟩ petty interests, the pain of this life, ⟨even if only [in] isolated moments that are themselves unhappy,⟩ the troubles, burdens, and cares of "this bank and shoal of time,"[10] pity and compassion—all this, | like a dream image, 5
seems to float away ⟨into the past like the soul that drinks from the waters of forgetfulness,[11] its other, mortal, nature fading into a mere semblance, which no longer causes it anxiety and on which it is no longer dependent.⟩ As from the highest peak of a mountain, remote from all distinct views of the earthly scene, we look up into the blue sky and from afar peacefully survey all the limitations of the landscape and of the world—so in religion, delivered from the harshness of this actual world, we see it with the spiritual eye only as a floating semblance, which, in this pure region, only mirrors its lights and shades, its contrasts, softened, in the radiance of satisfaction and love, into eternal rest. In this intuition and feeling, we are not concerned with ourselves, with our interests, our vanity, our pride of knowledge and of conduct, but only with the content of it—proclaiming the honor *of God* and manifesting *his* glory.

This is the universal intuition, sensation, consciousness—or what

9. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Sunday: (α) pain – thus finite interests float away; (β) substance of everything; (γ) blessing in [the midst of] concrete life⟩

10. [*Ed.*] *dieser Sandbank der Zeitlichkeit.* Cf. Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, act 1, sc. 7. Hegel apparently quotes from the translation by Joh. Joachim Eschenburg (1779).

11. [*Ed.*] A reference to the underworld river *Lēthē*, the personification of oblivion. The souls of the departed drank of this river and thus forgot all they had said or done in the upper world. This myth is found in many forms, from Plato (*Republic* 10.621a-c) to Dante (*The Divine Comedy*, *Purgatory*, Cantos 30, 33). However, it is not certain that Hegel had any specific form of the myth in mind.

you will—of *religion*. To investigate and become cognizant of its nature is the aim of these lectures.[12] [13] [3a]

[1.] On the [Purpose of the] Philosophy of Religion[14]

I wanted to make this cognitive knowledge [of God and religion] the object of my lectures because, ⟨in the first place,⟩ I believe it has never been so important and so necessary that this cognition should be taken seriously once more. ⟨The special interest and importance of the philosophy of religion for our time lies here.⟩ For
6 the doctrine that we can know nothing of God, that we cannot | cognitively apprehend him, has become in our time a universally acknowledged truth, a settled thing, a kind of prejudice.[15] And anyone who grasps the thought, or tries to, of entering upon the cognition of God, of comprehending his nature in thought, can therefore expect that no one will pay any attention at all, that such a thought is regarded as a long-refuted error, deserving no further attention. The more the cognition of finite things is expanded—and the extension of the sciences has now become almost boundless, all fields of knowledge ⟨having enlarged [their scope] beyond all compass⟩—the more the sphere of the knowledge of God has contracted. There was a time when all ⟨science⟩ was a science of God. It is the distinction of our age, by contrast, to know each and every

12. *Ms. margin:* (The very first thing – to grasp the specific purpose of the philosophy of religion⟩

13. *Ms. margin:* (See special sheet⟩

[*Ed.*] I.e., sheet 3a-b, immediately following.

14. [*Ed.*] This section is contained on a separate sheet, 3a-b, designated by Hegel for insertion at this point (*n.* 13). Although it might be surmised that it was written and used at a later time since it appears on different, smaller paper than the rest of the *Ms.* and was originally out of order, having been inserted before the actual beginning of the lectures, it was probably a part of the original lectures. W_2 reproduces this material with some minor variations and expansions, which most likely derive from the Henning transcript of 1821. This material is not found in its present form in later lectures, although echoes of it occur in the 1824 lectures. The heading "On the Philosophy of Religion" probably refers to the words in the marginal notation on sheet 2b (*n.* 12) and is shorthand for "On the Purpose of the Philosophy of Religion." However, the general character of this heading apparently misled the curator who first numbered the sheets of Hegel's lecture manuscript into concluding that it should be located at the beginning since sheet 2a, where the lectures actually begin, has no heading at all.

thing, indeed to know an infinite mass of objects, but only of God to know nothing. There was a time when [one] cared, was driven indeed, to know God, to fathom his nature—a time when spirit had no peace, and could find none, except in this pursuit, when it felt itself unhappy that it could not satisfy this need,[16] and held all other cognitive interests to be of lesser import. Our age has renounced this need and the efforts to satisfy it; we are done with it. What Tacitus said of the ancient Germans, that they were *securi adversus Deos* [indifferent to the gods],[17] [3b] we have again become with respect to cognition [at least], *securi adversus Deum.* It is no longer a grief to our age that it knows nothing of God; rather it counts as the highest insight that this cognition is not even possible. What the Christian religion (like all religions) proclaims as the supreme, the absolute commandment, "Ye shall know God," is now accounted mere folly. Christ says, "Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect."[18] This lofty demand | is an empty sound to the 7

15. [*Ed.*] Hegel here refers to the widely held view of his time, deriving from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* that human cognition is unable to achieve secure results when it goes beyond the realm of experience, but rather, to the extent that it assumes the existence of the ideas it posits, produces mere "phantoms of the brain" (B 269, B 571). Thus the existence of God is undemonstrable for theoretical knowledge. Together with the doctrine of the *Critique of Practical Reason* that the existence of God may at the same time be assumed as a postulate of practical reason, this led to the view of contemporary philosophy and theology that the existence of God may indeed be *assumed* but not *cognitively apprehended,* and that therefore God is not an object that can be known. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 611 ff.; *Critique of Practical Reason,* pp. 128 ff. (*Werke* 5:124 ff.). These views were popularized by Jacobi; see especially his *Briefe über Spinoza,* pp. 426–427 (*Werke* 4/2:155), and his correspondence with Fichte (*Werke* 3:7). In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:500, 511 (*Werke* 15:635, 646), Hegel refers additionally to Fichte and Bouterwek in this connection. See J. G. Fichte, *Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschrift gegen die Anklage des Atheismus* (Jena, 1799), p. 51 (*Gesamtausgabe* 6:52); and F. Bouterwek, *Apodictik: Festsetzung des Grundes aller Wahrheit und Beweise* (Halle, 1797), p. 212.

16. W_2 *adds:* The spiritual conflicts to which the cognition of God gives rise in the inner life were the highest that spirit knew and experienced within itself.

17. [*Ed.*] Tacitus, *Germania* 46. However, Tacitus was speaking of the Finns, not the Germans, whom he was contrasting with the superstitious Romans. Thus Tacitus meant this expression in a positive sense, as Hegel himself recognized (*Berliner Schriften,* p. 708).

18. [*Ed.*] Matt. 5:48.

wisdom of our time, which has made of God an infinite phantom, far removed from our consciousness, and which likewise [has reduced] human cognition to a vain phantom of finitude, to schemas [that are] the fulfillment of appearance. How, then, are we supposed still to observe this commandment or to attach a meaning to it—"Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect"—if we know nothing of God and of God's perfection? How should this [be] a commandment for us, whose knowledge and will are so limited and oriented throughout only toward appearances,[19] and for whom the truth ˜—and God is the truth—˜[20] is supposed to remain simply a beyond? With respect to its content, we must regard such a point of view as the last step in the degradation of humanity. Yet at the same time humanity is all the more arrogant in that it has proved this degradation to be its supreme achievement, its true definition, and there is only this formal aspect that still has any interest, [namely,] that humanity [has reached] the conclusion through cognition itself [that] its cognition grasps everything else *except* the true. [More will be said] on this later. ⟨This [is] the more specific concern of the science of religion in our time, which has been handed [to us].⟩

I declare such a point of view and such a result to be directly opposed to the whole nature of the Christian religion, according to which we should *know* God *cognitively,* God's nature and essence, and should esteem this cognition above all else. The question whether [we have this cognition] through faith, authority, revelation, or through reason (as it is called) is of no consequence in this connection, since the cognition [associated with the point of view we have described] is as much finished and done with the content that revelation gives us of the divine nature as it is with the rational content.

⟨But it is in the interest of rationality that we have here to consider this standpoint and its wisdom more closely. We shall have to come

19. [*Ed.*] A reference to Kant's argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that we are able to know cognitively appearances only, not things as they are in themselves.

20. W_2 *reads:* and what else, we must ask further, would be worth comprehending if God is incomprehensible?

back, however, to consider it in a more precise way; and we shall then treat it more thoroughly. Let it suffice for the present to have drawn attention to it, and to have explained that these lectures | 8
have rather the purpose of knowing God—doing just the opposite of what it does and of what it holds to be the ultimate achievement.⟩[21] [2b]

[2. The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to Religion]

[22]First of all, the most definite consciousness regarding our aim must [be] this: that the religion present and presupposed in everyone is the stuff that we merely want to comprehend. It is not [for us to] seek to produce this foundation; [4a] rather this is what must already be explicitly present in everyone. ⟨It is not a question of bringing something substantially new and alien into humanity.⟩ That would be like trying to introduce spirit into a dog by letting it see spiritual creations, or eat witty remarks, or chew on printed matter; or like[23] trying to make a blind person see by talking to that person about colors. Those who have never enlarged their hearts ⟨beyond the bustle of finite life,⟩ or looked into the pure aether of the soul with enjoyment, who have not felt the joy and peace of the eternal, ⟨even if only dimly in the form of yearning,⟩ do not possess the stuff that we here speak of. They may perhaps have an image of it, but the content is not their own thing; it is an alien matter they are wrestling with.

It may happen that religion is awakened in the soul through the philosophical cognition of it, and that religious feeling arises in a person thus; but this is not necessary, and it is not itself the

21. *Ms. adds:* First of all we have . . .

[*Ed.*] The text breaks off at the bottom of the sheet and a possible continuation has been lost.

22. *Ms. margin:* ⟨But the more specific introduction to what I have proposed in these lectures requires that first of all I treat in general the relation of the philosophy of religion to religion; [this is its] purpose [?] insofar as it can be accomplished in preliminary fashion . . . and indeed: (α) Relationship of philosophy of religion as [something] belonging to a subject; (β) relationship of knowledge to religion⟩

[*Ed.*] The bottom corner of the *Ms.*, where this marginal notation is located, is missing, and our reading is uncertain at some points.

23. *Ms. reads:* or as little

aim of philosophy—⟨not what is called edification, which is the aim of preaching, directed to the heart, to the singularity of the subject as this one person.⟩ Philosophy does, of course,
9 have to | develop and represent the necessity of religion in and for itself, to comprehend that spirit advances and must advance from the other modes of its willing, imagining, and feeling to this its absolute mode. ⟨[Its] necessity [is] that it is the destiny and the truth of spirit.⟩ But it is a different task to raise the individual subject to this height. The caprice, the perversity, the indolence of individuals may interfere with the necessity of their universal spiritual nature; [they may] deviate from it and try to establish a peculiar standpoint for themselves, and hold to it. The subject can quite simply be evil, for this option too lies within freedom—⟨to slip into the standpoint of opinion, untruth, and laziness, or adopt that standpoint and stick to it knowingly.⟩ The planets, plants, and animals cannot deviate from the necessity of their nature, from the laws of their species, ⟨[i.e.,] from their truth. They become what they ought to be; "is" and "ought" [are] not divided.⟩ But human freedom contains free choice within itself and can sever itself from human necessity and laws; it can work and act against the human vocation. Therefore, even if [philosophical] cognition were to perceive the necessity of the religious standpoint clearly, and even if the will were to experience in actuality the nothingness of its separation, this does not hinder the will's ability to persist in its obstinacy ⟨and to stand apart and at a distance from its own necessity and truth.⟩ [4b]

Anyway, it can happen that religion first dawns in mind and spirit through philosophy, just as the feeling of religion is awakened by and comes by other paths. It is awakened first by the general religious instruction that we receive from our youth [up]. But, as we said, this is not to be represented as a necessity; in regard to any individual, it is not as though cognition | had to verify itself
10 by bringing forth religion in this or that subject. By a shallow style of argumentation one can build an argument against cognition to the effect that this or that person possesses it and yet remains aloof from religion—so cognition is no help, it is not the way and the means to religion.[24] And cognition *will* and *shall* not be this either.

For, as we said, its end is to know and comprehend the religion that already *exists*—and not by so doing to lead this or that person to religion, to make someone religious when that person neither possesses nor wants to possess anything of religion. ⟨Still less should we maintain that cognition is the one essential path to religion. The metaphysical *theologia naturalis* was looked upon as though it ought to achieve this. [But] philosophy must presuppose that the subject [has] got this far by itself.⟩ (More [will be said] later on the precise relationship of cognition to religion.)

In fact, however, no one is so utterly depraved, so lost, so bad, and so wretched as to have no religion at all or to have [no] knowledge or awareness of it—even if it were only to fear it or long for it or hate it.[25] Since we are human beings and not animals, [religion] is not an alien sensation or intuition for us. But what matters is the relationship of *religion* in human beings to *everything else* in their world view, consciousness, cognition, purposes, and interests; this is the relationship that philosophical cognition is concerned with and upon which it essentially works.[26] [27] |

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24. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Blame assigned – this really so intended⟩

25. W_2 *adds:* For even in the latter case one is still inwardly occupied and involved with it.

26. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) Source of the cleavage as opposed to that original impulse toward religion. This brings us closer to our intention. Its mediation, reconciliation – other standpoints – mention and expound the two major standpoints of religion⟩

27. W_2 *adds:* In this relationship resides the source of the cleavage from the original and absolute impulse of spirit toward religion, and here too all the manifold forms of consciousness and their most widely differing connections to the interest of religion have been shaped. Before the philosophy of religion can sum itself up in its own distinctive concept, it must work itself through all those ramifications of the interests of the time that have at present concentrated themselves in the widely extended sphere of religion. At first the movement of the principles of the time still remains outside philosophical insight, but this movement pushes on to the point that it comes into contact, conflict, and antagonism with philosophy. We shall consider this oppostion and its resolution when we have examined the opposition as it still maintains itself outside of philosophy, and have seen it develop until it reaches its consummation, at which point it inwardly involves philosophical cognition.

[*Ed.*] While the first sentence of this passage appears to be an expansion of the marginal note contained in n. 26, the subsequent reference to the "interest of the

[3. Opposition between Religious Consciousness and the Rest of Consciousness][28]

[29]Without philosophical insight, the relationship of religion to the rest of consciousness is such that the two are conceived in isolation from each other. They constitute two kinds of occupation, two regions of consciousness, [5a] between which we pass back and forth only alternately.[30] For our actual worldly doings, we have a number of workdays, during which we are concerned with our particular interests and our worldly goals, ⟨our needs, pleasures, and satisfaction⟩ in general. Then there is Sunday, when all these things are set aside, when we collect ourselves, live for ourselves,

time" and the "principles of the time" (expressions not used in the *Ms.*) suggests the ambience of the 1827 lectures. In W_2 the passage serves as a transition to the first major section division of the Introduction, "The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to Its Presuppositions and to the Principles of the Time." On the other hand the passage is preceded and followed in W_2 by material from the *Ms.* The basis of the passage could be either *Hn* or *MiscP*, editorially reworked to fit the context.

28. [*Ed.*] This constitutes the longest section of the Introduction, in which Hegel describes the opposition that he perceived to have developed in his time between religious consciousness and "the rest" of consciousness, or between religious feeling/disposition and scientific, cognitive knowledge. The expression used throughout this section, *übriges Bewusstsein*, is translated "the rest of consciousness." It refers to that region of consciousness which is "left over" or "remains" (*übrig*) after specifically religious consciousness has been distinguished or removed from it. "The rest of consciousness" includes both our ordinary, everyday way of viewing the world and modern, scientific knowledge, which, in accord with the principles of understanding (*Verstand*) of the Enlightenment, views things in terms of purely immanent relationships and constructs a finite system of the universe in which God is not needed and has no place. Hegel regarded this opposition as unfortunate, but he was also convinced that the prevailing theological attempts to overcome it, by means of either a rational supernaturalism or a theology limited to religious experience, had failed. The former is unscientific, the latter is noncognitive. Only a speculative philosophy of religion can achieve a true reconciliation of cognition and religion (see Sec. 4). Although this section is not repeated as such in the later lectures, the implicit criticism contained within it of the philosophy of understanding of the Enlightenment, the theology of reason (which by means of "argumentation" attempted to explain away contradictions and miracles), and the philosophy and theology of feeling was expanded and reworked in the 1824 and 1827 lectures.

29. *Ms. margin:* ⟨To explain this more precisely⟩

30. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) The aspects of the rest of consciousness filled with contingencies, (β) with finite things⟩

i.e., for our true essence[31] and for the essential higher nature that is within us, released from our absorption in necessary business and labor of every kind. Free from labor and in contemplative mood, we raise ourselves above everyday life. It is the same in scientific activity; ⟨[here] we have so much to know specifically.⟩ The | cognition of nature and its laws, of natural objects, the science 12
of law, and so forth—these are all specific realms of knowledge, essentially different from the science of God, which is itself a peculiar and specific science as against them.

Upon closer inspection this distinction has, in general, a double modification. ⟨Religion appears at first to have the same dignity and recognized status in both modifications, and it is on the other side, that of the rest of life and consciousness, that the distinction emerges. On this account the distinction appears to be quite innocent since it does not [pretend] to affect religion and leaves its dignity and status alone.⟩

(α) The religion of the pious person,[32] i.e., of one who truly deserves to be so called, ⟨involves—like religion in general (suffice it to say for the present)—(αα) an unreflective, uncontested faith in God (whose known image is presupposed), a trust, an obedience without opposition. For example, it is one thing to believe in God or the gods, and quite another to *say*, "*I believe* in God." In the latter there is already reflection, consciousness of an opposite view [to my faith]; now the need for justification, argumentation, polemics, etc., comes in. (ββ) [But the religion of the pious person is] not isolated and thus [is not merely] a faith or trust [occurring] in the human relationship to God;[33]⟩ [it] is not kept in isolation and is not cut off from the rest of one's existence and life but rather breathes its influence over all of one's sensibilities and actions. Pious consciousness refers all purposes and objects to God as their infinite and ultimate source. Every moment of one's finite existence and

31. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Two standpoints of religion that we know – to which our time generally holds and must hold⟩

32. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Goes indifferently and cheerfully about his work – after serving God he serves his own special ends, the unselfconscious life of custom⟩

33. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨(ββ) Not isolated⟩

affairs, of one's suffering and joy, is lifted out of this restricted sphere and thereby produces an image and a sense of one's eternal
13 essence. ⟨In like manner, the rest of one's life and | consciousness remains within the mode of sensation, of trust, of custom, obedience, habit, reflective activity; [one] *is* what circumstances and nature have made of one, and one accepts one's situation, one's life and rights, as they come along: it *is* so. With respect to God, [it is all his] gift, and particular happenings are a fate beyond understanding. They [are] enjoyed thankfully, or [are] offered up to God freely; [they are experienced as] a gift, i.e., [as] arbitrary grace, or as an equally incomprehensible fate.⟩

This relationship does not appear straightaway to involve the sundering of religion from the rest of consciousness; ⟨[it is] only a passing over, only a relinquishing, of that sphere in feeling.⟩ Rather [it involves] the other standpoint—a relationship which, especially from the standpoint of our reflection and culture, can be regarded as occurring frequently—⟨whereby the rest of consciousness is subjugated under that higher region.⟩

(β) [The second modification] appears at first to involve the same sort of relationship, but the contents of its related aspects are maintained in a quite different status. According to what is admitted, religion is still regarded as and pronounced to be supreme, but [with respect to] the real situation, things are [5b] different. ⟨As we said, the distinction emerges from the secular side and at first appears not to affect religion at all. Hence it is from this side that corruption and disunity creep over into religion. The distinction may be briefly described as the development of the free human understanding and human aims. We are accustomed to this distinction (the development of human reason and human aims) because cognition, understanding, and reflection thereby enter into human life,⟩ and because in life and science ⟨reflection⟩ and understanding are awakened and consciousness has become independent. The understanding has willed absolute, firm ends such as right and the state, objects that are to exist in and for [themselves] and for the sake of the understanding. Thus, too, [consciousness] cognizes
14 the laws of nature and the properties, orders, | and characteristics

of natural things and of the products of spirit.[34] Thus research and cognition, like the willing and the actuality of these ends, are a *human work*, a work of the human understanding; it is what *we* have brought forth. ⟨We are not just the ones who know this or have these rights, etc.⟩ We are here in our own property, which we ⟨have not merely received. We do indeed start from what is, from what we find present; but what we make of this through our knowing and willing, that is *our* affair, *our* work, and we are aware that it is our work,⟩ [which we] *ourselves* have produced. These productions, therefore, constitute our honor and glory; they make up a vast and infinite wealth—the world of our insight and knowledge, ⟨of our external possessions, our rights, and our deeds.

Thus spirit has entered into this antithesis—[as yet] naively, without knowing it—but it becomes a conscious antithesis, ¯[with whose] stages and advances we are not here concerned.¯[35] One side [of the antithesis] is that wherein [spirit] knows itself as its own (in its rights and its cognition generally, determining itself from itself independently and autonomously). The other [side is that] in which spirit [recognizes] a higher power and absolute duties, duties without corresponding rights; whatever it receives for [doing] its duties remains merely [a gift of] grace.⟩[36] The religion that we have on this basis is now distinguished from the first region. We restrict cognition and scientific knowledge to that former region, and [only] sensibility and faith are left to the sphere of religion.[37]

¯⟨Cognition, [however,] is conditioned [in its] objects and ends; [it] is also necessarily cognizant of the conditionedness of its knowing and doing—of its dependence in respect of its material upon something external to it. This is where the connection of its two

34. *Ms. canceled:* This cognition can be developed in detail; it treats of what is and is complete on its own account

35. W_2 *reads:* For spirit now moves between two sides, whose distinction has actually developed.

36. W_2 *adds:* On the one side, the autonomy of spirit is the foundation; on the other, it conducts itself humbly, dependently.

37. *Ms. canceled:* In the former, spirit is engaged in knowing itself; from the latter, knowledge is excluded, and may–or may not–remain [merely] general.

autonomous sides with each other comes in."[38] This is [the point at
15 which]⟩ we confess | that everything surely has been created by God—everything that makes up the content of what we know and of what we take into possession and use as means for our own ends, including even spirit and the faculties of spirit, which, as we say, we employ in order to obtain that cognition.

But this concession is immediately cold and lifeless because it lacks just what constitutes the vitality of this consciousness,[39] that in terms of which it is present to itself, knows itself, is conscious of itself—[namely] insight and cognition, the means by which it knows something for itself. It is [also] fruitless because in this separation it stops short at the simple generalization that everything is a work of God. ⟨The reason is that everything determinate and finite belongs to cognition, to humanly self-posited ends.⟩ With the most diverse things—the course of the stars and their laws, elephants, ants, human beings—this reference [to God] consists simply in the single claim that God has created them. This religious reference of particular objects [to God] therefore becomes [6a] very boring;[40] it runs on and on in the same fashion; the repetition becomes burdensome. The matter is disposed of once and for all by the simple admission that everything [has been] made by God, which is self-evident. Then in the course of knowledge and in the pursuance of goals no further thought is given to it. It can begin
16 to look as though the admission | was made just to get rid of the

38. W_2 *reads:* Nevertheless, even the side of autonomy is conditioned in its activity, and its cognition and will must experience this conditionedness. Human beings demand their rights, but whether these rights are actually conceded them is independent of them, and in this respect they depend on an other. In matters of cognition they proceed from the organization and order of nature, which is something given. The content of their sciences is material extraneous to them. Thus the two sides, that of autonomy and of conditionedness, enter into a relationship with one another.

39. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Impatient – likewise tedious – [everything] made [by] God – determinate opposition not recognized⟩

40. [*Ed.*] Hegel has in mind here not only naive religious piety but also the theodicy that justifies things as they are by the repetitious claim that God has created everything. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:340–342 (*Werke* 15: 465–466), Hegel writes: "The result of Leibniz's theodicy is an optimism supported

matter, or perhaps in order to be covered outwardly in this respect. [In short,] the concession may or may not be made seriously.

Piety—the first attitude—is never tired of lifting up its eyes to God on each and every occasion, even though it repeats itself every day and every hour in the same fashion. ˜(For cognition such repetition would be boring because pious sensibility or faith sticks altogether to the singular [occasion]; in every moment it is wholly what it is, without looking backward or forward in reflective comparison. Cognition, on the other hand, essentially makes this comparison and has a consciousness of this unity or uniformity. [In cognition we] must keep [the uniformity] in view.

In this second configuration the expression and the consciousness of this quite general and abstract relation are immediately present. But in the first it is not so expressly contained, and as a result the sundering of religion from the rest of consciousness does not [seem] to take place. Instead, what is most noteworthy seems to be the abiding [of consciousness] in unity precisely because the disjunction between the divine and cognition as self-positing is not [yet] present: [humanity has] not yet eaten of the tree of knowledge. [We shall discuss] the peculiar | mode of separation here present in more 17
detail later in dealing with the particular configurations of [our] religion.

(αα) This much [has been] noted generally [concerning] the thoroughgoing contingency marking the *content* of the determinate consciousness of piety. Pious thoughts [remain] as valid with respect to this [content] as to that; [likewise with] sensations of gratitude. Good and evil destiny (or fortune and misfortune) are dispensations [of providence; one] accepts whatever comes just as it comes (in its singularity, variety, immediacy), without reflecting on it. Even with the most disparate things, one is as good as another. But this appears

on the lame and wearisome thought that God, since a world had to be brought into existence, chose out of infinitely many possible worlds the best possible." Why should this be the case? "When Leibniz answers, 'God made it so,' this is no answer at all. We wish to know the definite reason of this law; such general determinations sound pious, but are not satisfying." Cf. Leibniz, *Theodicy*, I, § 8 (p. 128) (*Philosophische Schriften* 6:107).

more specifically in the)[41] way that this piety considers things in order to make its reflection more thorough, [namely,] by dealing with the structure and arrangement of natural things in terms of their teleological relations, and similarly by regarding every petty incident of individual life, like the great events of history, as proceeding from divine purposes, or as directed by and leading back to them. With respect to the relation to deity, this view does not, therefore, confine itself to a purely general relation to God's creativity and power; rather the divine activity [is] a determinate relation, and the manifold materials of intuition, occurrences, [etc.], ⟨are set in relation to one another, God [being] the one who activates these relations.⟩ A more detailed content comes in: the animals and their environment [are] so constituted that [they can] forage for food, nourish their young, be protected against harm, survive the winter, defend themselves against predators, etc. In human life, [one observes] how through this or [that] apparent accident or misfortune human beings have been led to happiness, whether it be temporal or eternal. [6b] In brief, the act and will of God are here

41. *Ms. first draft in brackets:* These two attitudes have this in common: the relation of God to the other world of consciousness is wholly indefinite and general. The second of these attitudes has indicated this at once in the expression quoted ["God has created all things"]. Pious consideration has thereby made itself more thorough.

W_2 *reads (parallel to second draft):* Here on the other hand, where cognizing and defining on one's own terms are concerned, it is a matter essentially of this comparing and the consciousness of uniformity, and then a general proposition is enunciated once and for all. On the one side the understanding holds sway, while over against it is the religious feeling of dependence. (b) Even piety is not exempt from the fate of falling into a ruptured state. Rather, the rupture is already intrinsically present in it, so that its actual content is only manifold and contingent.

[*Ed.*] The first draft is found in the main text of the *Ms.*, but is replaced by a lengthy marginal addition, which represents a second draft, and which we have given in the main text instead of the first draft. W_2 offers a parallel to the second draft, to which it then attaches the first draft. The reference in W_2 to "the religious feeling of dependence" is an allusion to Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube*, § 9 (see below, 1824 *Concept*, n. 37). Since the first volume of Schleiermacher's work was not published until the end of June 1821, Hegel could not have referred to it at this point in his lectures, and the parallel in W_2 must, therefore, be from a source other than Henning. References to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* are first found in those parts of the *Ms.* written after June 1821, e.g., *Ms.* sheet 69a (see vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*).

viewed in terms of specific activities, natural circumstances, events, etc. Divine activity has a ⟨specific⟩ content.

(ββ) [But the following] is now self-evident. This content itself [is] finite, these ends are contingent; they are picked up momentarily, and likewise they are forgotten again straightaway without rhyme or reason. For example, the | wisdom of God in nature [is] 18
marveled at [because he] armed the beasts with the means both to obtain their food and to defend themselves against their enemies. Teeth, claws, and stings [serve] the survival purposes of individual animals. Bees [have] stings to protect themselves, but these are of no help since a person [can] take sulfur, for example, and kill a whole hive of them. The mouse—a rodent—feeds in order to stay alive, but the cat catches it and eats it. [Some] bushes have thorns, while other plants have no such protection, [but even] where that protection is found the rose still gets plucked. Of course, the fact that the mouse is eaten and the bees are killed also has a purpose, [namely,] the preservation of the cat and human uses; but in this way the former purpose, the preservation of bees,[42] is reduced to a means.

In fact, it is the progress of knowledge that has caused the depreciation and downfall of this external teleological view.[43] To begin with, better cognition at least demands consistency, and it recognizes that purposes of the kind that were taken to be divine (the purposes of God's wisdom) are [actually] subordinate and finite. [They show] themselves to be null and void, [and hence they] cannot be considered by that same observation and experience to be the object of the eternal divine will.

If this way of viewing things is adopted, and its inconsistency thereby ignored, then, because of the inconsistency, it is essentially indeterminate and superficial because—⟨as in pious feeling gener-

42. [*Ed.*] Hegel does not write "mice and bees." This may have simply been an oversight, or there may be a reason for it, namely, a play on the idea of preserving bees. Human beings "preserve" or "keep" bees as a means to a specific human end; the cat does not "preserve" the mouse in this fashion.

43. [*Ed.*] Hegel here alludes to Kant's distinction between relative, external purposiveness and internal purposiveness in the *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 63, 82 (*Werke* 5:366–369, 425).

ally⟩—each and every content (no matter what) can be assimilated under it, [just] as it is. For there is nothing, no arrangement, no event, for which a useful trait could not be pointed out in some direction or other. In general, this[44] is no longer an ingenuous piety of feeling, but rather the piety that begins from the general thought [7a] of a purpose or good and subsumes and rationalizes the present case under it. But with this kind of rationalizing, piety finds itself
19 in the predicament that— | ⟨[in dealing with] immediate existence or phenomena, immediate natural objects or things⟩—however many expediencies and uses it points out, there are just as many inexpediencies and harms that can be held against it. What is beneficial to one is disadvantageous to another and therefore is inexpedient. The preservation of life and of the interests that depend upon existence are at one time advanced, but at another time they are just as much endangered and destroyed.[45] So it is in fact a contingent content that is referred to God, but this—which can just as well [be] or not [be]—is directly inappropriate to the concept of God.[46]

For this much is implicit in the representation of God generally—that he or his ways of acting are universal and necessary. Such inconsistency destroys this universal determination; indeed, one can

44. *Ms. margin:* ⟨comes to consciousness, to cognition⟩

45. W_2 *adds:* Thus it is inwardly disruptive that, contrary to God's eternal mode of activity, finite things are raised to essential ends.

46. *Ms. margin:* ⟨This treatment of expediency before the cognition of the necessary.

The same separation of the material is always found. The consideration of external expediency is the externality of the matter. [When one thing is] useful for another, then it is not an end in itself. [To be] for another is its own reference, its own nature. [The making of] a tree into lumber for building is not part of the nature of the tree. [When] reference [to another is] the proper and immanent nature of the thing referred, identical with its distinctive character, [then this reference] is its necessary character. [This] can be seen as the point of transition [from piety] to the other side.⟩

[*Ed.*] Hegel prefaces this marginal addition with a notation concerning its proper location. However, neither the notation nor the addition itself are keyed to the main text by a reference mark. We have located them at the point to which the initial notation is physically adjacent, but the discussion of the cognition of necessity does not begin until several lines further along in the main text.

make it quite ridiculous. Piety is thus thrown out by its own mode of argument. Once we have begun with thought and the relations of thought, we must above all seek and demand the consistency and necessity that properly belong to it, and set them up against the standpoint of contingency. ⌜⟨[Thought] passes over to | cognition proper, which was previously characterized as a moment of the self, for the ego or thought [is] in general a relation, to be precise, a relating of what is.⟩⌝[47] Cognition ranges over what is and its necessity, as in the relation of cause and effect, of ground and consequent, of force and its expression, and of the generic universal to these singular existences, which precisely are subject to contingency. In this way, cognition (or science) ⟨takes away from them the contingency that they have in their immediacy⟩; it puts the multifarious materials in an immanent relationship with one another;[48] it considers the relationships that the wealth of finite phenomena have to one another, and in this [way] encloses within itself the world of finitude to [constitute] a *system of the universe,*[49] so that cognition has no need of anything for the system that is outside the system itself. [7b]

[50]For what a thing is follows from its perception and observation. We know from experience—from our own intuition, feeling, consciousness, etc., or that of others—what natural things are, what

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47. W_2 *reads:* With this, the principle of the self is at once completely developed. I, as simple and universal, as thought, am relation in general. Since I am for myself as self-consciousness, these relationships should also be for me. To the thoughts and images that I make my own, I give the character that I myself am. I am this simple point, and whatever is for me I will cognize in this unity.

48. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Accordingly as a thing is constituted in this or that fashion, it is related to another⟩

49. [*Ed.*] Hegel may be alluding here to the French Enlightenment, especially to Holbach's *Système de la nature* (London, 1770), and J. B. Robinet's *De la nature,* new ed. (Amsterdam, 1763). Cf. Hegel, *Werke* 15:521. Hegel may not be referring directly to these works but rather to Jacobi's characterization of the cognition that moves from effects back to causes. Cf. Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza,* p. 419 (*Werke* 4/2:149). In fact, Hegel identified Jacobi's description of cognitive "understanding" with the form of it that appeared in the French Enlightenment.

50. *Ms. margin:* ⌜⟨(a) (α) To grasp the determinateness of things [is to grasp] what [they] are – not according to their contingent determinateness but according

the modes of activity of spirit are. Furthermore, we ask where these things come from, what their grounds and causes [are]. Here the question has the sense of an inquiry into their specific particular
21 causes and relations, [while] God as | cause is wholly universal. ⌜[When we inquire into] the cause of lightning, ⟨or of the fall of the Republican constitution in Rome,⟩ or the cause or ground for this or that human law⌝[51]—and of these as effects or consequences—what we want to know is the ground of this [particular] phenomenon, not the ground that answers for everything but exclusively just for this specific thing;[52] and the ground of such a thing [is] such as must be sought and established in the finite sphere only—i.e., a finite ground. Cognition of this kind, therefore, does not transcend, or even desire to transcend, the finite sphere.[53] It is a universe of cognition that does not need God and lies ouside of religion. These cognitions constitute a kingdom of what we call the sciences and special technical knowledge. They are not religion and have nothing directly to do with religion. In them, cognition is dealing with its own relationships and connections; thereby it has all determinate material and content on its side, and nothing whatever is left for the other side, the side of the infinite and the eternal.

to their essential determinateness – whereby they are what they are – their most essential [determinateness is] their most general – plants, quadrupeds, land –

(β) Relation of the determinate as determinate. – Finite things are determined – *therefore in relation to others* – not a contingent but a determinate [relation to] the original cause [from which] they [are] derived.⌝

W_1 reads: From the constitution of things we proceed to their connections in which they stand in relation to an other—not however in a contingent but in a determinate relation, in which they point back to the original cause from which they are derived.

51. *W_2 reads:* Thus it is no longer sufficient to speak of God as the cause of lightning, or of the fall of the Republican constitution in Rome, or of the French Revolution; one soon discovers that the [divine] cause is only an entirely general one and does not yield the desired explanation. With respect to a natural phenomenon or this or that law . . .

52. *Ms. margin:* ⟨A proximate [ground] or a series of proximate [grounds] – an immanent, specific relation – specificity ought also to reside in the relation⟩

53. *W_2 adds:* since it is able to apprehend everything in its finite sphere and is privy to all that happens.

[54]To religion belongs the absolute content—but without any cognition according to this concept of it. This cognition weaves and moves among its relations and connections of cause and effect, of grounds and consequents, which, as we have said, are themselves necessarily determinate. ⟨[It] takes possession of the finite, draws it into | its sphere, finds [it] to be incongruous with the infinite; 22
[this is] just such an infinite as is distinguished from the finite.⟩ All determinate content devolves upon it, and to be cognizant means to become aware of the connectedness and necessity ingredient in the finite. [55]Religion, therefore, shrivels up into simple feeling, [8a] into a contentless elevation of spirit into the eternal, etc., of which, however, it knows nothing and has nothing to say, since any cognizing would be a dragging down of the eternal into this sphere of finite connections.

Consequently, *les sciences exactes*[56] [stand] opposed to religion. These two sides [confront each other as follows: on the side of religion[57]] the heart and mind [are] filled with divine substantial consciousness and sensation, ⟨[with] freedom, self-consciousness,⟩ but without consistency in regard to the determinate, this being, by contrast, contingent; [on the side of cognition] a coherent connectedness of the determinate [prevails], ⟨a familiarity with the finite and with the thought-determinations of this nexus of connections,⟩ a system on its own account but without solid substance, without God. [The religious side has] an absolute content, an absolute totality [with] God ⟨[as its] center. Everything submerged in and related to him, posited only by him, [is] idealism.⟩ [There is] only the positive, but [it is] abstractly positive. [The other side has] a finite content, finite knowledge and consciousness, necessary connections without a midpoint. [The former is] not cognition, [the latter is] cognition.

54. *Ms. margin:* ⟨A kingdom of finite content [over against] the infinite content – (b) The infinite distinct from the finite⟩

55. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(c) A shriveling⟩

56. [*Ed.*] On the general distinction between the exact sciences and religious cognition, Hegel alludes (e.g., in *Encyclopedia* [1830], § 62) to Jacobi. Cf. Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza,* pp. 419–420 (*Werke* 4/2:149–150).

57. [*Ed.*] In this paragraph, the contrast between the two sides is made by repeating α and β several times, which we have replaced by words in brackets.

[4. Need for the Reconciliation of Religion and Cognition][58]

Philosophy of religion [demonstrates] this equation[59]—the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite, the reconciliation of the heart ⟨with religious cognition, of the absolutely substantial feeling with intelligence.⟩[60]

This [is] the need of the philosophy of religion, the necessity of
23 philosophy in general.[61] In this reconciliation there must | be a correspondence to the highest demand of cognition, of the concept and reason. Cognizing or conceiving can surrender nothing: [neither] infinite, substantial certainty, ⟨freedom, [nor,] insofar as anything is definite, the necessity and dependence [of cognition],⟩ [nor] its worth and sublimity, [nor] knowledge, insight, conviction. But the absolute content cannot give anything up either. [God cannot be] drawn down into finitude and delivered to us in a merely sensible or crude form. His majesty consists precisely in the fact that he does not renounce reason, [for then his majesty would be] something irrational, empty, and grudging,[62] not something communicated in spirit and in the highest form and inmost being of spirit.

58. [*Ed.*] Having established the opposition between religious consciousness and the rest of consciousness, or between religion and cognition, in the preceding section, Hegel now describes the need to reconcile the opposing sides. The fundamental task of the philosophy of religion is to achieve this reconciliation. The need for reconciliation is most acutely felt in the Christian religion because it is precisely in this religion that estrangement is most sharply thematized. Christianity also goes further than the other religions in actually achieving reconciliation, although cognition here remains finally at the level of doctrine or *Vorstellung*, and contemporary theology draws back into the realm of feeling. This gives rise to the "discord of our time," which it is the task of the philosophy of religion to resolve. Jacobi's thought in particular was an example or expression of this "discord," and Hegel may have had him especially in view.

59. [*Ed.*] *Ausgleichung.* This term could also be translated "equalization," "accommodation," "settlement," etc.

60. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) The eternal or infinite; (β) determinate in itself. (α) In and for itself; (β) myself, my reflection, self-consciousness, my freedom – absolute objectivity – and subjectivity. (α)⟩

61. *Ms. canceled:* This need is clearer in the Christian religion – law, world, revelation, and then faith – proof.

62. [*Ed.*] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 982b–983a (cf. below, 1827 *Concept,* n. 45).

In the Christian religion this need [for the reconciliation of the two sides] is more directly present perhaps than in the other religions, for [the following reasons]:

(α) It has its very beginning in an absolute cleavage, [and there is felt] need only in cleavage. Pagan religion contains ⟨from the start⟩ a more serene state of reconciliation. The Christian religion is not so serene; [it] awakens the need itself, takes its start from anguish, awakens this anguish, disrupts the natural unity of spirit (i.e., the unity of humanity with nature); [8b] it disturbs natural peace. [This is] the same as original sin: [human being is] evil from the start and has with it, therefore, a negative element in its inmost being. [That] human being is good by nature [is] a doctrine of recent times[63] [that] annuls the Christian religion. Therefore, this cleavage of the subject, of the ego, from the infinite, absolute essence ⟨drives spirit back into itself.⟩ (This reconciliation itself [occurs] in faith, [in] the form of revelation as opposed to reason, and more recently, to cognition.) [From] the standpoint of cognition, purpose is the unification, the reconciling of the two sides.[64]

(β) But [there is] this reconciliation directly in naive faith too, in the sphere of feeling or sensation. Then, later on, consciousness is faith, the holding [of its content] to be true, the knowledge that begins from the | representation that I am other [than what I ought 24
to be]—sinful, remote, estranged. ⟨Spirit [is turned in] upon itself against its immediate natural being.⟩ Christian faith starts from the representation that I am not this, [not] serene like the Greeks; it puts me once more [into] division. [I am] the subject, [and I ask] whether [faith] is actually the case, whether [it is] true.

(γ) This truth of the promise: what is represented [is] true to begin with on the basis of authority. I am transported into an intelligible world, [a world of] cognition: this is the nature of God, ⟨his attributes and modes of activity.⟩ Whether it is so rests on the intuition and assurance of others, [on] confirmation. [The cognition

63. [*Ed.*] See below, 1824 *Concept*, n. 47.

64. [*Ed.*] The reference to purpose *(Zweck)* as the instrument of unification is suggestive of Kant's *Critique of Judgment.*

is] referred to myself; thought, cognition, reason occur precisely within me. My freedom [is] put before my eyes in my sinfulness; my freedom [is] in my thinking: I am on my own. The Christian religion does not merely *say* that I should know; cognition, rather, is part of its very nature. (α) In the Christian religion I am to retain my freedom—indeed, I am to become free in it. In it is the individual, the subject; the welfare of the soul, the salvation of the individual as an individual, not merely of the race, [is] the essential purpose. This subjectivity, this selfhood (not selfishness) is precisely the principle of cognition itself. ⟨(β) At the same time God's essence and nature [are] manifest—the development of his content.⟩ [9a]

Hence the Christian [religion] is essentially doctrine; it offers representations and thoughts. Even if these are *only* representations of God and of his nature and activity, they are, [nonetheless,] representations of the universal content and object, and on this account [they are] immediately thoughts. Since it belongs under the principle of cognition, the Christian religion gives this content in a developed form, and as essentially for representation, but separate from the modes of immediate opinion and intuition and from a simple adherence to intuitions and representations. Having been thus separated, | [doctrine is] not therefore naive but [is] a representation opposed to this natural resting in intuitions and representations appropriate thereto. At the same time it is not merely something subjective but is also an absolute, objective content that is in and for itself, and has the characteristic of truth. [Remember] the distinction already remarked on between my naively holding something to be true and [my holding it] with this characteristic [i.e., as doctrine]. Thus the Christian religion touches the antithesis, the general antithesis, between feeling, the form of immediate intuition, trust, and reflection, knowledge. The two together provide a developed doctrinal system[65] of religious truth, a content of and for cognition. [Christianity] has revealed what God is, so that we now *know* what he is.

The Christian religion, therefore, contains cognition within itself

65. [*Ed.*] *Lehrbegriff.* This term was often used in this sense in seventeenth-century dogmatics.

essentially and has stimulated cognition to develop in all its consistency as form, a world of form, and at the same time to oppose itself to the form in which the Christian content exists as a given[66] truth, only for representation and feeling. ⟨[In the latter form] a contradiction [is found, for here the content exists] not in its necessity, i.e., [as] cognition, and it is not free; yet the content [is] developed in a connected chain of distinct representations, hence [as] necessary thoughts, not thoughtlessly.⟩ This is what the discord of our times rests on. Educated reflection must enter into [the sphere of] religion, but at the same time it finds it unendurable there and becomes impatient with it. Religion, on the other hand, or religious feeling, is distrustful of reflection, or of reason as it is called. [9b] ¯Either reflection leaves religion alone, | putting it to one side, some- 26
thing, as it were, about which one only [wants to keep] the peace, [or[67] it] sticks with inconsistency. Religion does not fit the pattern of the rest of consciousness or the requirements of cognition. Without seriousness of spirit, one can, in inconsistency and thoughtlessness, be satisfied with everything.[68]

(α) [We can] cast ourselves upon feeling with educated reflection, but this is to do violence to oneself, to renounce cognition and rationality. [In this case,] spirit cannot be integrated or maintain its integrity.

(β) Religion [can be] reduced to mere yearning: religion [as a matter of] willing and not-being-capable. Yearning has urges and representations but remains a subjective lack. It does not master this lack, and, without seriousness of spirit, lets itself remain in this inconsistency.

(γ) Or [there can be] indifference toward religion because cognition, the rationality of spirit, is not found in it. [Indifference] lets it remain unsettled, simply leaves it alone.¯[69]

66. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Freedom and necessity⟩

67. [*Ed.*] Hegel originally wrote "or" in the *Ms.* but then apparently accidently canceled it.

68. *Ms. canceled:* (α) Indifference toward religion because it is without cognition. Reason cannot launch into it. (β) Feeling

69. W_2 *reads:* If discord arises between insight and religion, it must be removed by cognition or it will lead to despair and drive out reconciliation. This despair is

(δ) Or [there can be] the demand to occupy oneself with it, [as do,] for example, the theologians. This occupation, [however, is] merely busying oneself with it, an expansion and extension [of it]. The historical aspect provides enough to keep one busy: it allows one to indulge in erudition [concerning] historical circumstances, philological criticism, the study [of] church history, how something was established by this or that council and why, what the grounds [were] for these [decisions], how these views [came about, etc.]. In all this, one is always dealing with religion and its content, and [yet] it is only religion that is not taken into account. A blind man can be concerned with the size of a painting, the canvas, the varnish, the history of the painter, the fate of the picture, [its] price, into whose hands [it has fallen, etc.]—and yet see nothing of the picture itself.

[70]This [situation] confronts religion especially [in our time]. Cog-

the consequence of one-sided reconciliation. One rejects one side and holds fast to the other, but no true peace is obtained thereby. On the one hand, the self-cloven spirit rejects the demand of insight and wants to return to naive religious feeling. But in this, spirit does violence to itself, for the independence of consciousness demands satisfaction and does not allow itself to be forcibly set aside. The healthy spirit is incapable of renouncing independent thinking. Religious feeling becomes yearning, hypocrisy, and retains an element of nonsatisfaction. The other form of one-sidedness is that of indifference toward religion: one either leaves religion alone as an unsettled matter or finally opposes it. Such is the consistency of shallow souls.

70. *Ms. margin:* ˜⟨(α) Religious feeling [is] distrustful of the finitude involved in cognition, of the subject's holding fast to itself in its being-for-self.

(β) Cognition, reason [are] distrustful of the totality of feeling, [of its] lumping together everything that is developed and dispersed into a unity – and [of]

(αα) [its] lack of freedom: [the subject] does not retain itself in thought as an object

(ββ) [its] arbitrary caprice: holding [something] to be true or valuable, a reverencing [of God] that nonetheless passes into determinacy⟩˜

W_2 *reads:* When the two sides have thus developed and enter into a reciprocal relationship, they are mutually distrustful. Religious feeling distrusts the finitude involved in cognition, and charges science with vanity because in science the subject is self-related and self-contained, and the ego, as the cognizing principle, exists for itself vis-à-vis everything external. On the other side cognition is distrustful of the totality in which feeling maintains itself, and in whose unity it lumps together everything that is dispersed and developed. Cognition is afraid of losing its freedom if it should accept the demands of feeling and unconditionally accept a truth that

nition [is] not reconciled with religion; [there is] a dividing wall. Cognition [does] not risk a serious consideration [of] | religion or 27
take a fundamental interest in it. Philosophy of religion has to remove this hindrance. On the other side, [its task is to give] to religion the courage of cognition, the courage of truth and freedom. [10a]

[5. Division of the Subject]

[On the one hand we have] religion as naive faith, feeling, intuition, in general in [the form of] immediate knowledge and consciousness. On the other side [are found] the relinquished immediacy of spirit, the standpoint of reflection, the relationship of religion and cognition as external to each other. Philosophy of religion, [by contrast, offers] a thinking, comprehending cognition of religion; [in it] the absolute substantial content and the absolute form (cognition) [are] identical.

We have now to consider in more detail the concept of religion: that is to say, these two moments are developing in this absolute object, no longer external to one another but identical and therefore being just the form [of the concept] in general. Then [we shall

it does not see clearly and distinctly. And when religious feeling steps forth from its universality, projects purposes for itself, and thus makes a transition to determinacy, cognition can see in this only arbitrary caprice, and it would see itself surrendering to chance if it were to pass into determinacy in the same way. If, therefore, reflection as educated must enter into religion, it finds it unendurable there, and it becomes impatient of all its determinations.

[*Ed.*] The marginal notation is found at the bottom of sheet 9b with no reference mark. It replaces an earlier and shorter notation, around which it is written, "Religious feeling [is] distrustful of cognition." Apparently Hegel first intended the latter as a parallel to the statement, "Cognition [is] not reconciled with religion." Then he enlarged upon the original notation as a way of explaining the "dividing wall"—a wall of distrust—between religion and cognition, resuming a theme first introduced at the bottom of sheet 9a. The passage in W_2 is clearly an expansion of the outline found in this marginal notation. When lecturing, Hegel *may* have introduced this material not here but in the context of his earlier reference to "distrust," since the latter includes the statement that reflection finds its entry into the sphere of religion to be "unendurable" and becomes impatient with it.

consider] the division of the subject and [offer] a survey of the more
28 specific parts and the course of our treatment.[71] |

(α) The *concept of religion* [comes] in the first place from representation or [is] taken from science as a presupposition, but then too the major moments of the necessity of the religious standpoint [are established]—the latter in terms of the first of the so-called proofs of the existence of God.[72]

(β) [As for] what follows, the whole of our treatment—indeed, even immediate religion itself—is nothing other than the *development* of the concept,[73] and that [in turn] is nothing other than the

71. [*Ed.*] The sequence does not follow the order that seems to be indicated here. Hegel in fact provides the division and survey *before* taking up the concept of religion "in more detail"—assuming that the latter is a reference to the whole of the first part of the work, not just to the one-sentence summary given here. By contrast with the surveys in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, the one in the *Ms.* is very brief and is given in the speculative terminology of the *Logic*. The "absolute and genuine method of cognition" is the *speculative* method, which recognizes that the *history* of religion must be understood ultimately as nothing other than the development and self-positing of the *concept* of religion, which in turn takes on actuality and determinateness (is raised to the status of *idea*) by means of this historical instantiation. At the same time, the actual description of the determinate religions will be *phenomenological* since it will trace the various forms of finite consciousness assumed by the absolute idea as it emerges and advances through the history of religion.

The consummation of this process entails a return of the concept to itself in the sense that it has become completely objective to itself in the representational forms of the Christian religion. Religion now has itself (or its concept) as its object, not some external object such as natural or human representations of deity as in the determinate religions. The concept of religion entails precisely the unity of subjective consciousness and its object, namely God as absolute idea or spirit; this unity, and hence the concept of religion itself, is consummated in the absolute religion, whereas in the earlier religions a tension persists between consciousness and its object.

72. [*Ed.*] Hegel first envisioned only two parts to *The Concept of Religion*—the derivation of the concept from representation and the demonstration of its necessity—but expanded them to four as he wrote out the lectures. The "proofs" in question are the cosmological proofs, which may be viewed as coincident with the demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint from the constitution of the finite world (see *Ms. Concept,* n. 99). However, Hegel does not treat these or other proofs of the existence of God specifically in the *Ms. Concept;* rather, in the *Ms.* the proofs are taken up only in Parts II and III of the work (see n. 73). It is only in the 1827 lectures that the proofs are treated in Part I.

73. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Proofs of the existence of God⟩

[*Ed.*] Since the development of the concept entails its self-actualization, its being

positing of what is contained in the concept. This positing constitutes the reality of the concept; it elevates and perfects the concept into the *idea.* Furthermore, this positing, insofar as it is at the same time a simple determinateness of the concept, is the further progressive determining of the concept, and the entire treatment [is] nothing other than the consummation of the determinations of the concept. This [is] the absolute and genuine method of cognition.[74]

(γ) But what is the *consummation* of the determinations of the concept? Can it proceed on into the spurious infinite?[75] On the contrary, all genuine progressive determination returns into itself. [10b] The consummation of the determination of the concept means nothing other than that the concept of religion itself is [fully] posited. Determination [generally is] only a positing of what the concept already is implicitly, only a duplication of it. This determining is a distinguishing in general, and, more precisely, [in the form of] reality, objectivity, objectification. The consummation [of it] means that the concept has become completely objective[76] to itself; in it is manifest what it is, its determinateness, its very self: the concept is for itself, it is manifest to itself.

The consummate religion is the one in which the concept has returned to itself, the one in which the absolute idea—God as spirit in the form of truth and revealedness—is an object for consciousness. The earlier religions—in which the determinateness of the

posited as real, there is a sense in which the whole of the treatment also constitutes a sustained proof of the existence or reality of God as the absolute idea. In the 1821 and 1824 lectures the various proofs—cosmological, teleological, ontological—are dispersed through the second and third parts of the work and are taken up in relation to specific religions, while in the 1827 lectures all the proofs are gathered into a special section in the first part.

74. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Various standpoints or determinations of religion – i.e.,
(α) various religions
(β) distinct determinations of God, which all remain within the absolute concept of God
(γ) proofs of the existence of God⟩

75. [*Ed.*] On the concept of the "spurious infinite," see *Science of Logic,* pp. 138 ff. (*GW* 11:79 ff.).

76. *Ms. reads:* whole
[*Ed.*] Hegel wrote *gänzlich* ("whole") but may have intended *gegenständlich* ("objective").

concept is deficient, being poorer and more abstract—are deter-
29 minate religions, which | constitute the stages of transition for the concept of religion on the way to its consummation. The Christian religion will disclose itself to us to be the absolute religion, and we shall treat its content accordingly.

INTRODUCTION
THE LECTURES OF 1824

31

Preface[1]

I have deemed it necessary to devote a separate section of philosophy to the consideration of religion. Let us first consider how the philosophy of religion is connected with philosophy in general; this is tied up with the question of our present-day interest in religion and philosophy; and this in turn is linked to the relationship of the philosophy of religion, and of philosophy, to positive religion.

To begin with, we must recall in general the object that we are dealing with in the philosophy of religion. Our object is the object of religion itself; it is the supreme or absolute object. The philosophy of religion has as its goal, as its content, the region in which all the riddles of the world, all the contradictions uncovered by profound thought, are resolved, and in which every pain of feeling is dissolved and healed, the region of eternal rest, of truth. Human beings are truly human through consciousness—by virtue of the fact that they think and by virtue of the fact that they are spirit. This gives rise to manifold images and configurations, i.e., the sciences, the arts, political interests, the relationships that are connected with human

1. [*Ed.*] *D* has an initial heading, "The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Whole of Philosophy," which we have located below as the heading for Sec. 1. Following the first paragraph, in which the main themes of the *Introduction* are summarized, Hegel repeats the opening remarks from the 1821 *Ms.*, in which he offers a general characterization of what religion and its object are. These remarks are the only part of the *Introduction* repeated without much change in all thelecture s. To identify them we are using the term "Preface," which, however, is not found in any of the auditors' notebooks. Only after this "preface" does Hegel turn to the first of the topics that he indicates he will consider.

freedom and will. From here flows all that brings them respect, satisfaction, honor, and happiness, all these interests have their center, find their end and their beginning, their truth, in one thought, in the thought of God. God is known in religion; God is the sustaining center, which breathes life into all these configurations in their existence. If we consider this object [God] in relation to others, then we can say that it *is* strictly for its own sake; it has no such relation [to others] and is strictly in and for itself *the unconditioned*, the free, the unbounded, that which is its own purpose and ultimate goal.

Religion appears as what is occupied with this object. Occupation with this ultimate, final end is thus unreservedly free and is
32 therefore its own end since | all other aims go back to this final end; though previously valid for themselves, they disappear in the face of it, no other aim holds out against it, and all are resolved in it. Occupation with this object is fulfilling and satisfying by itself, and desires nothing else but this. Hence it is the absolutely free occupation, the absolutely free consciousness. This occupation is the consciousness of absolute truth; as a mode of sensibility it is the absolute enjoyment we call blessedness, while as activity it does nothing but manifest the glory of God and reveal the divine majesty. For the peoples have generally regarded this occupation, their religious consciousness, as their true merit, as the sabbath of life in which finite aims, limited interests, toil, sorrow, unpleasantness, earthly and finite cares—˜ in which ˜[2] all the unpleasantness and misery of the everyday world—waft away in devotion's present feeling or in devotion's hope. All of it wafts away into a kind of past. Psyche[3] drinks from this river of forgetfulness, and in its doing so earthly cares and worries waft away, and the whole realm of temporality passes away into eternal harmony.

This image of the absolute that religious devotion has before it can have a greater or lesser degree of present liveliness, certainty, and enjoyment, or can be presented as something longed or hoped for, something far off, otherworldly. ˜But it is never isolated, for it

2. *Ho reads:* where, on the bank and shoal of temporality,
[*Ed.*] See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 10.
3. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 11.

radiates into the temporal present."[4] Faith is cognizant of it as the truth, as the substance of present existences; and this content of devotion is what animates the present world, what operates effectively in the life of the individual, ruling over one's commissions and omissions, over one's volition and action. This is the representation that religion has of God generally, and the philosophy of religion makes this content the content of a particular treatment. | 33

1. The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Whole of Philosophy[5]

"Since I have deemed it necessary to give it this separate treatment, I must remark that it had previously escaped my notice that *theologia naturalis* was an object of the Wolffian philosophy,[6] which introduces the nature of God into the content of philosophy."[7] However, Wolff's treatment stays within the bounds of the metaphysics of the understanding then current, and is to be viewed rather as a science of the understanding than as one of rational thinking. This manner of approach does not seem to alter the fact that this science

4. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP/Hn?) reads:* Indeed, it remains ever a certainty and, as something divine, radiates into the temporal present; [so] even amid the fearfulness that yet torments the soul here in this region of temporality, there is also the consciousness of the efficacy of truth.

5. [*Ed.*] This heading is found in *D* at the very beginning of the text. The section, which actually begins at this point, contains two main themes: the relation between "God" and "religion," and the suggestion that the idea of God is both the "result" of philosophy and the beginning of the philosophy of religion. While this material is new to the *Introduction*, replacing the first two sections of the *Ms.*, the first theme actually borrows and reformulates material from Sec. A of *The Concept of Religion* in the *Ms.*, while the second theme anticipates the beginning of the *Concept* in the 1827 lectures. The first section of the *Ms. Concept* contains what amounts to a second introduction to the lectures as a whole, and some of this material was retrojected into the 1824 and 1827 *Introductions* (see below, *Ms. Concept*, n. 2).

6. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 3.

7. *Ho reads:* Since it is deemed necessary to make this object the content of philosophical treatment, we can remark to begin with that this is now happening for the first time.

[*Ed.*] Hegel's claim to have, for the first time, made not merely God but religion the object of philosophical treatment is transmitted only by Hotho. For that reason its authenticity should be regarded as doubtful, although a support for it is the fact that the text of Griesheim's transcript is not very convincing. In any event, Hotho's formulation can be viewed as an indication of the awareness of the novelty of

could not have the same goal as ours. But it called itself essentially "theology," and its content and object was God as such. Our object, however, is not just God as such; the content of our science is religion. In regard to that concrete science we can say that, because it was only a science of the understanding, its concept of God was restricted to the sterile result of an abstract essence of the understanding.[8] To the extent that God is grasped as an essence of the understanding, God is not grasped as spirit; to the extent that God is grasped as spirit, however, this concept includes the subjective side within it, the side that is introduced into this concept when it is defined as religion.

Our concern here is therefore not with God as such or as object, but with God *as he is [present] in his community.* It will be evident that God can only be genuinely understood in the mode of his being as *spirit,* by means of which he makes himself into the counterpart of a community and brings about the activity of a community in relation to him; thus it will be evident that the doctrine of God is to be grasped and taught only as the doctrine of *religion.* Regarding the relationship of the two sciences in general, a further point to be noted is that our science is not differentiated from philosophy. Philosophy in general has God as its object and indeed as its only proper object. Philosophy is no worldly wisdom, as it used to be

philosophy of religion as an academic discipline. Only toward the end of the eighteenth century did it begin to be established as a separate philosophical topic. See, e.g., *Magazin für Religionsphilosophie, Exegese und Kirchengeschichte,* ed. H. Ph. C. Henke, 5 vols. (Helmstedt, 1794–1796); K. H. L. Pölitz, *Beitrag zur Kritik der Religionsphilosophie und Exegese unsers Zeitalters: Ein Versuch auf Veranlassung der neusten zur Begründung einer reinen Religionswissenschaft angestellten Untersuchungen* (Leipzig, 1795); L. H. Jakob, "Philosophische Abhandlung: Über die Religion," in *Annalen der Philosophie und des philosophischen Geistes, von einer Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer,* ed. L. H. Jakob, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1796).

8. [*Ed.*] The concept of God as an "essence of the understanding" (*Verstandeswesen*) is less a concept of natural theology itself than of the criticism of it, especially by Kant. Hegel could be thinking, on the one hand, of Kant's concept of the noumenon as something that is not given to the intuition but can be known only by means of the understanding, thus remaining problematic (*Critique of Pure Reason,* B 306); and, on the other hand, of the concept of the *ens rationis ratiocinatae,* whose objective reality is attainable at least by practical reason (*Critique of Judgment,* § 91).

called; it was called that in contrast with faith. It is not in fact a wisdom of the world but instead a cognitive knowledge of the nonworldly; it is not cognition of external existence, of empirical determinate being and | life, or of the formal universe, but rather 34
cognition of all that is eternal—of what God is and of what God's nature is as it manifests and develops itself.

To this extent, then, we have here the same object generally as in philosophy pure and simple; but there is also a difference.

In philosophy the supreme [being] is called the absolute or the idea, and it is superfluous to go back any further. ⌜In the Wolffian philosophy this supreme [being] is called *ens*[9] or thing, and it⌝[10] promptly announces itself as the sort of abstraction that does not in principle correspond to our representation of God. In more recent philosophy[11] the absolute is not merely an *ens* of this kind, for it is not so completely abstract; but what we call the *absolute* and the *idea* is still not for that reason synonymous with what we call *God*.

In order to make the difference plain we must first consider what "meaning" itself means. When we ask what this or that "means," we are asking two different questions, in fact two opposite questions. In the first place we call what we have in mind—the significance, purpose, or general thought of the expression or work of art in question—"the inner." This is what we are asking for. But the inner is *universal* representation or determinateness; it is *the thought* in general. When we ask in this way what God is, what

9. [*Ed.*] In natural theology God is not designated simply as *ens*, but as *ens a se* (being from, or of, itself) or as *ens perfectissimum* (most perfect being). See, e.g., Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars prior, §§ 29 ff. and §§ 24–26; and Pars posterior, §§ 6–10. The fact that God must surely also be designated as *ens* (Pars prior, § 4) follows necessarily from the definition of *ens*, for otherwise God would be denied existence. See also Wolff's *Philosophia prima sive ontologia* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1736), §§ 134, 137; and A. G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 819.

10. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* and to point out that in the Wolffian philosophy this supreme [being] was called *ens* or thing; for it

11. [*Ed.*] With the expression "more recent philosophy" Hegel alludes—as he also does in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 233, 405 (*GW* 11:146, 254)—to Schelling's philosophy, in particular to his *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, originally published in the *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik* (ed. Schelling), 2/2 (1801), 1–127 (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/4:105–212).

the expression "God" means, we want the thought; it is the thought that is supposed to be delivered up to us—the representation we no doubt have. Consequently it signifies that the concept should be delivered up, and so what we call in philosophy the "absolute" or the idea is of course the meaning. What we want to know is the absolute, the idea, the conceptualized nature of God, the nature of God grasped in thought, or the logical essence of the same. This is one meaning of "meaning," and to this extent what we call the "absolute" is synonymous with the expression "God."

But there is another sense in which we ask, when the opposite is what is wanted, namely, when we start from pure categories of
35 thought | and not from representation. It may be that spirit is not at ease in the categorial definition chosen, that it is not at home there and asks what this pure category of thought can mean. For example, there is the category of the unity of subjective and objective, or of the unity of the real and the ideal; we may understand each of the terms on its own account, may know what "unity," "objective," "subjective," and the like are, and yet we can very well say that we do not understand the category in question. In a case of this kind, if we ask what it means, the "meaning" is the opposite of what it was before.[12] What is wanted here is an intuition or a representation of the thought-category, an example or an accompaniment of the content that has so far only been given in thought. ˆOur expression "example" contains the representation and intuition of this already.ˆ[13] If we find a thought-content of this kind

12. *Ho adds:* For if earlier we wished to investigate the innermost essence, the concept of an object lying before us, its externality would not suffice for us; in the same way, now that we have it before us according to its innermost essence, according to the thought of it, what impels us is the opposite need of investing this pure thought with externality.

13. *Ho reads:* At the same time, in the word "example" the externality is indeed acknowledged as merely an accompaniment, whereas the pure thought is acknowledged as the substantial. And this twofold meaning of "meaning" points us to the idea as the inner concept or the pure thought, which, however, likewise proceeds to its externalization and furnishes itself with examples of itself, and in doing so remains the essential and yet becomes for itself the example of itself.

[*Ed.*] Hegel's point is based on an untranslatable wordplay. An "example" (*Beispiel,* lit. "playing with") is really an "accompaniment" (*Beiherspielendes,* lit. "playing beside or alongside").

difficult, the difficulty lies in the fact that we have no representation of it. It becomes clear to us through the example, and [we] say that now we know what such a thought-content means. Spirit is thus for the first time present to itself in this content.

When we begin in this way from the representation of God and ask for the meaning, what is wanted on the one hand is the idea of God, the absolute, the essence grasped in the concept; and this meaning is ˉcoincident with the logical idea.ˉ[14] But God is this: not merely to be *in* himself, but to be just as essentially *for* himself. God is spirit, not finite spirit but absolute spirit. That God is spirit consists in this: that he is not only the essence that maintains itself in thought but also the essence that appears, the essence that endows itself with revelation and objectivity. | 36

Although we consider the idea of God in this way in the philosophy of religion, we at the same time also have before us the mode of God's representation. God represents only himself, and does so only to himself. This is the aspect of the existence of the absolute. Thus in the philosophy of religion we have the absolute as our object not merely in the form of thought but also in the form of its manifestation. Thus the universal idea is to be grasped in its utterly concrete meaning, ˉwhich involves the characteristic of appearing, of revealing itself.ˉ[15] This aspect of existence, however, is itself to be rethought ˉin philosophyˉ[16] and grasped by thought.

But [pure] philosophy in its customary divisions [first] considers the logical idea, the idea as it [is] in thought, not just for our thoughts but in the way that the content is thought itself or the categories of thought themselves.[17] Beyond that, philosophy points

14. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads (similar in D):* in common with logical philosophy: the logical idea is God, as God is in himself.

15. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* that of essentiality as such, as also its activity of issuing forth, of appearing, of revealing itself. We say in common parlance that God is lord of the natural world and of the spiritual realm: God is the absolute harmony of the two, the producer and activator of this harmony; here neither the thought and concept, nor the manifestation and existence, of God are lacking.

16. *Ho reads:* since we are looking at things philosophically *W (Var) reads:* (since we are in the sphere of philosophy)

17. *Ho adds:* —indeed the whole totality of categories developing themselves through themselves and out of themselves.

to the absolute in its process of production, in its activity—and this activity is the absolute's path in coming to be for itself, in becoming ˜spirit. God˜[18] is thus the result of philosophy, a result that is recognized ˜not merely to be the result but to be eternally producing itself, the act of production and equally the beginning of the first [step].˜[19] These determinate configurations of the
37 idea or of the absolute—nature, finite | spirit, ˜the world of consciousness˜[20]—are embodiments of the idea; but they are determinate configurations or particular modes of appearance of the idea. They are configurations in which the idea has not yet penetrated through to itself in order to be as absolute spirit.

In the philosophy of religion we consider the ˜idea˜[21] not merely in the way it is determined as idea of pure thought, nor yet in its finite modes of appearance, but as the absolute, or as the logical idea—except that at the same time we also consider it in the way this idea appears and manifests itself, though in its *infinite appearance* as spirit. Spirit is what manifests itself, what appears but is infinite in its appearance; spirit that does not appear *is not;* it reflects itself back within itself.[22] This then, in general, is the position of the philosophy of religion ˜vis-à-vis˜[23] the other branches of philosophy. God is the result of the other branches: in the philosophy of religion this end is made the beginning. *That God* (as result) *appears* is what we make into our particular object—God as the *utterly concrete idea* together with its infinite appearance, which is identical with the substance, with the essence [of reality]; this is the content, the specification of this content.

18. *Ho reads:* spirit as knowledge of the activity itself. The absolute's knowledge of itself as absolute

19. *Ho reads:* not to remain merely one-sidedly in the character of result but, as what has returned to itself from itself, to know itself equally as what is utterly the first. *W (Var) adds:* The one-sidedness of the result is sublated in the result itself.

20. *Thus P; Ho reads:* the will, the state W_1 *reads:* the will W_2 *(Var) reads:* the world of consciousness, intelligence, and will

21. *W (HgG) reads:* logical idea, having being in itself,

22. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* Also contained in this characterization of appearance is finite appearance, i.e., the world of nature and the world of finite spirit; but spirit exists as the power of these worlds, as bringing them forth from itself and itself from them.

23. *Ho reads:* first vis-à-vis philosophy in general, and then

This is the content of the philosophy of religion, expressed abstractly. We treat this content with our thinking reason, and the definition of our treatment as thoughtful [*denkend*] brings us to the topic of how the philosophy of religion stands with reference to our contemporary needs, ˜i.e., its relationship to the theology of our time, to the church, and to the representation of God.˜[24]

Thus far we have considered philosophy of religion as the treatment of the concrete idea of the divine in rational form, as the conceptualizing | cognition of God. Now we turn to its relationship 38
to our contemporary needs, to the contemporary view of religion and God.

2. The Position of the Philosophy of Religion vis-à-vis the Needs of Our Time[25]

If we call the cognition or knowledge of God "theology" generally, whether we approach it from the standpoint of philosophy or from that of theology in the narrower sense, we seem at first to be treading the same path as the theology that used to be called rational theology. It is the universal highroad or the universal mode in which what is known of God is said of God. ˜We know namely that in the Christian church and chiefly in our Protestant church there was set down a *doctrinal system* [*Lehrbegriff*], a content that was uni-

24. *Ho reads:* for thoughtful or rational consideration discovers the antithesis to other contemporary modes of consideration.

25. [*Ed.*] The heading is found in *D.* In this section Hegel develops more explicitly and consistently his controversy with the theological and philosophical views of his time, which are rooted in the Enlightenment. The so-called "rational theology" (*Vernunfttheologie*) is really based on understanding (*Verstand*) and rationalistic argumentation (*Rasönnement*) or exegesis rather than on reason (*Vernunft*) in the proper sense. More recent forms of rational theology share with the theology based on feeling (*Gefühl*) the conviction that in the strict sense nothing can be known of God. Finally there is the purely historical approach in theology, which gives up any claim to its content, dealing only with historical data like "countinghouse clerks" who handle other people's money but have no wealth of their own. All these approaches have the effect of driving a fatal wedge between religion and cognition, the former being relegated to a private realm and the latter reserved for the everyday secular world. This criticism is already present in Sec. 3 of the *Ms. Introduction,* which addresses the opposition between religious consciousness and the rest of consciousness, and the present section can be viewed as a further development of themes first introduced there.

versally valid and universally accepted as the truth, as [stating] what God's nature is. This content has generally been called the creed: in the subjective sense, what is believed, and objectively, what is to be known as content in the Christian religion, what God himself has revealed that he is. This content can be called *dogmatics:* the doctrinal system of the church, the content [of its teaching] concerning what God's nature [is] in relationship to humanity and in the latter's relationship to God. (New definitions have been added to this old *symbolum,* which nonetheless are not our concern here.)

39 | In the Protestant church the doctrinal system is at the same time supposed to be based essentially upon the Bible; it does not exist merely in the spirit of the church but also has an external footing in the Bible.

Later on, so-called [pure] thinking turned against this content in the name of "Enlightenment." It left the doctrinal system in place and also left it the Bible as foundation, but arrived at its own divergent views and sought to interpret the word of God in a different way. This took place in the guise of exegesis.[26] [27] Because exegesis draws upon reason for counsel, what happened is that a so-called *rational theology*[28] came into being, opposed to the doctrinal system in the form established by the church. In part, this

26. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* We know that the faith of the church, more specifically the Protestant church, is set down as a doctrinal system. This content has been universally accepted as truth, and as a definition of what God is and what human beings are in relationship to God. It has been called the creed: in the subjective sense, what is believed, and objectively, what is to be known as content in the Christian community and as what God himself has revealed. As a common and established doctrine this content is now set down partly in the apostolic *symbolum* [the Apostles' Creed] and partly in the later symbolical books [the Protestant confessions]. In this regard the controlling determination in the Protestant church is that the Bible is the essential foundation of doctrine.

(a) Reason as argumentation has now come to the fore in the cognition and specification of the doctrinal content. Initially, to be sure, this took place only in such a way that the doctrinal content and the Bible as its positive foundation were supposed to subsist unshaken, and thinking was only supposed, as exegesis, to adopt the thoughts of the Bible.

27. *W (HgG) adds:* But in fact understanding had established its views and thoughts by itself in advance; only after that was attention given to how the words of scripture admit of explanation in accord with those views.

28. [*Ed.*] Hegel is not referring so much to the metaphysical *theologia naturalis* or *theologia rationalis* as to the exegesis and dogmatics of the theological rationalism

was the church's own doing, in part it was the doing of [the thinking] to which the church is opposed. In this rational theology it is exegesis that plays the primary role. Here exegesis takes over the written word, interprets it, and professes only to make the understanding of the word effective and to remain faithful to it.

But where interpretation is not mere explanation of the words but discussion of the content and elucidation of the sense, it must introduce its own thoughts into the word that forms the basis [of the faith]. There can only be mere interpretation of words when all that happens is that one word is replaced by another with the same scope. If interpretation is *elucidation,* then other categories of thought are bound up with it. A development of the word is a progression to further thoughts. One seemingly abides by the sense, but in fact, new thoughts are developed. Bible commentaries do not so much acquaint us with the content of scripture as with the mode of thought of their age.

In a commentary the sense of the word is supposed to be indicated. But indicating the sense means bringing the sense out into consciousness, into representation; and this other representation makes its influence felt in the exposition of what the sense is supposed to be.[29] | The most sharply opposed views are exegetically 40
demonstrated by theologians on the basis of scripture, and in this way so-called holy scripture has been made into a wax nose.[30] All of the heresies have appealed to scripture, as has the church.

of his day, represented by J. F. Röhr and J. A. L. Wegscheider among others. In particular Hegel would have been familiar with the exegesis of H. E. G. Paulus, his early friend and patron and later his opponent. See H. E. G. Paulus, *Philologisch-historischer Commentar über das Neue Testament,* 4 parts (Lübeck, 1800–1805).

29. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* Yet even in the exposition of a philosophical system that is already developed within itself, like that of Plato or Aristotle, it is the case that the expositions come out differently in accord with the inwardly determined mode of representation of those who undertake them.

30. [*Ed.*] Hegel was probably familiar with this expression through Lessing. See in particular Lessing's *Axiomata, wenn es deren in dergleichen Dingen gibt: Wider den Herrn Pastor Goeze, in Hamburg* (Braunschweig, 1778) (*Sämtliche Schriften* 13:128): "The inner truth is no wax nose that every rascal can shape in conformity to his own face as he wishes." The expression "wax nose" itself, however, may be traced back to the twelfth century—e.g., to Alain de Lille (Migne *Patrologia Latina* 210.333). In the fifteenth century, Geiler von Kaisersberg applied it specifically to scripture (see M. D. Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* [Paris, 1957], p. 361).

[31]~~Since a so-called theology of reason arose and was produced
41 in this manner, we can on the one hand say | that we find ourselves on common ground [with it], that reason has to be a factor; and if the interpretation that emerges is supposed to be in accordance with reason, then we can here claim the right to develop religion freely and openly out of reason, without taking as our starting point the specific word [of scripture]. It is therefore at this point
42 that we consider the nature of God and of religion in general. |

31. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads (parallel in main text follows):* b. The theology of reason that arose in this way did not, however, confine itself steadily to the task of exegesis in the realm of the Bible, but as free cognizing assumed a relationship to religion and to its content generally instead. In this more general relationship the concern and the result cannot be anything else than that cognition should take possession of everything that is determinate in the sphere of religion. As an instance, the doctrine of God advances on to characteristics, attributes, and actions of God. Cognition takes possession of this determinate content and shows that it belongs to it. On the one hand it grasps the infinite according to its own finite fashion, as something determinate or as something abstractly infinite; and then, on the other hand, it finds that all particular attributes are inappropriate to this infinite. Thereby it destroys the religious content in its own way and totally impoverishes the absolute object. To be sure, the finite and the determinate, which this cognition has drawn within its sphere, direct it to something otherworldly, but it grasps this [object] itself in a finite manner as an abstract, supreme being [*höchstes Wesen*] utterly lacking all character. The Enlightenment—in other words, the consummation of finite cognition just depicted—purports to set God exceedingly high in calling God the infinite for which all predicates are inappropriate and unjustified anthropomorphisms. But when it grasped God as the supreme being, it in actuality made God hollow, empty, and impoverished.

c. It may now seem that the philosophy of religion finds itself on the same soil as this rational theology of the Enlightenment, and hence in the same antithesis to the content of religion; but this is a semblance that immediately dissolves.

α. That rational consideration of religion which was only an abstract metaphysics of the understanding grasped God as an abstraction that is *empty ideality*, and with which the finite is contrasted externally. Also, from this standpoint morals as a particular science constituted the knowledge of what pertains to the actual subject with regard to action and behavior, whereas the aspect of the human being's relation with God stood divorced from it. On the other hand, the thinking reason that no longer maintains itself abstractly, but sets out from the faith of human beings in the dignity of their spirit and is impelled by the courage of truth and freedom—this reason grasps the truth as something concrete, as fullness of content, [i.e.] as an ideality in which determinateness or the finite is contained as a moment. For it, God is therefore not the void but spirit, and this determination of spirit does not remain for it merely a word or a superficial determination; instead the nature of spirit unfolds for it in that it cognizes God essentially as the triune. God is thus

This rational theology has on the whole been called the theology of the Enlightenment. Pertinent here, however, is not merely this kind of theology but also the kind that leaves reason aside and expressly rejects philosophy, and then erects a religious doctrine from the plenitude of its own argumentative power. Though biblical words lie at its basis, to be sure, *private opinion* and *feeling* still remain the controlling factor. It very often happens that philosophy is set aside in the process, that philosophy is represented as something ghostlike that must be ignored because it is uncanny. Philos-

grasped in the way in which he makes himself into his own object, and then in the way in which the object in its differentiation remains identical with God, and God himself loves himself in it. Without this determination of the Trinity, God would not be spirit and spirit would be an empty word. But if God is grasped as spirit, then this concept includes the subjective aspect within itself, or unfolds itself to [include] it, and, as thinking consideration of religion, the philosophy of religion embraces the entire determinate content of religion.

β. But with respect to the form of thoughtful consideration that confines itself to the word of holy scriptures and claims to interpret it with reason, the philosophy of religion only seems to stand on common soil with it. For that treatment lays out the basis of Christian doctrine from the plenitude of its own argumentative powers; and although it allows the biblical words to retain their subsistence, private opinion still remains the principal determination to which the assumed biblical truth must be subordinated. Hence this mode of argumentation clings to its presuppositions and operates within the reflective relationships of the understanding, without their being subjected to criticism. As rational cognizing, however, the philosophy of religion is opposed to the arbitrariness of this argumentation, and is [based on] the reason of the universal, which presses toward unity.

Philosophy is therefore so far removed from finding itself upon the general highway of rational theology and of exegetical argumentation that these tendencies for the most part seek rather to combat it and cast suspicion upon it. They protest against philosophy, but only in order to retain for themselves the arbitrariness of their argumentation. They call philosophy something private, whereas philosophy is in fact nothing but rational and truly universal thinking. They regard philosophy as something spectral, such that one does not know what it is but which is rather uncanny in any case; but this representation of it only shows that they feel more at ease in sticking to their unregulated, arbitrary reflections, to which philosophy grants no validity. If the theologians who operate in exegesis with this mode of argumentation, and who appeal to the Bible to support all their fancies, while opposing philosophy and denying the possibility of cognition—if they have in fact carried things so far and debased respect for the Bible so severely—then spirit must look about for another source in order to secure a truth full of content, if it is indeed the case that no *cognition* of God's nature is possible on the basis of a correct elucidation of the Bible.

ophy, however, is nothing other than cognition through reason, the common feature in the cognition of all human beings; and to the extent that one rejects philosophy, one rejects with it the very principle of the common rationality of spirit, in order to leave the door open to ˜private reason.˜[32]

In the rational theology of more recent times the principal role is played by this way of looking at things, bringing reason into the lists against itself and combating philosophy on the grounds that reason can have no cognition of God.[33] The consequence is that no meaning for the expression "God" remains in theology any more than in philosophy, save only the representation, definition, or abstraction of the supreme being—a vacuum of abstraction, a vacuum of "the beyond." Such is the overall result of rational theology, this generally negative tendency toward any content at all in regard to the nature of God. The "reason" of this kind of theology has in fact been nothing but abstract understanding masquerading under the name of reason, and it has ventured as far in this field as has
43 the reason | that claimed the possibility of cognition for itself. The result is that one only knows in general *that* God is; but otherwise this supreme being is inwardly empty and dead. It is not to be grasped as a living God, as concrete content; it is not to be grasped as spirit. If "spirit" is not an empty word, then God must [be grasped] under this characteristic, just as in the church theology of former times God was called "triune." This is the key by which the nature of spirit is explicated. God is thus grasped as what he is for himself within himself; God [the Father] makes himself an object for himself (the Son); then, in this object, God remains the undivided essence within this differentiation of himself within himself, and in this differentiation of himself loves himself, i.e., remains identical with himself—this is God as Spirit. Hence if we are to speak of God as spirit, we must grasp God with this very definition, which exists in the church in this childlike mode of representation as the relationship between father and son—a representation that

32. W_1 *(HgG/Var?) reads:* private argumentation.

33. [*Ed.*] Hegel has in mind the views of Kant and Jacobi; see above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15.

is not yet a matter of the concept. Thus it is just this definition of God by the church as a Trinity[34] that is the concrete determination and nature of God as spirit; and spirit is an empty word if it is not grasped in this determination.

But when modern theology says that we cannot have cognition of God or that God has no further determinations within himself, it knows only that God *is* as something abstract without content, and in this way God is reduced to this hollow abstraction. It is all the same whether we say we cannot have cognition of God, or that God is only a supreme being.[35] Inasmuch as we know [only] *that* God is, God is the *abstractum*. To cognize God means to have a definite, concrete concept of God. As merely having being, God is something abstract; when [God is] cognized, however, we have a representation with a content. If the representation to the effect that God is not to be cognized were substantiated through biblical exegesis, then precisely on that account we would have to turn to another source in order to arrive at a content in regard to God.

34. [*Ed.*] The neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity, which Hegel criticizes here and elsewhere in the *Lectures*, may be traced to deism and the so-called neologians, e.g., W. A. Teller and J. G. Töllner. But, as Hegel's excerpts from Scheiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* demonstrate (*Berliner Schriften*, pp. 684 ff.), his criticism is directed primarily against this work since it treats the doctrine of the Trinity only in the concluding four paragraphs. See Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 187: "But the ecclesiastical doctrine that three persons of equal essence and equal power subsist in the one and undivided divine essence is not, so comprehended, of equal value with the other, proper doctrines of faith, but is only an appended [*verknüpfender*] proposition" (this paragraph is not in the 2d ed.). See below, 1827 *Intro.*, n. 17.

35. [*Ed.*] The designation of God as a "supreme being" (*höchstes Wesen, être suprême, summum ens*), is common in the deistic literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see Herbert of Cherbury, *De Veritate* [London, 1645], pp. 210 ff.), as well as in the school philosophy (see Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars posterior, §§ 6 ff.). But since Hegel is here referring to "modern theology," it can be surmised that his equation of the noncognizability of God with the designation of God as a supreme being contains a hidden polemic against Schleiermacher, perhaps against Schleiermacher's statement that, even if the idea of God were not available from some other source, "pious excitations would be available, so that the effort would arise, when thoughtful reflection has advanced far enough, to form the idea of the supreme being by means of considering these excitations. The concept [of God] that has been formed in this fashion is solely what we are concerned with in what follows." See Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 9 (this passage is not in the 2d ed.); cf. §§ 2, 10.

Whether it is substantiated by the Bible must be left to the theologians. Although we may seem to be sharing common ground with rational theology (because our definition of God is that of thinking reason), in what follows we shall nonetheless see that rational theology is precisely the staunchest opponent of philosophy. In this respect it is a need of the present day to be cognizant of God through
44 thinking reason, | and thereby to obtain a living, concrete representation of the nature of truth. The result of rational theology is expressed by saying that we cannot be cognizant of the truth. God is truth. But to the extent that human beings have faith in their own dignity, in the dignity of their spirit, and have the courage of truth and freedom, they are driven to seek truth. Truth is no empty shell [but] something concrete, a fullness of content. It is this fullness that modern theology has emptied out. Our intention, however, is to regain such a fullness by means of the concept.~~

It is to be noted that there is a type of theology that wants to adopt *only a historical attitude* toward religion; it even has an abundance of cognition, though only of a historical kind. This cognition is no concern of ours, for if the cognition of religion were merely historical, we would have to compare such theologians with countinghouse clerks, who keep the ledgers and accounts of other people's wealth, a wealth that passes through their hands without their retaining any of it, clerks who act only for others without acquiring assets of their own. They do of course receive a salary, but their merit lies only in keeping records of the assets of other people. In philosophy and religion, however, the essential thing is that one's own spirit ~itself should recognize a possession and content, deem itself worthy of cognition, and not keep itself humbly outside.~[36]

This is therefore the relationship [of the philosophy of religion to the theology of our time]. In view of this plague the more explicit need that arises is that of regaining, for the true, essentially through
45 philosophy, a fullness, a content, and an import. |

36. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* itself should enter with the utmost interest into an inner connection, not only occupying itself with something alien to it but drawing its content from what is essential and deeming itself worthy of cognition. Here human beings are dealing with the value of their own spirit and are not permitted to stay humbly outside it, standing about at a distance.

3. The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to Positive Religion[37]

"In the third place, finally, theology is not merely rational theology, which brings it only to the abstraction of the I, to this emptiness or lack.[38] There is still a theology that has a content—a content consisting of the church's doctrine—which we call the content of a positive religion. The philosophy of religion seems at first to stand on the same side [with what] is called rational theology, but it is in fact opposed to it; and it seems to be even more opposed to the theology that holds to the church's positive doctrine. But just as in the first relationship the reverse is the case, so here, too, it will be shown that the philosophy of religion is infinitely closer to positive doctrine.

The antithesis of reason and faith, as it used to be called, is one that arose long ago in the Christian church;[39] the church often feared the destruction of its doctrine by philosophy and on that account was hostile to it. But rational theology is hostile to philosophy because a content might be able to gain entry through philosophy, | and for that reason it declares every elucidation of 46
the content to be an obfuscation."[40]

37. [*Ed.*] This is the third topic that Hegel promised to take up in the opening paragraph of the *Introduction*, but he treats it only briefly. He contends that philosophy of religion is actually closer to "positive religion," that is, historically mediated and revealed religion based on the doctrinal content of the church, than it is to rational theology. However, a division has emerged between the philosophy of religion and the teaching of the church, a division that presupposes a doctrine of double truth—"two kinds of reason and two kinds of spirit"—and Hegel's critique of this notion is what constitutes the substance of this section. Catholic theology with its speculative proclivities avoided this split more successfully than did Protestant theology.

38. W_1 *(HgGlVar?) adds:* or [merely] historical theology, which has only alien [i.e., other people's] thoughts about God.

39. [*Ed.*] This antithesis may be traced back to the ancient church but not to the New Testament. In *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 55 (*GW* 4:315), Hegel contended that modernity has transcended this antithesis; but in his Preface to Hinrichs's *Religionsphilosophie* he expressed doubts about the success of this transcendence (see H. W. F. Hinrichs, *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* [Heidelberg, 1822], p. i; *Werke* 17:279).

40. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Philosophy of religion cannot therefore stand opposed to positive religion, and to the church doctrine that has still preserved its content, after the fashion in which the metaphysics of the understanding and

Regarding the relationship of the philosophy of religion to the church's doctrine (insofar as this doctrine [*Lehre*] is not that emptiness [*Leerheit*] but has solid content), it is to be noted that there cannot be two kinds of reason and two kinds of spirit,[41] a divine and a human reason or a divine and a human spirit that would be strictly distinct from one another, as if their essence were strictly opposed. Human reason, human spiritual consciousness or consciousness of its own essence, *is* reason generally, is the divine within humanity. Spirit, insofar as it is called divine spirit, is not a spirit beyond the stars or beyond the world; for God is present, is omnipresent, ˜and strictly *as spirit* is God present in spirit.˜[42] God is a living God who is effective, active, and present in spirit. Religion is a begetting of the divine spirit, not an invention of human beings but an effect of the divine at work, of the divine productive process within humanity. What has emerged as religion, and is a product of the divine spirit, shows itself first as faith. So we must have faith that what has emerged in the world is precisely reason, and that the generation of reason is a begetting of the spirit and a product of the divine spirit itself. The expression "God rules the world as reason" would be irrational if we did not ˜concede that among the

argumentative exegesis oppose them. Rather it will become evident that it stands infinitely closer to positive doctrine than it seems to at first glance; it will become evident in fact that the reinstatement of church doctrine (reduced to a minimum by the understanding) is so emphatically the work of philosophy of religion that the rational theology which operates only through understanding decries it as an obfuscation of the spirit precisely on account of this its authentic content. The dread of the understanding and its hatred of philosophy derive from its apprehension at seeing that philosophy takes its reflective process back to the fundament, i.e., to the affirmative upon which it founders; and yet philosophy arrives at a content, at a cognition of God's nature, in spite of the fact that every content seems already to be annulled. Every content appears to this negative tendency to be a darkening of spirit, while it seeks forever just to remain in the night that it calls "Enlightenment," and there of course it must deem the ray of cognition's light to be a hostile one.

41. [*Ed.*] The doctrine of double truth may be traced back to the thirteenth century. Somewhat later it was propounded especially by William of Ockham and Pomponazzi, but was rejected by the church at the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517).

42. *Ho reads:* as spirit present in the spirits. *W (Var) reads:* as spirit in all the spirits.

peoples nothing is higher than religion [and that it is] the divine spirit that has accomplished everything in them."[43] | 47

We should also mention as a historical note that in the Catholic Church, particularly in former times, there was no such separation between philosophy | and church doctrine, for Scholastic philosophy 48

43. W_1 *(Var) reads:* accept the fact that God also relates himself to religion and that the divine spirit has brought it forth among the peoples. The different religions are only different views of one and the same thing. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* accept the fact that God also relates himself to religion and that the divine spirit operates in the determination and shaping of it. But the development of reason that is completed in thinking does not stand in antithesis to this spirit, and therefore this development cannot be distinguished strictly from the work of spirit itself, which it has brought forth in religion. The more that human beings in their rational thinking give the thing itself control within themselves and renounce their private concerns, the more they comport themselves as universal consciousness and their reason seeks not its own concern in the sense of something particular, the less will reason fall into that antithesis; for reason is itself the matter, it is spirit, the divine spirit. The church or the theologians may disdain this support or take it amiss when their doctrine is made rational; they may even repel the efforts of philosophy with proud irony and may ridicule its "contrived" truth—although its efforts are not directed against religion in a hostile way, but rather seek to ground the truth of religion. But this contumely avails no longer and becomes mere vanity once the need for cognition is awakened and [an awareness of] cognition's split from religion. In that situation insight has its rights which can no longer be in any way denied, and the triumph of cognition is the reconciliation of the antithesis.

Although philosophy, as the philosophy of religion, distinguishes itself sharply from the tendencies of understanding that are basically opposed to religion in a hostile way, and is by no means the hobgoblin that people ordinarily imagine it to be, we do still find nowadays the starkest antithesis of philosophy and religion posited as a contemporary shibboleth all the same. All the principles of religious consciousness that are fully developed at the present time—though their forms may [otherwise] be in the sharpest contrast with each other—agree at least in being antagonistic to philosophy or in seeking at all events to prevent it from concerning itself with religion. For this reason it is still our business to consider philosophy in its relationship to these contemporary principles. Our expectations from this consideration are all the more favorable because, along with all the antagonism toward philosophy coming from so many sides (indeed from almost every side in present-day consciousness), it will become evident that the time has nevertheless now arrived when philosophy can occupy itself with religion in a manner that is unconstrained as well as auspicious and beneficial. For *either* our adversaries are those forms of the severed consciousness that we have considered above (they adopt in part the standpoint of the metaphysics of the understanding for which God is something empty and the content has disappeared, and in part the standpoint of feeling, which has withdrawn into its empty inwardness after the loss of absolute content, but concurs with that metaphysics in the result, i.e., that any determination is unsuited

was the philosophy of the church. Speculative philosophy has, in fact, been more in evidence in the Catholic Church than in the Protestant. ¯This cleavage first occurred in the Protestant Church.¯[44]

4. Preliminary Questions[45]

¯We could now proceed to deal with the object, with the thing itself. But it seems necessary on external grounds to discuss certain preliminary questions first, questions that must seemingly be disposed of before we can advance to the science [of the philosophy of re-

to the eternal content because it is indeed only an abstraction); *or* else we shall see how the contentions of philosophy's opponents contain nothing but what philosophy contains for *its* principle and as foundation for its principle. This contradiction, that the opponents of philosophy are the opponents of religion who are overcome by philosophy, and that they nonetheless implicitly possess the principle of philosophical cognition within their own reflections, is grounded in the fact that they are the historical element out of which the consummate philosophical thinking has itself taken shape.

44. *Thus G; Ho reads (similar in P, but canceled):* The separation whose reconciliation is the goal of the philosophy of religion first came into being in the Protestant church. For what has appeared in the world as religion is the absolute truth not yet as conceptual truth, even though the content is true. The labor of elevating these represented [truths] to the concept is at the same time the teaching of the philosophy of religion.

45. [*Ed.*] At this point Hegel seems to change course. He abruptly drops the discussion of the relationship of the philosophy of religion to positive religion, which has uncovered the question of double truth. Not only this but other "preliminary questions" seem to have to be disposed of before philosophy of religion can turn to its proper object, the thing itself, namely God and the religious knowledge of God. He enumerates several of these questions—not only that of double truth, but also the question of the limits of reason, the view that God is apprehended only in the mode of feeling and has no objectivity over against the consciousness of the believer (and thus is likely to prove to be a fiction), and the notion that philosophy of religion must first demonstrate that there *is* a God before God can be cognitively grasped. But these and all other so-called preliminary questions must be set aside, Hegel says, because they cannot be investigated and settled in advance of actually *doing* philosophy of religion. The only way to investigate the capacity of cognition is to engage in cognitive acts. Against the prevailing view of his time Hegel argues that there is no epistemological prolegomenon to philosophy that is not already speculative philosophy. The preliminary methodological questions are not to be disposed of in preliminary fashion but only in connection with the content or object of the philosophy of religion, which gives itself in the process of cognizing it. Method and content are finally one and the same.

ligion] proper. Such questions are bound to occur to us; they must do so if we are familiar with the culture of our time, i.e., with the philosophical culture and with the interests of theology. There are viewpoints, preliminary questions, | and modes of representation, 49
which seem to make it necessary that, before we proceed to the philosophy of religion, it must be recognized and shown that such a science exists. There are views that reject it, that deem it impossible.[46] Hence we have to discuss such positions; we do not do so, however, in order to resolve these preliminary questions, but rather to show that we have to leave these views aside, and that what is essential in them comes within the purview of our science itself and is settled there."[47]

Therefore, with reference to the content of these major views, in the *first* place what we have before us is not religion in general but what we call a positive religion, a religion that is acknowledged to have been revealed by God and to rest upon an authority higher than human authority, and which for that reason appears sublime, outside the domain of human reason. The initial difficulty in this view is that we would first have to argue for reason's entitlement

46. [*Ed.*] It is not certain which views Hegel is alluding to. It seems unlikely that the possibility of a philosophical thematization of religion as such was being questioned, but rather the possibility of a *speculative* philosophy of religion, such as Hegel's, which was at the same time a speculative theology. Thus it may be assumed that Hegel again has Kant's and especially Jacobi's views in mind; cf. the latter's reference to "unphilosophy," which is a "nonknowing" (Jacobi, *Werke* 3:9).

47. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Before we can proceed to the treatment of our object itself, it seems indispensable to settle several preliminary questions, or rather to embark upon inquiries about them, upon the assumption that the question whether any such treatment, any such rational cognition of religion, is possible at all, depends on the outcome of these inquiries. The investigating and answering of these questions seems to be unavoidably necessary because they have especially preoccupied the philosophical and popular interest evident in the deliberations of our time, and because they involve the principles on which present-day views about the religious content rest as well as our views about the cognition of it. If we refrain from any such investigation, it will at least be necessary to show that our doing so does not happen by chance, and that we have the right to do so, because what is essential in that investigation falls within our science itself and all those questions can be settled only in it.

Therefore we have only to notice here the obstacles that the contemporary culture and view we have been considering set against the justification for cognizing religion conceptually.

and capacity to concern itself with such truth and such teaching of a religion as purportedly lies beyond the domain of human reason. We certainly agree that reason must enter into relation with what is called religion. In this respect we can proceed in the traditional way. It has been said, and is still said,[48] that positive religion exists on its own account, that we are to offer no opinion on its doctrines [but simply] are to respect and esteem them. On the other side stands reason or comprehending thought, and never shall these twain come into contact or reason make connection with those teachings of the revealed religion. This was how they wanted to preserve the freedom of philosophical investigation in former days. They said it is a subject matter by itself that should do no harm to positive religion, but they subordinated its results to the teaching of positive religion. "We do not want to give our investigation this posture."[49] In and for itself it must be viewed as only a pretense; i.e., it is false that both of these—both belief in, standing fast in, positive religion, and free philosophical investigation—can subsist peacefully alongside one another. There is no ground for supposing
50 that faith in the content or in the doctrine of positive | religion can still persist when reason has convinced itself of the contrary. The church has been both correct and consistent "in not allowing this comparison to be made."[50] Human spirit in its innermost aspect, [in its] conviction about the nature of God, is not, in this most inward conscience, the sort of divided thing in which the two sides of a contradiction could subsist—faith [on one side and] a reason on the other that had achieved results deviating from this teaching

48. [*Ed.*] While Hegel may be alluding to the scholastic doctrine of double truth, and to Schleiermacher's attempt to establish a sharp demarcation between worldly wisdom and Christian theology (see *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 2), it seems clear in this context that he has more in mind the attempt by certain philosophers to argue for the lack of relation between reason and positive religion, notably Vanini, Bayle, and Descartes, who are mentioned in this connection in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:140–142, 238 (*Werke* 15:246–248, 352). See, e.g., Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 1:25 (p. 195).

49. *Ho reads:* However, we do not concede to the two fields this posture of indifference [to one another].

50. *W (HgG) reads:* in not allowing the view that reason might be opposed to faith and yet could subordinate itself to it.

of positive religion. This, then, is the first preliminary question, in which the right of reason is to be demonstrated, its right to concern itself with the [positive] teachings of religion.

The *second* preliminary question relates to an impression, a proposition or a view, regarding what reason and cognition are, that can almost be regarded as the focal point of the plague of the present age. Those mentioned in the preceding sphere only contend that reason cannot cognitively apprehend the truth of God's nature; they do not deny the possibility of cognizing other truths, since for them only the highest truth is uncognizable. According to the second position, however, reason is entirely debarred from cognitively apprehending truth at all. Its contention is that if cognition relates itself to spirit in and for itself, to life, to the infinite, it only produces errors, and that reason must forgo all claims and all attempts to grasp any aspect of the infinite affirmatively; for through comprehension the infinite is annulled and downgraded to the finite.[51] This result in regard to reason, this denial of reason, is supposed to be a result of rational cognition itself. The first thing we have to do, according to this tendency, is to investigate the cognitive subject

51. [*Ed.*] Hegel's account does not permit a positive identification of the two positions to which he refers. Both could be ascribed to Kant. On the one hand there is Kant's position that, insofar as it lifts itself above the domain of possible experience, reason begets mere thought entities or phantoms of the brain (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 571; also B 269). By the second position Hegel could have in mind Kant's doctrine that even within the domain of experience things are not cognized as they are in themselves but only as they appear (see *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15). Hegel does not strictly separate the two views that he distinguishes and criticizes. Even in characterizing the second view he returns to the hypothesis of the noncognizability of the infinite. The formulation that the attempt at comprehension degrades the infinite to something finite certainly points to Jacobi: "To uncover conditions of the unconditioned, to discover a possibility in the absolutely necessary, and to wish to construe it in order to be able to comprehend it, seems obviously to be a nonsensical understanding. . . . Should a *concept* of what is unconditioned and unconnected (and hence extranatural) become *possible*, then the unconditioned must cease to be the unconditioned; it must itself take on conditions; and the *absolutely necessary* must start to become the *possible*, in order that it can be construed." Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 424–426 (*Werke* 4/2:153–155). In a letter to Fichte, Jacobi wrote: "That it knows nothing of God is no reproach to transcendental philosophy, for it is generally recognized that God cannot be *known*, only *believed*. A God who could be known would be no God at all" (*Werke* 3:7).

beforehand, in order to establish cognitively its capacity to have cognition of God and thereby to establish the possibility of a philosophy of religion.

Because knowledge of God does not fall within the comprehension of reason, there coheres with this standpoint the view that consciousness of God is rather sought only in the form of *feeling*—that religion has feeling as its source, and that the relationship of the human spirit to God is to be confined only to the sphere of
51 feeling | and is not to be transposed into thought or into comprehension. Surely if God and divine things are excluded from the realm of necessary and substantial subjectivity, if knowledge is excluded from this realm, then nothing remains but the realm of contingent subjectivity; that is the realm of feeling.[52] If in regard to God we could appeal only to feeling, then we would have to wonder how any kind of objectivity is still attributed to this content, i.e., to God. The materialistic views[53] have been more consistent in this respect. They have regarded spirit and thought as something merely material, a combination of material forces; they have re-

52. [*Ed.*] The view that religion has its proper place in the realm of feeling (*Gefühl*) was widespread in Hegel's time and took different forms. Probably Hegel had especially in mind Jacobi's position, which, following Hume, established a close connection between faith and feeling. See esp. Jacobi's *David Hume über den Glauben*, pp. 44, 47 (*Werke* 2:161, 163). See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. John Oman (New York, 1958), p. 45. J. F. Fries described feeling as the "presentiment" (*Ahndung*) of the eternal in the finite, distinguishing it as a special organ from both knowledge and faith; see his *Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung* (Jena, 1805), esp. p. 176. Fries's conception was adopted by W. M. L. de Wette, among others: see de Wette's *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik* (Berlin, 1813). The fact that Hegel did not yet argue polemically against the founding of religion on feeling in his manuscript of 1821, but for the first time in the lectures of 1824, indicates that he had Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, which had appeared in the meantime, especially in view. See Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 8, "Piety in itself is neither a knowing nor a doing, but an inclination and determination of feeling" (in the 2d ed., § 3, Schleiermacher drops "inclination" and adds "or of immediate self-consciousness"); and § 9, "The common element in all pious excitations, and therefore the essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, that is, the feeling of being dependent on God" (in the 2d ed., § 4, Schleiermacher revises this proposition considerably, concluding it: "or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God"). See also below, 1824 *Concept*, nn. 20, 37.

53. *W (HgG) adds:* or, as they may otherwise be designated, the empiricist, historicist [*historisch*], and naturalistic views, at least

duced spirit and thought to feeling and sensation, and accordingly taken God and all representations [of God] as products of feeling, and denied objectivity to God. The result is then atheism. God is thus a product of feeling, of my weakness—a product of pain, hope, fear, joy, cupidity, and so forth. What is rooted only in my feeling *is only for me;* what is in my feeling is what is mine, but it is not what is his [God's?], is not independent in and for itself.[54] It seems necessary therefore to show beforehand that God is not simply rooted in feeling, is not merely *my* God. The former metaphysics,[55] therefore, always used to begin by proving that there is a God, that God is not merely rooted in feeling, that God is not merely something subjective but is something objective.

Connected to this is then the *fourth* preliminary question, inasmuch as one starts by demonstrating that there is a God—that there are not mere feelings of God but an objective God, that God *is,* that God is an *object.* Proving God turns out to be the summons to the philosophy of religion. One might suppose that our inquiry must also begin at this point.

It may appear as though the other sciences hold over philosophy the advantage that their object is already acknowledged in and for itself. In arithmetic, numbers are conceded in advance; in geometry, space; in medicine, ¯illnesses.¯[56] [57] | The object of philosophy is not, 52

54. [*Ed.*] "What is mine" (*Meinige*) involves a pun on "subjective opinion" (*Meinung*), and "what is his" (*Seinige*), a pun on "being" (*Sein*). There is probably also an allusion here to the struggle for recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* chap. IV.A ("me" against "him"), which becomes, in the "unhappy consciousness" of chap. IV.B, a hopeless struggle with "the unchangeable" (God).

55. [*Ed.*] Hegel apparently refers here especially to natural theology as a special part of this metaphysics, and to the role played by the proofs of the existence of God in it. See Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Pars prior, § 4; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica,* § 810; and, earlier, Spinoza, *Ethics,* Part I, Prop. XI (*Chief Works* 2:51). The tradition of placing the proofs of the existence of God at the beginning of natural theology goes back to scholasticism, especially to Thomas Aquinas.

56. *W (HgG) reads:* human bodies and illnesses.

57. W_2 *(1831) adds (similar in* W_1*):* and they are not called upon to demonstrate that there are such things as space, bodies, or illnesses. Philosophy as such therefore seemingly has the disadvantage of having to secure a being for its objects *in advance,* before it begins. Should one in any case concede to philosophy that there is a world, philosophy is nonetheless promptly challenged if it wishes to presuppose likewise the actuality of the incorporeal in general, of a thought and spirit free from matter, let alone to presuppose the actuality of God.

and should not be, of this kind. Since its object is not something already granted, philosophy, and more specifically philosophy of religion, must first demonstrate its object. From this it would follow that before philosophy exists it should prove that it exists, that it is. It would have to prove its existence prior to its existence.

These then are the preliminary questions that must be settled first, so it seems, and the very possibility of a philosophy of religion depends upon their being settled. But if these points of view are valid (i.e., that conceptual thought has no relationship to positive religion, or that religion is only a feeling), then philosophy of religion is directly impossible, since in order to show its possibility those hindrances must first be eliminated. So it seems at first glance, and a brief accounting needs to be given of why we are pushing these preliminary questions to one side. Why we do so must be briefly sketched in its main features, in order to remove this difficulty. The initial demand is that we should first investigate reason generally, the cognitive capacity or conceptual thought, before proceeding to cognition. This demand is involved in all of these views. We picture the project of cognition as though it were something that came about by means of an *instrument* with which one wants to grasp the truth. On closer consideration, the demand that we should first cognize this instrument is inappropriate, however plausible it may seem. The critique of the cognitive capacity is a stance taken by Kant's philosophy and by our time.[58] It was believed that a great discovery had been made at this point, but, as so often happens in life, the belief was a mistake. "Just when people think they have done the cleverest thing is when they have done the
53 silliest."[59] |

Reason is to be investigated—but how? It must be investigated rationally, it must be cognized. This is possible only through rational thinking, through rational cognition; any other way it is impossible.

58. *W (HgG) adds:* and its theology.

59. W_2 *(MiscP/Var?) reads:* For ordinarily when people have a fancy that they take to be quite clever, they are the most foolish, and their satisfaction consists in having discovered a splendid twist for their foolishness and ignorance. As a rule they are indefatigable in twisting about when it comes to fashioning a good conscience regarding their laziness and avoiding the issue.

This demand directly involves a requirement that annuls itself. If we ought not to begin philosophizing until we have cognized reason rationally, then we cannot begin at all, for in cognizing we *are* comprehending rationally; but we are supposed to relinquish this rational comprehension, since it is precisely reason that we are supposed to cognize. This is the same demand as that Gascon[60] makes who does not want to go into the water until he is able to swim. To learn to swim one must go into the water. One cannot make cognition into one's object without thereby behaving cognitively at the same time.

Here in the philosophy of religion it is more precisely God, or reason in principle, that is the object. God is essentially rational, is rationality that is alive and, as spirit, is in and for itself. When we philosophize about religion, we are in fact investigating reason, intelligence, and cognition; only we do so without the supposition that we will get this over first, apart from our [real] object; instead the cognition of reason *is* exactly the object, is what it is all about. Spirit is just this: to be for itself, to be for spirit. This is what finite spirit is; and the relationship of finite spirit or of finite reason [to infinite spirit or reason] is engendered within ˜religion˜[61] itself and must be dealt with there. Also pertinent here is the distinction between a science and conjectures concerning a science. These conjectures are contingent; but insofar as they are thoughts containing viewpoints relating to the matter, they must fall within the treatment itself, though in their proper order and where they are necessary; then they are not [just] contingent bubbles of thought that arise within us. The other factor is that the viewpoints underlying these questions, insofar as they | are involved in the matter, are brought 54
up along with [the evolution of] the content itself. In this way those viewpoints even occur within religion itself, and we thus come to the relationship of reason to positive religion.

The [infinite] spirit that makes itself an object gives itself essentially the shape of a *representation,* of something given, of some-

60. [*Ed.*] Thus *G;* the 1827 lectures read "Scholastic." No other 1824 source gives the anecdote. See below, 1827 *Intro.,* n. 51.

61. *Thus G, P; D reads:* science *W (HgG/Var?) reads:* philosophy of religion

thing appearing to the other [finite] spirit *for which* it is. Spirit appears for the other as something given, something coming to it in a higher mode; and therein lies the necessity that the relationship of spirit [to spirit] comes to be a positive religion. Spirit comes to be for itself in the shape of representation; the positive aspect of religion is brought forth in the shape of [spirit's being] the other *for* the other, *for which* spirit is. Similarly, the definition of religion—according to which it is *cognitive,* is the activity of reason or the activity of conceptualization and thought—lies within religion itself; this cognitive attitude toward God falls within religion itself, just as the standpoint of feeling does. Feeling, too, must show itself in religion. Feeling is the subjective aspect, what pertains to me as this single individual. When I feel I thereby appeal to myself, and thus relate myself back to my singular subjectivity; others can have other feelings and thereby appeal to themselves, too. With thinking, on the other hand, we are on common ground. Both this standpoint [of *thinking*] (inasmuch as God gives himself this ultimate singularization of thisness, [becoming] the object for a cognizing activity and the object for a thinking activity) and [*what is*] *thought* (inasmuch as God thus gives himself the relationship of God to the feeling subject) must be treated within religion.[62] [63] Thus the determination that God *is,* the determination of what has being in and for itself, this determination of [God's] being, is a determination that falls essentially within the treatment of religion,
55 within the treatment of the nature of its object. |

62. [*Ed.*] *Auch dieser Standpunkt—insofern sich Gott diese letzte Vereinzelung des Diesen gibt, zu dem Gegenstand als einem Erkennenden und dem Gegenstand als Denkenden—, und der Gedanke—insofern er sich das Verhältnis Gottes gibt also zum fühlenden Subjekt—muss auch innerhalb der Religion abgehandelt werden.* The German of this sentence is difficult to construe, and the meaning is not entirely clear. The basic point seems to be that acts of cognition and states of feeling are possible within religion because God, by entering into otherness as a singular "this," and by relating himself to subjective feeling, makes himself to be the object of such acts and states. Similarly, as the next sentence indicates, the determination that God *is* falls within the treatment of religion rather than being something that must be demonstrated in advance, abstractly. On this last matter, see below, n. 72.

63. W_1 *(HgG/Var?) adds:* If we also say that feeling and devotion are essential, this is only because there is a spiritual relationship or spirituality in this feeling. W_2 *adds:* because there is a spiritual relationship or spirituality in this feeling.

5. Survey of the Stages of Our Discussion[64]

The more precise division of our treatment is as follows. The first topic is the concept of religion itself in general; the second is the necessary or determinate religion, religion in its determinateness; the third is religion in its infinitude, the absolute religion as existing. The concept of religion is not yet religion in the way it exists, while determinate religion, just because it is determinate, does not yet correspond to the concept. Religion contains within itself the infinite absolute content. Determinate religion does not correspond to this content, for it is finite. The infinite religion is what first corresponds to the concept; it is the consummate religion, i.e., the Christian religion.

I. The Concept of Religion

We have to consider the moments [of the concept] in more detail. Taken in its speculative, absolute sense, the concept of religion is the concept of the spirit that is conscious of its essence or of itself. The mode and manner of consciousness, the way that spirit itself is for itself or is objective to itself, is, as a rule, *representation,* and thus absolute consciousness is *religion.* It is *philosophy* to the extent that spirit is conscious of itself not in the mode of representation but in that of *thought.* This is now the *speculative concept,* spirit conscious of itself.

Now, speaking more precisely, the following moments are contained in this concept. First, we consider the determinateness, the

64. [*Ed.*] The heading for this section is found in *P*; the first two subheads are in *G*, while the third is editorial. It is noteworthy that the *Concept of Religion* in the 1824 lectures does not correspond to the summary given here until the last section, and then only partially. The summary describes the three moments of the concept of religion, which correspond to the logical moments of the concept as such, namely the moments of universal substance (the metaphysical concept of God), differentiation or consciousness (the theoretical religious relationship), and sublation of the difference or the cultus (the practical relationship). But Hegel adopted this logical structure of the *Concept of Religion* only in 1827; the 1824 *Concept* is still largely concerned with preliminary matters, such as the establishment of the speculative standpoint vis-à-vis the empirical, and a continuing polemic against the views of the time. Hegel clearly had arrived at his mature conception of the lectures by 1824, but it is as though he were distracted from putting it into place by his preoccupation with opposing views—a preoccupation that is at its height in 1824.

metaphysical content, the pure thought of it. Second, because it is a consciousness, pure thought does not stay pure but enters into the distinction of consciousness. In this consciousness we have two sides, the object and the subject for which this object is; this is the standpoint of finite spirit within religion. Spirit rules in religion. According to its concept, in and for itself, spirit is infinite, and spirit rules insofar as it differentiates itself inwardly; but as the inwardly self-differentiating spirit that gives itself consciousness, as spirit in relation to an other within its distinction, it is finite. And it is just from this standpoint of finite spirit that we are to consider the shape in which its essence is object to it. The *first* moment is therefore the *substantial* one, the *second* the standpoint of *consciousness,* while the *third* is the sublating of this finite standpoint of con-
56 sciousness, the uniting of both sides, the *cultus.* The concept | of religion [is] the substantial basis of religion, the substance that is one. The standpoint of consciousness is the subordinate moment of difference. Then there is the return to the first, substantial standpoint. [First] the concept is for us, [though] in actuality it is what is *inward;* at the second stage it *appears* as object, as something *external;* only at the third stage is it *one,* does it become *cultus.* These three moments belong to the idea of religion in general, to religion insofar as it is idea. The first is the *abstract* concept, the second the process or the *realization* of the concept, and the third the *identity* of the first two.

II. Determinate Religion

What is second, then, is that we have to consider determinate religion, religion in its determinateness. The route from abstract to concrete is based on our method, on the concept, ˜or rather on the nature of the concept. The fact that the concept resolves to determine itself, that absolute spirit resolves to be in a determinate mode, we can present in the following manner.˜[65] Spirit *is* in the most *concrete* sense. The absolute or highest being belongs to it. But spirit is, and this being belongs to it, only insofar as it is *for* itself,

65. *W (HgG) reads:* not on the fact that much particular content is at hand. Our view distinguishes itself totally from this.

i.e., insofar as it posits itself or brings itself forth; for it *is only as activity.*"[66] It is not immediate; natural things are immediate and abide in this [immediate] being. Spirit's being is not immediate in this way, but only as self-producing, as making itself for itself.[67] Spirit comes to itself; this is a movement, an activity, a mediation of itself with | itself. It involves distinctions and directions, and this 57
succession of directed movements is the path by which spirit comes to itself, for spirit is itself the goal. The absolute goal is to recognize itself, to be for itself. That it cognizes itself, that it is as object for itself, that it grasps itself in the complete intuition and complete consciousness of itself, is object to itself in the way that it is in itself, and comes to complete cognition of itself—this goal is its true goal. This process by which spirit produces itself or comes to itself, this path it takes, contains distinguishable determinations and distinct moments. The path is not yet the goal. Spirit does not reach the goal without having traversed the path, is not at the goal from the outset; that which is most perfect [i.e., complete] must traverse the path *to* the goal.[68] Something cannot be perfect from its very beginning, but only when it attains itself, attains its goal. Therefore spirit is this process and is perfect only at its goal. At the stations of its process spirit is not yet perfect; its consciousness concerning itself is not yet authentic; it is not yet manifest to itself according to its truth; it is revealed to itself only at its goal. Inasmuch as spirit is essentially this activity of self-production, these are stages of its consciousness, but it is conscious of itself only according to these stations. These distinct stages now yield the determinate religions;

66. W_1 *reads:* brings itself forth and to consciousness. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* brings itself forth. But in this its activity it is knowing, and it is what it is only as knowing. Thus it is essential for religion not to be only in its concept, but to be the consciousness of what the concept is; and the material in which the concept carries itself out, as the plan so to speak, the material it makes its own and shapes in conformity with itself, is human consciousness—as, for example, right, too, only is because it exists in spirit and engages the will of human beings, and because they know it as the determination of their will. In this way the idea first realizes itself, whereas it was posited beforehand in the first instance only as the form of the concept.

67. *W (HgG) adds:* through negation, as subject, otherwise it is only substance.

68. *W (HgG) adds:* in order to gain it.

[a determinate] religion is a consciousness of universal spirit that is not yet for itself as absolute. This consciousness, at each stage, of the spirit that has not yet penetrated to itself, is spirit's determinate consciousness ~but not yet absolute consciousness; i.e., it is determinate religion.~[69] We therefore have to consider the determinate religions, imperfect as they are, because they are stages of the path of spirit. It is the very nature of spirit itself that it forges this path, for *it is* only through the fact that it *becomes for itself*.

We now have to consider these determinate religions in three ways. *First,* we must look at the determinateness of any such religion as a pure determination of thought, i.e., we must consider its metaphysical concept. What will present itself to us in this metaphysical
58 determinacy is the content that, in the older tradition | of philosophy—[for example, in the] Wolffian philosophy[70]—took the form of the "proofs of the existence of God." We shall consider in more detail how this form of "giving proofs" is deficient and faulty. In more recent times we no longer hear of these "proofs," since "proof" as such is only a procedure of the understanding, [whereas] here only speculative reason suffices. Besides being representations, these "proofs of God's existence" also have a certain content, a thought-content, and it is noteworthy that these different proofs correspond to the different stages of determinate religion. (The fact that there are a number of proofs[71] already speaks against them, since a proof must on its own account be adequate and exhaustive if it is suited to the nature of its object.) Therefore the different

69. *W (HgG) reads:* the path of spirit's education.

70. [*Ed.*] Hegel probably refers to Wolff in particular because in Wolff's *Theologia naturalis* the proofs not only are given but also determine the conception of natural theology. The existence and attributes of God are demonstrated a posteriori in the first part and a priori (taking the concept of the most perfect being as the point of departure) in the second part. For Wolff's demonstrative claim, see esp. his *Theologia naturalis,* Pars prior, §§ 2–4.

71. [*Ed.*] Hegel is thinking in particular of the cosmological, physico-theological, and ontological proofs. He does not discuss other, more ancient proofs (such as the proof *ex consensu gentium*—"from the consensus of the peoples") or more modern proofs (such as the moral proof in Kant's *Critique of Judgment,* §§ 86–89). A similar criticism of the multiplicity of proofs already is found in Wolff's *Theologia naturalis,* Pars prior, § 10: "In natural theology it is not requisite, and not even fitting, to expound God's existence with multiple proofs, for one proof suffices."

proofs of God's existence have a content; and it is precisely the different stages of the determinacy of religion that are expressed by their similarly determinate thought-content. In other words, the succession of the different determinate religions is contained in the succession of proofs.[72] This is a higher justification for these very proofs of God's existence, as we shall see. (It is easy to recognize their negative aspect, but difficult to recognize their affirmative import.) [Thus] the first step is [that we give an account of] the thought-determinacy of God and simultaneously of the determinacy of the finite and its sublation, in the course of which, by means of sublation, the very representation of God is supposed to arise—and we hold fast the pure thought-determinacy of religion, of a specific stage of religious consciousness.

The *second* step is that we consider the shape or the *representation of this determinacy,* i.e., what shape this determinacy must have. Religion is such a consciousness insofar as in religion there occurs that determinacy of consciousness for which the object is on the whole a represented object and not a conceived object; in other words, the subjective consciousness is a representing and not a conceiving consciousness (the latter is philosophy). We have to show that, in order to make itself capable of being represented, spirit must advance to the form wherein it is a subjective consciousness of something represented.

The *third* aspect is the *particular cultus,* the church of such a religion—the cultus or the mode of unification of the thought-determinacy and the representation. The historical side of religion (i.e., of the religions) is then linked especially with these two aspects, the modality of the shape and of the cultus. For it should be noted, in connection with determinate | religion, that these determinacies, 59
of which we take cognizance one after another [in logical order], have also been necessarily present in the world. When we consider the sequence of the determinate religions under the guidance of the

72. [*Ed.*] This helps to explain why in the 1821 and 1824 lectures Hegel considers the different proofs in relation to the concept of God as it appears in each of the determinate religions, rather than setting forth a demonstration of God's "existence" in advance of the concrete discussion. However, the latter is just what he does in 1827 by gathering all the proofs into the *Concept.*

concept, as ruled and determined by the concept, the sequence of the historical religions emerges for us from it, and thus we have the history of religions before us at the same time. For what is *necessary* through the concept must have *existed,* and the religions, as they have followed one another, have not arisen in a contingent manner. Instead it is spirit that governs what is inward, that has brought it forth. It is not the work of chance, and it is absurd to see contingency here.[73] Therefore the religions, in the way they have followed one another in history, are not determined externally but instead by the concept itself; they are determined by the very nature of spirit itself, which has forced itself into the world in order to bring itself to consciousness of itself. It traverses a process by which it brings itself to consciousness of itself. Inasmuch as we consider the consciousness of spirit and these determinate religions according to the concept, this is a purely philosophical treatment, but at the same time also a treatment of what *is.* Philosophy on the whole does not consider *what is not;* only *what is, is rational.* ([I mean] what *actually* is, not the merely phenomenal or the merely existing.)[74]

III. [The Revelatory Religion]

The third stage is that in this very course of the determinate religions the concept loses its finitude, loses this inadequacy of its existence, which it has in consciousness; it sublates its own untruth and comes to be as it is, arrives at genuine consciousness of itself. This is then the *revelatory* or *manifest religion,* and not only the *revealed* religion—manifest, whereas formerly religion was always still veiled, was not in its truth. The fact that what we cognize as the concept of religion is also the content of *this* religion holds good to begin with in the mode of representation. The content of religion itself

73. *W (HgG) adds:* in the manner of the historian.

74. [*Ed.*] The treatment of the cultus in the 1824 *Concept* is largely devoted to a survey of the development of the concept of religion through its history, specifically the fundamental and distinctive forms assumed by cultic practice. This survey appears to be an expansion of a similar brief survey given at the end of Sec. A of the *Ms. Concept,* and the preceding paragraph contains echoes of the *Ms.* at this point, too.

is found in a religious mode. Only when the time had come[75] did spirit become manifest; for the very movement of spirit, this path upon which it alone posits itself as spirit, whereby it becomes all things as spirit and arrives at the goal, is a path that falls within existence and hence in time. Religion | is for the universal con- 60
sciousness, the nonphilosophical consciousness, for consciousness of spirit generally; and thus for this general consciousness spirit is an object in a sensible mode, in representation; only in philosophy is spirit an object as concept.

This is therefore the general survey of our procedure. This procedure will to a certain degree be a theodicy.[76] Spirit is not only an abstract, otherworldly spirit, but living and contemporary spirit, [which] is present within consciousness and is effective. For this very reason spirit itself has to appear within consciousness and to pass through the [mode of] appearance, in order then *to be for itself*.

75. [*Ed.*] Hegel alludes to the New Testament idea of the fullness of time. See Mark 1:15, Gal. 4:4, Eph. 1:10.

76. [*Ed.*] With the term "theodicy" Hegel situates philosophy of religion in the ancient tradition of the "justification of God," which reaches back into antiquity and in particular to Stoicism. He is probably thinking above all of Leibniz's *Essays on Theodicy* (1719) (*Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 6).

INTRODUCTION

THE LECTURES OF 1827

Preface[1]

What we must take into consideration is first the relation of the philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole, and second the relationship of the science of religion to the needs of our time.

The object is religion. This is the loftiest object that can occupy human beings; it is the absolute object. It is the region of eternal truth and eternal virtue, the region where all the riddles of thought, all contradictions, and all the sorrows of the heart should show themselves to be resolved, and the region of the eternal peace through which the human being is truly human. All the endless

1. [*Ed.*] None of the extant manuscripts has an initial heading. One might suppose, on the basis of the summary statement in the opening sentence, that the first topic to be considered, beginning immediately in the next paragraph, is "the relation of the philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole." But this summary is misleading since the first topic Hegel considers—and only after what we are calling the "Preface"—is rather different (see n. 5). The summary of the first of the two points to be considered actually reflects the 1824 lectures, which indicates that Hegel used the Griesheim transcript of 1824 when he lectured in 1827, changing the content of the latter lectures as he proceeded. The first long paragraph ("The object is religion . . . our intent to consider") is based on the opening remarks in the *Ms.*, which Hegel repeated in 1824 and 1827. In order to identify this common material we are using the heading "Preface," although it is not an expression used by Hegel himself. The 1827 "Preface" cannot be reconstructed from either *W* or *L* since both of them tightly interweave materials from 1821, 1824, and 1827 in an editorial version of Hegel's opening remarks. Our text at this point is based on the transcript of the Polish student Hube, whose German left something to be desired. His staccato sentences, rapid shifts of images, and grammatical infelicities have been smoothed out a bit, but the style is not characteristic of Hegel and the contents are abbreviated.

intricacies of human activity and pleasures arise from the determination of human being as implicitly spirit. Everything that people value and esteem, everything on which they think to base their pride and glory, all of this finds its ultimate focal point in religion, in the thought or consciousness of God and in the feeling of God. God is the beginning and end of all things. God is the sacred center, which animates and inspires all things. Religion possesses its object within itself—and that object is God, for religion is the relation of human consciousness to God. The object of religion *is* simply through itself and on its own account; it is the absolutely final end in and for itself, the absolutely free being. Here our concern about the final end can have no other final end than this object itself. Only in this context do all other aims experience their settlement. In its concern with this object, spirit frees itself from all finitude. ˜This concern is the true liberation of the human being and is freedom itself, true
62 consciousness of the truth.˜[2] Everything [else] drops into the | past. Finite life seems like a desert. Religion is the consciousness of freedom and truth. If our concern with it is a feeling then it is bliss, and if an activity then it has to manifest God's glory and majesty. This concept of religion is universal. Religion holds this position for all peoples and persons. Everywhere this concern is regarded as the sabbath of life. Truly in this region of the spirit flow the waters of forgetfulness from which the soul drinks.[3] All the griefs of this bank and shoal[4] of life vanish away in this aether, whether in the feeling of devotion or of hope. All of it drops into the past. In religion all cares pass away, for in it one finds oneself fortunate. All harshness of fate passes into a dream. Everything earthly dissolves into light and love, not a remote but an actually present liveliness, certainty, and enjoyment. Even if [the bliss of] religion

2. *Thus Hu with An; W_1 reads:* In its concern with this object, spirit unburdens itself of all finitude. This concern leads to satisfaction and liberation. *W_2 (Var/1831?) reads:* In the region in which spirit concerns itself with this aim it unburdens itself of all finitude and gains ultimate satisfaction and liberation; for here spirit no longer relates itself to something other and limited, but to the unlimited and the infinite instead. This is an infinite relationship, a relationship of freedom and no longer one of dependence.

3. [*Ed.*] See *Ms. Intro.*, n. 11.

4. [*Ed.*] See *Ms. Intro.*, n. 10.

is put off into the future, it is still radiant in life here and now, or in the actuality within which this image is effective and substantial. Such is the universal content of religion among human beings; this content it is our intent to consider.

1. Comparison of Philosophy and Religion with Regard to Their Object[5]

[6]~But it should be noted straightaway that the proposal to "consider" it involves a relationship to it that is already twisted out of shape. For when | we speak of "consideration" and "object" we 63
are distinguishing the two as freestanding, mutually independent,

5. [*Ed.*] In this section Hegel does not consider "the relation of philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole," as he suggests in his initial summary statement (see n. 1), but rather offers a comparison of philosophy and religion with regard to their object (hence our editorial section heading). Hegel makes two basic points: that the object or content of philosophy and religion is one and the same, and that the connection between philosophy and religion has already been established in the tradition. While this section may be considered to be new, it draws on materials from earlier lectures, including parts of the *Ms. Introduction* and Sec. A of *The Concept of Religion* in the *Ms.*

6. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads (parallel in main text follows):* Since we remarked earlier that philosophy makes religion the object of its consideration, and since this consideration now seems to have the aspect of something distinct from its object, it looks as if we are still standing in the relationship where both sides are independent of one another and remain separate. In assuming this observational relationship, we would be stepping outside of the region of devotion and enjoyment that religion is; the object and the [act of] consideration as the movement of thought would then be as distinct as (for example) the spatial figures in mathematics are distinct from the spirit that considers them. But this is only the relationship as it appears to begin with, when cognition is still severed from the religious side and is *finite* cognition. If we look more closely, however, it is evident that in fact the content, need, and interest of philosophy is something it has in common with religion.

The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth in its very objectivity, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is not worldly wisdom but cognition of the nonworldly; not cognition of external mass or of empirical existence and life, but cognition of what is eternal, of what God is and what flows from God's nature: for this nature must reveal and develop itself. Hence philosophy is only explicating *itself* when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. Since it is the concern with eternal truth, which is in and for itself, and indeed since it is the occupation of thinking spirit (not of [individual] caprice and of particular interest) with this object, philosophy is the same activity as religion. In its philosophizing, spirit immerses itself just as vitally in this object, and relinquishes its particularity in the same way. For it

fixed sides that are mutually opposed. For example, space is the object of geometry, but the spatial figures that it considers are distinct from the considering spirit, for they are only its "object." So if we say now that philosophy ought to consider religion, then these two are likewise set in a relationship of distinction in which they stand in opposition to one another. But on the contrary it must be said that the content of philosophy, its need and interest, is wholly in common with that of religion. The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is only explicating *itself* when

penetrates its object just as the religious consciousness does, which also has nothing of its own but only wants to immerse itself in this content.

Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself the service of God; it *is* religion, because it involves the same renunciation of subjective fancies and opinions in its concern with God. Thus philosophy is identical with religion, and the distinction [between them] is that philosophy exists in a waypeculiar to itself, distinguished from the mode we are accustomed to call "religion" as such. What they have in common is that they are both religion; what distinguishes them consists only in the type and mode of religion [that each is]. They differ in the peculiar character of their concern with God. But this is where the difficulties lie, which seem so great that for philosophy ever to be one with religion counts as an impossibility. The apprehensive attitude of theology toward philosophy and the [mutually] hostile stance of religion and philosophy arise from this. In the perspective of this hostile stance (as theology construes it), it seems that philosophy works to corrupt the content of religion, destroying and profaning it, and that the concern of philosophy with God is completely different from that of religion. This is the old antipathy and contradiction that we already see among the Greeks; for even among the Athenians, that free and democratic people, books were burned and Socrates was condemned to death. But now this antipathy is held to be an acknowledged fact, and more so than the just-asserted unity of religion and philosophy.

Old as this antipathy is, however, the linkage of philosophy with religion is just as ancient. Already for the Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists, still situated within the pagan world, the folk deities were not deities of phantasy but had become deities of thought. Afterward this linkage found a place in the work of the most eminent church fathers, who adopted an essentially conceptual approach in their religiosity, by setting out from the assumption that theology is religion together with a thinking, comprehending consciousness. The Christian church owes to their philosophical instruction the first beginnings of a content of Christian doctrine.

This uniting of religion with philosophy was carried through even more fully in the Middle Ages. So far were they from believing that conceptual knowing might be injurious to faith that it was regarded as essential to the further development of faith itself. These great men—Anselm, Abelard, etc.—developed the definitions of the faith still further on the basis of philosophy.

it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. For the *thinking* spirit is what penetrates this object, the truth; it is thinking that enjoys the truth and purifies the subjective consciousness. Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself | the service of God,[7] as is religion. But each of 64
them, religion as well as philosophy, is the service of God in a way peculiar to it (about which more needs to be said). They differ in the peculiar character of their concern with God. This is where the difficulties lie that impede philosophy's grasp of religion; and it often appears impossible for the two of them to be united. The apprehensive attitude of religion toward philosophy and the hostile stance of each toward the other arise from this. It seems, as the theologians frequently suggest, that philosophy works to corrupt the content of religion, destroying and profaning it. This old antipathy stands before our eyes as something admitted and acknowledged, more generally acknowledged than their unity. The time seems to have arrived, however, when philosophy can deal with religion more impartially on the one hand, and more fruitfully and auspiciously on the other.

This linkage between them is nothing new. It already obtained among the more eminent of the church fathers,[8] who had steeped themselves particularly in Neopythagorean, Neoplatonic, and Neoaristotelian philosophy. | For one thing, they themselves first 65
passed over to Christianity from philosophy; and for another, they applied that philosophical profundity of spirit to the teachings of Christianity. The church owes to their philosophical instruction the first beginnings of Christian doctrine, the development of a *dogmatics.* (Of course it is often said to be a pity that Christianity ever required a determinate content and a dogmatics. We shall have to say more later about the relationship [of the dogmatic content] to religious sensibility, to the purely intensive element in devotion.)

7. [*Ed.*] See *Ms. Intro.*, n. 6.

8. [*Ed.*] Hegel is presumably thinking in particular of Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, even though in the sense of orthodox dogmatics the latter two do not count as church fathers, or do so only in a qualified way. Perhaps he is also thinking of Augustine. Nowhere can more exact information about the church fathers be obtained from his work.

We can see the same linkage between theology and philosophy in the Middle Ages, too. Scholastic philosophy is identical with theology; theology is philosophy, and philosophy is theology. So far were they from believing that thinking, conceptual knowing, might be injurious to theology that it was regarded as necessary, as essential to theology itself. These great men—Anselm, Abelard, etc.—built up theology out of philosophy.˜ Thus Anselm said: *cum ad fidem perveneris, negligentiae mihi esse videtur non intellegere quod credis.*[9] [10] |

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2. The Relationship of the Science of Religion to the Needs of Our Time[11]

˜Although it follows upon a period when the antipathy became

9. [*Ed.*] "When you have achieved faith, it seems to me to be negligence not to understand what you believe." This is an abbreviated quotation from memory, taken from Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*, chap. 2: *Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei credamus, priusquam ea praesumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intellegere* (Migne *Patrologia Latina* 158.362b.) "As the right order requires us to believe the deep things of Christian faith before we undertake to discuss them by reason; so to my mind it appears a neglect if, after we are established in the faith, we do not seek to understand what we believe" (translation by S. N. Deane, *St. Anselm: Basic Writings* [LaSalle, Ill., 1962], p. 179). While Hegel was familiar with the major works of Anselm—the *Cur Deus Homo*, the *Monologion*, and the *Proslogion*—and considered this eleventh-century theologian to be a seminal figure in the history of speculative thought about God, he probably knew Abelard only from the accounts in the histories of philosophy by Jacob Brucker, Dietrich Tiedemann, and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, to which he refers in commenting on Abelard in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*.

10. W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* In constructing its world for itself over against religion, cognition would have made only a finite content its own. But in that it has developed itself further, i.e. into the true philosophy, it has the same content as religion.

But if in a preliminary way we now seek out the distinction between religion and philosophy as it comes to prominence within this unity of content, we find it to be as follows.

11. [*Ed.*] This heading, suggested by the summary statement in the opening paragraph (see n. 1), designates the longest section in the 1827 *Introduction*. It is not clearly organized and appears to be something of a grab bag of themes taken over and highlighted from the 1824 *Introduction*. For example, the first topic, the reduced doctrinal content of present-day theology, is a modification of the critique of historical theology in Sec. 2 of the 1824 lectures. The second topic, in which Hegel argues that the knowledge of God, while based on immediate experience,

once more a presupposition,[12] the present day seems again to be more propitious for the linkage of philosophy and theology. In support of this view two circumstances must be underlined. The first concerns the content, the second the form."[13] With reference

also has cognitive content, further develops the critique of the theology of reason and the theology of feeling found in the same section of the 1824 *Introduction.* The argument that there can be no investigation of the cognitive faculty in advance of cognition draws upon one of the "preliminary questions" in Sec. 4 of 1824, namely, that there is no epistemological prolegomenon to philosophy that is not already speculative in character. Only the summary description of speculative method—which achieves a unification of opposites in which the element of difference is not extinguished but sublated—appears to be new. It is clear that in 1827 Hegel's conflict with the philosophical and theological views of the time becomes the dominant theme of the *Introduction.* However, this polemic does not spill over into *The Concept of Religion* as it does in 1824, so it may well be that Hegel determined in 1827 to concentrate the polemic in the *Introduction,* allowing *The Concept of Religion* to be organized according to the moments of the self-explication of the concept of God, quite apart from partisan considerations. Some material from Sec. A of the *Ms. Concept* is also included here—material of an introductory character no longer appropriate to the 1827 *Concept.*

12. [*Ed.*] A reference possibly to the confessionalism of the Lutheran Reformation with its attack on Scholastic thought, and certainly to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophies that sharpened the distinction between natural and revealed (positive) religion in a manner critical of the latter.

13. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Thus in accordance with all its base ramifications, the contemporary view unconcerned with knowledge of God does not hesitate, in the blind arrogance that is peculiar to it, to turn against philosophy. Yet philosophy is the liberation of spirit from that disgraceful abasement; and philosophy has drawn religion forth once more out of the level of profoundest suffering that it was forced to undergo from that standpoint. The very theologians who are still at home only in that state of vanity have dared to complain against philosophy for its destructive tendency, theologians who [themselves] no longer possess any of the content that is subject to possible destruction. In order to repulse these objections, which are not only unfounded but even more frivolous and unprincipled, we need only to look briefly to the way in which the theologians have rather done everything [they could] to dissolve the determinate character of religion. They have (1) thrust the dogmas into the background or declared them to be unimportant, or have (2) considered the dogmas only as alien definitions by other people and as mere phenomena from a history that is long gone. When we have reflected thus upon this aspect of the content, and have seen how philosophy reinstates it and renders it secure from the depredations of theology, then we shall (3) reflect upon the form of that standpoint, and shall see here how that orientation, which in its form is antagonistic to philosophy, is so ignorant about itself that it does not even know in what way it contains implicitly within itself the very principle of philosophy.

to the *content*, the reproach has usually been brought against philosophy that by it the content of the doctrine of the revealed, positive religion is suppressed, that through it Christianity is destroyed. Only a so-called natural religion[14] and theology has been admitted in philosophy, i.e., a content that the natural light of reason could supply regarding God; but it was invariably considered as standing opposed to Christianity. At present this reproach that philosophy is destructive of dogma has been removed, and in fact the theology of our time, i.e. of the last thirty to fifty years, has on its own part effected this removal.

In recent theology very few of the dogmas of the earlier system
67 of ecclesiastical confessions have survived or at least | retained the importance previously attributed to them, and others have not been set in their place. ˜One could easily arrive at the view˜[15] that a widespread, nearly universal indifference toward the doctrines of faith formerly regarded as essential has entered into the general religiousness of the public. For though Christ as reconciler and savior is still constantly made the focus of faith, nevertheless what formerly was called in orthodox dogmatics the work of salvation has taken on a significance so strongly psychological and so very prosaic that only the semblance of the ancient doctrine of the church remains. In lieu of the former dogmas we now behold in Christ merely "great energy of character and constancy of conviction, for the sake of which Christ deemed his life of no account."[16] This is now the universal object of faith. Thus Christ is dragged down to the level of human affairs, not to the level of the commonplace but still to that of the human, into the sphere of a mode of action of which pagans such as Socrates have also been capable. And so, although Christ has remained the focal point of faith for many

14. [*Ed.*] The idea of a "natural religion," as contrasted with revealed religion, is common throughout the Enlightenment. See in particular Herbert of Cherbury (with whose thought Hegel would not have been familiar), Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume. The idea of a "natural light of reason," however, may be traced back to Bacon, Thomas Aquinas, and Cicero.

15. W_2 *(Var) reads (similar in* W_1*)*: One can easily convince oneself [of this] by considering what now actually passes for the dogmas of the church

16. [*Ed.*] This quotation cannot be identified in its present form. Hegel may have conflated passages with which he was familiar from rationalistic exegesis and dogmatics in a fashion such as this.

people who are religious and also more profound in outlook, it must still seem that the most weighty doctrines have lost much of their interest, faith in the Trinity for example, or the miracles in the Old and New Testaments, etc.[17]

If a large part of the educated public, even many theologians, had to declare with hand on heart whether they hold those doctrines of faith to be indispensable for eternal blessedness, or whether not believing | in them would have eternal damnation as its conse- 68
quence, there can surely be no doubt what the answer would be.[18] "Eternal damnation" and "eternal blessedness" are themselves phrases that may not be used in so-called polite company; such expressions count as ἄρρητα.[19] Even though one does not disavow them, one still would be embarrassed to have to declare oneself about them.[20] And if one has read the books of dogmatics, of

17. W_2 *(1831) adds (similar in* W_1*):* The divinity of Christ, i.e., the dogmatic element proper to the Christian religion, is set aside or reduced to something universal only. Indeed this did not only happen in the Enlightenment, but it happens also in the work of more pious theologians. Both parties agree that the Trinity may have entered Christian doctrine from the Alexandrian school, or from the Neoplatonists. But although it must be conceded that the church fathers studied Greek philosophy, it is still primarily immaterial where that doctrine came from. The question is solely whether it is true in and for itself. That point, however, is not investigated, and yet that doctrine is the fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion.

[*Ed.*] From the allusion to "more pious theologians," as well as from the Preface to the 2d ed. of the *Encyclopedia* (1827), we can assume that Hegel here has especially in mind F. A. G. Tholuck, whose *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients* was published in 1826. Tholuck was convinced that the doctrine of the triad was widespread in Islamic thought and in late Greek philosophy, and that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is closely linked with Neoplatonism. In his *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), Tholuck argues that, while the speculative idea of the Trinity may be "decorative timbering" (*Fachwerk*), it can never be the foundation of the house of faith (pp. 219–220). Hegel responds to this view critically in his letter to Tholuck of 3 July 1826 (*Briefe* 4/2:60–61).

18. [*Ed.*] On the neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity among Hegel's theological contemporaries, see above, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 34, as well as the preceding note.

19. [*Ed.*] Literally, "inexpressible." *W* adds as an explanatory comment: "such things as one is averse to [or dreads] expressing."

20. *W (1831) has* express *in place of* declare *and adds:* In the doctrinal theologies of these theologians we shall find that the dogmas have become very lean and shriveled up, though there may, to be sure, be a great flurry of words.

edification and sermons of our day, in which the basic doctrines of Christianity ought to be expounded or at any rate taken as fundamental, and one were obliged to pass judgment on whether in the greater part of current theological literature those doctrines are expressed in an orthodox sense and without ambiguity or escape hatches, then again there is no question what the answer would be. "If now theology no longer places such importance on the positive doctrines of Christianity, or for that matter if through their interpretation these doctrines are enveloped in such a fog, then one impediment to the philosophical comprehension of dogmas drops away, which used to arise from the fact that philosophy was considered to be an opponent of the teachings of the church. If those doctrines have declined so sharply in their interest, then philosophy can operate without constraint in regard to them."[21]

The most important sign that these positive dogmas have lost much of their importance is that in the main these doctrines are
69 treated *historically*. [22]As far as this historical procedure | is concerned, it deals with thoughts and representations that were had, introduced, and fought over by others, with convictions that belong to others, with histories that do not take place within our spirit, do not engage the needs of our spirit. What is of interest is rather how these things have come about in the case of others, the contingent way in which they were formed.[23] The absolute way in which

21. *W (1831) reads:* It seems that, in accord with the general education of most of them, the theologians themselves endow the principal doctrines of positive Christianity with the importance that was formerly ascribed to them (when they were even valued as principal doctrines) only after they have been enveloped in a fog of vagueness. Now if philosophy ever did count as the opponent of church doctrine, it can be an opponent no longer; for the doctrines whose ruin philosophy seemed to threaten are no longer valid in the universal conviction. So when it considers those dogmas in a conceptual manner, a great deal of the danger for philosophy from this quarter should therefore have been set aside, and philosophy can operate without constraint in regard to the dogmas that have declined so sharply in interest for the theologians themselves.

22. *Precedes in L (1827?):* This theology, which adopts only a historical attitude with respect to the cognition of God, and which is indeed a cornucopia of cognitions but only of an external sort, clings tightly to merely historical perspectives and piles up a mass of content as external information.

23. *L (1827?) adds:* The subject is there dealing not with its own commitments to believe, with a cognition that should belong to it and be for its own benefit, but

these doctrines were formed—out of the depths of spirit—is forgotten, and so their necessity and truth is forgotten, too, and the question what one holds as one's own conviction meets with astonishment. The historical procedure is very busy with these doctrines, though not with their content but rather with the external features of the controversies about them, with the passions that have attached themselves to them, etc. ˜For this reason˜[24] philosophy no longer has to face the reproach that it devalues the dogmas. Instead it suffers the reproach of containing within itself too much of the teachings of the church, ˜more than the generally prevailing theology of our time.˜[25] | 70

˜The other circumstance that seems to favor the renewed linkage of theology and philosophy concerns the *form*. Here indeed it is a question of the conviction of the age˜[26] that God is revealed immediately in the consciousness of human beings, that religion

with a cognition of the opinions and views of others, not with the thing itself; the thing itself would benefit anyone concerned with it. W_2 *(Var) reads:* formed and appeared; and the question what one holds as one's own conviction meets with astonishment. W_1 *(Var) reads:* formed and appeared.

24. *W (1831) reads:* Here theology has by its own act been set in a sufficiently abject position. W_1 *(1831) adds further:* For this reason philosophy seems to be in little danger when it is reproached for treating the Christian dogmas in a thoughtful way, or indeed for opposing the church doctrines themselves. If there are now only a few dogmas, or if these dogmas are now only a matter of history, then philosophy could no longer be opposed to them, and then

25. W_1 *(1831) reads:* It is also quite correct that philosophy contains infinitely more than the more recent superficial theology. The latter is wholly built upon just that reflection for which philosophy will not grant any validity, and it reduces the positive doctrines to a minimum. The reinstatement of the authentic doctrine of the church must emanate from philosophy, for philosophy is what guides that vacuous reflective activity back to its ground, that is, philosophy is that in which it goes to the ground [i.e. perishes]. The one circumstance that can be called propitious for the philosophical consideration of religion concerned the content.

26. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Because of the emptiness of the standpoint we are considering, it might seem that we have only referred to the reproaches that it raises up against philosophy, in order to declare expressly that our own aim, which we, by contrast, shall not relinquish, is to do the opposite of what that standpoint holds to be ultimate—namely, to have cognition of God. Yet it still has in its form an implicit aspect in which it must actually hold a rational interest for us; and under this aspect the more recent stance of theology is even more propitious for philosophy. For bound up with the fact that all objective determinateness has collapsed into the inwardness of subjectivity, there is precisely the conviction

amounts just to this point, that the human being *knows God immediately*. This immediate knowing is called "religion," but also "reason" and "faith," too, though faith in a sense different from that of the church. "All conviction *that* God is, and regarding *what* God is, rests, so it is surmised, upon this immediate revealedness in the human being, upon this faith.[27] This general representation is now an established preconception."[28] It implies that the highest or religious content discloses itself to the human being in the spirit itself, that spirit manifests itself in spirit, *in this my own spirit,* that faith has its root in the inner self or in what is most my own, that my inmost core is inseparable from it. This is the general principle,

27. [*Ed.*] While Hegel may also have Schleiermacher in mind at this point, in his view it was primarily Jacobi who laid the theoretical foundation for the theology of immediacy with the claim that all human knowledge derives from an attitude of immediate certainty that he called "faith." In a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, Jacobi wrote: "We have all been born into faith and must remain in faith, just as we have all been born into society and must remain in society. *Totum parte prius essenecesse est.* How can we strive for certainty if we are not already acquainted with it, and how can we be acquainted with it otherwise than by means of something that we already acknowledge with certainty? This leads to the concept of an immediate certainty that not only requires no grounds but utterly excludes every ground, and is purely and simply the representation itself harmonizing with the represented thing. Conviction based on grounds is a certainty at second hand. . . . If every truth-claim that does not spring from rational grounds is faith, then conviction based on rational grounds must itself come from faith and receive its force from faith alone" (Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 215–217 [*Werke* 4/1:210–211]). Jacobi's views are summed up in the epigram: "The element in which all human cognition and agency takes place is faith" (*ibid.*, p. 228 [p. 223]). See also his *David Hume*, pp. 24 ff. (*Werke* 2:145 ff.). On Hegel's criticism of these views, see his *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 63 remark; see also below, *Ms. Concept*, n. 68.

28. *Thus L; similar in An; Hu reads:* This contention is completely familiar and requires no further discussion. *Follows in L (1827?):* Later we shall discuss more precisely how it came about. For the present we take it in its direct sense, without any polemical orientation against philosophy, as the contention that the consciousness of God is immediately present in [human] spirit along with its consciousness of itself. W_1 *(Var) reads:* All conviction . . . in the human being. This contention in the direct sense, aside from the fact that it has given itself a polemical orientation against philosophy (we will deal with that later), requires no proof, no corroboration. W_2 *(Var) reads:* Regarded now from this standpoint, all knowledge, all conviction and piety, rests upon the fact that in [human] spirit as such the consciousness of God is immediately present along with its consciousness of itself. (a) This contention in the direct sense, aside from the fact that it has given itself a polemical orientation against philosophy, is valid as such and requires no proof, no corroboration.

the way in which religious faith is defined in recent times as immediate intuition, as knowledge within me | that absolutely does 71
not come from without. Its effect is utterly to remove all external authority, all alien confirmation. What is to be valid for me must have its confirmation in my own spirit. The impetus can certainly come from without, but the external origin is unimportant. *That* I believe is due to *the witness of my own spirit.*

Now this being-present or manifesting of that content is the simple principle of philosophical cognition itself: namely, that our consciousness has immediate knowledge of God, that we have an absolutely certain knowledge of God's being. Not only does philosophy not repudiate this proposition, but it forms a basic determination within philosophy itself. In this way it is to be regarded as a gain, as a kind of good fortune, that basic principles of philosophy itself are active as general preconceptions in the universal [i.e. popular] mode of representation, so that the philosophical principle can more easily gain general assent among educated people.[29]

[30][However, in the first place,] in regard to this immediateknowledge it is noteworthy that the principle does not stand still at this simple determinacy, this naive content. It does not express itself merely affirmatively. Instead the naive knowledge proceeds polemically against cognition and is especially directed against the cognition or conceptual comprehension of God. What it demands is not merely that one should believe, should know immediately. What it maintains is not simply that consciousness of God is conjoined with self-consciousness, but rather that the relationship to God is only and exclusively an immediate one. The immediacy of the connectedness is taken as precluding the alternative determination of

29. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* In this general disposition of the spirit of the age, not only has philosophy therefore secured an outwardly favorable position (it has no dealings with what is external, least of all where philosophy and occupation with it exist as a state institution), but it is inwardly favored if its principle already lives of its own accord as an assumption in the spirit [of the people] and in their hearts. For philosophy has this principle in common with contemporary culture: that reason is the locus of spirit in which God reveals himself to human beings.

30. *In B's margin:* 8 May 1827

[*Ed.*] See below, n. 49.

mediation, and because it is a mediated knowledge philosophy is disparaged on the grounds that it is only a finite knowledge of the
72 finite. |

More precisely, the *immediacy* of this knowledge is supposed to reside above all in the fact that one knows *that* God is, *not what* God is. The expansion, the content, the fulfillment of the representation of God is thus negated. But what we call "cognition" involves knowing not only *that* an object is but *also what* it is; and knowing what it is, not just in a general way or having a certain acquaintance with it, some certitude about it, but knowing what its determinations are, what its content is, so that our knowing is a fulfilled and verified knowledge in which we are aware of the necessary connectedness of these determinations.

It is claimed that God cannot be cognized at all, but that we are only aware that God *is*; this we [supposedly] *found* in our consciousness.[31] If we first set aside the polemical orientation of this claim and consider only just what is involved in the assertion of immediate knowledge, it is this: that on the one hand it is our spirit itself that bears witness to this content, that the content does not come from without or only through instruction. On the contrary, our convicton about it rests on the assent of our own spirit, on our consciousness, that spirit finds this content within itself.[32] On the other hand, consciousness also relates itself to this content, so that this consciousness and this content, God, are inseparable. In fact it is *this connection* in general, this knowledge of God and the inseparability of consciousness from this content, that we call *religion in general.* But at the same time the implication in this assertion of immediate knowledge is that we ought to stop short with the consideration of religion as such—more precisely, with the consideration of this connection with God. There is to be no progressing to the cognitive knowledge of God, to the divine content

31. [*Ed.*] This standpoint is found in the contemporary philosophy originating from Jacobi. See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15.

32. W_1 *(1831) reads:* [it is] a self-limitation, which, with respect to its origin, is even acknowledged by philosophy, but then also resolved and exhibited in its one-sidedness and untruth by philosophy.

as this content would be divinely, or essentially, in God himself. In this sense it is further declared that we can know only our relation to God, not what God himself is. "Only our relation" falls within what is meant by religion generally.[33] That is why it is that nowadays we merely hear religion talked about but find no investigations into God's nature or what God might be within himself, | how God's 73
nature must be defined. God as such is not made the object [of inquiry] himself; God is not before us as an object of cognition, and knowledge does not spread out within this sphere. ⌜Only our relation to God, or religion as such, is an object [of inquiry] for us. Our discussion concerns religion as such and does not, or at least not very much, concern God. Expositions of God's nature have become ever fewer. What is said is only that human beings ought to have religion. The connection religion has with philosophy and the state is discussed, but not God.⌝[34]

But if we elucidate what is implied in the thesis of immediate knowledge, what is immediately declared by it, then God himself is expressed in relation to consciousness in such a way that this relation is something inseparable or that we must consider both sides together, ⌜and this is the essential object of our consideration.⌝[35] ⌜This is itself the philosophical idea, and is not opposed to

33. [*Ed.*] Here Hegel draws the consequences of the contemporary assertion of the noncognizability of God; cf. *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15. Perhaps he has specifically in mind Schleiermacher's view that the divine attributes do not denote "something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which we relate our feeling of absolute dependence to God." *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 64; in the 2d ed., § 50, the concluding clause is revised to read: ". . . in which the feeling of utter dependence is to be related to him."

34. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* and does not display differentiated determinations within it [i.e. in God as object of cognition], so that it is itself grasped as the relationship of these determinations and as relationship within its own self. God is not before us as object of cognition, but only our connection with God, our relationship to him. And while expositions of God's nature have become ever fewer, it is now demanded only that human beings ought to have religion or ought to abide in religion, and there is not supposed to be any advance to a divine content.

35. *Thus B; L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* We can, to be sure, distinguish subjective consciousness on the one hand, and God as object, God [viewed] objectively, on the other. This is an essential distinction in the entire doctrine of religion. But at the same time it is said that there is an unbreakable, essential relation between the two, and this is the important thing, not what one opines or fancies about God.

the philosophical concept."[36] According to the philosophical concept God is *spirit,* concrete; and if we inquire more precisely what spirit is, it turns out that the basic concept of spirit is the one whose
74 development constitutes the entire doctrine of religion. If we ask | our consciousness for a provisional account of what spirit is, the answer is that spirit is a self-manifesting, a being for spirit. *Spirit is for spirit* and of course not merely in an external, contingent manner. Instead it *is* spirit only insofar as it is *for* spirit. This is what constitutes the concept of spirit itself. Or, to put the point more theologically, God's spirit is [present] essentially in his community; God *is* spirit only insofar as God is in his *community.*[37]

Because the inseparable unity of consciousness with God is affirmed in what immediate knowledge contains, this inseparability therefore contains what is implied in the *concept of spirit:* [namely,] that spirit is for spirit itself, that the treatment cannot be one-sided or merely treatment of the subject according to its finitude, i.e., according to its contingent life; instead it [must be] considered under the aspect in which it has the infinite absolute content as its object. When the subject is considered by itself (the subjective individual as such) it is considered in its finite knowing, its knowledge of the finite. By the same token it is also maintained regarding the other side of the relation that God is not to be considered in isolation, for that is not possible. One knows of God only in connection with consciousness.[38]

"What has been stated are the basic characteristics that we can regard as immediate impressions and unmediated convictions of

36. *Thus B; W_2 (Var) reads:* Now what this contention contains as its real kernel is the philosophical idea itself, except that it is held by immediate knowledge within a limitation that is resolved and exhibited in its one-sidedness and untruth by philosophy. W_1 *(Var) reads:* If we set in relief what this contention contains, [we see] it is the philosophical idea itself.

37. W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* It is said that the world or the sensible universe must have onlookers and must be for spirit. And so God, too, must be for spirit all the more.

38. W_2 *(1831) adds (similar in W_1):* and thus the unity and inseparability of the two determinations, i.e., of knowledge of God and of self-consciousness, itself presupposes what is expressed in identity, and the dreaded identity is contained right in this unity and inseparability.

the age | relating expressly to religion, to knowledge of God.[39] 75
Therefore only what are basic elements or fundamental concepts of philosophy of religion can be linked up with this foundation. ˜This also provides us with an external justification˜[40] for forging a path to our science without having to be polemical toward the views that supposedly stand in the way of philosophy. Certainly these contentions do oppose themselves to philosophical cognition,˜˜[41] for there is no limit to that lack of awareness about the knowledge of God which is opposed to philosophy. But exactly those contentions, which for this reason maintain that they are contradicting philosophy, that they are contesting it and are most sharply opposed to it—if we look at their content, the determinate view they express, then we see that in themselves they exhibit agreement with that which they assail.

The result of the study of philosophy is that those walls of division, which are supposed to separate absolutely, become transparent; or that when we get to the bottom of things we discover

39. *L (1827?) adds (similar in* W_1*):* I have taken them straightforwardly according to what they contain, and have left to one side their opposition from the standpoint of philosophical cognition. We are still only in the introduction.

40. W_1 *(Var) reads:* Through this agreement with respect to the elements, to which attention has been drawn, an external justification is first of all provided in regard to our discussion

41. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* In fact we thus see the basic concept of philosophy present as a universal element within the culture of the age. And it is also evident here how philosophy does not stand above its age in the form of something completely different from the general determinateness of the age. Instead one spirit pervades actuality and philosophical thought, except that the latter is the true self-understanding of the actual. In other words, there is but one movement by which the age and philosophy themselves are borne along, the difference being simply that the determinateness of the age still appears to be present contingently, it still lacks justification, and so it can even yet stand in an unreconciled, hostile antithesis to that genuine and essential content, whereas philosophy, as justification of the principle, is also the universal peacemaking and reconciliation. Just as the Lutheran Reformation led the faith back to the primary centuries, the principle of immediate knowledge has led Christian cognition back to the primary elements. But if this reduction also causes the evaporation of the essential content at first, then it is philosophy that cognizes this principle of immediate knowledge itself as a content, and leads it on as such to its true unfolding within itself.

absolute agreement where we thought there was the most extreme antithesis.[42]

More specifically, these contemporary impressions are polemical against the amplification of the inherent content. We are to believe in God, but in general are not to know what God is, are not to
76 have any determinate knowledge of | God. The possession of determinate knowledge is what is meant by "cognition." On this basis theology as such has been reduced to a minimum of dogma. Its content has become extremely sparse although much talking, scholarship, and argumentation go on. This tendency is principally directed against the mode of amplification called dogmatics. We can compare this shift in attitude to what was done for the purpose of the Reformation. Then the amplification of the system of hierarchy was contested, and the leading of Christianity back to the simplicity of the first Christian era was offered as the defining goal. Similarly, it is basically characteristic of the modern period that the doctrines of the Protestant church have been brought back to a minimum. But despite theology's reduction of its knowledge to a minimum it still needs to know many things of different sorts, such as the ethical order and human relationships. Moreover, its subject matter is becoming more extensive; the learning displayed in its manifold historical eloquence is highly accomplished.[43] Thus one is engaged not with one's own cognition but with cognition of other people's representations. We can compare this bustling about of theology with the work of the countinghouse clerk or cashier, because all the active bustle is concerned with the alien truths of others.[44] It will become

42. *Thus also* W_2; W_1 *(1831) adds:* One must know only what is here the essential category of thought. Faith is also a knowledge, but an immediate knowledge. Thus the antithesis reduces to the abstract determinations of immediacy and mediation, which we have to refer to only in logic where these categories of thought are considered according to their truth.

43. *L (1827?) adds:* But because this proliferating content is not developed from the concept, does not and is not supposed to come about according to the concept, or according to cognition, it takes place arbitrarily, according to argumentation, which is opposed to rational cognition.

44. *W (1831) adds the following, after giving the 1824 version of this analogy:* Theology of this kind does not find itself any longer in the domain of thought at all; it does not any longer deal with infinite thought in and for itself, but deals with

plain in our treatment of the science of religion that it is the peculiar concern of reason to form itself into an all-embracing intellectual realm. The main thing about this intellectual formation is that it occurs *rationally,* according to the necessity of the subject matter, of the content itself, not according to caprice and chance. | 77

"Because it has thus contracted exclusively into the knowledge *that* God is, theology has extended its object to embrace ethical life and morality; and because this extension itself is not supposed to occur via cognition, it takes place *arbitrarily,* rather than according to necessity."[45] This argumentative thinking makes some assumption or other, and proceeds according to the relationships of the understanding [employed in the kind] of reflection that we have developed within us through our education, without any criticism of these relationships. That approach is gaining ground in this science [theology]. In contrast, development by means of the concept admits of no contingency. That is just why it is so fervently denounced, because it chains us down to proceeding according to the necessity of the thing rather than according to fancies and opinions.

That argumentative method involves assumptions, which themselves can in turn be called in question. Yet the argumentative theology of the Christian church pretends nevertheless to possess a firm footing, asserting, "For us the firm footing is the Bible, it is the words of the Bible." But against this one can quote the essential sense of the text, "the letter kills,"[46] etc. One does not take the words [of the Bible] as they stand, because what is understood by the biblical "word" is not words or letters as such but the spirit with which they are grasped. For we know historically that quite

it only as a finite fact, as opinion, representation, and the like. History occupies itself with truths that used to be truths, i.e., for others, and not with truths such as would be the possession of those who concern themselves with them.

45. W_1 *(1831) reads:* Although theology has severely reduced its actual knowledge of God to a minimum, it still needs to know many things of different sorts, such as the ethical order and human relationships. Moreover, its range and subject matter is becoming more extensive. But because, in the case of this proliferating content, this does not and is not supposed to come about according to the concept, according to cognition, it takes place arbitrarily, according to argumentation, which is opposed to rational cognition.

46. [*Ed.*] See 2 Cor. 3:6. "The written code kills, but the Spirit gives life."

opposite dogmas have been derived from these words, that the most contrasting viewpoints have been elicited from the letter of the text because the spirit did not grasp it. In these instances appeal was to the letter, but the genuine ground is the spirit.

The words of the Bible constitute an unsystematic account; they are Christianity as it appeared in the beginning. It is *spirit* that grasps the content, that spells it out.[47] How it is done depends on
78 how spirit | is disposed, on whether it is the right and true spirit that grasps the words. This true spirit can only be the one that proceeds within itself according to necessity, not according to assumptions. This spirit that interprets must legitimate itself on its own account, and its proper legitimation is the subject matter itself, the content, that which the concept substantiates.

Hence the authority of the canonical faith of the church has been in part degraded, in part removed. The *symbolum* or *regula fidei* itself is no longer regarded as something totally binding but instead as something that has to be interpreted and explained from the Bible. But the interpretation depends on the spirit that explains. The absolute footing is just the concept. To the contrary, by means of exegesis such basic doctrines of Christianity have been partly set aside and partly explained in quite lukewarm fashion. Dogmas such as those of the Trinity and the miracles have been put in the shadows by theology itself.[48] Their justification and true affirmation can occur only by means of the cognizing spirit, and for this reason much more of dogmatics has been preserved in philosophy than in dogmatics or in theology itself as such.

[49]We should note in the second place the consequence of imposing

47. *W (1831) adds after an interpolation from the 1824 lectures:* Whether the Bible has been made the foundation more for honor's sake alone or in fact with utter seriousness, still the nature of the interpretative explanation involves the fact that thought plays a part in it. Thought explicitly contains definitions, principles, and assumptions, which then make their own claims felt in the activity of interpreting.

48. [*Ed.*] See 1824 *Intro.*, n. 34, and above, n. 17.

49. *In B's margin:* 10 May 1827

[*Ed.*] If the following comments on investigating the cognitive faculty itself are "in the second place," then presumably what is first, in the discussion of the form of religious thought, is the preceding analysis of the immediate knowledge of God culminating in the remarks on its assumptions in relation to biblical authority (see above, n. 30). Both points are marked by a date notation in the margin of *B*.

upon philosophy, in particular upon philosophy of religion, the demand that before we embark upon cognitive knowing we must investigate the nature of the cognitive faculty itself; only this investigation of the instrument would show for certain whether we can rightfully try for cognition of God. We wanted just to proceed to the thing itself without turning to further preliminaries. But this question lies so close to our concern that it must be attended to. It seems to be a fair demand that one should test one's powers and examine one's instrument before setting to work.[50] But plausible as this demand may appear, it proves to be no less unjustified and empty. With such analogies it is often the case that forms that suit one context do not suit another. How should reason be investigated? Doubtless rationally. Therefore this investigation is itself a rational cognizing. For the | investigaton of cognition there is no way open 79
save that of cognition. We are supposed to cognize reason, and what we want to do is still supposed to be a rational cognizing. So we are imposing a requirement that annuls itself. This is the same demand as the one in the familiar anecdote in which a Scholastic declares that he won't go into the water until he has learned to swim.[51]

50. [*Ed.*] Hegel's thought is fundamentally at odds with a procedure that grants to epistemology, whether of the Cartesian, the empiricist, or the critical variety, a prior and privileged position within the philosophical enterprise. Cf. his critique of this procedure in the opening paragraphs of the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where his principal targets (as in this passage) are the critical philosophies of Kant and Reinhold.

51. [*Ed.*] This anecdote is contained in a collection of witticisms written in Greek, known as φιλογέλως ("Friend of Laughter"), collected by Hierocles of Alexandria and Philagrios the Grammarian in late antiquity. See *Philogelos der Lachfreund: Von Hierokles und Philagrios*, ed. A. Thierfelder (Munich, 1968), p. 28: § 2. "A Scholastic who wanted to swim was nearly drowned. He swore never again to go into the water until he had learned to swim." In the 1824 *Introduction* (see above, n. 60), Hegel alludes to the same anecdote, but, according to *G*, uses the term *Gascogner* ("Gascon") instead of *Scholastikus*, thus appearing to convert it into an ethnic joke about Frenchmen from Gascony, reputedly noted for their boasting. However, such a change makes little sense, and since only *G* gives this version he probably simply misunderstood Hegel or reconstructed the anecdote later from memory incorrectly. Hegel also used the anecdote in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy;* a student notebook of 1825–26 gives the Greek form σχολαστικός, as does the 2d ed. of these lectures in the *Werke* (see *History of Philosophy* 3:428), while the 1st ed. simply reads: "a man who wanted to swim" (*Werke* 15:555).

Besides, in philosophy of religion we have as our object God himself, *absolute reason.*[52] Since we know God [who is] absolute reason, and investigate this reason, we cognize it, we behave cognitively. Absolute spirit is knowledge, the determinate rational knowledge of its own self. Therefore when we occupy ourselves with this object it is immediately the case that we are dealing with and investigating rational cognition, and this cognition is itself rational conceptual inquiry and knowledge. So the [critical] requirement proves to be completely empty. Our *scientific cognition is itself the required investigation* of cognitive knowing.

The second circumstance[53] requiring discussion at this point is the following observation. We should recall here what we said by way of introduction, that on the whole religion is the highest or ultimate sphere of human consciousness, whether as feeling, volition, representation, knowledge, or cognition. It is the absolute result, the region into which the human being passes over as that of absolute truth. In order to meet this universal definition, consciousness must already have elevated itself into this sphere transcending the finite generally, transcending finite existence, conditions, purposes, and interests—in particular, transcending all finite thoughts and finite relationships of every sort. In order to be within the sphere of religion one must have set aside these things, forgotten them. In contrast with these basic specifications, however, it very frequently happens when philosophy in general and philosophizing about God in particular are criticized, that finite thoughts, relationships of limitedness, and categories and forms of the finite are introduced in the service of this discourse. Opposition that draws upon such finite forms is directed against philosophy generally and especially against the highest kind, the philosophy of
80 religion | in particular. Belonging to such finite forms is the immediacy of knowing or the "fact of consciousness." Examples of

52. *L (1827?) adds:* God is essentially rational, a rationality that, as spirit, is in and for itself.

53. [*Ed.*] The ensuing paragraphs challenge a simplistic application of the Kantian categories of finitude to the religious object. Perhaps this makes them the "second circumstance" in the passage on investigating the cognitive faculty, the first being the more general discussion of the preceding two paragraphs.

such categories include the antitheses of finite and infinite and of subject and object, abstract forms that are no longer in place in that absolute abundance of content that religion is.[54] They must of course occur in our science, for they are moments of the essential relationship that lies at the basis of religion. But the main thing is that their nature must have been investigated and cognized long beforehand. If we are dealing with religion scientifically, this primarily logical cognition must lie behind us. We must long since have finished with such categories.[55] The usual practice, however, is to base oneself on them in order to oppose the concept, the idea, rational cognition. These categories are employed entirely uncritically, in a wholly artless fashion, just as if Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* were nonexistent, a book that put them to the test and arrived in its own way at the result that they can serve only for the cognition of phenomena and not of the truth.[56] In religion, however, one is not dealing with phenomena but with the absolute content.[57] How totally improper, indeed tasteless, it is that categories of this kind are adduced against philosophy, as if one could say something novel to philosophy or to any educated person in this way, as if anyone who has not totally neglected his education would not know that the finite is not the infinite, that subject is different from object, immediacy different from mediation. Yet this sort of cleverness is brought forward triumphantly and without a blush, as if here one has made a discovery.

˹That these forms˺[58] are different everyone knows; but that these

54. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* In the spirit (or in the disposition that has to do with religion) determinations wholly other than such meager ones as finitude and the like are present, and yet what is supposed to be important in religion is subjected by argumentative [criticism] to determinations of this kind.

55. [*Ed.*] Hegel refers here to his criticism of the categories of the understanding in his *Science of Logic.*

56. [*Ed.*] See *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15.

57. *W_2 MiscP/Var?) adds:* But the Kantian philosophy seems in the view of that argumentative thinking to have come into existence only so that we might operate all the more unabashedly with those categories.

58. *Similar in W_1; W_2 (MiscP/Var?) reads:* Here we merely note the fact that such determinations as finite and infinite, subject and object (and this always constitutes the foundation of that clever and cheeky chatter)

determinations are still at the same time inseparable is another
81 matter. | There is reluctance to ascribe to the concept this power, though it can be encountered even in physical phenomena. We know that in the magnet the south pole is quite distinct from the north pole, and yet they are inseparable. We also say of two things, for example, that they are as different as heaven and earth. It is correct that these two are plainly different, but they are inseparable. We cannot point out earth apart from the heavens, and vice versa. Immediate and mediated knowledge are *distinct* from one another, and yet only a very modest investigation is needed in order to see that they are *inseparable.* Hence, before one is ready to proceed to philosophy of religion, one must be done with such one-sided forms. From these considerations it can easily be seen how difficult it is for a philosopher to engage in discussion with those who oppose philosophy of religion in this fashion; for they display too great an ignorance and are totally unfamiliar with the forms and categories in which they launch their attack and deliver their verdict upon philosophy. Being unfamiliar with the inner spirit of the concepts, they bluntly declare that immediacy is surely something different from mediation. They utter such platitudes as something novel, but in so doing they also assert that immediate knowledge exists in isolation, on its own account, wholly unaffected, without having reflected upon these subjects, without having paid attention to their outer nature or inner spirit to see how these determinations are
82 present in them.[59] This kind of opposition to philosophy has | the

59. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* Actuality is not accessible to them, but alien and unknown. The gossip that they direct in hostility against philosophy is therefore school chatter, which saddles itself with empty categories that have no content; whereas we in the company of philosophy are not in the so-called "school" but in the world of actuality, and we do not find in the wealth of its determinations a yoke in which we might be confined, but we move freely within them. And then those who contest and disparage philosophy are even incapable of comprehending a philosophical proposition through their finite thought. Just when they perhaps repeat its very words they have distorted it, for they have not comprehended its infinity but have dragged in their finite relationships instead. Philosophy is so patient and painstaking that it carefully investigates its opponent's position. Admittedly that is necessary according to its concept, and it is only satisfying the internal impulse of its concept when it cognizes both itself and what is opposed to it (*verum index sui et falsi* ["truth is the touchstone of itself and of the false": Spinoza, *Opera* 4:124,

tedious consequence that in order to show people that their contentions are self-contradictory one must first go back to the alphabet of philosophy itself. But the thinking spirit must be beyond such forms of reflection. It must be acquainted with their nature, with the true relationship that obtains within them, namely the infinite relationship, in which their finitude is sublated.

Only slight experience is needed to see that where there is immediate knowledge there is also mediated knowledge, and vice versa. Immediate knowledge, like mediated knowledge, is by itself completely one-sided. *The true* is their unity, *an immediate knowledge that likewise mediates,* a mediated knowledge that is at the same time internally simple, or is immediate reference to itself. That one-sidedness makes these determinations finite. Inasmuch as it is sublated through such a connection, it is a relationship of infinity. It is the same with object and subject. In a subject that is internally objective the one-sidedness disappears; the difference emphatically does not disappear, for it belongs to the pulse of its vitality, to the impetus, motion, and restlessness of spiritual as well as of natural life. Here is a unification in which the difference is not extinguished, but all the same it is sublated.[60] | 83

320]). However, it should be able to expect as *quid pro quo* that the antithesis will now also desist from its hostility and cognize philosophy's essence peaceably. That, however, does not ensue, and the magnanimity of wanting to acknowledge its opponent and heap coals of fire on his head is of no avail to philosophy, for the opponent will not keep quiet, but is persistent. But when we see that the antithesis dissipates like an apparition and dissolves into a mist, then our only wish for the contest is to render an account of ourselves and of conceptual thought, and not simply to gain the verdict over the other side. And to convince the opposition fully, [or to have] this personal influence upon it, is impossible because it remains within its limited categories.

60. *L (1827?) adds:* However, the argumentative method of the finite understanding that was mentioned has not elevated itself to such concepts. It uses them in a crude, coarse fashion without thinking them through. W_2 *(MiscP) adds instead:* Since in the following discussion we are beginning with religion, with the supreme and the ultimate, we must now be able to assume that the futility of those relationships has long been overcome. But at the same time, because we did not commence with the beginning of science but expressly considered religion, we must have regard also, within religion itself, for the sort of relationships of the understanding that ordinarily come under consideration above all in connection with religion.

3. Survey of the Treatment of Our Subject[61]

"After making these remarks, if we wish to get closer to our object itself, all that still remains by way of introduction is to give an outline of its articulation, to provide in the most general way a conspectus or a survey of our science and of how it is internally divided, so that we may be historically informed about it."[62]

There can be but *one method* in all science, in all knowledge. Method is just the self-explicating concept—nothing else—and the concept is one only. Here too, therefore, the *first moment* is, as always, the *concept.* The *second moment* is the *determinateness of the concept,* the concept in its determinate forms. These forms are necessarily involved in the concept itself. In a philosophical mode of treatment it is not the case that the universal element, or the concept, is set forth at the beginning as though merely for the sake of its prestige. In the way in which they are prefixed to the single sciences, however, concepts such as nature, right,[63] and the like are general definitions that are placed at the beginning, although one

61. [*Ed.*] This heading is adopted from *An*, which reads literally: "Conspectus of the Treatment of Our Object." The paragraphs preceding the detailed survey of the three parts of the philosophy of religion offer a speculative description of the moments of the concept of religion in the process of its self-explication and self-manifestation—the moments of pure conceptuality (universality), self-determination (differentiation, particularity), and self-reunification (reestablishment, consummation, subjectivity), which serve as the logical, rational basis for the actual historical appearance of the religions and the division of the subject into three parts. These paragraphs seem to be an expansion of the brief survey at the end of the *Introduction* in the 1821 *Ms.* (sheets 10a-b), which also is couched in the speculative terminology of the *Logic* (see above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 71). The 1827 lectures then add a detailed division and survey, which is lacking in the *Ms.* Having been through the lectures on two previous occasions Hegel now, in 1827, had a clear idea of what would actually follow.

62. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Ed?) reads:* With this reference to the discussion itself that is to follow we now directly provide the general survey or division of our science.

63. [*Ed.*] From the three basic philosophical sciences of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* (logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit), others can be distinguished, such as the "science of right" (*Rechtswissenschaft*). *Recht* is occasionally translated below as "law," although in Hegel's own *Philosophy of Right* the concern is not principally with law in the juridical sense but with the broader foundations of civil society and the state. In this derogatory sentence, however, Hegel is not referring to his own work but to the individual sciences as set forth by others.

is embarrassed by them because nothing depends on them. What really matters instead is the detailed content, chapter by chapter. A so-called concept of this kind has no further influence on this subsequent content. It indicates roughly the field where the investigator is, and in which the issues are located, so that content from another domain may not be introduced [inadvertently]. But the content—e.g., magnetism or electricity—is what counts as the subject matter, whereas the prefixed concept is [only] the formal aspect.[64]

The concept constitutes the beginning in philosophical treatment, too. But here it is the substance of the thing, like the seed from which the whole tree unfolds. The seed contains all of its characteristics, the entire nature of the tree: the type of its sap, the pattern of its branches, etc. However, these are not preformed, so that if one took a microscope one would see the twigs and leaves in miniature, but they are instead enveloped in a | spiritual manner. Similarly the concept contains the entire nature of the object, and cognition is nothing but the development of the concept, the development of what is contained in the concept but has not yet emerged into existence, is not yet explicated, not yet displayed. 84

Therefore the *first moment* is the *concept of religion* or religion in general, and the *second* is our consideration of *determinate religion.* And we do not derive the determinateness from outside, but rather it is the free concept that impels itself to its own determinateness. It is not the same in this case as when one treats right or law empirically, for example. The determinate details of the history of law do not follow from the concept, but we derive them from another source. There we first define in general what "right" designates; but the determinate legal systems such as the Roman and the German have to be taken from experience. Here, on the contrary, the determinateness has to result from the concept itself. The determinate concept of religion, then, is religion in its finitude, finite religion, something one-sided constituted in opposition to other religions as one particular type set against another.

64. *Thus, also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscPIVar?) adds:* But in such a mode of consideration the prefixed concept, for instance right, can also become a mere name for the most abstract and most contingent content.

For that reason we consider in the *third place* the concept as it comes forth to itself out of its determinateness, out of its finitude, as it reestablishes itself out of its own finitude, its own confinement. This *reestablished concept* is the infinite, true concept, the *absolute idea* or the *true religion.* These are therefore the three divisions in general, expressed in abstract terms.

Religion in its concept is not yet the true religion. The concept is true within itself, to be sure; but it also belongs to its truth that it should realize itself, as it belongs to the soul that it should have embodied itself. To begin with, this realization is a determination of the concept; but the absolute realization is when this determination is adequate to the concept. This adequate concept-determination is the absolute idea, the true concept. This progression is the development of the concept, and initially this development is
85 the experience, cognition, and knowledge of what religion is.[65] |

The concept that we have here before us is now *spirit itself* without qualification. It is spirit itself that is this development and that is active in this way. Spirit, if it is thought immediately, simply, and at rest, is no spirit; for spirit's essential [character] is *to be altogether active.* More exactly, it is the activity of *self-manifesting.* Spirit that does not manifest or reveal itself is something dead. "Manifesting" signifies "becoming for an other." As "becoming for an other" it enters into antithesis, into distinction in general, and thus it is a *finitizing* of spirit. Something that is *for an other* is, in this abstract determination, precisely something finite. It has an other over against itself, it has its terminus in this other, its boundary. Thus spirit that manifests itself, determines itself, enters into existence, gives itself finitude, is the second moment. But the third is its manifesting of itself according to its concept, taking its former, initial manifestation back into itself, sublating it, coming to its own

65. *Similar in* W_1; *L (1827?) adds:* The stages that we accordingly have to traverse are: first, the concept of religion; second, religion in its determinate existence; third, the infinite, absolute religion. As concept, religion is still without determinate being [*Dasein*]. In determinate being it is incommensurate with its concept. In the absolute religion concept and determinate being correspond for the first time and for that reason become the idea of religion.

self, becoming and being *explicitly* the way it is implicitly. [66]This is the rhythm or the pure eternal life of spirit itself. If there were not this movement, then it would be something dead. Spirit is the having of itself as object. Therein consists its manifestation, ¯in its being the relationship of objectivity, its being something finite.¯[67] The third moment is that it is *object to itself*, is reconciled with itself in the object, has arrived at freedom, for freedom is being present to itself.[68]

[69]The division, as we are setting it out beforehand, ¦ whose various parts and content we now propose to specify in more detail, is[70] only historical. But it is adopted for the simple reason that it is also necessary according to the concept. 86

66. *Precedes in* W_2 *(1831) (similar in* W_1*):* According to the moments of the concept, the presentation and development of religion will therefore occur in three divisions. We will consider the concept of religion: first in general; then in its particularity as self-dividing and self-differentiating concept, which is the aspect of primal division [*Ur-teil*, i.e. judgment], of limitation and difference, and of finitude; third, the concept that closes with itself, the syllogism or the return of the concept to itself, out of its determinateness in which it is unequal to itself, so that it comes to equality with its form and supersedes its limitedness.

67. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* but above all it is a relationship of objectivity, and in this relationship it is finite.

68. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* This rhythm, in which the whole of our science and the entire development of the concept is in motion, also recurs, however, in each of the three indicated moments, for each of them in its determinateness is the totality implicitly, until the totality is posited as such in the final moment. Hence, although the concept appears first in the form of universality, then in the form of particularity, and finally in the form of singularity, or if the entire movement of our science is such that the concept becomes the judgment and consummates itself in the syllogism, the same development of moments arises in every sphere of this movement. The only qualification is that in the first sphere the development is held together in the determinateness of universality, whereas in the second sphere, that of particularity, it allows the moments to appear independently, and only in the sphere of singularity does it return to the actual syllogism that mediates itself in the totality of the determinations.

69. *Precedes in W (1831):* Thus this division is the movement, nature, and activity of spirit itself that we, so to speak, simply witness. It is necessary through the concept, but the necessity of the progression has to exhibit, explicate, and prove itself only in the development itself.

70. *L adds:* therefore

[*Ed.*] The "therefore" makes sense only in the context of the preceding passage from *W*, which is also included in *L*.

I. The Concept of Religion[71]

As we have already stated, we shall consider in the first part the concept of religion. In the simple concept of religion what appears as content, or as the determination of the content, is solely the universal. Determinacy, or particularity as such, is not yet present. Hence the basic definition, or the character, of this first part of the philosophy of religion is that of *universality*.

In its concept religion is the relation of the subject, of the subjective consciousness, to God, who is spirit. In its concept regarded speculatively it is therefore spirit conscious of its own essence, conscious of its own self. Spirit is conscious, and that of which it is conscious is the true, essential spirit. True spirit is *its* essence, not the essence of an other. To this extent religion is forthwith explicitly *idea*, and the concept of religion is the concept of this idea. The idea is the truth, the reality of the concept in such a way that this reality is identical with the concept, or is determined simply and solely through the concept. If we call the concept "spirit," then the reality of the concept is consciousness. Spirit as concept, universal spirit, realizes itself in the consciousness that is itself spiritual, the
87 consciousness for which alone spirit can be. |

Religion is therefore *spirit that realizes itself in consciousness*. Every realization, however, is a relationship in which two aspects must be considered: the elevation of the human being to God, the consciousness that itself is conscious of God, of spirit; and the spirit that realizes itself in consciousness. These two aspects are connected with one another. This is the first moment in the idea, their connection, that in which the two sides are identical. This does not mean the commonality, however, or the superficial universality in which we liken several things to one another, but rather the inner unity of the two. So this *first moment* of the idea is the *substantial unity*, the universal in and for itself, the purely spiritual without further determination. Universality is the foundation. Only with determinate religion do we have determinate content.

The *second moment* to this initial universal one is precisely what

71. *In B's margin:* 11 May 1827
[*Ed.*] The heading is in *B*.

is called "relationship," the going apart of this unity. Here we have subjective consciousness, for which this universal in and for itself exists, and which relates itself to it. This can be called "elevation of the human being to God," because the human being and God are related [to each other] *as distinct*. Precisely what is called religion first makes its appearance here. We have to consider this relation according to its particular determinations. The first of these is feeling; and certainty in general, or faith, is classed under it. The second determination is representation. The third is thought, the form of thinking. We shall have to inquire more closely at this point to what extent religion is a matter of feeling. The form of representation is next for consideration after that, and the form of thought is third. Under this last determination we will most especially speak of religion.

Whenever we philosophize about religion, we are engaging in religious thinking. From this religious thinking in general we have to distinguish the type of religious thinking that we have to deal with here as a characteristic of the abstract concept of religion, and that is a thoughtful activity of the understanding.[72] This thoughtful understanding will show itself to be what used to be called "proofs for the existence of God." We will consider here the significance of this "proving." Today the "proofs" have fallen into neglect or into contempt | because it is supposed that we are beyond all that. But 88
for the very reason that they were authoritative for more than a thousand years[73] they deserve to be considered more closely. Even if we discover that they have deficiencies, we shall see at any rate what is genuine in the procedure they express, namely that they in fact display the process of the elevation of the human being to God, except that the form of understanding obscures it. We shall show what they lack in order to be the form of reason. Thus we need to consider the form of reason in contrast with that of the understanding, and to see what is wanting in the latter in order to express

72. W_1 *(Var) reads (similar in An, B):* In this religious thinking we have in particular to deal at first only with what is a thoughtful activity of the understanding.

73. [*Ed.*] Hegel appears to have in mind here the form that the proofs for the existence of God assumed in the ancient world—e.g., in Xenophon, Plato, Cicero, Augustine, and Boethius.

this process, which takes place in every human spirit. If one thinks on God, one's spirit contains the very moments that are expressed in this procedure.

Religion is for everyone. ⌜It is not⌝[74] philosophy, which is not for everyone. Religion is the manner or mode by which all human beings become conscious of truth for themselves. Here we must consider the modes of consciousness, especially feeling and representation, and then also thoughtful understanding. The concept of religion has to be considered in this universal mode in which the truth comes to human beings; and therefore the second moment in our consideration is the relationship of the subject [to God] as the feeling, representing, thinking subject.

⌜The *third moment* in this first part is⌝[75] the sublating of this antithesis of the subject and God, of the separation, this remoteness of the subject from God. Its effect is that as a human being one feels and knows God *internally,* in one's own subjectivity, that as this subject one elevates oneself to God, gives oneself the certainty, the pleasure, and the joyfulness of having God in one's heart, of *being united with God,* "being received by God into grace" as it is phrased in theological parlance. This is the *cultus.*[76] The simple
89 form of the cultus, namely the inner cultus, | is devotion in general. But what is best known within devotion is the mystical attitude, the *unio mystica.*[77]

74. W_1 *(Var) reads:* Not so

75. *Thus B; L (1827?) reads (similar in* W_1*):* If we have recognized spirit in general, the absolute unity, as the first moment, and as the second the relationship of the subject to the object, to God (not yet to a determinate God, to a God with determinate content, and similarly not yet [having] determinate sensations, determinate representations, determinate thoughts, but merely feeling, representation and thinking in general), then the third is

76. *L (1827?) adds (similar in* W_1*):* To gain for oneself this certain apprehension that God accepts human beings, and receives them into grace, is not only a matter of relationship or of knowledge, but is also a deed, an action.

77. W_1 *(1831) adds in conjunction with a passage from 1824:* The highest concept is the knowledge of spirit. Absolute spirit knows itself; this knowledge is distinguished from it and is therewith the distinct knowing that finite spirit is. In finite knowing, absolute spirit knows itself, and, vice versa, finite spirit knows its essence as absolute spirit. This is the universal concept of religion in general. We have then to consider the forms in which religion in general occurs, as feeling, as

II. Determinate Religion[78]

Determinateness must issue from the concept. The concept as such is what is still enveloped, and the determinations or moments are contained within it but not yet spread out.[79] God, the concept, judges or divides [*urteilt*]; that is, God determines. Only now within this category of determination | do we have existing religion— 90
religion that at the same time *exists determinately.*

We have already noted above that spirit is in principle not immediate—it is not [found] in the mode of immediacy. It is living, is active, is what it makes of itself. The living thing *is* this *activity.* Stone or metal is immediate, it is complete and remains just as it is. But anything alive is already this activity of mediation with itself.

representation, and especially as faith, which is the form in which this knowledge by spirit of itself occurs. Finally there is the cultus or the community. In the cultus the formal consciousness frees itself from the rest of its consciousness and becomes consciousness of its essence; the cultus consists in the consciousness that God knows himself in the human being and the human being knows itself in God. As knowing itself in God, the subject, within its inmost self, is the subject in its genuineness. That is the basis of its life as a whole. Its life also then applies itself outwardly, for the subject has a worldly life that possesses that true consciousness as its substantial ground; i.e., the way in which the subject determines its goals in its worldly life depends upon the substantial consciousness of its own truth. This is the aspect under which religion reflects itself in worldliness. This is therefore the knowledge of the world, and to that extent philosophy has been called "worldly wisdom" (though it is, above all, knowledge of absolute spirit). In this way religion also ventures out into the world. The morality and political constitution of the people must have the same character as its religion; for morality and the political constitution are governed wholly by whether a people has only grasped a limited representation of freedom of spirit, or has attained to the true consciousness of freedom. In an appendix to this first part I will say something more about this connection of religion and the political constitution.

[*Ed.*] See below, pp. 451–460. This allusion to the treatment of the relationship of religion and the state can be viewed as an additional indication that this passage belongs to the 1831 lectures, since only in that year did Hegel fully take up this theme.

78. *B reads:* II. The Second Part or Determinate Religion

79. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* [They] have not yet received the legitimation of their distinction. This distinction is the judgment or primal division [*Urteil*], the category of determinateness, the second [sphere] in general. The concept, or merely inner subjectivity, determines itself to objective existence; for only through being its own result is it the concept for itself explicitly. With respect to absolute spirit this point is presented as follows:

The plant is not yet complete when the bud is present, for this meager existence of the bud is just its abstract initial existence. [To exist] it must develop, must first bring itself forth. And finally the plant recapitulates its unfolded self in the seed—this its beginning is also its final product.[80] In the case of the plant there are two sorts of individual. The seed corn, which is the beginning, is something other than what is the completion of its life, into which this unfolding ripens. It is the same for living things generally, for the fruit is something other than the initial seed. But because it is altogether alive, spirit is just like this. At first it is only implicitly, or is in its concept; then it enters into existence, unfolding itself, bringing itself forth, becoming mature, and bringing forth what it is in itself, the concept of its own self, so that what is implicit, its concept, may now be explicit. The child is not yet a rational human being, for it has merely a capacity, is to begin with merely implicit reason, implicit spirit. Only through its formation and development does it first become spirit, for spirit is only genuine spirit insofar as it is the final stage.[81]

Therefore the concept in general is only the first moment. The second is its *activity of self-determining,* of entering into existence, of being for an other, of bringing its moments into mutual distinction and spreading itself out. These distinctions are nothing else but the determinations that the concept itself inwardly contains. In respect to the concept of religion, to the activity of the religious
91 spirit, this self-determining yields the determinate or ethnic | religions.[82] The different forms or determinations of religion, as mo-

80. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* In the same way the animal goes through its cycle to beget another animal; and the human being, too, is first a child and, qua natural being, goes through the same cycle.

81. *W (1831) adds:* This is also called self-determination, entering into existence, being for an other, bringing its moments into mutual distinction, and spreading itself out. These distinctions are nothing else but the determinations that the concept itself contains within itself.

82. *L (1827?) adds:* The religious spirit has stages in the formation of the consciousness of its absolute essence. At every stage its consciousness is determinate consciousness of itself, the path whereby spirit is educated; it is consciousness regarding the determinate aspects of its concept even though it is not absolute consciousness of the concept in the totality of its determinations.

ments of the concept, are on the one hand moments of religion in general, or of the consummate religion. They are states or determinations of content in the experience and the consciousness of the concept. On the other hand, however, they take shape by developing on their own account in time and historically. Insofar as it is determinate and has not yet traversed the circuit of its determinations, with the result that it is finite religion and exists as finite, religion is *historical* and is a *particular shape* of religion. By indicating, in the series of stages, the principal moments in the development of religion, how these stages also exist in a historical manner, I will in effect be furnishing a single sequence of configurations, or a history of religion.

III. Absolute Religion[83]

"Here spirit,"[84] being in and for itself, no longer has singular forms or determinations of itself before it in its developed state, and knows itself no more as finite spirit, as spirit in some sort of determinateness or limitedness. Instead it has overcome those limitations and is explicitly what it is implicitly. Spirit's knowing of itself as it is implicitly is the *being-in-and-for-self* of spirit, the consummate, absolute religion in which it is manifest what spirit is, what God is; and this religion is the Christian religion. That spirit must run its course in religion as in all else is necessary in spirit's concept. It *is* spirit only by virtue of the fact that it is for itself as the negation of all finite forms, as this absolute ideality.

I have representations and intuitions, which constitute a specific content: this house, etc. They are my intuitions and represent themselves to me. But I | could not represent them to myself if I had not 92
grasped this content within myself. This entire content must be

83. *B reads:* III

84. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* The manifestation or development and the determining do not proceed to infinity and do not cease contingently. The genuine progression consists rather in the fact that this reflection of the concept into self terminates itself when it actually returns into itself. Thus the very appearance is infinite appearance, the content is in conformity with the concept of spirit, and the appearance is such as the spirit is in and for itself. The concept of religion has itself become objective for itself in religion. Spirit,

posited within me in a simple and ideal way. Ideality means that this being [that is] external [to me] (i.e., its spatiality, temporality, materiality, and mutual externality) is sublated. Inasmuch as I know this being, its contents are not represented things, being outside one another; rather they are within me in a simple manner. Though a tree has many parts, it nevertheless is merely simple in my representation. Spirit is knowledge. For it to be knowledge, the content of what it knows must have attained this ideal form, it must have been negated in this manner. What constitutes spirit must have come into its own in such a way. Spirit must have been educated, must have traversed this circuit. These forms, distinctions, determinations, and finitudes must have been, in order for it to make them its own and to negate them, in order for what it is in itself to have emerged out of it and stood as object over against it, yet at the same time be its own.

This is the path and the goal by which spirit has attained its proper concept, the concept of itself, and has arrived at what it is in itself. And it only arrives at it in this way, the way that has been indicated in its abstract moments.[85] The Christian religion appeared when the time had come.[86] This time is not a contingent time, a discretionary or whimsical choice, but is rather grounded in an essential, eternal decree of God. That is, it is a time determined in the eternal reason and wisdom of God, not one determined in a contingent fashion. Rather it is the concept of the matter, the divine concept, the concept of God's own self.

This is the preliminary presentation of the plan of the content that we wish to consider.

85. *W (1831) adds:* The revealed religion is the revelatory or manifest religion because God has become wholly manifest in it. Here everything is commensurate with the concept; there is no longer anything secret in God. Here the consciousness of the developed concept of spirit exists, the consciousness of being reconciled not in beauty, or in gaiety, but *in spirit.*

86. [*Ed.*] See 1824 *Intro.*, n. 75.

PART I
THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

[10b]

The concept [of religion is] (α) first [set forth] on the basis of *representation* in order that we may become familiar with it and, more precisely, with how our discussion will be arranged. But (β) the *necessity* of this concept, i.e., of the religious standpoint in general, [is to be developed].[1]

A. THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION IN GENERAL[2]

(α) [We know] this concept on the basis of representation. We know initially that religion [is] consciousness of God in general, whether this consciousness has the form of feeling, representation,

1. [*Ed.*] The outline that Hegel gives here is incomplete. It includes only the first two sections: A. The Concept of Religion in General, and B. Scientific Conception of the Religious Standpoint. The agreement of the outline as given here with the first sentence of Sec. B indicates that Hegel initially did not intend to distinguish between the "scientific conception" (Sec. B) and the portrayal of the "necessity" of the religious standpoint (Sec. C). Whether Sec. D, on "the relationship of religion to art and philosophy," was originally planned or was conceived only in the process of writing out the manuscript can no longer be determined with certainty. In favor of the latter supposition, however, is the fact that Hegel ordinarily prepared complete outlines of what he intended to discuss; hence an original twofold division of the *Ms. Concept* is to be assumed.

2. [*Ed.*] This section heading is found in the *Ms.*, preceded by an "a." Hegel begins by providing not a definition of the concept of religion but rather a preliminary description and derivation of it from its appearance in religious representation. At

cognition, concept, knowledge, or whatever else it might be. But the object that we are considering is religion itself, and in it we immediately encounter [11a] these two moments: (α) the *object* [that is] *in* religion, and (β) consciousness, i.e., *the subject*, the human being that comports itself toward that object, religious sensibility, intuition, etc.

If we proposed to treat merely the object as such, God, then this philosophy of religion would be what earlier was expounded under the so-called *theologia naturalis,*[3] a part of the older metaphysics, the doctrine of God and the divine attributes, etc. And then morals, religious morals, of course, would be a special science, treated in part directly as duties toward God and duties toward human beings, insofar as the latter are sanctified by their relation to God.

In this fashion the objective and subjective sides are separated. We seem at the outset to have established a larger range to ⟨our⟩ object *arbitrarily* because we include the other side of the relation
96 of the human being to God in our discussion. However, | there is nothing arbitrary about this. If we intended to treat only the *theologia naturalis,* i.e., the doctrine of God as an object, as the object of religion, then the concept of God itself would lead us over to religion as such, if this concept were taken in a genuinely speculative [sense] and not in the manner of the old metaphysics [as] determinations of the abstract understanding. The concept of God is God's *idea,* [namely,] to become and make himself *objective* to himself.[4] This is contained in God as *spirit:* God *is* essentially in

the end of the section he shows how the essential moments of the concept of religion manifest themselves in the various stages of the history of religion. Thus we have here, following the general *Introduction* to the lectures as a whole, another, specific introduction to *The Concept of Religion.* This section offers the only discussion of the cultus found in the *Ms.* In the later lectures the cultus becomes a distinct moment of the concept of religion.

3. [*Ed.*] Cf. the structure of Wolff's *Theologia naturalis:* following the existence of God, the *intellectus, potentia, voluntas, sapientia, bonitas,* and *ius Dei* are treated, as well as creation and divine providence. Morals is the subject of another science: Christian Wolff, *Philosophia moralis sive Ethica methodo scientifica pertractata,* 4 vols. (Halle and Magdeburg, 1750–1752).

4. [*Ed.*] The "idea," according to Hegel, entails the actualization of what is conceptual; it is the "absolute unity of the concept and objectivity" (*Encyclopedia*

his community and has a community; he is objective to himself, and is such truly only in self-consciousness [so that] God's very own highest determination is self-consciousness. Thus the concept of God leads of itself necessarily to religion—⟨[to] determinacy, knowledge, cultus.⟩ God is incomplete, integrates himself, has truth for the first time, and is true only as absolute idea, i.e., when the side of God's *reality* is posited for itself and in identity with the concept."[5] [11b]

[6]"If now this definition of God were not already present in the *consciousness* of the community, it is [nevertheless] present in and for itself ⟨and is present in every religion.⟩ God is essentially something that is represented, known, intuited, etc., is found in the feeling of reverence, thankfulness, etc. Precisely this, as we said earlier,[7] is the goal, the consummate religion—that God should come to be known as this totality, which spirit | is; therefore God is not less 97
[than] spirit."[8] Spirit does have its own immediate nature, its physical, organic nature, but does not know it in its determinacy and truth and has [only] a rough, general representation [of it]. Human beings live in the state; they themselves are the vitality, activity, and actuality of the state. But the positing, the becoming conscious of

[1830], § 213). It is intrinsic to the divine idea that it should actualize or objectify itself in nature and finite spirit; in this fashion God becomes spiritual—becomes absolute *spirit*, does not remain merely absolute *idea*.

5. W_1 *reads:* The movement in the preceding sphere is, generally speaking, the movement of the concept of God, of the idea, in becoming objective to itself. We have this movement already in the representational expression: God is a spirit. Spirit is not something singular but is spirit only insofar as it is objective to itself and intuits itself as itself in the other. The highest determination of spirit is self-consciousness, which includes within itself this objectivity. God, as idea, is subjective for what is objective, and objective for what is subjective.

6. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Knowing, known – itself as object – divine consciousness not for another. – Spirit of God in human being – grace of God – as though human beings were spectators – [or] were aliens – [as though] what was taking place in them were something alien⟩

7. [*Ed.*] See *Ms. Intro.*, p. 111.

8. W_2 *reads:* What is here of special importance, however, is that the concept should also actually be known in its totality; and, in accord with the degree to which this knowledge is present, a particular stage of religious spirit is higher or lower, richer or poorer. Spirit may have something in its possession without having a developed consciousness of it.

what the state is, is not present simply because of that. That the state is perfect means precisely that everything that [is] implicit in it, i.e., in its concept—even if to begin with it is merely a state such as Nimrod's[9]—should be developed, posited, made into right and duty, into law. This development gives rise to wholly different rights and duties for the citizens. But what is substantial in these relations and hence in the state—e.g., property, marriage, defense of the sovereign, etc.—is present also in an undeveloped society.[10] [11]

(β) However, another aspect enters into consideration with the determination that the subjective aspect is an essential moment [of
98 religion]. For, to begin with, | the objective and subjective aspects are different—the former being object for the latter. ⟨At first, [there is] only a general relation between them,⟩ an unspiritual relationship, [such that the religious object appears as] something alien and external, an infinite power vis-à-vis the subject. This objective [being] can appear for the subject's knowing as completely other, as completely unknown on this side (or however the relationship

9. [*Ed.*] Referring to Josephus's account in *Antiquities of the Jews* 1.4, Hegel describes Nimrod, son of Cush, "the first on earth to be a mighty man" (Gen. 10:8–12), as follows in *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate:* "He united men after they had become mistrustful, estranged from one another, and now ready to scatter. But the unity he gave them was not a reversion to a cheerful social life in which they trusted nature and one another; he kept them together indeed, but by force. He defended himself against water by walls; he was a hunter and a king. In this battle against need, therefore, the elements, animals, and men had to endure the law of the stronger, though the law of a living being" (*Early Theological Writings*, p. 184).

10. W_2 *reads:* And the ultimate decision that rests with subjectivity as to what is to be done for the whole—this is found equally in an undeveloped society and in a perfect state; only the specific form of this substance differs in its stages of development.

11. [*Ed.*] The point of this difficult paragraph is that, just as the substance of ethical relations can be present implicitly in an undeveloped state, or just as spirit may have a physical, organic nature but does not yet know the real meaning of this nature, so also the concept of God can be present implicitly in every religion without having yet been brought to specific consciousness; and the goal of the history of religion is that the God-concept should become known in its totality, just as the goal of the state is to raise its ethical substance into specific, positive law. The point is summed up by the sentence from W_2 quoted in n. 8: "Spirit may have something in its possession without having a developed consciousness of it."

of knowing is [described]). Further, however,[12] it is the relationship of the will, of actuality, the subject as separate, [being] a single individual [existing] for itself. But since God is the absolute essence for the subject—the substance of the absolute subject—the singular being knows itself to be only an accident or predicate, something vanishing and transient over against it—a relationship of might, the sensation of fear, etc. But equally the relationship is not a negative but also a positive one: ⟨love⟩. The subject [is] ⟨implicitly⟩ identical [with the absolute essence], which is *its* substance, *its* subject, and is *in* the subject, [12a] is *its* essence, not the essence of another. This unity, this reconciliation, this restoration of oneself, giving oneself, from out of the previous cleavage, the positive feeling of sharing, of participating in this oneness, partaking of one's positive character, ⟨fulfilling oneself, [achieving] divine knowledge⟩—this is a form of doing or acting that can at once be more external or internal in character; in general it is the cultus. ⟨At first the cultus is of more limited significance, [involving] action that is one's own, to be sure, yet at the same time essentially external and public; the inner action of disposition [is] not so much emphasized.⟩[13]

12. *Ms. margin:* (Love)

13. W_2 *reads:* When the moment of subjectivity is further defined, so that the distinction is made between God as an object and the knowing spirit, the subjective side is defined in this distinction as that which belongs on the side of finitude, and the two sides are at first so opposed to each other that their separation constitutes the antithesis of finitude and infinitude. This infinitude, however, being still burdened by the antithesis, is not the true infinitude; to the subjective side, which exists for itself, the absolute object is still an other, and its relation to the latter is not self-consciousness. But these circumstances also give rise to the relation consisting in the fact that the finite knows itself as nothing in its state of separation, and knows its object as the absolute, as its substance. Here there first occurs the relationship of fear vis-à-vis the absolute object, since, in contrast with the latter, individuality knows itself only as an accident or as something transient and vanishing. But this standpoint of separation is not the true one; rather it is what knows itself to be nothing and what therefore has to be sublated, and its relationship is not only a negative but also within itself a positive one. The subject knows the absolute substance into which it has to sublate itself to be at the same time *its* essence, *its* substance, in which, therefore, self-consciousness is implicitly conserved. It is this

"The cultus belong essentially to the concept of religion; while the concept of God, in terms of the determinacy that it has at each
99 stage, | is necessarily also the determinacy of this relationship to God. Thus in theology [is found] the *plan of salvation* as the inner history and successive stages of activity of mind and heart, of what transpires and rightly transpires in the soul, as well as the sacraments, ⟨ecclesiastical⟩ actions, duties, etc."[14]

"The subjective and cultic aspect of religion is, therefore, the other essential element in the consideration of religion generally. [We are to consider] the basis on which the characteristics of the two correspond to each other—the form and content of the concept of God, and the relationship to God; the one is a copy of the other, and from the one [we must] learn to understand the other."[15] [16]

"[We have] already observed that the *theologia naturalis* as reflection upon the mere idea of God [has] become inconsistent—strictly speaking, unspiritual. The highest determination of God is

unity, reconciliation, restoration of the subject and its self-consciousness, the positive feeling of sharing and partaking in this absolute and actualizing one's unity with it—in this sublation of the cleavage—which constitutes the sphere of the *cultus.* The cultus comprises the entire sphere of internal and external activity that has as its purpose this restoration of unity. The term "cultus" is usually taken only in the more limited sense of referring to external, public action, while the inner action of disposition is not given much prominence.

14. W_2 *reads:* However, we shall conceive of cultus as that activity which, encompassing both inwardness and outward appearance, in general brings about restoration of unity with the absolute, and which in so doing is also essentially an inner conversion of mind and heart. Thus the Christian cultus, for example, contains not only the sacraments and ecclesiastical actions and duties but also the so-called "plan of salvation" as an absolutely inner history and as the successive stages of activity of the disposition—generally speaking, a movement that transpires and rightly transpires in the soul.

15. W_2 *reads:* At every stage of religion we shall always find these two sides—that of self-consciousness or of cultus, and that of consciousness or of representation—corresponding to each other. As the content of the concept of God or consciousness is determined, so too is the relationship of the subject to God; or in other words, so too is self-consciousness determined in the cultus. The one element is always a copy of the other, the one refers to the other. Both modes, of which the one holds fast only to objective consciousness and the other to pure self-consciousness, are one-sided, and each brings about its own annulment.

16. *Ms. margin:* (History of religions – difficult)

to be real spirit, [but he is] not recognized; that God is spirit, is personal, [is] indeed said, | [yet he is] hardly even this [for natural 100
theology] but rather essence."[17] [On the other hand] it is equally one-sided to consider and comprehend religion *only* as something *subjective*—i.e., to make the subjective side its only real concern. (Human beings have a representation of objectivity because they are conscious beings. "[Here we see] the barrenness and decay of worship; journeys that do not arrive at place or destination.) This is especially the attitude and the way of viewing [religion] in our time; religion is an orientation toward God, a feeling, speaking, and praying directed toward God above—but [only] *toward* God, [hence] ⟨a nullity for God, a shooting into the blue⟩—which accordingly means that we *know* nothing of God, have no acquaintance with the divine content, essence, and nature; [12b] [we are oriented] toward a place that for us is empty.

Spirit is, however, ⟨(α)⟩ essentially consciousness: that which is in it as sensibility, how consciousness is subjectively determined, must be an object for it; i.e., [it must] be conscious of it, know it. (β) Precisely God should be for it something different from its subjectivity and finitude. Thus [God is] to be known, cognized by consciousness as an object, not in external fashion but intuited spiritually. In the Christian religion, moreover, the previously hidden and concealed divine essence, content, and determination have been made open or manifest. (γ) Religious sensibility should contain just this, | being set free from its subjectivity[18] and possessing within 101
itself what is substantial, as against the accidental character of our opinions, preferences, inclinations, etc. This substantial content is precisely what is fixed in and for itself, independent of our sensi-

17. W_2 *reads:* Thus it was a one-sided view when the earlier natural theology comprehended God only as an object of consciousness. This way of reflecting upon the idea of God, for which God properly could be understood only as essence, even if such words as "spirit" or "person" were used, was inconsistent, for if it actually had been carried through it would have had to lead to the other, subjective side, that of self-consciousness.

[*Ed.*] On natural theology's definition of God as "essence," see 1824 *Intro.*, nn. 8, 9, 35.

18. *Ms. margin:* (Objectively preserved, affirmed)

bility, and must [be recognized] as something objective that subsists in and for itself. But the drawing of lines,[19] merely being oriented [toward God], does not reach this genuine, unifying, self-subsistent object.[20] [21]It does not achieve a true and actual renunciation of itself.[22] For this acknowledgment of something higher and wholly indeterminate, these lines that are drawn toward it, have no hold on, determination by, or connection to this object itself; they are and remain *our* doing, *our* lines, *our* goal—something subjective. The further consequence then is [that] since the self-subsisting object to which we owe our bounden duty is not present to hand, all worship shrivels into mere feeling. The cultus contains actions, enjoyments, assurances, confirmations, and a verification of something higher; but no faith and conviction can get a foothold on the basis of these specific actions and of such self-generated assurance since the objectively binding moment is lacking in them. What remains the foundation is only subjective sensibility. [13a]

Certainly, it is infinitely important to have emphasized this subjective side so much, the side which Luther called *faith;*[23] but it is

19. [*Ed.*] In the *History of Philosophy,* Hegel ascribes an "inward weaving and drawing of lines" especially to Novalis: see *Werke* 15:644 (this passage not in the Eng. trans.).

20. W_2 *reads:* The cultus now becomes completely barren and empty, its activity a movement that makes no advance, its orientation toward God a relation to a nullity, a shooting into the blue. But even this merely subjective activity is intrinsically inconsistent and must dissolve itself. For if the subjective side is also to be specified in some fashion, it is implied by the conception of spirit that it [too] is consciousness and that its determinacy becomes an object to it. The richer the disposition, the more fully determinate it is, the richer must the object be for it too. In order for feeling to be substantial, its absoluteness must in addition be such that it frees itself from its subjectivity; for the substantial element that should belong to it is directed precisely against the accidental character of opinion and inclination, is in fact something fixed in and for itself, independent of our feeling and sensibility. It is the objective, which subsists in and for itself. If the substantial element remains only shut up within the heart, it is not recognized as something higher, and God is only something subjective. The orientation afforded by subjectivity remains at best a drawing of lines into empty space.

21. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Subjectively posited⟩

22. W_2 *adds:* while in the cultus, by contrast, spirit should free itself of its finitude and feel and know itself in God.

23. [*Ed.*] See below, p. 243.

not the only aspect. It is vain and in itself empty and incomplete; and the truth is that it should equally contain the objective element—⟨as the object [is], so [is] the subject, and vice versa.⟩

Giving religion a purely subjective direction—my heart [is] everything—has destroyed the cultus. Just as one must proceed from one's subjective heart to deeds, so too consciousness must advance to an objective knowledge; the one is most intimately bound up with the other. What individuals intend in their relation to God depends upon | their representation of God;[24] and conversely 102
they cannot intend anything specific in regard to God if they think they have not, and cannot have, any cognition or cognizance [of God]—specifically a determinate representation of him as an object ⟨[that] is regarded as having being objectively in and for itself.⟩[25]

(α) This is the general [definition] of the cultus: it is the eternal relationship, the eternal process ⟨of knowing⟩ in which the subject posits itself as identical with its essence. However, whatever is not originally | one implicitly, cannot be posited as one, nor can that 103
whose distinction [is] not *implicitly* [sublated] ever be sublated. This oneness of being belongs to what is *in-itself,* i.e., to the absolute,

24. W_2 *adds:* their self-consciousness corresponds to their consciousness

25. W_2 *adds:* Only when religion is an actual relationship, involving the discrimination of consciousness, does the cultus actually take form as the sublation of the ruptured elements and [become] a vital process. But this movement of the cultus is not limited only to the inner life in which consciousness liberates itself from its finitude, is the consciousness of its essence, and the subject as knowing itself in God has penetrated into the foundation of its life. Rather this its infinite life now also develops itself outwardly; for the worldly life led by the subject also has as its foundation this substantial consciousness, and the ways and means by which the subject determines its purposes in worldly life depend upon the consciousness of its essential truth. It is in connection with this side that religion reflects itself into worldly or secular life and that knowledge of the world makes its appearance. This going out into the actual world is essential to religion, and by means of this transition into the world, religion appears as morality in relation to the state and the entire life of the state. As the religion of the peoples is constituted, so also is their morality and government. The shape taken by the latter depends entirely on whether a people has reached only a limited representation of the freedom of spirit or has the true consciousness of freedom.

The more precise determinations of the cultus are as follows: the moment of presupposed unity, the sphere of separation, and the freedom that reestablishes itself in the separation.

substantial content. In this content, in its own absolute object, consciousness must, therefore, represent to itself its own implicit unity as its essence. The human form, the incarnation of God, must appear as an essential element of religion in the definition of its object—in the lower religions it may be just *this* being, this immediate determinate being, a unity with the finite in base forms [such as] stars ⟨and animals⟩ ˜[26]—so-called anthropomorphism. It is only the empty specter of abstract absolute essence that one must have renounced. It is relevant also in this connection that only [one] moment of God's being exhibits human or other forms of determinate being, appears externally, or reveals itself inwardly in dreams or an inner voice. [13b]

104 ˜This, therefore, [is] the determination of absolute unity, but | (β) the second [determination] is the moment of separation, of difference. ⟨[27]The world generally, reality, [is] on the one hand united with God—the finite within the infinite, [as] its garment, shape, existence—[and on the other hand] related indifferently to God as a posited, created reality.⟩ God [is] the absolutely positive; therefore what differs from him [is] the negative. This negative appears on the side of worldly essence, of human being. This negative of God is evil, or wickedness in general. This determination is likewise an absolute moment in the whole of religion.˜[28]

26. W_1 *reads:* This process of sublating the rupture appears to fall only on the subjective side, but it is also posited in the object of consciousness. Through the cultus unity is attained, but what is not originally one cannot be posited as one. This unity, which appears as an accomplishment or result, must also be recognized as having being in and for itself. For what is an object to consciousness is the absolute, and the latter's distinctive characteristic is that it is the unity of its absoluteness with particularity. This unity is therefore in the object itself, e.g., in the Christian representation of the incarnation of God.

Generally speaking, this implicit unity—more specifically the human form, the incarnation of God—is an essential moment of religion and must be present in the determination of its object. In the Christian religion this determination is completely developed, but it also appears in the lower religions, even if the only indication of it is that the infinite manifests itself in unity with the finite in such fashion that it appears as *this* being, this immediate determinate being, in [the form of] stars or animals.

27. *Ms. adds:* (αα)

28. W_1 *reads:* This is the moment of presupposed unity, a unity that must enter into the concept of God in such a way that the object of consciousness (God) exhibits the content of the entire concept of religion and is itself the totality. The moments

"(γ) The subjective moment to the object [is] itself a moment of this object, and, as implicitly one with it, [is] also a positive moment; it too must finally | come forth and be present in the figurative 105
representations of religion. This absoluteness and infinitude of self-consciousness is represented in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. To begin with, the outstanding characteristic of the latter is duration in time; and in this way immortality, the fact that spiritual self-consciousness is itself an eternal, absolute element, is represented as a sublimation or elevation, a being snatched up out of time."[29]

of the religious concept are thus seen here as unified. Each of the aspects of the true idea constitutes the same totality, which is the whole. The specific contents of the two aspects consequently are different not in themselves but only in their form. The absolute object therefore determines itself for consciousness as totality that is in unity with itself.

(b) This totality now also appears in the form of separation and finitude, which confronts that self-unified totality as its other side. The moments of the content of the entire concept are here posited as separating themselves from one another, as differentiated, and consequently as abstract. The first moment on the side of differentiation is that of *being-in-itself*, being that is identical with itself, formlessness, objectivity in general. This is matter as representing what subsists indifferently. To be sure, form can be brought into it, but still only as abstract being-for-itself. Then we call it *world*, which appears in relation to God partly as the garment, clothing, or form of divinity, or as something in contrast with God.

Over against this moment of indifferent being-in-self there now stands *being-for-self*, the negative in general, or "form." In its initially indeterminate form, this negative appears as the negative element in the world, while the latter is the positive element, that which subsists. The negativity that is opposed to this subsisting element, to this feeling of self, to the maintenance of existence, is *evil*. In contrast with God, with this reconciled unity of being-in-self and being-for-self, there appears the element of difference—the difference between the world as subsisting positively and the destruction and contradiction evident in it. Here the questions suggest themselves, which pertain to all religions with a more or less developed consciousness, as to how evil is to be reconciled with the absolute unity of God, and wherein the origin of evil lies. This negative element appears initially as evil in the world, but it also reverts to identity with itself, in which it is the being-for-self of self-consciousness—or *finite spirit*.

29. W_1 *reads:* This negative that gathers itself into unity with itself is now once more something positive because it relates itself simply to itself. As evil it appears in entanglement with positive subsistence. But the negativity that subsists or is present for itself and not in relation to an other, the inward, infinite negativity that reflects itself into itself and has itself as object, is actually the *ego*. This self-consciousness, and its inward movement itself, evince finitude and self-contradiciton. Disturbance occurs within it; evil makes its appearance within it, and this is the evil of the world.

This is religion in general, and these are the more precise determinations of the concept, which directly constitute its content. The concrete spirit of religion, wherever it exists, drives forth these
106 determinations since they reside in its concept, | and consequently they appear at every stage. However, we remarked earlier,[30] both with respect to the method of science and with respect to the progressive determination of the concept, that the consummation of religion itself brings forth its concept and makes it objective to itself. Once it has been thus objectified, it is developed, and the totality of its determinate characteristics is posited in it. (αα) It should be noted that the latter emerge in this revelatory religion as essential moments of the content, ⟨together with the consciousness of the content⟩ and with the determination of being the truth—i.e., [they appear] as objective and in the system of the objective object. ⟨Positive cognition first emerges as such in the consummate religion (i.e., not the mere explanation of myths).⟩ These characteristics also appear in the determinate [15a][31] religions, however, sprouting up fortuitously, like the flowers and creations of nature, as foreshadowings, images, representations, without [our] knowing where they come from or where they are going to. ⟨In this immediate mode [of their being there is] not yet the reflection that this is the truth and the right, whether [their immediate being is] an intuition (an-

(c) I, however, who am free, can abstract from everything; this negativity and seclusion are what constitute my essence. Evil is not the whole of the subject, which enjoys rather a unity with itself that constitutes the positive or good side, the absoluteness, the infinitude of self-consciousness. It is this ability to abstract from all that is immediate and external that constitutes the essential moment of the seclusion of spirit. This seclusion is removed from the temporality, change, and vicissitude of the world, from evil and estrangement; and, as the absoluteness of self-consciousness, it is represented by the thought of the immortality of the soul. Initially the striking characteristic of the latter is duration through time; this elevation over the power and vicissitudes of change is represented, however, as belonging implicitly and originally to spirit, not as first of all mediated through reconciliation. Thus an advance is made to a further characteristic—namely, that the self-consciousness of spirit is an eternal, absolute moment in eternal life, into which it is transposed beyond time (this abstraction of change), and beyond the reality of change, beyond cleavage, when it is taken up into unity and reconciliation, which are presupposed as originally present in the object of consciousness.

30. [*Ed.*] See *Ms. Intro.*, pp. 110–111.

31. [*Ed.*] *Ms.* sheet 14a-b was inserted at a later date in this position. A reference to it occurs on sheet 18a, where it properly belongs (see below, n. 56).

thropomorphic Oriental incarnation), or an image (Greek), or a thought and an actuality (Christian); [but] this last is present, common, actual.)"[32]

(ββ) In the scientific portrayal of the necessity of these content-determinations, however, the concrete idea is necessarily the last one—as we remarked already.[33] For the idea in its initial [phase] is simple and abstract, [while the scientific portrayal] is what was described above under the totality of the idea.[34] It contains precisely the development, i.e., the objective, separately posited determination, of the concept, and this positing is the portrayal of the necessity and the proof of it. "Thus, we are anticipating when, with respect to the scientific verification, | we speak of those stated moments of 107
a religion which have not yet arisen in its consciousness of its objects, even if they are present in its intuition, feeling, and configuration; for, having not yet emerged from the concept, they [still do not] constitute an essential moment of the determination of the absolute object in that religion. In other words, God is not yet represented under this determination of the totality of religion."[35]

32. W_2 *reads:* The essential moments of the concept of religion manifest themselves and make their appearance at every stage in which the religious concept has existed at all. They differ from the true form of the concept only because they are not yet posited in the totality of the concept. The determinate religions are not indeed *our* religion, yet they are included in ours as essential though subordinate moments, which cannot be lacking in absolute truth. Therefore in them we have to do not with what is foreign to us but *with what is our own,* and the recognition that this is so is the reconciliation of true religion with false. Thus the moments of the concept of religion appear at lower stages of development, though as yet in the shape of presentiments and as natural blossoms and creations that sprout up by chance. What determines the characteristics of these stages throughout, however, is the determinacy of the concept itself, which at no stage can be lacking. The thought of the incarnation, for example, pervades all religions. General concepts such as this are found in other spheres of spirit as well.

33. [*Ed.*] This cross-reference is not clear. Hegel may be referring to his discussion on p. 186 of the self-objectification of the idea.

34. [*Ed.*] Hegel may be referring here to the conclusion of the *Introduction,* but he does not speak specifically there of the "totality of the idea." He refers to the "totality" of the spirit on p. 187.

35. W_2 *reads:* In like manner the moments of the concept are actually present in the determinate religions, in intuitions, feelings, unmediated shapes; but the *consciousness* of these moments has not yet developed; they have not yet been raised to the determinacy of the absolute object, and there is as yet no representation of God when the concept of religion in its totality is defined in this way.

But the determinacy itself in which these characteristics are posited at a [definite] religious standpoint constitutes the principle of this religion itself, and they must appear in it as they are determined within this element. [15b]

⟨(α)⟩ In the cognitive awareness of these characteristics lie principles through which the religions of the peoples can and must be grasped. This is one of the most difficult tasks facing comprehension. A survey of these religions reveals what supremely marvelous and bizarre flights of fancy the nations have hit upon in their representations of the divine essence and of their [own] duties and modes of conduct. To cast aside these religious representations and usages as superstition, error, and fraud is to take a superficial view of the matter, just as it is superficial to see in them only the fact that they spring from piety, and so to accept them as something pious, no matter what other constitutive characteristics they may have.

⟨(β)⟩ The history of religions depends on [comprehending] the precise formation-process of the representations of God. No matter how much this history is compiled and elaborated, it mainly lets just the external and apparent side be seen. The higher need is to apprehend what it *means,* its positive and true [significance], its connection with what is true—in short, its *rationality.* After all, it is *human beings* who have lighted upon such religions, so there must be *reason* in them—in everything contingent there must be a
108 higher necessity.[36] | [We need] to study the history of religion in this sense, and at the same time to be *reconciled* to what is horrifying and tasteless in it; it is not a question of *justifying* it,[37] or judging it to be right and true in all its forms—human sacrifice, or the

36. W_2 *adds:* We must do them this justice, for what is human and rational in them is also our own, although it is in our higher consciousness as only a moment.

37. [*Ed.*] The German text reads: . . . *sich mit dem zugleich auch versöhnen, was Schauderhaftes, Abgeschmacktes darin vorkommt, rechtfertigen, richtig, wahr finden, wie es in seiner ganzen Gestalt ist* . . . , *davon ist nicht die Rede.* The question is whether the word "justify" (*rechtfertigen*) is connected grammatically with the clause that precedes, in which case Hegel seems to say that the history of religion is to be justified by comprehending it and reconciling ourselves to what is horrifying in it; or with the clause that follows, in which case he says that it is not to be

sacrifice of children [for example]; but we need at least to recognize its origin, the source from which it has sprung, as *human*. This [is] the higher reconciliation.[38] [But] the history of religion is not our purpose; [we do] not intend to venture upon it here—contingency and locality pervade all these forms. [16a]

B. SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF THE RELIGIOUS STANDPOINT[39]

[1. The Distinction between External and Internal Necessity]

This scientific conception means nothing else than the ⟨portrayal⟩ of the *necessity* of the religious standpoint—and that not as a *conditioned, external* necessity but as an *absolute* necessity. Hence we need to become aware of what spiritual process or movement it is that is going on inwardly as it raises itself to religion.

There is, [to be sure,] a way of viewing external necessity that treats religion as a means, as an activity with an [external] aim. But religion is thereby degraded into something contingent, which is not in and for itself but is an arbitrary thought of mine that I can also discard; it possesses in and for itself nothing objective but is [only] what I have chosen to think. ⟨The true view, the substantial relationship, and the distorted, false relationship, lie very close to one another.⟩[40] For example, it was said by the ancients that a city, a state, or families, individuals, perished because they despised the gods, and [conversely] that reverence toward the gods, their veneration and worship, would preserve and benefit states and indi-

justified, only comprehended and reconciled. The punctuation of the *Ms.* is ambiguous, since commas both precede and follow *rechtfertigen*. The parallel passage in W_2 chooses the first option (probably reflecting the interpretation of the editor, Bruno Bauer), while we have elected the second. Not only is the second reading more plausible in terms of meaning, but also it seems more likely that *rechtfertigen* is part of the series *rechtfertigen, richtig, wahr finden*.

38. W_2 *adds:* with this entire sphere, the reconciliation that completes itself in the concept.

39. [*Ed.*] This heading is found in the *Ms.* with a "b" written above it.

40. W_2 *adds:* The distortion of the latter appears to be only a slight displacement of the former.

109 viduals; in the same way in the Christian religion | the fortune and advancement of individuals [is said to] rest upon or be advanced by their religious sensibility.

The practice of righteousness attains stability[41] only when religion forms its basis, when its most inward [mode], namely conscience, first finds in religion its absolutely genuine sense of duty, an absolute security regarding its obligation. Furthermore, it is religion that consoles the individual in suffering, misfortune, and death. The state must rest essentially on religion; the security of attitudes and duties vis-à-vis the state becomes for the first time absolute in religion. Against every other mode of obligation one can supply excuses, exceptions, counter reasons. [16b] If one knows how to disparage the laws, the regulations, and the individuals who govern and are in authority, to regard them from a point of view from which they are no longer worthy of respect, [one can do this]. ˜For all these objects˜[42] have at the same time a contemporary, finite existence. They are so constituted as to invite reflection and investigation with a view to justifying them or criticizing them, etc.; [in short,] they invite subjective consideration. It is only religion that suppresses all of this, nullifies it, and thereby introduces an infinite, absolute obligation. ⟨To sum up:⟩ reverence for God or the gods secures and preserves individuals, families, states; contempt for God or the gods dissolves rights and duties, the bonds of families and states, and leads to their destruction.

These are considerations of the highest truth and importance. If now it were inferred from this proposition as [the result of] experience—⟨or if it were in fact laid down as a fundamental truth, whether immediate or what you will⟩—[that] therefore religion is necessary, ⟨[that] an essential and substantial connection [obtains between religion and ethical obligation],⟩ then this would be an external sort of conclusion. (Possibly, however, it might initially
110 [appear] deficient only with respect to | subjective cognition, and no twisted aspect or posture need be given to the content itself.) If,

41. W_2 *adds:* and the fulfillment of duty is secured

42. W_2 *reads:* For all these characteristics are not simply what they are implicitly and inwardly; rather they

however, the conclusion of the reflection is stated as follows: "Therefore religion is useful for the purpose of individuals, governments, and states, etc.," then a relationship is introduced whereby religion is treated as a means; the primary purpose is something other [than itself]. In general, it is quite correct that the purposes and intentions of individuals, governments, and states [gain] subsistence and solidity only when based upon religion. What is misleading here is that whatever is construed as a *means* [17a] is at the same time degraded into something contingent. A *condition* or *cause* is something else; the indispensable condition for owning something is to have what it costs.

But in religion we have ˉto doˉ[43] with *spirit*, which is highly versatile. Already the physical organism, in responding to diseases, exercises certain necessary properties of the remedies,[44] but at the same time is indifferent to their specific character, so that a choice of remedies is possible. Likewise, when spirit has something as a means and can use it, the means is degraded into something specific; [spirit] is conscious of its freedom to use either it or something else. Thus if religion is a means, spirit knows that it can use it, and also that it can use something else. It stands over against religion ⟨so that⟩ it can choose to rely upon itself. Moreover, spirit has the freedom of its own aims or purposes. Its power, its cunning, its control of human opinions, etc.—these are also[45] means. And precisely in the freedom of *its* purposes—which implies that its purposes are valid and religion only a means—it has the freedom to make its own force, cunning, power, and authority[46] into pur-

43. *Ms. reads:* to be

44. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Choice among the remedies⟩

45. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) These are its purposes – a finite purpose⟩

46. *Ms. margin:* (You must have religion so that . . .

The complaint is that human beings have no religion; thus [we find] the spirit of disobedience toward governments, lavishness, luxury, etc.

When one is addressing those who are subjects, it is wasting breath to say that people ought [to have] religion in order to be good subjects; [it] may appear expedient for governments [to say this]. But this presupposes that the people have made it their aim to be content with what governments want of them. If this is already their purpose, if they have made up their minds to do this, then they require no other means [such as religion] in order to decide upon it.)

111 poses— | in the pursuit of which it is able to dispense with religion or directly oppose it.[47]

It would then be a question whether spirit should resolve upon, or rather know itself to be obligated to, those purposes that are involved with religion. But this obligation itself, this necessity of its having certain purposes, together with the disregard of other more agreeable purposes, would lead to objective purposes having being in and for themselves, independent of free will—⟨[would lead] perhaps [to something that was] no longer a mere means, that is, [to purposes] bound up [with] the religious sphere or directly with religion [itself]. [To use it as a mere means would be] *hypocrisy*, for religion should be what exists in and for itself.⟩ [17b]

Objective purposes require the surrender of subjective interests, opinions, and purposes, and this negative aspect is included when one says that the veneration of God is the foundation of the true well-being of individuals, peoples, states, governments, etc. The latter is a consequence of the former, which is thus the main thing; it has its own definition and determinacy and regulates human purposes and intentions, which are not what is primary and properly self-determining. Such a slight change in the attitude of reflection alters and entirely destroys the first meaning [referred to above].

That necessity which is [mere] utility is[48] precisely for this reason

47. [*Ed.*] The point of the discussion thus far may be stated as follows. The attempt to demonstrate the *external* necessity of religion involves showing that religion is a necessary means to some end, ethical, political, or individual. But religion can never be a means to an end other than itself; religion is its own end. Moreover, it cannot be demonstrated from the principle of means that religion is *necessary* to anything else, even though it undoubtedly plays a useful social or political role. For if religion is a mere means, then the versatile human spirit can, if it chooses, make use of other means and get along quite well without religion. Nor is it the case that people actually need religion in order to conclude that they should subject themselves to governments (cf. n. 46). On the other hand, Hegel does not conclude from this that religion is not in fact the foundation or substance of individuals, peoples, and states. It is; but precisely for this reason it is not a *means* but a *condition* or *cause* (see the next two paragraphs).

48. *Ms. margin:* (Observations [drawn] from the field of utility [are] not [proper]. For example, [religion is supposed to offer] solace and compensation for suffering; but there are forms of suffering for which one ought not to let oneself be consoled.)

an *external, contingent* necessity, which is capable of being inverted.

Thus we are here talking about *inner,* ⟨*rational*⟩ necessity, which has being in and for itself, a necessity that free will and evil are indeed capable of opposing. ¯The question of the extent to which religion cannot be eradicated | in anyone, or the extent to which 112
one can succeed [in freeing oneself of it], is an empirical, psychological question because it has to do with the contingency of free will—the pinnacle on which the I that has being for itself is able to position itself.¯[49]

[50]The more precise understanding of the necessity of the concept [of religion] is that religion[51] (α) is conceived of as a result; but (β) as a result that equally sublates itself as a result—⟨the primary truth in which everything is mediated, upon which everything else depends⟩; and ⟨γ⟩[52] it is the content itself that in and through itself passes over to posit itself as a result. [This is] objective necessity, not merely for subjective convenience ¯and in a subjective sense, in the way that a geometrical theorem is proved: "If this is so, then this follows, etc." Here the process [of the proof] elicits a recognition of the necessity in us only subjectively, but the object itself is not produced.¯[53] [18a]

With respect to religion as something spiritual in principle, ⟨it immediately⟩ is the case that in its existence *it is itself this process and this passing over.*[54] With natural things, e.g. the sun, [we have

49. W_2 *reads:* But then this free will belongs to a sphere outside, attaching itself to the I, which, as free, is able to position itself on the pinnacle of its being-for-self. Such free will is no longer connected with the necessity [of which we speak]; it is no longer necessity's own self-inverting nature, as is the case so long as necessity is understood merely as utility.

50. *Ms. margin:* (Universal necessity; [necessity] generally)

51. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Mediation; (β) sublation of the mediation)

52. *Ms. reads:* (β)

53. W_2 *reads:* It is not *we* who set this necessity in motion; rather it is the *action of the content itself,* or, the object may be said to produce itself. Subjective derivation and cognitive movement occur, for example, in geometry: the triangle itself does not go through the process that we follow in the course of recognition and proof.

54. [*Ed.*] The idea of religion as a "passing over" (*Übergehen*) from the finite to the infinite, from the sensible to the intelligible, from human being to God, is central to Hegel's interpretation. Religion is itself this act of passing over, which is not something posited by us. It is precisely this that constitutes the inner, rational, objective necessity of religion. See further below, pp. 207–208.

before us] an immediate existence at rest in an immediate apprehension, and in such an intuition or representation no consciousness of an act of passing over is present. The religious thought of God by contrast is a *looking away*—a forsaking of the immediacy of
113 the finite, and a *passing over* to the intelligible world, to a | gathering-into-self—or, [defined] objectively (as in artistic intuition), to the gathering up of what is immediately perishable into its absolute, substantial essence. ⟨However, [we must] come to an understanding of the pure concept [of religion] more precisely in its simple abstract moments, which previously we have taken up in more concrete form, as derived from representation, in order to apprehend more definitely the thing whose necessity we have to grasp.⟩[55] [56] [14a]

[2. Speculative Definition of] the Concept of Religion[57]

ˆReligion [is] the consciousness of *the true* in and for itself. Phi-
114 losophy is by definition consciousness of *the idea*, and its | business

55. [*Ed.*] This marginal notation indicates that Hegel has changed his conception of the structure of the lectures. Before proceeding with the development of internal necessity, he now believes it is necessary to introduce a definition of the "pure concept" of religion, a definition that he had not in fact offered in the first section. The first part of the definition is contained on a special sheet designated by the symbol "D." This sheet was later inserted into the *Ms.* at the wrong place and given the number 14; however, there can be no doubt about its correct location. Following the insertion Hegel continues discussing the definition of the concept of religion for several more sheets and does not return to the question of the internal necessity of the religious standpoint until sheet 22b in a new section headed "Necessity of This Standpoint" (our Sec. C below). Thus the bulk of the second section on the "Scientific Conception of the Religious Standpoint" does not treat the matter of the internal necessity of the religious standpoint but rather develops a definition of this standpoint. The flow of the discussion is from external necessity to definition of the concept to internal necessity.

56. *Ms. margin:* ⟨D. See special sheet)

57. *Ms. reads*: D. On the Concept of Religion.

[*Ed.*] This section is contained on special sheet 14a-b, designated for insertion in the *Ms.* at this point by the symbol "D" (see n. 56). In it Hegel offers a brief general or "abstract" definition of the concept of religion. He also describes this definition as "speculative" because it holds together religious *consciousness* and its *object*, "the true in and for itself," God as "the absolutely self-determining true." Ordinarily these are grasped as abstract, opposed elements, but speculation knows that religious consciousness entails a "rising above" and "passing over" to the absolute, and that the absolute in turn mediates itself with itself in and through the consciousness of it. Hegel develops the speculative concept of religion more fully in the 1824 lectures.

is to grasp everything as idea. The idea, however, is the true [expressed] in thought, not in intuition and representation. But the true [expressed] in thought is that the concrete, the actual, posits itself in ruptured form—ruptured into opposed, abstract determinations. Concrete actuality is grasped as the unity of these determinate oppositions: this is the *speculative element.* We intuit and represent the whole; reflection then makes distinctions upon and within our intuition. But it keeps these distinctions apart, as such, and forgets the unity that embraces them, perceiving them as one only within a third term external to them, not as unified in themselves. Thus, for example, among animals species and individual are a unity, a unity of universality and singularity. Thus too, becoming [is] being and nonbeing; but we let a representation [of] becoming satisfy us—and of being and nonbeing likewise; to grasp them, thus separated, in unity, this is the speculative [insight] that the understanding resists. Philosophy [is] consciousness of the speculative because it grasps ⟨all⟩ the objects of pure thought, both natural and spiritual, ⟨and it grasps them in the form of thought.⟩ This [is] the true *as* true, as the unity of what is differentiated.

Now religion itself is the standpoint of the consciousness of the true; ⟨[it is] the consciousness of the most completely universal speculative content as such,⟩ not of *something* that is true, not of this or that, not of something that on one side is still finite and untrue, but rather of the absolutely true, of the universal, of the absolutely self-determining true that has being in and for itself. But this absolutely self-determining true *is* only as the idea.[58] If God [is] not [conceived] as this unity, [as] the absolutely self-determined and | self-determining absolute, [14b] then [we have] that infinite 115
abstraction, the supreme being [*das höchste Wesen*]. [God is properly conceived] only as having within himself the differentiated infinite universalities, [as having] within himself determinateness, i.e., limit, i.e., [as having] difference within himself, and [having it] as difference."[59]

58. *Ms. canceled:* The world, God, etc., are representations insofar as they are not, like God, conceived as that unity.

59. W_2 *reads:* (a) Speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the idea, such that everything is apprehended as idea; the idea, however, is the true in thought, not in mere intuition or representation. The true in thought means more precisely

This speculative [element] is what comes to consciousness in religion. Otherwise, God is an indeterminate, empty name. This is the religious standpoint. This consciousness [is] not [to be found]' in any other sphere; [there is] actuality and truth of a kind, to be sure, but not the highest, absolute truth, for the latter can be found only (α) in the perfect universality of determinate characteristics, and (β) in the state of being determined in and for itself—not, that is, in simple determinacy (for this [is defined] vis-à-vis an other), but rather in the determinacy that contains the other within itself.

¯Accordingly, religion itself as such exists as this speculative [element]. ⟨It is this speculative [element] as a state of consciousness, so to speak.⟩ But its object and everything else [exist] in the more

that it is concrete, posited as divided within itself, and indeed in such a way that the two sides of what is divided are opposed categories of thought, of which the idea must be conceived as the unity. To think speculatively means to resolve everything actual [into its parts] and to oppose these to each other in such a way that the distinctions are set in opposition in accord with the categories of thought, and the object is apprehended as the unity of the two. Our intuition has the whole of the object before itself; our reflection distinguishes, apprehends different sides, recognizes a manifold in them, and severs them. In this distinguishing, reflection does not maintain the unity of the two. Sometimes it forgets the whole, other times the distinctions; and if it has both before it, it still separates the properties from the object and so positions both that that wherein the two are one becomes a *third*, which is different from the object and its properties. In the case of mechanical objects, which fall into the sphere of externality, this circumstance may have a place: the object is only the lifeless substratum for the distinctions, and its quality of oneness is only the gathering together of external aggregates. In the true object, however, which is not merely an aggregate, an externally united multiplicity, the object is one with its distinguished characteristics, and it is speculation that first grasps the unity in this very antithesis as such. It is in fact the business of speculation to apprehend all the objects of pure thought, of nature and of spirit, in the form of thought and thus as the unity of what is distinguished.

(b) Religion, then, is itself the standpoint of the consciousness of the true, which is in and for itself; consequently it is the stage of spirit at which the speculative *content* becomes an *object* to consciousness. Religion is the consciousness not of this or that truth in individual objects but rather of what is absolutely true, of the truth as the universal, the all-encompassing, outside of which there lies nothing at all. The content of its consciousness is further the universally true, which is in and for itself, which determines itself and is not determined from without. While the finite requires an other for its determinacy, the truth has its determinacy, its limit, its end within itself; it is not limited through an other, but the other is found within it.

concrete forms of representation: God and community, the cultus, absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity.

Here the concept of religion [is] initially more abstract. Its two moments, the moments making up the antithesis [to which we have referred, are] (α) absolute universality, pure thinking, and (β) absolute singularity, sensibility.~[60] [18a]

[3. The Religious Relationship as the Unity of Absolute Universality and Absolute Singularity][61]

Religion is the consciousness of the true in and for itself as opposed to sensible, finite truth, sense perception, ⟨etc.⟩[62] This [is] the more precise understanding of the | definition of religion that we are 116
acquainted with initially from representation.

~Consciousness of the true that has being in and for itself without limit and wholly universally:[63] this is an *elevation, a rising above,* a reflecting upon, a *passing over* from what is immediate, sensible, singular (for the immediate is what is first and not therefore the

60. W_2 *reads:* Religion is accordingly this speculative [element] in the form, as it were, of a state of consciousness, the aspects of which are not simple categories of thought but rather are concretely filled. These moments can be none other than the moment of thought, active universality, thought in operation, and actuality as immediate, particular self-consciousness.

61. [*Ed.*] Here we return to the main text, which elaborates on the general "speculative" definition of the concept of religion contained on special sheet 14a-b. At the end of the latter Hegel notes that the two moments of the concept are "absolute universality" and "absolute singularity." These moments are now treated under the forms of devotion (*Andacht*, cf. n. 66) and religious sensibility or sensation (*Empfindung*, cf. n. 67), and as the conflict between infinite consciousness and finite self-consciousness. Speculation recognizes that these two moments and their relationship are held together and in fact constitute the religious subject. (This accounts for our editorial sectional heading at this point.)

62. *Ms. margin:* (Religion in and through thought – and the object itself, and indeed –

(α) The highest thought – religion in its form, abstract concept, this totality –

(α) moment of thought

(β) of sensibility

(γ) of representation –

The three moments [are] inseparable)

63. [*Ed.*] There follows a series of key terms that describe the essential activiry of religious consciousness: *Erhebung* ("elevation," "rising above"), *Übergehen* ("passing over"), *Ausgehen* ("going out"), *Fortgehen* ("going on," "progression").

elevation); and thus it is a *going out* and *on* to an *other*—⟨not to a third, and so on into infinity, [for then] the other itself again becomes finite and is not an other,⟩ but [to a] *second*. But therefore it [is] at the same time a sublation of the progression to and production of a second since this second should rather be the first, the truly unmediated and unposited. This is the process of spirit in
117 general, and since, | as thus immediately posited, it is the absolutely universal, therefore this activity is *thought*, and this unlimited universal, God, is the highest thought. [It is] not thought *implicitly* ⟨in the way that intuition [is]. Thought is intrinsically activity; [that is,] thought as such [is activity], not thought as subjectivity. It does not matter whether [it is] defined as in the subject or according to its objectivity.⟩ [Thus thought] is posited as object, as the universal. This [is] its content and essential determination.

At this point [it should] be noted first of all that God and religion exist in and through *thought*—simply and solely in and for thought. And even though religious sensation may subsequently [take up] this object again and the relationship to it as feeling, the undifferentiated unity [is] just the unity of thought with itself. Thankfulness, ⟨resignation, etc., introduce themselves.⟩[64] [18b]

[65]This thinking is the foundation, the substantial relation. It is what is meant by *devotion*, not thought in the regular or formal sense.[66] For while it may well extend to the absolute object, it does

64. W_2 *reads:* The first moment in the concept of religion is indeed the purely universal, the moment of thought in its perfect universality. It is not this or that which is thought; rather *thought thinks itself*. The object is the universal, which, as active, is thought. As the act of rising up to the true, religion is a *going out* from sensible, finite objects; if this becomes merely a *going on* to an other, then it is a false progression *ad infinitum* and the sort of talk that gets nowhere. But thought is a rising up from what is limited to the absolutely universal, and religion exists only through thought and in thought. God is not the highest sensation but the highest thought; even when God is brought down to the level of representation, the content of this representation still belongs to the realm of thought.

65. *Ms. canceled:* ⟨(I *sense* God – cannot be said – I am thankful – I sense *thankfulness* toward God)⟩

66. [*Ed.*] The connection between devotion (*Andacht*) and thought (*Denken*) is undoubtedly strengthened for Hegel by the fact that the terms are related etymologically. The root of *Andacht* is formed from the imperfect of the verb *denken*, namely, *dachte*. Devotion is a form of thought that attaches itself to its object in the mode of dependence or immediacy. Thus it is to be distinguished from thought "in the regular or formal sense" (our translation of the adjective *förmlich*).

not constitute an independent progressive movement of thoughts, a development of the objectivity of the object and a consequence of subjective activity; [it is not] reasoning or speculating, the relating of reasons, consequences, purposiveness. [Devotional] thinking does not advance of itself to conceptual relations. Thus [it is] the wholly universal, undeveloped, subjective [way of] thinking and | 118
rising up into the wholly universal abstract element. ⟨[Its] object [is] the wholly universal as such, the all-encompassing. (Whether the content [in its] objectivity is further posited by means of thinking or in some other way will be discussed later.)⟩

For itself, this devotion is not yet *sensibility* [*Empfindung*] or *feeling* [*Gefühl*][67] as such but rather the purely abstract orientation, a rising above everything limited and finite. There is [also] *devotional* sensibility, but this [is] a further determination of devotion. ⟨This is quite peculiar to religion as distinct from other modes of consciousness, and also from the other kind of thinking, [which deals with] relationships, causes, and grounds, [where] everything is finite and limited.⟩

[(α)] The most immediate consequence, when we hold fast to this standpoint, is that thought is the element, the absolute and original mode of activity or state to which the consciousness of the divine pertains: God *is* only in and for thought. Consequently, *only human being has religion essentially.* The animal has sensation and feeling, but by means of thought human being distinguishes itself from the animal and therefore has religion. ¯Here we come up against what is usually said, namely that religion is something apart from, independent of, and alien to thought, indeed that thought is opposed to and detrimental to religion. But it is precisely the same

67. [*Ed.*] While this phrase suggests that the terms *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* are closely related for Hegel, there is in fact a subtle distinction between them, which he sometimes observes and sometimes does not. (See 1824 *Concept*, n. 20.) To preserve the distinction, we always translate *Empfindung* as "sensibility" or "sensation" and *Gefühl* as "feeling." The term *Empfindung* predominates in the 1821 *Ms.* (more, however, in the *Concept* than in the *Introduction*), while *Gefühl*, which Schleiermacher had elevated to a major theological category and a topic of controversy in *Der christliche Glaube* of 1821–22, is the prevalent term in Hegel's 1824 and 1827 lectures. Hegel's use of *Empfindung* was probably influenced by Jacobi; cf. the latter's *David Hume*, pp. 200–201 (*Werke* 2:283–284). In the material it takes from the *Ms.* and *Hn*, W_2 consistently changes *Empfindung* to *Gefühl*.

with thought in regard to right and ethical life: I have right and ethical life only insofar as I *know* myself to be free and know ethical life [to be] free substance. [I] know myself as this essential, infinite [being]; [I] know this infinitude, universality, [as] the substantiality of [my] will—speaking generally, [as] the rationality of will. All this is not *my* willing, my interest and purpose as this single, particular individual, but rather simply my universality, my essentiality. Otherwise [there is] only desire, force, free choice, etc. [68]It is one of the gravest and crudest errors of our time that *thought* is not
119 recognized to be the element and essential form in all of this, | as well as the sole fundamental content. ⟨Religious sensation ought to be something specific, otherwise it is not intelligible.⟩[69]

68. (Reason – Jacobi – revelation, immediate knowledge of God – is thought, in thought)

[*Ed.*] Hegel is here apparently referring to Jacobi's early equation of faith and immediate knowledge; cf. 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27. See also Jacobi's *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung* (Leipzig, 1811) (*Werke* 3:277). Jacobi held that all knowledge is derived from immediate sense experience. "He regarded all 'immediate' knowledge as a direct 'revelation' of being. The mark of this 'revelation' was an unshakeable *faith*, a feeling of immediate certainty, an inescapable conviction of real existence." Thus H. S. Harris in his Introduction to Hegel's *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 26 (see pp. 25–32).

69. W_2 *reads:* The most foolish delusion of our time is the opinion that thought is detrimental to religion and that the more thought is abandoned, the more secure religion becomes. This misunderstanding originates in a fundamental misconception of the higher spiritual relationships. Thus, in regard to right, good will is taken explicitly as something opposed to intelligence, and one is given credit for an all the more genuine good will the less one thinks. To the contrary, right and ethical life consist solely in the fact that I am a thinking being; i.e., I do not look upon my freedom as that of my empirical person, which belongs to me as this particular person, and in terms of which I could subjugate the other person by means of cunning or force, but rather I regard freedom as a universal that has being in and for itself.

If we now say that religion has within itself the moment of thought in its complete universality, and that the unlimited universal is the supreme, absolute thought, we do not as yet here make the distinction between subjective and objective thought. The universal is object and is thought purely and simply, but not yet developed and further defined within itself. All distinctions are as yet absent and annulled within it. Everything finite vanishes, everything disappears and is at the same time included, in this aether of thought. But this element of the universal is not yet more exactly defined; out of this liquid element and in this transparency nothing has as yet taken shape.

(β) But, as we said, this thinking is *devotion*, not objectively self-developing thought, not the sort of thought that spreads itself out in and through itself to contents, definitions, [19a] conceptual relations. In this abstraction (and hence even immediacy), thought lacks the moment of ⟨form, determinateness, finitude on its own account, being-in-and-for-self,⟩[70] of being infinitely determined within itself. ˜This constitutes the other side, the other extreme of the syllogism.˜[71] It is consciousness in its singularity as such, the subject in its immediacy as this particular thing, [existing] not universally but with and according to its needs, circumstances, sins, etc.—speaking generally, in accord with its wholly empirical, temporal character.

(γ) In religion, I myself am the *relation* of the two sides as thus defined. I the *thinking* subject, and I the *immediate* subject, are one and the same I. And further, the relation of these two sides that are so sharply opposed—⟨of utterly finite consciousness and being and of the infinite⟩—is [present] in religion for me. This is the *speculative* definition of religion; ⟨only thereby and to this extent is it speculative.⟩ ˜In philosophy the speculative, defined in terms of its antithesis, has a different meaning; of this we shall speak later.[72] [It has] the form of thought and [of] reconciliation in thought: thought has already begun to strip away the rigid oppo-

The progression occurs when this universal determines itself for itself, and this self-determining then constitutes the development of the idea of God. In the sphere of universality the idea itself is initially the material of determinacy, and the progression appears in divine figures; but the other, the configuration [itself], is retained in the divine idea, which is still in its substantiality, and under the character of eternity it remains within the womb of universality.

[*Ed.*] The German edition attaches this passage from W_2 to the one contained in our n. 64, construing the whole as a parallel to the main text between the beginning of n. 64 and the end of n. 69. However, it does not appear to offer a parallel to the intervening material.

70. [*Ed.*] This marginal notation replaces the word "determinateness" in the main text, which is not canceled.

71. W_2 *reads:* The particularization that is still retained in the sphere of the universal constitutes, therefore, when it actually comes to appearance as such, the other vis-à-vis the extreme of universality.

72. [*Ed.*] Hegel is apparently referring to Sec. D, "The Relationship of Religion to Art and Philosophy."

sition, rendering it more fluid through the element of universality,
120 bringing it closer to reconciliation. | The standpoint of religion is that in it the speculative consists in the unity of this rigid antithesis."[73] Here and for the moment this is a fact; later its necessity [will be demonstrated].[74]

In thinking, I raise myself above all that is finite to the absolute and am *infinite consciousness,* while at the same time I am *finite self-consciousness,* indeed to the full extent of my empirical condition. Both sides, as well as their relation, exist for me [in] the essential unity of my infinite knowing and my finitude. These two sides seek each other and flee from each other.[75] I am this conflict and this conciliation, which exist in myself and for myself. ⟨I myself as infinite am opposed to myself as finite, and as finite consciousness am opposed to myself, to my thinking and consciousness, as infinite.⟩ I am what intuits, senses, and represents this union and conflict. I am their holding together, the effort put forth [19b] in this holding together, the labor of mind and heart to master this opposition, which likewise exists for me.

[76]From the side of my subjective, empirical singularity, I sense or intuit myself to be finite, or represent or think of myself as such (in [my] formal thinking). These distinctions are not so important here; compared with the content of consciousness, which is the
121 main thing, these forms are initially of indifferent value. |

73. W_2 *reads:* While in philosophy the rigidity of these two sides is lost through *reconciliation in thoughts* because both sides *are* thoughts (the one is not a purely universal thinking nor the other of empirical, singular character), religion only arrives at the enjoyment of unity by lifting these two rigid extremes out of the state of cleavage, reworking them, and bringing them together again. But by thus stripping its extremes of the form of cleavage, rendering the opposition fluid in the element of universality, and bringing it to reconciliation, religion remains always akin to what is thought, even in its form and movement; and philosophy, as utterly active and opposition-uniting thought, occupies a position directly adjacent to religion.

74. [*Ed.*] See below, pp. 221–232.

75. W_2 *adds:* At one time, for example, I accentuate my empirical, finite consciousness and place myself in opposition to infinitude; at another time I exclude myself from myself, condemn myself, and give preponderance to infinite consciousness. The middle term contains nothing other than the characteristics of both extremes. They are not the pillars of Hercules, confronting each other harshly.

76. *Ms. margin:* ⟨More precise form of this relation⟩

I am the relation of these two sides;[77] these two extremes are each just me, who connect them. The holding together, the connecting, is itself this conflict of self within the unity, this uniting of self in the conflict. In other words, *I am the conflict,* for the conflict is precisely this clash, which is not an indifference of the two ⟨as⟩ distinct but is their bonding together. I am not *one* of the parties caught up in the conflict but am both of the combatants and the conflict itself. I am the fire and water that touch each other, the contact (⟨now separated and ruptured, now reconciled and united⟩) and union of what utterly flies apart; and it is just this contact that is itself this double, clashing relation as relation.[78] | 122

77. W_2 *adds:* which are not abstract characteristics such as "finite and infinite," but are each of them the totality.

78. W_2 *adds:* As forms of this relation of the two extremes, we shall acquaint ourselves with

(a) feeling
(b) intuition
(c) representation.

Before entering upon this subject, we shall have to become acquainted with the entire sphere of these relations in its necessity, insofar as it contains, as the elevation of finite consciousness to the absolute, the forms of religious consciousness. In investigating this necessity of religion, we shall be obliged to conceive religion as posited through what is other [than itself].

To be sure, in this mediation, when it opens for us the way into the sphere of those forms of consciousness, religion will present itself already as a *result* that immediately *sublates itself as result;* consequently it will present itself as the *primary* thing, through which everything is mediated and on which everything else depends. We shall thus see in what is mediated the counterthrust of the movement and of the necessity, which both moves forward and thrusts backward. But this mediation of necessity is now also to be posited *within religion itself,* so that in fact the relation and the essential connection of the two sides, which are comprised in the religious spirit, may be known as necessary. The forms of feeling, intuition, and representation, as they proceed necessarily one from the other, now propel themselves to that sphere in which the inner mediation of their moments proves itself to be necessary, i.e., to the sphere of thought in which religious consciousness will comprehend itself conceptually. These two mediations of necessity, of which one leads to religion and the other takes place within religious self-consciousness itself, comprise therefore the forms of religious consciousness as it appears as feeling, intuition, and representation.

[*Ed.*] This passage shows strong evidence of editorial revision, especially in terms of its use of the general future tense and the division into feeling, intuition, and representation, which lies at the basis of the treatment of the religious relationship in W_2, but which is found in none of the available manuscripts.

Initially this relation, this consciousness, exists as such (not I as knowing and the known object); it exists as relation, as devotion itself on the one side—a pure, simple raising and imagining [of oneself] into the higher, the highest, the universal element. But this devotion is at once *sensibility* too: these [are] the moments of *religious sensibility*.[79] This relation is called "sensibility" because I comport myself in it in the mode of immediacy; it is my immediate relationship, i.e., I exist as this singular, empirical self-consciousness. I exist in the mode of sensibility to the extent that I am immediately determined, a determinacy[80] [that] is immediately mine as [being] in this empirical [ego]. I see an object, [20a] feel an object with my fingers; thus for me it is something other, external to me.
123 But | seeing this blue, feeling this warmth, is at the same time my subjective determinateness, which is in me and unseparated from me. I sense in a fashion similar to sentient nature generally in its sensibility. Sensing is this fluidity,[81] this immediate reflection within me, this immediate making into mine of what simultaneously remains something other ⟨but [exists] for me; thus [it is] only [as] sensation and life, distinction vis-à-vis myself, not an other,⟩ that I am so determined. ⟨I as this particular [self am] not an object. [I am] myself, my unity with myself, maintaining unity with myself—[I am] mine in this complete diversity.⟩

79. *Ms. margin:* (More precise nature of sensibility in general)

80. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Determinacy simply; (β) in this empirical [ego]⟩

81. W_1 *reads:* Since I have a determinate character in feeling, I comport myself in it in the mode of immediacy. In feeling I am this single empirical I, and the determinacy of my feeling belongs to this particular empirical self-consciousness.

A distinction is thus implicitly contained in feeling. On the one side am I, the universal, the subject; and this transparent, pure fluidity, this immediate reflection into myself, becomes disturbed by an other; but in this other I keep myself entirely with myself. The alien characteristic becomes, so to speak, fluid in my universality, and that which is for me an other, I make my own. When another quality has been put into what is lifeless, this particular thing has acquired another quality too. But I, as feeling, maintain myself in that other which penetrates me, and continue to be, in the determinacy, I. The distinction in feeling is, in the first place, an inner one in the I itself: it is the distinction between me in my pure fluidity, and me in my determinacy. But this inner distinction, owing to the fact that reflection enters into it, is none the less also posited as such. I separate myself from my determinacy, place it as other over against me, and subjectivity is for itself *in relation* to objectivity.

In intuition and representation, then, my activity enters in order to remove this determinacy as not mine, externalizing it, making it objective. Thus [we have] two determinacies: (1) I have this determinacy within me; and ⟨2⟩ it is not in me. I have thus divested myself of my determinacy and in so doing have sublated my immediacy as such. With that I have entered the sphere of the universal as such ⟨as the identity of what is differentiated.⟩ [It is] the same with inner feeling. I am determined, am immediately angry or compassionate, find myself so determined; it exists as mine, as the determinateness ⟨of this particular individual.⟩ Likewise there is a transition not to external intuition but only to representation and recollection [when I] represent the content, ingredients, and determinacy of feeling; [I must] make the wrath, the wrong, the injury that I [have] suffered, the sorrow, pain, forlornness and loss, an object of representation. Anguish and sorrow that speak [are] not concentrated [within me]; injury [is] not immediately identical with me; [I] withdraw myself from the injury and from determinacy in general. [Here there is] a distinguishing of subject and object; but precisely this being-for-myself of subjectivity in relation to objectivity is the form of objective, universal subjectivity, the externalizing of sentient singularity.

˜Now it is said that sensibility is *only* subjective, something particular and peculiar to me. This appears to be opposed to the fact that | in the cleavage I first constitute [myself] as subject overagainst 124
[20b] object; and subjectivity ⟨this limitedness⟩ exists only vis-à-vis objectivity.˜[82] But in fact (1) this antithesis, namely that I as subjectivity exist vis-à-vis objectivity, is a relation, an identity distinguished from this distinction, and it is at this point that universality begins.[83] ⟨2⟩ Sensibility as such, on the other hand, is the I in this

82. W_2 *reads:* It is customary to say that feeling is only something *subjective;* but I am "subjective" only with reference to an object of intuition or representation by positing an other over against me. Thus it would seem that feeling cannot be termed something subjective because the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity has not yet appeared in it.

83. W_2 *adds:* Because I stand in relation to an other and distinguish the object from myself by intuiting and representing [it], I am the connection between these two, myself and the other—a distinguishing whereby an identity is posited. I am related to the object by *overreaching* it.

immediate, simple unity, wholly filled with determinacy, which my I does not transcend. ⟨[I] am a particular being;⟩ [I] do not [go beyond] the content that I transcend by detaching it from myself in external intuition or representation of the content of inner sensation. Thus as sentient, I am something entirely particular, thoroughly immersed in determinacy. In the strict sense of the word, I am subjective, *only* subjective without objectivity and without universality. ⟨In intuition and representation [I am] a subjective, particular content with the form of objectivity; but in sensation [I am] a particular content without any form of objectivity, and just for this reason [I am] completely determined subjectively vis-à-vis every form of objectivity.⟩

[84](The speculative relationship is initially sensed in immediate, unpurified fashion—both of its sides [related] to the universal, the objective—but [as] a conflict [within] my determinacy. The conflict itself drives [me] beyond sensibility to representation. Sensibility is quite obviously only one aspect and exists together with
125 representation.) |

The *types* of sensibility [are now to be considered].

[85]~This is the nature of sensibility: it is religious insofar as it possesses a distinctive content and distinctive determinacy, and this determinacy is what was mentioned earlier. [It involves] determinacy as infinite thought of the utterly universal, determinacy as wholly empirical subjectivity, and the speculative relationship of both of them. I sense this in myself—it is my conflict—⟨and also the reconciliation and resolution of it.⟩ ⟨I am at peace with myself, identical in and with my empirical self.⟩~[86] ⟨Why is sensibility claimed to be necessary for religion? Precisely because religion has thoroughly permeated me as this particular person, because it is

84. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Religious sensation – sensation of this conflict – of itself already drives beyond sensation⟩

85. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Mere representation without sensibility – interest, immediate unity with me – love, children, parts of myself, of my actual self-consciousness⟩

86. W_2 *reads:* If now the essential religious relationship resides in feeling, then this relationship is identical with my empirical self. Determinacy, as the infinite thought of the universal, and I as wholly empirical subjectivity, are conjoined in me in feeling; I am the immediate unification of the two, the resolution of their conflict.

not merely a representation, thought, wish, means, etc., but rather exists subjectively entirely in this identity with me. In the mode of feeling, my whole empirical existence [is] gathered into one, and [is] at the same time wholly and completely recognition of the universal. Religion is all the more inward the more universal is sensibility, i.e., the more it permeates all aspects of me in integral fashion—a feeling such that the entire empirical self [is] drawn into the religious relation in all its aspects, successively and side by side.〉 It must at the same time be noted, however, that because I find myself determined on the one hand as this empirical subject, and on the other hand in such fashion as to be raised into a wholly different region, and am sensible of passing to and fro from one to the other, and of the relationship of both—in this experience precisely I find myself determined against myself or distinguished from myself. That is, [21a] I am driven by the content of this very sensibility of mine into [its] antithesis, i.e., to | consciousness as such 126
and to representation in general, 〈even if now intuition,〉 for what distinguishes representation from sensibility is reflection, [or] the advance to the distinguishing of a subject and object. We do not need to discuss here how consciousness itself and representation are more precisely distinguished. Consciousness as such (as distinct from self-consciousness) has in principle an external object. Intuition [has] this externality in its objective, complete character, 〈[in its] genuine, determinate character,〉 in [the form of] spatiality and temporality; in representation as such the object [is] simultaneously posited within me.

˜The essential point is that religious sensibility immediately and on its own account advances to consciousness, to representation. (α) This is characteristic not only of religious sensibility but of human[87] sensibility generally, for the human being is spirit, consciousness, representation. There is no sensibility that is not also representation. (β) But other modes of sensibility are [driven to representation] only by the nature of | the case itself, so to speak, 127

87. *Ms. canceled:* 〈(β) resides, however, immediately in the I of the religious [person]〉

[by] the inner necessity ⟨of the form of determination, [i.e.,] the I and [its] determinacy.⟩ But *religious* sensibility contains in its very content not only the necessity but also the actuality of the antithesis, and consequently it contains *representation.* In religious sensibility I am made external to myself; my universal thought is the negation of my particular, empirical existence."[88] Because I feel this, I feel that [empirical] side as a determinacy that falls outside of me; or, because I am in this fashion, I feel myself negated, estranged from my universal self—[I am] disowning myself (in repentance, for example), negating my empirical consciousness.[89]

This relationship should be carefully noted. The necessity of representation for sensibility is a matter of far-reaching significance.[90] [91] (α) It is a common prejudice that [21b] intuition, representation, cognition, etc., should exclude sensibility. One can still go on sensing when one has an objective representation before oneself (intuition, cognition, etc.). On the contrary, sensibility nourishes itself, gives itself permanence, renews and kindles itself afresh, *by means of* representation. Anger, indignation, hatred are just as

88. W_2 *reads:* This transition to reflection is characteristic not merely of religious feeling but of human feeling in general. For human being is spirit, consciousness, representation; there is no feeling that does not contain within itself this transition to reflection. In every other feeling, however, it is only the inner necessity and nature of the case that impels to reflection; this alone is the necessity that distinguishes the I from its determinacy. Religious feeling, on the contrary, contains in its content, in its very determinacy, not only the necessity but the actuality of the antithesis itself, and consequently reflection. For the content of the religious relationship is just the thought of the universal, which is itself already reflection, hence the other moment of my empirical consciousness, and the connection of the two. Therefore in religious feeling I am alienated from myself, since the universal, thought having being in and for itself, is the negation of my particular empirical existence, which appears in regard to it as a nothingness, which has its truth only in the universal. The religious relationship is unification, but it contains the power of judgment [*die Kraft des Urteils*].

89. *Ms. adds:* and

90. *Ms. canceled:* ⟨Only religious sensibility – not representation, even less thought. Representation does not at all sublate what is sensed. (α) Merely a representation without sensibility)

91. *Ms. margin:* ⟨At an earlier point above [we considered] representation without sensibility; here [we consider] (α) what it would be like if sensibility must be without representation; (β) what religion is without doctrine)

active in sustaining and invigorating [themselves] by ⟨representing⟩ the many aspects of the enemy and of the injustice [they suffer] as are love, good will, and joy through the equally manifold connections of the object which they present to themselves. If we do not *think,* as we put it, of the object of our hatred, anger, or love, etc., the sensibility and inclination are extinguished; if the object disappears from representation, then the sensibility disappears [too], and every wholly external stimulus stirs up anguish and love [afresh]. One of the means of weakening sensibility [is to] distract the mind [*Geist*], bringing other objects before its intuition and | 128
representation, transplanting [it] to other situations and circumstances in which those manifold aspects are not available to representation. Representation must [then] forget the object—and forgetting is, for hatred, worse than forgiving, just as for love being rejected is worse than mere unfaithfulness.

⟨(β) Religious sensibility must advance to representation and doctrine.⟩ All that raises human beings above the level of animal sensation is that their sensibility is at the same time knowledge and consciousness. Human beings know themselves while animals know nothing of themselves; human beings know only themselves, even in consciousness, when they withdraw themselves from immediate identity with determinacy. [22a] Precisely to the extent that the religious relation is viewed as being *only* in the mode ofsensibility,[92] religion dies away into something devoid of representation and action and loses all determinate content—of this we shall speak further later on.[93] [Our topic now is] the importance of religious doctrine, [so we must point out] at once the folly of the notion that the religious relation exists only as sensibility, that only religious sensibility as such is religion, indeed even to the exclusion of representation, cognition, thought—as if sensibility cannot occur in conjunction with the latter.

⟨Still [to be] considered in regard to sensibility is where the

92. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[Religion is] not merely certainty, subjective sensibility, the identity of my empirical I, but also *truth* in and for itself, and therefore religious *doctrine* [as well as] art, imagery, and other [forms of] representation⟩

93. [*Ed.*] See below, p. 239–240.

particular types of religious sensibility fall.〉[94] Specifically, it has been shown[95] that in religious sensibility the empirical, particular form of subjectivity is contained. By virtue of its very nature, this is [contained] in sensibility as particular interests, particular determinacy in general. Religious sensibility as such itself contains *both* the contrast between the determinacy of empirical self-consciousness and that of universal thought or intuition *and* their relation and unity. Religious sensibility swings back and forth between the
129 determinacy of their antithesis and their unity | and satisfaction.[96] In the determinacy of separation, together with the fact that the universal is the substantial against which the self-aware empirical consciousness also feels its essential nothingness—indeed that of its still positive 〈volitional〉 existence—this representation, this determinacy in general, is the sensation of *fear*. Being aware of one's own inner existence and conviction as of no account, along with self-consciousness on the side of the universal condemning the former, results in the sensation of *repentance*, of *anguish* about oneself, etc. Being aware that one's empirical existence, furthered on the whole or in one or another of its aspects—and indeed not so much through one's own self-activity [as through] a connective power external to one's [22b] strength and prudence, which [is] represented as and attributed to the universal's having being in and for itself—results in the sensation of *thankfulness*, etc. The higher unity of my self-consciousness generally with the universal, and the certainty, security, and sensation of this identity, is *love, blessedness.*

[97]Generally speaking, this [is] the determinate standpoint and

94. *Ms adds:* We still have to speak of the *types* of religious sensibility.

95. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 216. At the place to which he here refers, Hegel initially intended to treat the "*types* of sensibility," but then inserted remarks on the "nature of sensibility" and also alluded to the meaning of empirical subjectivity.

96. W_2 *adds:* . . . differing as the relationship of my subjectivity to the universal determines itself in accord with the particular mode assumed by the interest in which I happen at the time to exist. Accordingly the relation of the universal and empirical self-consciousness can be extremely varied in character: the highest tension and hostility of the extremes, or the highest unity.

97. *Ms. margin:* 〈Concept [of] sentient devotion. (α) Devotion: universal, speculative thought. (β) Sentient: my immediate singularity. (γ) Both elements accordingly pushed to extremes. Relation of the two is itself universally objective and sentient in my egoistic singularity.〉

concept of religion—this speculative intuition, this self-consciousness, sensing and sensed, [hence] representing. The next point concerns the cognition of the *necessity* of this standpoint and its proof—the cognition of its truth, of the fact that it is the true and the veracious. | 130

C. *NECESSITY OF THIS STANDPOINT*[98] [99]

When we consider the nature of this necessity, it will be evident that and why it [can]not here be treated in detail; our concern is, rather, just to understand it and its procedure.

[100]Specifically, the religious standpoint contains: (α) The *objective* and *universal*—not in any sort of determinateness (e.g., a species or right), nor [as] *a* universal ([such as] will or freedom as universals). [What it contains is] rather *the* utterly unlimited universal or concrete that nonetheless encompasses utterly everything within itself—the natural and spiritual world in its full expanse and in the endless articulation of its actuality. (β) The *subjective*—likewise in the full expanse of its self-consciousness. (γ) The two sides are totalities only because and to the extent that each has incorporated the other within itself implicitly. The objective totality includes also the spiritual world, which [takes shape] by incorpo-

98. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(d) Difference from philosophy and art⟩

99. [*Ed.*] This heading stands in the *Ms.* with a "c" written above it. In this section Hegel offers a demonstration of the "internal" necessity of the religious standpoint and its object from the constitution of the finite world—in effect a form of the cosmological proof of the existence of God (cf. *Ms. Intro.*, n. 72), and a "phenomenological" approach to the truth of religion by contrast with the "speculative" definition of the concept of religion in the preceding section. By tracing phenomenologically the immanent teleological movement of nature and finite spirit to their goal and foundation in the absolute idea, Hegel provides a convenient summary of "the whole sphere of the philosophical sciences." The notation contained in n. 98 appears to anticipate the final main section division of the *Concept*, which occurs on *Ms.* sheet 25b: "d. Relationship of Religion to Art and Philosophy." It is not related to the three points contained in the preceding marginal notation, which are designated by Greek letters.

100. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[We must] first remind ourselves [of the two sides of the religious standpoint]: the universality and fulfillment of both sides. Objective world in itself, subjective [world] for itself⟩

rating and subsuming the [natural] world in its imagining and thinking. For subjective consciousness shapes and deepens itself within itself by means of reciprocal interaction with its world.

¯The inexhaustible wealth of everything in the universe [23a] is contained and understood in the religious standpoint; and this standpoint itself has the sense that it is the *absolute truth* of this wealth, that the latter as it is in and for itself exists only from this
131 standpoint, | and that all other modes of its existence are past, external, ephemeral, untrue, miserable, self-contradictory, self-destructive. As a result, spirit is unable to remain or sustain itself at any of these stages.

⟨[Its] true satisfaction [is that] it exists in this expression for the sake of its satisfaction, [its] subjective position. The presupposition [is that] spirit [is] the truth.⟩ The assertion that the religious standpoint is the *truth* of the world contains on its objective side *the true,* which has being in and for itself, and which we call *God;* and on the subjective side, the fact that religiousness is the *true actuality of self-consciousness,*¯[101] ⟨its true life, [its] experienced, conscious truth.⟩ The objective proof, the objective necessity [of the religious standpoint] consists therefore in the *cognition of truth.* This cognition is not such that we presuppose a concept of God and religion, (α) the correctness of which we would have to demonstrate, and (β) then seek the subjective cognitive grounds for this content, cognitive grounds without which we would not be convinced. Primarily,[102] therefore, it is not a question of proving some such

101. W_2 *reads:* The standpoint of religion shows itself in this transition [to the absolute] as the standpoint of truth, in which the whole wealth of the natural and spiritual world is contained. Every other mode of existence of this wealth must here prove itself to be an external, arid, miserable, self-contradictory and destructive mode of actuality, which involves the end of truth and contains the aspect of untruth—a mode of actuality that returns into its ground and source only from the standpoint of religion. By means of this proof [of the necessity of the religious standpoint] it is then made clear that spirit cannot stop short and remain at any of those stages, and that only religion is the true actuality of self-consciousness.

102. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[It is not a question of] proving that this *representational image* "God" is truly actual, but rather that this *content* is what is true. We could then even discard representation or reduce it to that content—the content [that is] true in and for itself.⟩

proposition [as]: "God is thus and so," "Religion is this and that." Such propositions contain as a presupposition the representational images "God," "religion." It is a question of the *necessity of the content* in and for itself, or of discovering in the cognition what it is that is the true. ⟨The only presupposition [that we need to make is] that we do not wish to halt and remain in any subjective standpoint other than what we discover corresponding to its concept.⟩

This true, however, is the *idea*, which has two aspects: (α) the two sides of the idea itself; (β) their unity. The former are the totality of the | subjective, the latter [the totality] of the essence of the subject generally and of the world, ⟨nature.⟩ The truth [resides] only 132
in this consummation of the two sides in a totality: only in this do they exist and posit themselves as identical. [23b]

⟨A proof [is] subjective knowledge of the necessity⟩ [of something]. Necessity[103] [involves] derivation from something other. ⟨[It involves] dialectical movement in general. Consciousness [means]: I am, I have finite judgment. But there *is* actually nothing; no external grounds or derivation have been adduced [to prove the existence of consciousness]. We only consider consciousness the way it is given:

(α) Two independent [things subsisting] in one are contradictory, such as movement;

(β) Therefore movement [is] not [a matter of] consciousness [but is] a negative result;

(γ) But more precisely the object [of consciousness is] something that sublates itself, an ideal in space and time, otherwise manifold and one;

(δ) The object of consciousness disappears for it; the object is not something external to it, not still external to it, but rather [is] itself at the same time an object distinguished by the way it is determined.

This [is] the course [of the proof] in general. Where does the religious standpoint come from? [It entails] truth in [its] full and universal significance, encompassing within itself all fulfillment. [It

103. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Necessity (α) in itself⟩

comes] from the whole range of worldly appearance in its full and concrete significance. The course [of the proof] can be richer or more abstract, can be mounted from any detail. Vanini's straw:[104] here [we have] abstract finitude, [which] does not satisfy our def-
133 inition of God. | The other [is that] from which we are to begin.⟩[105]

⟨(α)⟩ ˜This other is nondivine being, the finite world, finite con-
134 sciousness, | ⟨our activity, the sublation of finitude.⟩˜[106] ˜Finitude

104. [*Ed.*] Lucilius Vanini (1585–1619) was an Italian freethinker who was tried and convicted on charges of atheism, for which he was burned at the stake. In self-defense at his trial, he picked up a piece of straw from the ground and said that already this straw was proof enough for him of the existence of God. He was, literally, grasping at straws. Hegel was familiar with this report from various sources, such as the histories of philosophy by Brucker and Buhle, to which reference is made in his discussion of Vanini in the *History of Philosophy* 3:138 (*Werke* 15:244–245). See also J. G. Herder, *God: Some Conversations* (1787), trans. F. H. Burkhardt (New York, 1940), p. 112.

105. *Ms. in brackets:* Consideration of nature and spirit: the dialectic of nature has its truth in spirit, spirit [has its truth] in and for itself—spirit in its appearance, in consciousness.

[*Ed.*] This original version in the main text is replaced by the preceding marginal addition.

106. W_2 *reads:* As far as the proof of this necessity is concerned, the following remarks may be sufficient.

When it is to be shown that something is necessary, it is implied thereby that it has started from something *other*. Here the other of the true, divine being is nondivine being, the finite world, finite consciousness. Now if we are to begin from this as the immediate, finite, and untrue, and indeed as an object of our knowledge, and as immediately comprehended by us in its determinate quality—if therefore we are to begin in this fashion from what is first, then it shows itself in its progression not to be as it immediately gives itself to be, but rather as destroying itself, becoming, referring to an other. Therefore it is not *our* reflection and consideration, our judgment, which tells us that the finite with which we begin is founded on something that is true. It is not *we* who adduce its foundation. Rather it is the finite that shows implicitly that it is resolving itself into something other and higher than itself. We follow the object as it returns of itself to the source of its truth.

Now, while the object that forms the starting point perishes in its truth and sacrifices itself, it does not thereby disappear; rather its content is posited in the determination of its ideality. We have an example of this sublation and ideality in consciousness: I relate myself to an object and then consider it as it is. The object, which I at once distinguish from myself, is independent: I have not made it; it did not wait for me in order to exist; and it remains when I go away from it. Both, I and the object, are therefore two independent things, but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things, in which they are posited

[is] the antithesis (α) in itself [of] nature and spirit as [they are] in themselves;˜[107] but also (β) for each other: consciousness, spirit, exists for itself vis-à-vis an other, but since this other exists for it, it exists in its consciousness; [it is] the world of its consciousness, the external, immediate world in its representation; [it is] determined by the world, but equally the world is its own, the world of its spirit.

⟨(β)⟩ ˜⟨Our cognitive activity is a sublating, omitting, abstracting [activity], which at the same time is an objective activity, [having] the form [of] the sublation of finitude.⟩˜[108] Now the necessity of this world is to sublate its finitude. ˜The latter is (αα) sublated implicitly | *for us* in the concept; the logical is implicitly the identity 135

as one. In that I have knowledge of the object, these two, I and the other, are one in my simple determinateness. If we genuinely comprehend this, then we have not only the negative result that the oneness and independence of the two should be sublated. This sublation is not merely empty negation but rather the negative of the two from which I have started. The nothing is thus only the nothing of the independence of the two, the nothing in which both determinations are sublated and ideally contained.

Should we now desire to see how in this fashion the natural and spiritual universe returns to its truth in the religious standpoint, the detailed consideration of this return would constitute the whole sphere of the philosophical sciences. We should have to begin here with nature; it is the immediate. Spirit would in that case be opposed to nature, and both, insofar as they confront one another, are finite.

107. W_2 *reads:* Two ways of considering the matter may here be distinguished.

In the first place, we could consider what nature and spirit are *in themselves.* This consideration would show that implicitly they are *identical in the one idea,* and that both are only the mirror of one and the same or have their one root in the idea. But this itself would still be an abstract consideration, limited to what these antitheses are in themselves, not comprehending them according to the idea and reality. The distinctions that essentially belong to the idea would be left unobserved. This absolute idea is the necessary element, the essence of both nature and spirit in which what constitutes their differences, their limit and finitude, falls away. The essence of spirit and nature is one and the same, and in this identity they are no longer what they are in their separation and quality.

108. W_2 *reads:* In this act of consideration, however, it is our cognitive activity that strips these two of their distinctness and sublates their finitude. It is from outside these limited worlds that they are limited and that their limitation disappears in the idea, which is their unity. This falling away of the limitation is a looking away that occurs in our cognitive activity. *We* sublate the form of their finitude and arrive at their truth.

[of nature and spirit]; in their identity they are not, however, what they are in their [respective] qualities. (Spinozism, Schellingian philosophy.[109])[110] (ββ) But likewise [as qualitative immediacies] they sublate *themselves in themselves*, ⟨not in a contingent but in a necessary fashion; i.e., the other is an other only according to form, otherwise it has the same content, is connected identically.⟩ [This is] objective activity, the action of objective necessity, of objective connections.[111] [(1)] [112]In *nature* the connecting has its form likewise as an in-itself; [these connections] are the positing of [nature's] other.[113] Its concept is this sublation which appears in them as their progression through a ladder of stages ⟨externally related: solar system, earth, plants, sentient animals, thinking human beings. [This is] because necessity [resides] in nature.⟩[114] (2) But the ne-

109. [*Ed.*] For the explanation of this allusion, see the passage from W_2 contained in n. 110. Hegel is referring to Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677) and to Schelling's "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie," *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik*, vol. 2/2 (1801) (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/2:105–212).

110. W_2 *reads:* This way of comprehending the matter is to this extent more *subjective* in character, and what presents itself as the truth of this finitude is the idea that has being in itself—the Spinozistic *substance* or the *absolute*, as Schelling conceived it. It is shown from natural things as well as from the spiritual world that they are finite, that the truth is the disappearance of their limitation in the absolute substance, and that the latter is the absolute identity of both—of the subjective and objective, of thinking and being. But substance is only this identity. We eliminate from substance the determinateness of form and quality [of finite things], which therefore is rigid, cold, motionless necessity, in which cognition, subjectivity cannot be satisfied because it does not rediscover in it its own vitality and distinctions. This phenomenon is found in ordinary devotion: we rise above finitude and forget it, but yet it is not truly annulled just because we have forgotten it.

111. W_2 *reads:* The second way consists in understanding the necessity that the self-sublation of the finite and the positing of the absolute are *objective* in character. It must be shown of nature and spirit that they sublate *themselves* in accord with their concept, and their finitude may not be removed merely by a subjective taking away of their limitation. This is, then, the movement of thought, which likewise is the movement of the thing itself, and it is the process of nature and spirit itself, from which proceeds the true.

112. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) Necessity in the object itself⟩

113. [*Ed.*] "[these connections] . . . [nature's] other" translates *sie sind das Setzen ihres Andern*. The antecedents of the pronouns *sie* and *ihres* are not certain.

114. W_2 *reads:* (a) *Nature*, therefore, is to be considered as what it is in itself—as the process whose final truth is the transition to spirit, so that spirit proves itself

cessity of nature | is *to become spirit,* i.e., that the idea which it is 136
implicitly should come to be *for itself,* that the concept which is its
inner essence should also become object to it, its external essence,
should come within its own element, that of unity with itself."[115]
⟨This distinction [occurs] with spirit, not with nature, which [is] as
it [is].⟩ "But spirit, precisely as the object | for itself, exists as that 137
which it is, in and for itself, in its identity with itself; but it is this

to be the truth of nature. It is the proper character of nature to sacrifice itself, consume itself, so that psyche comes forth out of this burnt offering and the idea rises into its proper element, into its own aether. This sacrifice of nature is its process, which has the more exact characteristic of appearing as a progression through a ladder of stages whose distinctions have the form of being externally related. The connection is only something internal.

115. W_2 *reads:* The moments through which the idea passes in the garb of nature are a series of autonomous figures. Nature is the idea implicitly and *only* implicitly, and the mode of its existence is *to be outside itself* in complete externality. The more precise mode of its progression is that the concept enclosed within it breaks forth, absorbs the crust of externality, idealizes it, and, in rendering the shell of crystal transparent, makes its own appearance. The indwelling concept becomes external, or conversely, nature immerses itself within itself, and externality constitutes itself a mode of the concept.

Thus an externality emerges, which is itself ideal and which is held within the unity of the concept. This is the truth of nature: *consciousness.* In consciousness I am the concept, and that which exists for me, of which I have a consciousness, is my existence in general. In nature, my existence is not known but is only an external thing, and it is first spirit that knows this externality and posits it as identical with itself. Sensation, which is the culminating point and end of nature, already contains a being-for-self, so that the determinacy that a thing has is at the same time ideal and is taken back into the subject. The qualities of a stone are mutually exclusive, and the conception that we form of it is not in it. In sensation, by contrast, external qualities do not exist as such but are reflected into themselves, and here begins *soul, subjectivity.* Here identity, which as gravitational force is only a striving for what ought to be, has stepped into existence. In gravitational force there always remains an element of mutual exclusion, the different points repel one another, and this one point, which is sensation, being-within-self, does not come to the fore. But the whole force and life of nature is ever pressing toward sensation and spirit. While, however, in this progression spirit appears as necessary through nature, as mediated through it, yet this mediation is of such a kind that it at once sublates itself. What stems from the mediation shows itself to be the ground and truth of that from which it has stemmed. To philosophical cognition, the progression is a stream *flowing in opposite directions,* leading forward to the other, but at the same time working backward, so that what appears to be the *last,* founded on what precedes, appears rather to be the *first*—the foundation.

such that it also exists as an other for it. ⟨[116]Spirit, also [is] a [totality], has its determinacy in its being as appearance; that is, what is in and for itself, the idea, should exist for it and appear to it. Nature *is* only appearance; for us, implicitly, in the view of thinking, it is *idea.* In it these two aspects are extrinsic to each other. But spirit itself is the thinking view[117] so that the idea ought to be for it. The finitude of spirit and this division thus stand in correlation.⟩ Spirit is such as to be in and for itself as *idea*—i.e., [24a] its determinate characteristics should be *ideal,* should be maintained as encompassed in its unity; but also it should on its own account be distinct from its characteristics (just ⟨because [they are] for it, hence the distinction⟩); it should exist as *relationship,* i.e., as *consciousness.*

These two moments are themselves initially to be distinguished. What is in and for itself does not exist for the consciousness of spirit; what is in and for itself initially has the form of an *other* for consciousness, an external world; and what it is in and for itself is likewise only an object of the thinking view. Its defining characteristic is that its being-in-and-for-self becomes relationship, and
138 vice versa its relationship, | or consciousness, becomes being-in-and-for-self. This stage is *religion* because it is precisely the self-consciousness of the idea itself, or because the idea ⟨exists⟩ as self-consciousness. These two sides [are] distinguished initially thus: What is in-and-for-self determines itself outwardly to the distinction (α) of consciousness in general, but (β) to the bringing forth of an objective world, of a necessity that itself has its own freedom as its basis and substance.[118] We have, therefore, to consider at first the

116. *Ms. reads:* (β) Spirit, (αα) also . . .

117. [*Ed.*] *die denkende Betrachtung.* This difficult-to-render phrase could also be translated "the contemplation of thinking" or "thinking contemplation."

118. W_2 *reads:* (b) *Spirit* itself is initially *immediate.* It comes to itself in order to be for itself, and its vitality consists in coming to be for itself through itself. In this process essentially two sides are to be distinguished: in the first place, what spirit is in and for itself, and in the second place, its finitude. First it is relationless, ideal, enclosed within the idea; second, in its finitude it is consciousness, and, since an other exists for it, it stands in relationship. Nature is only appearance; it becomes idea for us in the view of thinking; thus its own transfiguration, spirit, is found outside it. By contrast, the determinate character of spirit is that the idea lies within

necessity on both sides, on each [side] for itself,[119] since they are initially distinct and separated. This result then is just | to posit this 139
their necessity as identical. *Ethical life* is this substantial foundation of spirit, while consciousness [is] *morality, free self-consciousness,* which develops that foundation as infinite form in its determinate moments, and has now its own freedom in this its nature. Here consciousness, being-for-self, and substantial essence become equivalent to one another, and there is now only their finitude—the divine life [as an] existence in finitude—[to be sublated].¬[120] [24b]

spirit itself and that the absolute, that which is true in and for itself, is for spirit. In its immediacy spirit is still finite, and this finitude has the form such that initially the nature of spirit in and for itself is distinguished from what enters into its consciousness. But the determinate character and infinitude of spirit is such that its consciousness and its idea concur. This consummation of spirit and the resolution of the differences in that relationship can be conceived according to the double aspect of being-in-and-for-self and consciousness of it. The two are initially distinguished: what is in and for itself does not exist for consciousness and has still the figure of an other for spirit. But the two stand in a reciprocal relation such that the progression of the one is at the same time the advance of the other.

119. *Ms. margin:* ⟨*Phenomenology of Spirit*⟩

[*Ed.*] This notation is originally placed in the margin alongside items (α) and (β) but then is connected to this point by a line. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), Hegel shows how absolute spirit manifests itself first in consciousness in general—in the consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason of subjective spirit; then in the bringing forth of an objective world, the realm of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), i.e., "objective spirit." The next stage is that of religion. Hegel's marginal reference to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* indicates that he is here summarizing the leitmotiv of that work—namely, the rise of finite consciousness to the absolute—and construing it as a form of demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint.

120. W_2 *reads:* In the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* spirit is considered in its appearance as consciousness, and the necessity of its progression to the absolute standpoint is observed. The figures of spirit and the stages produced by it are there considered as they enter into its consciousness. What, however, spirit knows, what it is as *consciousness,* is one thing; the *necessity* of what spirit knows and of what exists for it is something else. The former, namely, the fact that its world exists for spirit, is a mere fact of existence and therefore appears as contingent. The latter, the necessity by which this world has come into being for it, does not exist for spirit at this stage of consciousness but rather is hidden from it, exists only for philosophical contemplation, and pertains to the development of what spirit is conceptually.

In this development a stage is now reached where spirit attains to its *absolute consciousness,* a stage at which rationality exists for it as a world; and since on the

This now is the course of philosophy [and of] the concrete development [of the world]—⟨that the truth of everything [should be] the content in and for itself—this corresponds to what we call the religious standpoint. [It] need not have this [philosophical] development; [it can subsist as] nature and spirit in general.⟩ But [this involves] the antithesis [of] universal and singular self-consciousness, or [of] infinite and finite, unity [and multiplicity], which themselves are abstract and do not exhaust what is contained in the representation of God. Every logical stage is such a development; e.g., God is absolute essence, i.e., the logically universal essence or substance, absolute subject, subject as such, the pure universal.[121]

And when we say "God," this word signifies *the absolute, all-encompassing fulfillment,* ⟨the truth of everything [that subsists] as this world of finitude and appearance.⟩ The relationship of this
140 fulfillment to the unity of the divine essence | may be defined in various ways. God is its power generally, the substance of the accidents, having or encompassing [everything] within himself.

[122]Thus the portrayal of the absolute as the absolute power and concrete encompassment of this wealth [of a world] lies behind us. [123]This representation is the presupposition, the point, from which

other hand as consciousness it develops toward consciousness of the being-in-and-for-self of the world, this is the point at which the two approaches, which at first were different, coincide. The consummation of consciousness is that the true object should exist for it, and the consummation of the object, the substantial, of substance, is that it should be for itself, i.e., distinguish itself from itself and have itself as an object. Consciousness propels itself toward consciousness of the substantial, and the latter, the concept of spirit, propels itself toward appearance and relationship in which it exists for itself. This final point, where the movement of both sides coincides, is the *ethical world,* the *state.* Here the freedom of spirit, which advances on its course independently like the sun, exists as a present, available object, as a necessity and an existent world. Here, likewise, consciousness is consummated; individuals find themselves completed in this world of the state; in it they have their freedom. Consciousness, being-for-self, and substantial essence have reached concurrence.

121. *Ms. adds:* Proofs of the existence of God.

122. *Ms. Margin:* ⟨(γ) Necessity [is] the absolute form – in the absolute itself – necessity as such and its course not behind us⟩

123. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(αα) (αα) Form – (αα) This course [is] onesided – departure from an actual being – this itself [has being] only as something posited⟩

we begin. The necessity is that this wealth should immerse itself in this its truth. But since the initial significance of this universal is merely to be the universal determinate in and for itself, and since as concrete, as idea, it consists in casting off from itself, it posits and develops *determinacies*. We have to consider this development and hence this necessity within our science."[124] This development is the universal's self-determination, and the forms of this determination are *the principal moments of logic*, which likewise constitute the form of the whole sphere of wealth mentioned above. God's internal self-development has thus the same logical necessity as the development of the universe, and the latter is implicitly divine only to the extent that, at each of its stages, it is the development of this form. [25a]

Here, then, we ourselves shall also ⟨have⟩ to consider this necessity, which as necessity occurs in the same form [in both spheres of development]. We have then to speak more exactly also of the intellective form of this necessity—the shape that it has in the *proofs of the existence of God*. The difference exists only with respect to the signification of the material or content, which in the former is the absolutely universal as such, and in the latter is the specific genera and spheres [of the finite world].

[125]"With regard to the material, it may be remarked additionally that, as unfolding itself in God,"[126] this material yields only divine configurations and | moments, [while] in the field of finitude, it 141

124. W_2 *reads:* (c) But this appearance of the divine life still occurs in the mode of finitude, and the sublation of this finitude is the *religious standpoint*, in terms of which God is object of consciousness as absolute power and substance into which the whole wealth of the natural and spiritual world has returned. The religious standpoint as development of the natural and spiritual universe offers itself in this progression as the absolutely true and primary, having nothing behind it as a permanent presupposition, but having absorbed the whole wealth of the world into itself. The necessity is rather that this entire wealth has immersed itself in its truth, namely, in the universal that has being in and for itself. But since this universal [is] determinate in and for itself, and as concrete, as idea, in fact consists in casting off from itself, it thus develops determinacy out of itself and posits it for consciousness.

125. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(ββ) Material – fulfillment as the intelligible, eternal world⟩

126. W_2 *reads:* Initially, with regard to the material, this development is indeed different since, as proceeding into pure universality,

yields finite configurations and spheres. To this extent this material and its configurations are wholly different, despite the fact that the bare form of necessity [in them] is the same. But, further, these two sorts of material—the internal self-development of God and the development of the universe—are not so absolutely different. God is the truth, the substance of the universe, not merely an abstract other. Thus it is the same material. It is the intelligible divine world, the divine life within itself, that develops. But these spheres—the activity of the divine life—are the same as the life of the world. ⌜The world's life, however, is only appearance while the divine life is eternal. Thus the life of the world [appears] in the divine life in its eternal form—everything [appears] *sub specie aeterni*. For example, the finite world, nature and finite consciousness, are the antithesis, the other of the idea. As religion represents it, there is
142 in God the other of God, | God's *Son*, i.e., God as other, the other that remains within love and within divinity; and the Son is the truth of this finite world. Thus it is not intrinsically an other material, whose necessity would only be observed, ⟨but rather in and for itself the same material, i.e., for the first time the truth.⟩⌝[127] [25b]

127. W_2 *reads:* The latter, the divine life in the modality of appearance, in the form of finitude, is viewed in that eternal life in its eternal form and truth, *sub specie aeterni*. Thus we have finite consciousness, the finite world, nature, what presents itself in the world of appearance. Generally speaking, this constitutes the antithesis of otherness to the idea. In God the other of the simple idea, which still is in its substantiality, also comes forth; but there it retains the character of divine eternity and remains within love and within divinity. This other that remains in the condition of being-in-and-for-self is, however, the *truth of the other* as it appears as finite world and as finite consciousness. The material whose necessity we have considered is thus in and of itself the same, whether it presents itself in the divine idea as in and for itself or whether it appears as the wealth of the finite world, for the latter has its truth and transfiguration only in the world of the idea.

The necessity that appeared to lie behind and outside the religious standpoint when it was derived from the preceding stages of the natural and spiritual world, we now see to lie within it, and necessity is thus to be posited as its inner form and development. In passing on to this development, we begin once again with the form of appearance and first consider consciousness as it appears in relationship at this standpoint, working through and developing the forms of this relationship until the inner necessity [of the religious standpoint] is developed and completed in the concept itself.

[*Ed.*] The last paragraph has been editorially revised in order to serve as a transition to the next section of W_2.

⟨*D. THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION TO ART AND PHILOSOPHY*⟩[128]

That the true acquires this signification of the absolutely universal—i.e., the unity encompassing all determinacy, the world, within itself, and comprising it ideally within itself as its power—and that this is the absolutely true—such then is the starting point of the philosophy of religion, and the necessity of this truth is the [philosophical] science that precedes it. But the necessity as such or as form, and the substantial material content, emerge themselves as the development of the idea and of the material in its element.

The religious standpoint [is] the truth as cast into itself, as cast into the true, [its] essence and object; [it is] self-consciousness as that for which the true itself and the whole of its empirical consciousness, i.e., of the *universum* of its world, exist—this standpoint is a *universal standpoint*, common to *art, religion,* and *science.* It is part of the definition of the concept of religion to establish more precisely its differentiation and determination.[129] Essentially it is a

128. [*Ed.*] This heading is found in the margin of the *Ms.* In the main text the new section is marked by a "d," and the same letter is written above the marginal heading. It should be recalled that Hegel's original plan did not call for a fourth section on this topic. The section as it stands reflects a transition from Hegel's earlier treatment of religion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* to his mature presentation in the later Berlin lectures (i.e., those of 1824 and 1827). In the earlier works Hegel treated religion as one of the three forms of "absolute spirit," the other two forms being art and philosophy, and the primary task was that of establishing the relationships and differences between these three forms (see esp. *Encyclopedia* [1830], §§ 553–577). Also in these works Hegel at this point considered Greek religion as the instance of the religion of art and Christianity as that of the revelatory (or revealed) religion. The section heading that Hegel adds to his lecture manuscript reflects this earlier treatment. But in the philosophy-of-religion lectures he will not treat the specific religions until the second and third parts. So this section evolves toward a discussion of the forms of religious consciousness: intuition, representation, conceptual knowledge or thought. Precisely this is what is taken up under the second moment of the concept of religion in the 1824 and 1827 lectures.

129. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Simultaneous determination of the side of objectivity – essentially the process, movement of making the object subjective. Art [is a form of] sensibility just as much as religion. However, in contrast with art, sensibility [may be recommended] because artistic intuition [remains] external; but [it may be recommended] equally in contrast with doctrine, which can also remain merely memory and representation.⟩

question of the *form* in which the absolute truth is [found] in re-
143 ligion. |

To understand more precisely what this involves, we must here recall what was established earlier[130]—that when religion generally is located in the thinking of the universal, within which it integrates the antithesis of this my singularity, and when the unity is defined initially as my sensibility, a consciousness or objectification of this content is at the same time postulated as essential. The form of the distinction of religion from art and philosophy therefore falls strictly[131]—i.e., initially—within the determination of this objective relationship, for precisely this relationship itself is the distinction or the form [of religion]. Now this relationship can be nothing other than ⟨a theoretical one, a modality of consciousness, for it concerns the form, the objectivity as such.⟩ [It has] the character (α) of *immediate intuition*, (β) of *representation*, (γ) of *thought* in the strict sense of conceptual, speculative thought of what is true. [26a]

[1. Intuition]

[132]The content, that which exists for consciousness, is the same [in each], and these forms cannot be distinguished as though representation and thought were not present in art and its consciousness, while art (immediate intuition) and thought were not present in religion. These [forms] interpenetrate each other essentially, because each of them, while thus distinguished, is at the same time the totality of consciousness and self-consciousness. (Art [is] likewise religion, and of itself art [is] one-sided without religion. The art work [has its being] in the subjective consciousness of the artist, the observer, and the community ([its] images). Religion as such, and the relationship of consciousness to it: religion as the religion of art [is] truth under the determination of contingency, externality; religion as such [pertains to] what is higher, to representation [as] the form of its content.)

130. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 216 ff.

131. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Objectivity as such, not merely as my representation⟩

132. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Art – merely the objective mode [of consciousness]. Art can [be present] in every religion – whether [as] subject matter or [as] mode⟩

˜Art rests [upon] and derives from the interest in portraying the spiritual idea for consciousness and initially for *immediate* | *intuition*—just because human being *is* consciousness, intuitive consciousness, not merely sensation; and, as we indicated earlier,[133] because the standpoint of religion is higher, it is not the standpoint of sensation but a more complete and developed standpoint. The *truth* is the law and content of art as well as of religion. Its portrayal is something produced by humans, made sensible and external, posited [in existence].˜[134] [Artistic] truth ordinarily has a twofold sense: (α) [that] of *accuracy*—the representation, the existing portrayal, that agrees with the object as otherwise known. In this sense art is formal—it is the imitating of given objects. The content can be what it will; the law of [formal] art is not beauty. But also to the extent that beauty *is* the law, art can be taken as *form*, and in other respects have a circumscribed content, like the genuine truth itself. (β) Truth in the genuine sense is the *correspondence of the object with its concept*, the *idea;* and this[135] is the content of art in and for itself—a content that concerns, of course, the substantial, wholly universal [26b] elements, essential aspects, and powers of nature and spirit. 144

˜The artist portrays this idea in a sensible and hence in a limited figure—in its ideality, but individualized, so that the | contingencies 145

133. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 221 ff.

134. W_2 *reads:* Art has been engendered by the absolute spiritual need that the divine, the spiritual idea, should be [present] as *object* for consciousness and initially for immediate intuition. The law and content of art is the truth as it appears in spirit, and it is therefore *spiritual* truth, but at the same time *sensible* truth for immediate intuition. Thus the presentation of truth is a work of humanity, but it is posited in an external fashion, so that it is produced under the conditions of sense. When the idea appears immediately in nature as well as under spiritual conditions, when the true is present in a dispersed multiplicity of things, the idea is not yet gathered into one center of appearance but still appears in the form of externality. In immediate existence, the appearance of the concept is not yet posited in harmony with the truth. By contrast, the sensuous intuition that gives rise to art is necessarily a product of spirit, not an immediate, sensuous configuration, and it has the idea as its vital center.

In what may be regarded as constituting the entire sphere of art, there may be other elements included than those which have just been alluded to.

135. W_2 *adds:* as the free expression of the concept unhindered in any way by contingency or caprice,

of the sensible cannot be dispensed with. He stands back from his art work; thus for intuition the work is simultaneously a quite ordinary external object, ⟨which has no sense of self and does not know itself,⟩ and which exists in intuition as the idea that it portrays. This idea now exists as such in the intuiting subject, in subjective consciousness. This involves a community, which knows what is portrayed and represents it as the substantial truth. It also [involves] the cultus in order that this representation should not remain something external, but that self-consciousness should in fact annul the
146 externality, the | dead relationship, the separation, and attain to the conscious feeling of having *its* essence in the object. But this[136] is already *religion;* the work of art is of itself lifeless, it is not self-consciousness—the idea in its intuitive immediacy."[137]

136. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Religion of art – symbol – the figure still separated from the content⟩

137. W_2 *reads:* The artist, then, has to present the truth in such a way that the reality in which the concept has its power and dominion is at the same time a sensible reality. Thus the idea is [found] in sensible form and in an individualization that cannot fail to have the contingent character of the sensible. The work of art is conceived in the mind of the artist, in which the unification of the concept and reality has *implicitly* taken place. But when the artist has released his thoughts into externality and the work is completed, he withdraws from it.

Thus the work of art is, so far as intuition is concerned, initially an external object of a quite ordinary sort, which has no sense of self and does not know itself. The form, the subjectivity, which the artist has given his work, is only external, not the absolute form of self-knowing, of self-consciousness. Consummate subjectivity is lacking in the work of art. This self-consciousness belongs to subjective consciousness, the intuiting subject. In contrast, therefore, with the work of art, which inwardly is not something that knows, the moment of self-consciousness is the other, but a moment that is utterly a part of the work—a moment that *knows* what is portrayed and represents it as the substantial truth. Since the art work does not know itself, it is inwardly incomplete and, because self-consciousness belongs to the idea, it requires the completion that it obtains through the relation of self-consciousness to it. Furthermore, the process by means of which the work of art ceases to be only an object takes place in this consciousness, and self-consciousness posits what appears to be an other to it as identical with itself. This is the process that sublates the externality in which the truth appears in the work of art, annuls these dead relationships of immediacy, and occasions, in the intuiting subject, the conscious feeling of having its essence in the object. Since this characteristic of entry-into-self out of externality belongs to the subject, a separation comes about between it and the work of art. The subject is able to consider the work wholly externally, to take it to pieces, or make inquisitive, aesthetic, or learned remarks about it—but the process that is essential for intuition, the necessary completion of the work of art, in turn annuls this prosaic separation.

"The Turk [threatened the painter with condemnation because he had] painted a fish without a soul. But the spectator—⟨the community⟩—is the soul.[138] Orientals [are] further removed from this distinction, [which constitutes] a return into oneself, to theoretical consciousness."[139]

"In this way religion and art are mutually integrated; [but only] insofar as they [have] come to be distinguished is there such a thing as art at all. | Hence art, which [is] absolute, does not and cannot 147
exist without religion, and it is only the objective portrayal of the content of religion in sensuous intuition or [in] image[s] and myths."[140]

138. [*Ed.*] In other words, the Turk was unable to understand that life can be represented by an artistic image that in itself is lifeless. Similarly an animal sees a painting as only a dead object, not as a representation of an aspect of life or reality. Only the consciousness of the spectator intuits "soul" in the work of art. The community—the religious community?—is already self-consciousness, subjectivity, and does not require something other than itself to bring it to life.

139. W_2 *reads:* In the Oriental substantiality of consciousness, this separation has not yet been reached, and therefore artistic intuition has not been consummated either, because it presupposes the higher freedom of self-consciousness, which is able freely to oppose to itself its truth and substantiality. Bruce, when in Abyssinia, showed a Turk a painted fish, but what the latter said was: "On Judgment Day the fish will accuse you of not having given it a soul." The Oriental wants not only the form but also the soul. He remains absorbed in unity, not attaining to the separation and process in which on the one hand stands the truth as embodied without soul, and on the other the intuiting self-consciousness, which in turn annuls this separation.

[*Ed.*] James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile in the Years 1768–1773*, 5 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1790) Book 8, chap. 13. This work was translated into German in 1790–91. Apparently the conversation to which Hegel refers occurred in Upper Egypt, not in Abyssinia.

140. W_2 *reads:* If we now look back on the progression that has been made in the religious relationship, and if we compare intuition with feeling, we see that indeed truth has emerged in its objectivity, but what is deficient in its appearance is that it remains in a state of sensible, immediate autonomy, that is to say, in that autonomy which in turn sublates itself, does not have being in and for itself, and likewise shows itself to be a product of the subject since it only attains to subjectivity and self-consciousness in the intuiting subject. In intuition, the totality of the religious relationship—namely, the object and self-consciousness—has fallen apart. The religious process belongs, actually, only to the intuiting subject, but is not yet complete in the subject and requires the sentient, intuited object. On the other hand, the object is the truth, but yet it needs, in order truly to be, the self-consciousness that lies outside it.

The progression that is now necessary is that the totality of the religious relationship should be posited as it actually is and as a unity. The truth attains objectivity

[2. Representation][141]

[142]But religion, then, is this totality of the two [art and religion]. With respect to the consciousness of its content, however, it is not bound and strictly limited to the form of immediate intuition and mythical image. To be sure, there must be *a* religion whose intuition occurs essentially in the mode of art. [27a] [143]But since religion is of itself the subjective side in the element of self-consciousness, *representation* [*Vorstellung*] is altogether more essential for it—representation [as] distinguished from *image* [*Bild*]. The image [is]
148 sensuous, | [derives] from what is sensuous; [it is] myth. Representation [is] the image elevated into its universality: [it is] thought, full of thought, and is a form for thought too. For example, the representations of right and ethical life, ⟨of virtue and bravery,⟩ of the world and evil, are spiritual in character, stemming essentially from thought and freedom. But also more sensible [words such as] "battle" and "war" are representations, not images. Hence religion [is] the inner, depth dimension [of] what is at hand, in the mode and form of simple thought. "God," "soul," and "world" can also combine with images—⟨[e.g., God's] "begetting"⟩—but thought is the overriding factor.[144] ⟨Thought deals in relations, starting by

in which its content, in and for itself, is not merely something posited but is [found] essentially in the form of subjectivity, and the whole process takes place in the element of self-consciousness.

[*Ed.*] Both paragraphs show traces of editorial reworking.

141. *Ms. reads:* ⟨(β)⟩

142. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Independence [of] religion – art not necessary [for it] – thus [art] can have this significance or not. Religion [is] a distinctive subjectivity, feeling, cultus – also an objectivity, a higher, distinctive subjectivity, representation – transposed into a subjective mode.⟩

143. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Representation of God [vs.] image of God. The representation of a battle, [as against] the image in its singularity, [is its] signification, [its] purpose, essence, determinacy, and description—the spiritual aspect, thinking intuition, highlighted in simple [abstraction]. Enemy: immediate explanation of the word.⟩

144. W_2 *reads:* We can readily distinguish between image and representation. It makes a difference whether we can say we have a representation or an image of God; likewise with respect to sensible objects. The *image* derives its content from the sphere of the sensible and presents it in the immediate mode of its existence, in its singularity and in the contingency of its sensible appearance. But since the infinite multitude of individual details, as they are present in immediate existence, can never be duplicated as a whole by even the most exhaustive presentation, the image is

singling out the essential feature. E.g., in the representation of right [there is] an abstraction from other, contingent, characteristics: [this is the way of] reflection, argumentation.⟩[145] [146]

To the extent that religion gives its content essentially in the form of representations, it has a *doctrine*—namely, that of *truth.*

¯(αα) Its content is and has the validity of *truth.*[147] [Religion] has something polemical | about it since the content is not grasped 149
immediately in sensuous intuition or figurative [*bildlich*] fashion but as mediated by the process of abstraction, [through] raising the figurative or sensible into the universal. [This is an elevation] that is linked with the rejection of the figurative—a rejection that seems initially to concern only its form but [actually] concerns its content also insofar as religious opinion was bound up with the figurative; and the figurative, the beautiful, has precisely the signification that the universal, the thought, the concept is *not separated* from its image [*Bild*] (which, accordingly, is not a *symbol*). A symbol presupposes reflection, [the presence] of separation. Religious representation, therefore, has the characteristic of being *true* as against the figurative and precisely as against the whole imperfect modality

always of necessity something limited. For the religious intuition that is able to portray its content only in imagery, the idea disintegrates into a multitude of figures in which it delimits and finitizes itself. The universal idea that appears in the sphere of these finite figures, but only in them and only as their basis, therefore remains concealed as such.

Representation, by contrast, is the image elevated into the form of universality or thought so that the one fundamental quality that constitutes the essence of the object is held fast and is kept in mind representationally by spirit. If, for example, we say "world," in this one sound is gathered and united the entire wealth of the infinite universe. When the consciousness of the object is reduced to a simple determinate thought, it is representation, which for its appearance requires only the *word*—this simple utterance that remains within itself. The manifold content that representation simplifies may be derived from the inner life, from freedom, and then we have representations of right, ethical life, evil; or it may also be taken from external appearance, and then we may, for example, have a representation of battles or of wars.

145. *Ms. in brackets:* (Furthermore, the cultus is an essential part of religion – subjective consciousness and its process, movement, identification.)

146. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Truth, Doctrine – (β) Faith⟩

147. *Ms. margin:* ⟨For [it occurs as] representation, which should, however, be objective, not subjective. Intuition and art already of themselves are objective.⟩

of intuition and imagery, which as sensuous cannot truly grasp the absolute from the very start."[148] [27b]

"(ββ) Moreover, its representations have the significance of truth as *objectivity* in contrast with the other mode [of truth, that] of
150 subjectivity. (The sensible also | is implicitly subjective, i.e., finite.) [They have the significance] of objectivity, so that the content [of religion] *is* in and for itself, [is] not something posited, remaining within me, a movement in me. In contrast with religious sensibility, [representation gives] objective duties, objective faith, the fact that there is something higher than this empirical consciousness of mine, no matter what I call "mine." Rather, in and for itself [this higher being is] secure in its substantiality against me."[149] The religious sensibility of our time [is the yearning] to envisage God in oneself—one's consciousness of the divine as self-consciousness, *oneself* as divine—deification of oneself. Truth as objective [has] perished [in the face of this] obstinacy in the form of religious sensibility. Self-forgetfulness, renunciation ⟨of one's opinion, is not present here—
151 a peculiar phenomenon! What | will come of it is not [for us] to say; force and suppression must appear [if consciousness is] no longer open to objective faith.⟩

148. W_2 *reads:* Religion, when raised up into the form of representation, immediately has something polemical about it. The content is not grasped immediately in sensuous intuition or figurative fashion but as mediated by the process of abstraction. What is sensuous and figurative is elevated into the universal, and with this elevation is necessarily linked a negative attitude toward the figurative. But this negative attitude concerns not merely the form (in which case the distinction between intuition and representation would lie in that only); it also touches the content. The idea and the mode of presentation are so closely related for intuition that the two appear as one, and the figurative has the signification that the idea is essentially linked to it and could not be separated from it. Representation, by contrast, proceeds on the assumption that the absolutely true idea cannot be grasped by means of an image and that the figurative mode is a delimitation of the content. It therefore sublates the unity of intuition, rejects the unity of the image and its meaning, and brings this meaning into prominence for itself.

149. W_2 *reads:* Finally, religious representation has the significance of truth, of objective content, and is thus directed against other modes of subjectivity, not merely against the figurative mode. Its content is that which has validity in and for itself, which remains substantially fixed as against my suppositions and opinions, and is inflexible as contrasted with the fluctuation of my desires and likings.

˜(γγ) *Doctrine.* Religion can be *taught,* it can be *imparted,* starting from representation: pedagogy. ⟨[Present-day teachers] do not know how to begin the teaching of religion.⟩ [It is] a misunderstanding [to suppose that children should simply] remain within the love of parents and teachers in order to nourish the sensation of obedience, as though this sensation itself were what is religious.[150] [A person must] first return | to love of the awesome object, but 152
precisely by transcending oneself in it—i.e., having liberated oneself

This has reference to the essence of representation generally. With regard to its specific form, we have to make the following remarks:

(a) We saw that in representation the essential content is posited in the form of thought, but this does not mean that it is already posited *as* thought. Thus when we said that representation is oriented polemically toward the sensible and figurative, and comports itself toward them negatively, this does not yet imply that it has liberated itself from the sensible absolutely and has posited the latter ideally in a complete way. This is first attained in actual thought, which elevates the sensible qualities of the content to universal categories of thought, to the inner moments or distinctive determinacy of the idea. Since representation is not this concrete elevation of the sensible to the universal, its negative attitude toward the sensible means nothing other than that it is not yet truly liberated from it. It is still essentially entangled with it and needs it and this struggle against the sensible in order to be itself. Thus the sensible belongs essentially to representation even if the latter is never able to allow it to have independent validity. Moreover, the universal of which representation is conscious is only the abstract universality of its object, only its indeterminate essence or approximate nature. In order to define the essence, it again requires the determinacy that belongs to the sensible, the figurative, but assigns the latter, as sensible, the position of being distinct from what it signifies, and treats it as a point at which it is not possible to remain, as something that only serves to represent the proper content that is distinct from it.

On this account, then, representation stands in a state of constant unrest between immediate sensible intuition and thought in the proper sense. Its determinacy is sensible in character, derived from the sensible, but thinking has infiltrated itself; in other words, the sensible is elevated by way of abstraction into thinking. But these two, the sensible and the universal, do not interpenetrate each other thoroughly; thinking has not yet completely overcome sensible determinacy, and even if the content of representation is the universal, yet it is still burdened with the determinateness of the sensible and needs the form of natural life. But it remains always the case that this moment of the sensible is not valid on its own account.

150. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[It is] alleged [that] fear can remain in the memory, in representation, [as] something alien in me. [The ego] wants only to have itself: selfishness. [Instruction] can equally well have an effect on the heart [and bring about] a consciousness of the true.⟩

from oneself, having made oneself empty and pure, having surrendered oneself.[151] Parents do love and should love their children just as they are, good or bad, together with all their naughtiness, and people have indeed [represented] the love of God toward them in this fashion. They direct this love according to their inclination and opinion; they abide in love—in and against all divine and human laws; they violate these laws, tread them under foot, and believe and say that they have not injured love.[152] [153] [This is] the energy

151. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Fear of God – negativity of one's self – fear and love [of God] – the same [with] the relationship of parents and teachers⟩

152. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Subjectivity of love without fear; love is the restoration of subjectivity itself as subjective particularity⟩

153. W_2 *reads:* After we have seen the general characteristics of representation, this is now the place to touch upon the pedagogical question of recent times, namely, whether religion can be *taught*. Teachers who do not know how to begin the teaching of religion hold that instruction in religion is out of place. But religion has a content that must be represented in objective fashion. This implies that this represented content can be communicated, for representations are communicable by means of words. To warm the heart, to excite the sensibilities, is another matter: it is not to teach but to interest my subjectivity in something, and it may well be provided by an eloquent sermon, but it is not teaching or doctrine. If, indeed, we proceed from *feeling*, positing it as primary and original, and then say that religious representations come from feeling, this is correct in one respect, insofar as the original determinateness resides in the nature of spirit itself. But on the other hand, feeling is so indeterminate that it can contain anything, and the knowledge of what lies in feeling does not belong to feeling itself but is only given by the instruction and docrine that communicate the representation. The instructors referred to want children and people in general to remain within their subjective experience of love, and they represent the love of God as being like that of parents for their children, who do and should love them just as they are. They pride themselves on abiding in the love of God, and while they tread all divine and human laws under foot, they believe and say that they have not injured love. But if love is to be pure, it must first renounce selfishness, it must have liberated itself—and spirit is liberated only when it has come outside itself and once it has intuited the substantial as an other, a higher, over against itself. Spirit truly returns to itself only when it has taken up an attitude toward the absolute power, toward the awesome object, only when it has come outside itself in this object, has liberated itself from itself, has surrendered itself. That is to say, the fear of God is the presupposition of true love. What is true in and for itself must appear to the disposition as something independent in relation to which it renounces itself; and only through this mediation, through the restoration of itself, does it attain true freedom.

of their self-will—the religiosity of Sand[154] and his love for his parents. Transgression [is] let loose to its own devices—a completely selfish piety—a gang of colts![155] [28a]

(δδ) ⟨*Faith and Love.*⟩ When objective truth [occurs] for me, I have emptied myself of myself, have kept nothing for myself, and at the same time have laid hold of this truth as my own. I have identified myself, [my] abstract ego, with it, and have maintained my self-consciousness in it, but as pure and passionless. This relation is called *faith;* from my side [it is] implicitly within me, speaking the content to me. ⟨Faith is the same as what religious sensibility is, [namely,] the absolute identity of the content with me; but in such a way that faith expresses the absolute objectivity that the content has for me. The church and Luther knew quite well what they meant by faith. They did not say that one is saved by ἀίσθησις, sensibility, conviction, love, but that one is saved by faith.⟩[156] | [Faith 153
is] the inner testimony of my spirit, therefore not a historical, learned testimony, but one without the necessity of the concept ⟨and [without] determination as my determination. [It is] concrete, a conjunction,⟩ a distinctive mode of truth—¯the absolute content

154. [*Ed.*] In 1819 a theological student in Jena by the name of Karl Sand (1795–1820) murdered the journalist and poet August von Kotzebue, whom the students suspected of being a Russian agent. The event became a *cause célèbre* in Prussia, and the Berlin rationalist theologian Wilhelm de Wette wrote a letter of condolence to Sand's parents in which he suggested that Sand's motives were pure. Subsequently de Wette was dismissed from the faculty by the government for this action, a dismissal that Hegel defended amid considerable controversy. See K. A. von Müller, *Karl Ludwig Sand,* 2d ed. (Munich, 1925).

155. [*Ed.*] *Pferdchen (?) Rotten.* The *Ms.* is difficult to decipher at this point. If this reading is correct, "gang of colts" is probably a metaphorical reference to the student fraternities with which Karl Sand was associated. Hegel believed that these student groups, inspired by a subjectivist philosophy, were encouraging romantic political terrorism.

156. W_2 *adds:* Thus in the absolute object I have freedom, which essentially includes the renunciation of my own opinion and particular conviction. Now since, in comparison with feeling, in which the content occurs as the determinateness of the subject and hence as contingent, for representation the content is lifted up into objectivity, it is more in connection with the latter that the content should justify itself on its own account on the one hand, and on the other, that the necessity of its essential conjunction with self-consciousness is developed.

of thought and truth [in] representations. But [with respect to] form [faith is]: ⟨(α) a content, a thought given over against me, [whereas] ˜reason with respect to its form and necessity is nothing given, not instinctive,˜[157] [nothing] only implicitly acceptable or given; (β) [its] content [is] the development of objective reason, a series of doctrines [in] the form of immediacy, [claiming that] something is the case.˜˜[158] ([This involves] argumentation—the antithesis of my concepts, principles, laws. The form of the concept, its content, [is] an identity. [There are] two ways in which religious doctrine perishes: (α) sensibility, (β) argumentation. First [it is] reduced [to] argumentation, then to sensibility, subjectivity. [It is given] a false representation, as though [it had been] rendered comprehensible. [The result is its] corruption.

[159]⟨The form of the objectivity of representation [was considered] earlier: as faith [it exists] *for me*. [There are] different ways of

157. W_2 *reads:* My connection with the content is not yet truly developed, and it appears only as something instinctive. The I, which turns itself in this fashion to the content, does not need to be merely this simple and ingenuous I; it already can be inwardly molded in various ways.

158. W_2 *reads:* However, with reference to what primarily concerns the content itself, the value the content has in representation is that of something given, of which all that is known is that it is so. Then over against this abstract, immediate objectivity, the conjunction of the content with self-consciousness appears, initially, as one that still has a purely subjective nature. The content, it is then said, commends itself to me for its own sake, and the witness of the spirit teaches me to recognize it as truth, as my essential determination.

159. *Ms. in large parentheses:*

(γ) Concept [of] Philosophy (See below)

I do not need to say much more on the situation and definition of philosophy; its form has been indicated earlier. – (α) The subjective (need of thought)

[*Ed.*] Apparently Hegel originally intended to begin the third part of the section at this point, the one treating the relation of religion to philosophy and speculative thought. But then he drew large parentheses around this heading and the first two sentences following it, indicating that he intended to cancel this material or postpone the transition; he also added the words "see below" to the right and slightly above the heading. In fact, the discussion of faith as a form of religious representation continues for several more paragraphs without a break, and the text then turns to the relationship between representation and thought. Only later, where he has added a "c" to the text (see below, n. 173), does Hegel take up speculative or conceptual thought in the strict sense. Both W_2 and L locate the transition to thought at the later point.

coming to faith; the certainty of this content [exists] for me.⟩ Religion in its peculiar form produces *conviction, certainty,* | *faith,* in 154
a distinctive way—a way that has simultaneously the nature of something subjective in it—a *testimony of the spirit,* in general, divine illumination. ⟨For example, the infinite idea of the incarnation of God—this speculative midpoint—penetrates forcefully and irresistibly into the mind that is not darkened by reflection or that [has raised itself] out of the process of reflection.⟩ Birth, training, and custom [induce faith]; we know nothing else. [It arises from] miracle, the historical mode, and from the Word and the letter. ([It answers to] the needs of my heart as this particular [individual], speaks not only to my spirit but [to my heart]; otherwise I do not know which way to turn.) ˜The history of religion, its wondrous expansion, [corroborates faith]. Thousands, millions, [have] found in it their consolation, happiness, dignity. This sort of authority based on human commonality [determines faith]. If all [believe] something, then it must very probably be correct; to cut oneself off is always perilous and perverse. [One] must think twice [before] setting one's own authority (which ⟨is [mere] opinion⟩) against this general authority.˜[160]

⟨All of these circumstantial ways and means can be brought into the form of demonstrations of the truth of a religion; and ˜(except for the testimony of one's own spirit) most proofs—e.g., those offered by Hugo Grotius[161] for the Christian religion—are of this sort.˜[162] The form of the proofs introduces the form of argumentation, of reflection; it cannot concern the content of truth in and

160. W_2 *reads:* Or it may be that we reflect on the wondrous way that religion has expanded, and how millions have found in it their consolation, happiness, and dignity. To cut oneself off from this authority is declared to be perilous, and the authority of one's own opinion is laid aside in its favor. But here too a false turn is taken in that personal conviction is subjugated to general authority and is silenced in relation to it. The consolation lies only in the supposition that the manner in which millions have regarded the matter must probably be right, and the possibility remains that, on being looked at once again, it may turn out to be otherwise.

161. [*Ed.*] Hugo Grotius, *De veritate religionis Christianae,* new ed. (Amsterdam, 1679), 2:33–49.

162. W_2 *reads:* have obtained this form from the Apologists.

for itself, [but] demonstrates [merely] credibility, probabilities,
155 etc.)[163] | [28b]

The beginnings of reflection, in particular, which go beyond holding fast to what is given, can and do confuse me, and the confusion is all the more dangerous and serious to the extent that the ethical and all other purchase on myself, on life, on activity and the state, is weakened by confusion regarding this region. The experience that I cannot help myself by means of reflection and thought, that I cannot stand on my own at all, is the need of religion generally; and indeed the absolute demand for something secure throws me back from thought upon religion, and leads me to an adherence to
156 the substantial and inwardly solid content in the form that it | is given.[164] To cast myself on the content in this way also means that

163. W_2 *(1831) adds:* and instead of considering the truth in its being-in-and-for-itself, it is able to understand it only in connection with other circumstances, occurrences, and conditions. Moreover, although apologetics with its argumentation passes over into thought and the drawing of conclusions, and wants to establish grounds that are supposed to be different from authority, nevertheless its major ground is still an authority, namely, divine authority, [claiming] that God has revealed to humanity the content that is to be represented. Without this authority, apologetics cannot function for even a single moment, and this perpetual mixing up and confusion of thinking, concluding, and authority is essential to its standpoint. But since from this standpoint it is inevitable that the argumentation should go on *ad infinitum*, the supreme divine authority is in turn seen to be one that itself stands in need of proof and rests upon an authority. For we were not present and did not see God when he revealed. It is always only *others* who tell and assure us of it, and precisely the testimonies of these others, who lived through the history, or who first learned it from eyewitnesses, ought, according to this apologetic, to be the means of connecting our conviction with a content separated from us temporally and spatially. Yet even this mediation is not absolutely secure, for all depends on the character of the medium that stands between us and the content and that is provided by the perception of others. The capacity to perceive demands prosaic understanding and its cultivation, conditions that were not present among the ancients. They lacked the capacity to comprehend history in its finitude and to draw out the inner signification of that finitude since for them the contrast between the poetic and the prosaic was not yet clearly established. And if we posit the divine within the historical, we always fall into the fluctuation and instability characteristic of everything historical. Prosaic understanding and unbelief are opposed to the miracles reported by the apostles, as, on the objective side, is the lack of appropriate relationship between miracle and the divine.

164. W_2 *adds:* Yet this return to the content is not mediated by the form of inner necessity, and is only a result of despair, in that I know not where to turn, nor how to help myself in any other way than by taking that step.

inasmuch as this final dependence on myself, this irony with respect to everything, [has been] given me by thought, [and inasmuch as I] have learned how to make everything totter, and in so doing remain standing as a god above the ruins of the world,[165] I now decide solely for myself what I want and what is convenient for me (without at the same time making the generally valid a rule), and ensconce myself in the final, highest vanity.

⟨The relation of philosophy to this content is different; or more exactly, the [religious] form [exhibits] a deficiency.⟩ The requirement of philosophy is to permeate [this content] with thought. The absolute identity of the subjective and objective [is] implicit; for me it [is found] in this element. ⟨[Philosophy has] the requirement to carry thought through to the point that it should prevail[166] and not remain subjective vanity.⟩

[*Representation and Thought.*[167]] The content of religion [is present] in this fashion for me. What does it lack? With respect to form, [it has] the *shape of representation* in contrast with *thought*, [and thus appears] as not necessary. Necessity [is to be understood] in terms of the concept and of freedom. [The content is] (α) within itself, (β) opposed to me [as] the subjective concept of my freedom

165. [*Ed.*] The allusion to "irony" has reference to Friedrich Schlegel: cf. the *Lyceum* Fragments Nos. 7, 42, 48, 108; the *Athenäum* Fragments Nos. 51, 121, 253, 305, 362, 431; and the *Ideen* No. 69; in *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, vol. 2, ed. H. Eichner (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna, 1967). The allusion to "the ruins of the world" has reference to J. G. Fichte, *Appellation an das Publikum* (Jena, Leipzig, and Tübingen, 1799), pp. 110, 112 (*Gesamtausgabe* 5:451–452). The latter allusion is found in other writings by Hegel—e.g., in the *Fragment of a System* (1800) (*Early Theological Writings*, p. 318 [Nohl, p. 351]); in *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 174 (*GW* 4:402); and in *Science of Logic*, p. 230 (*GW* 11:144).

166. [*Ed.*] The *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* 2:194 (*Werke* 14:384) show that Hegel is here alluding to the νοῦς of Anaxagoras, and indeed to a formulation given by Aristotle in *De anima* 3.4.429a18–21.

167. [*Ed.*] The *Ms.* adds a "β" in the margin, which probably corresponds to the "α" bracketed earlier (n. 159). While it does not make much sense to include the β without the α, the β does mark a transition to the next topic, the distinction and relation between *Vorstellung* and *Denken*. Thus we have added the bracketed subheading in place of the β. It then becomes clear that the section on "representation" as a whole includes in succession the topics of truth, objectivity, doctrine, faith, representation, and thought (the latter being a transition to the final section).

(in it [the subject has] its freedom and concept). Freedom [is] not an accidental convergence [of things].

Thought, freedom [as] distinguished from reflection, [are] concerned to make the [so-called] beyond *comprehensible*. To make [something] *common* means (α) to make it finite; (β) [it means that] I am satisfied with the matter, as in the church. [29a]

The distinctive way in which the truth occurs in religion has been defined as representation. ⟨[Its] content—the world, God—[is] established on its own account [and is] drawn together into the form of simplicity, although in itself [it has] a highly multifarious content.⟩ [We have] to consider more precisely: (α) the sort of
157 connection that these representations | have among themselves: (β) the sort of connection [that they have] with me; i.e., with my inmost being and conviction, with my knowledge of them as my essence.

(α) Of itself, a representation [is] something whole and concrete—"God," "world," "battle"—set forth in the simple form of universality, independently. No implicit connection mediates the content by means of itself. Hence [it is] not portrayed as true in itself and necessary; that is to say, [neither is the determination] of the identity of concept and reality grasped, nor [are] the differently distinguished determinations grasped in their identity with each other. This is reflection, argumentation, thinking, deliberation as such. Categories of thinking as such are forms of connection, which can also be fixed once more as representations, and then thinking itself actually occurs in the form of representation, [namely, as] understanding. ⌜[Religious representation] has essentially the nature of a connection that does not belong to thinking as such, ⟨hence⟩ a representational connection, a connection derived from analogy, from the figurative, or a more indeterminate representation of a certain mode of connection itself,⌝[168] one that thereafter remains

168. W_2 *reads:* But even if all these ways of mediating the connection of the content of representation with self-consciousness attain their goal, and even if apologetic argumentation with its reasons has brought many to conviction, or if I with the needs, impulses, and sorrows of my heart have found consolation and comfort in the content of religion, it is only accidental that this has taken place. It results from the fact that precisely this standpoint of reflection and disposition has not yet been disturbed, nor has the presentiment of something higher been awakened in it. Thus it is dependent upon a contingent deficiency.

reserved particularly for religious content. "Creating" is not a "grounding" or "causing": it is something higher than these limited thought-categories and contains the speculative relationship, the producing by the idea. "Begetting" is by contrast a figurative expression of the relationship of the absolute idea within itself, an expression derived from life,[169] which to be sure bears the idea within itself, but in a natural fashion. | 158

(β) [This being so,] the mode of connection would constitute the necessity of the content. But in representation the content [stands] in [29b] this relation to itself, not in a connection, not as under necessity; and hence this figurative, analogical connection itself [is] not one of *thought,* [is] not posited as an *identity* in *difference.* ⟨This [representational] connection then also determines the form and content of the connectional matrix. Because its content is the truth, and thus is in and for itself speculative and mystical in nature, it is merely its form that is stripped away [by philosophy], and the former [the connectional matrix] is presupposed. Thus the content remains⟩ [170]for me *something given*—⟨what is [called] *positive* and, to the extent [one is speaking] polemically, *revealed,* immediately given, i.e., not comprehended. The eternal decree [is equivalent to] a lack of connection between the universal and particular. (γ) Religion also remains with general representations. Providence, wisdom, the ways [of God] are incomprehensible. (δ) The ground of the confirmation, the connection of this content and my knowledge, belong to eternal faith.⟩ [The content,] that is, has and retains the form of an externality over against me. I make it *mine.* | ˜But 159
however concretely determined I (the I who thus appropriates it) am in other respects (heart, need, mood), as the essentially and absolutely concrete I, i.e., I as the concept, I am not [contained] in it, nor identical with it. This is what constitutes the need[171] and drive of rational insight. All that is meant by the indeterminate word "reason," "rational insight," is, not that within me there is anything that is certain and stands fast, but that there is within me

169. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Son⟩

170. *Ms. apparently not canceled:* Thus this content is

171. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[It] corresponds otherwise to *concrete* characteristics, exigencies, demands⟩

that which stands fast for itself, objective in and for itself, established within me, i.e., it is grounded within itself, is determined in and for itself. Such, however, is the pure concept."[172] Whatever further determinate content it may have in relation to will or intelligence, the substantive point is that such content should be known by me to be grounded within itself, that I have in it the consciousness of the concept. That is to say, I have in it not only certainty or conviction, i.e., conformity to principles otherwise held to be true, by subsuming [it] under such principles, but also the truth *as* truth *in the form* of truth—in the form of the absolutely concrete and of that which harmonizes within itself purely and simply.

[3. Thought][173] [174]

"Now it is this characteristic"[175] that is added by the *philosophical cognition of truth.* But from this it is immediately clear that only

172. W_2 *reads:* I, however, do not consist merely of this heart and mood, or of this good-natured reflection, which is compliant to and naively welcomes the apologetics of the understanding, and which is only too glad when it becomes aware of agreeable arguments. Rather, I have yet other and higher needs. I am further determined concretely in an entirely simple, universal way, such that the determinateness within me is pure and simple. That is to say, I am the absolutely concrete I, thinking determining itself within itself: I exist as the concept. This is another way of my being concrete. Here not only do I seek reassurance for my heart, but also the concept seeks satisfaction; and it is as compared with the concept that the religious content in the mode of representation retains the form of externality. Although many a great and richly endowed mind, and many a profound intelligence, have found satisfaction in religious truth, yet it is the concept, this inwardly concrete thinking, that is still not satisfied and that asserts itself initially as the drive of rational insight. If the as yet implicitly indeterminate word "reason," "rational insight," is not merely reduced to the fact that something or other is certain for me as an external quality—if, on the contrary, thought has so determined itself that the object is secured for me on its own account and is founded in itself—then it is the concept as the universal thought that particularizes itself within itself and remains identical with itself in this particularization.

173. *Ms. reads:* ⟨(c)⟩

[*Ed.*] Hegel originally wrote a "γ" in the margin, which he later changed to a "c." Since he often used roman letters for major divisions and Greek letters for subdivisions, he apparently intended by this change to designate the third major division of the section, that concerned with thought (*Denken*). He would thus distinguish this sectional division from the preceding series of paragraph markings,

the whole of *speculative philosophy* is capable of doing this, and simultaneously that nothing is further from its intention than to overthrow religion, i.e., to assert that the content [30a] of religion cannot for itself be the truth. On the contrary, religion is precisely the true content but in the form of representation, and philosophy is not the first to offer the substantive truth. Humanity has not had to await philosophy in order to receive for the first time the consciousness or cognition of truth. | 160

[176](Religious content is undermined in two ways, for all that their professed intent is to maintain religion—we are not speaking here

to which "γ" and "δ" had been added in the last marginal notation. This would be appropriate in light of his cancellation of the apparently premature transition to the third section on sheet 28a (see n. 159). However, even in this last section he concerns himself not so much with speculative thought per se as with the contrast between it and abstract understanding (*Verstand*)—a contrast that accounts for the enmity between philosophy and religion, despite the fact that philosophy has no intention of overthrowing religion. We should keep in mind that this entire discussion oscillates between a comparison of religion with art and philosophy and an analysis of the modes of religious consciousness.

174. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Concept, connection within itself, absolute necessity of the idea – (β) Liberation of the subjective concept⟩

175. W_2 *reads:* Thus it is that representation dissolves itself into the form of thought, and it is this determination of form

176. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Absolute correspondence [*Angemessenheit*] of content and form⟩

W_2 *reads:* The inner connection and absolute necessity into which the content of representation is transposed in thought is nothing other than the concept in its freedom, so that all content becomes a determinate quality of the concept and is harmonized with the I. The determinateness is here utterly my own; in it spirit has its own essentiality as an object, and the givenness, authority, and externality of the content over against me vanish.

Thereby thought gives to self-consciousness the absolute condition of freedom. Representation still stays within the sphere of external necessity, since all its moments, while relating themselves to each other, do so without giving up their independence. The relationship of these configurations in thought, by contrast, is the relationship of ideality, so that no configuration stands apart or on its own account is independent; rather each has the aspect of a show or semblance vis-à-vis the others. Thus every distinction, every configuration is something transparent, not subsisting on its own account in dark and impenetrable fashion. Consequently, the distinguished moments are not independent and do not offer resistance to each other, but rather are posited in their ideality. The condition of unfreedom in which both the content and the subject find themselves has not vanished because the *absolute correspondence* [*Angemessenheit*] *of content and form* has entered into play. The

of outright evil and godlessness. Philosophy is opposed to both of them and takes up a position against them.)

˜*Conceptual cognition* must be well distinguished from *abstract*
161 *understanding*. Understanding reflects; [in it] we have | ˙presuppositions of *finitude* to which we ascribe absolute validity, making them into rules and standards, applying them to the idea and to absolute truth, thereby subverting absolute truth, which rather is infinite.˜[177]

(α) ˜Understanding ⟨[178]makes the sensible form the main thing.⟩ It first makes into entirely determinate finite relationships the expressions that contain implicitly a speculative thought but are also expressed partly in imagistic, figurative form or as analogies—e.g., original or hereditary sin, outpouring of the Holy Spirit, begetting. [It treats hereditary sin] like the hereditary disease of a family or [like] a contingent [inheritance] of property: in the case of the former, a misfortune of nature; in the case of the latter, [it is] naturally not unjust that one [child] should inherit property from parents while another does not—⟨[that one] has a good example, a good upbringing⟩ without meriting it. But in the absolutely spiritual [arena of] the good, persons each have responsibility for their

content is within itself free, and its appearing within itself is its absolute form; and in the object the subject has before it the action of the idea, of the concept that has being in and for itself, which it itself is.

177. W_2 *reads:* There is something quite characteristic about the action of reflective thinking when it appears as *abstract understanding* and concerns itself with representation, since the latter expresses inner qualities and relationships in a sensible, natural, or generally external fashion. Since reflective understanding, besides, always has presuppositions of finitude to which it ascribes absolute validity, making them into a rule or standard, subverting by comparison the idea and absolute truth, so too it turns sensible and natural qualities, in which representation still wants simultaneously to be able to recognize the thoughts of the universal, into wholly determinate, finite states of affairs, holds fast to this finitude, and then declares representation to be in error. In part, it is still the characteristic dialectic of representation that is contained in this activity of understanding, and hence the enormous importance of the Enlightenment—which that action of understanding was—for the enlightenment of thought. In part, however, the dialectic of representation is also driven thereby beyond its true compass and transposed into the territory of formal free will.

178. *Ms. adds:* ⟨Understanding⟩

own deeds, for what they do, for the sins they commit. [Yet for the understanding all this is regarded as] happening without responsibility, befalling one in external fashion [like an inheritance]. Either the understanding first of all gives such absolute relationships the itch in order [to be able] to scratch them,[179] ⟨or it thinks that something is thereby done for the truth of religion. [Thus it produces] spiritless | dogmatics, faith in line with external actuality, 162
proofs of the understanding—and this external actuality as such is supposed to constitute these proofs! Θεὸς ἀγαπητός.[180] On such [externalities] the knowledge of absolute truth is supposed to be established!⟩"[181]

179. [*Ed.*] *Entweder Verstand gibt solchen absoluten Verhältnissen erst die Krätze, um sie zu kratzen.* It is quite likely that Hegel borrowed this turn of phrase from G. E. Lessing, who used an expression from Bolingbroke's *Hudibras* in reference to the translator Bergmann, saying that Bergmann "gives the itch (*die Krätze gibt*) to his author in order to be able to rub him." In other words, he misunderstood what the author had written and then rebuked him with learned annotations because of some nonsensical phrase that he himself introduced. See Lessing's *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, no. 4, "Über den Bergmannschen Bolingbroke" (*Sämtliche Schriften* 8:10). This metaphor was apparently a favorite of Hegel's since it appears in several of his writings: see Nohl, *Jugendschriften*, p. 61; *GW* 4:220; *History of Philosophy* 2:368 (*Werke* 14:580); and *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 573 remark.

180. [*Ed.*] Instead of θεὸς ἀγαπητός ("God the beloved," a passage that occurs nowhere in the New Testament), Hegel apparently intended to cite θεὸς εὐλογητός ("God the blessed"). This would then be a cryptic reference to Rom. 9:5, a passage which rationalist theologians by various exegetical maneuvers attempted to interpret as proving the divinity of Christ. Hegel gives his own version of the rationalist argument in the 1824 lectures (pp. 339–340), but there he conflates Rom. 9:5 and 1 Tim. 3:16, resulting in a thoroughly confused situation. For a complete explanation, see 1824 *Concept*, n. 156.

181. W_2 *reads:* Thus, for example, in the image of original or hereditary sin the inner relationship of thought is at the same time grasped in terms of natural qualities; but yet, by speaking in this way, representation means with the expression "sin" to raise the natural element, which resides in the quality of inheritance, into the sphere of the universal. The understanding, by contrast, comprehends the relationship in the modality of finitude and thinks *only* of natural possession or of hereditary disease. In this sphere it is freely conceded that, as far as children are concerned, it is a matter of accident that their parents should have had property or have been burdened with disease; children inherit nobility, property, or evil without merit or guilt. If we reflect further on the fact that the freedom of self-consciousness is elevated above this relationship of contingency, and that in the absolutely spiritual arena of the

˜(β) It then needs no great effort for the understanding to show that these finite relationships to which it [has] brought the speculative content of religion are inappropriate to its infinitude. This infinitude itself is an abstraction to which other finite entities are absolutely firmly opposed. [For example, with respect to] the Trinity, number is a wholly inessential relation, [and the fact is] that three is not one.˜[182] The finite, the human [can]not [in this fashion] coalesce with the divine. The metaphysics of understanding, [this] natural theology, ⟨has nothing at all of the speculative content of religion within it, and for this reason can[not] have [truth either].⟩ [30b]

This finitizing and defining of the absolute, the mystical, in terms of relationships of finitude has been characterized as making them comprehensible, and the prejudice has crept in that the religious ceases to be religious when it is rendered comprehensible. [This view has been prevalent] especially in modern times: Jacobi.[183] All proofs mean advancing from one finite thing to another. Reflection starts out from finite qualities and does not get beyond them: correct! [It] advances along the thread of identity but does not make the transition into its negation. However, reason, the concept, does this. ⟨Reflection⟩ does not posit the finitude, the determinacy of content, with which it starts, as negative, [and thus] it necessarily extends finitude as such into the absolute: Spinozism.[184]

good what persons do is their *own* activity, their *own* obligation, then it is easy to display the contradiction in the notion that what belongs absolutely to my own freedom is supposed to have come upon me from elsewhere in a natural fashion, unconsciously and externally.

182. W_2 *reads:* It is much the same when the understanding directs itself to the representational image of the Trinity. Also in this representation the inner thought-relationship is grasped in the mode of externality, for number is thought in the abstract quality of externality. But here understanding holds fast *only* to the externality, keeps to numeration, and finds each of the three to be externally complete in relation to the others. If now this quality of number is made the foundation of the relationship, then indeed it is utterly contradictory that those entities which are completely external in relation to each other should yet at the same time be one.

183. [*Ed.*] See the reference to Jacobi in 1824 *Intro.*, n. 51; also Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, p. 225 (*Werke* 4/1:223).

184. [*Ed.*] Because of the antithesis between Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza and that of Jacobi, it is not immediately clear why Hegel mentions Spinozism in

Philosophy is antithetical to three things: (α) remaining embedded in *sensibility;* (β) adhering to the forms of *representation,* which are construed as content-categories; | (γ) *reflection,* whether positive 163
(⟨building the positive truth of religion upon external proofs and grounds⟩ or negative—hypocrisy: acknowledgement of the entire range of thought and its objectivity—inasmuch as nothing is to count for me as valid and true—as that which is to count for me as true, coupled with pious submission and immersion in the system of doctrine.[185]

Conceptual knowledge: (α) [is] opposed to *sensibility,* particularity, subjectivity, not to a world view in its determinacy. ⟨[It is opposed to its] form and one aspect of [its] content, but only the form of representation [is] opposed.⟩ (αα) [It has] no necessary content. (ββ) [Its] particular inclination [is] not absolutely effaced. Beautiful, pure, loving religious souls grasp in their intensity the equally intensive totality and relate everything to God in simple,

this context. Jacobi accused Spinoza of extending the finite into the absolute (Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza,* pp. 407–409 [*Werke* 4/2:135–140]), an interpretation of Spinoza that Hegel already rejected in *Faith and Knowledge,* pp. 104 ff. (*GW* 4:352 ff.). Later Hegel offered as a substitute for this criticism the claim that Spinoza merely cast everything into the abyss of the one substance. Hegel's objection is not, as one might assume from the text, that Spinoza "extended" (*hineinkontinuiert*) the finite into the absolute, but rather that Spinoza neglected to allow the finite initially to come forth from the absolute through the self-determination of the absolute. Therefore the return of the finite into the absolute would be a mere immersion of determinate qualities in the abyss of the absolute substance, which, since it is not a mode of self-exposition of the absolute, would be consummated merely by means of external reflection. See esp. Hegel's *Science of Logic,* pp. 536 ff. (*GW* 11:376 ff.).

185. *Ms. canceled:*

Part II

Concept of Religion as a Whole Grasped in Its Determinate Aspects

Forms of Consciousness of the Absolute Idea

[*Ed.*] Hegel here makes a premature transition to the second main division of the lectures, which he cancels in order to add the next two paragraphs. Then at the top of the next *Ms.* sheet (31a) he writes a new heading: "Part II: Determinate Religion (Finite Religion)." His earlier subtitle, "Forms of Consciousness of the Absolute Idea," reflects the perspective of the *Phenomenology* and suggests that the whole of the second part is intended as a phenomenology of religion, i.e., of the various forms of consciousness assumed by the absolute idea as it emerges in and advances through the history of religion.

abstract fashion: ⟨enthusiasm, fanaticism.⟩ But firm ethical categories, the unfolding of a *universum,* [an ethical world, are lacking]. (β) [It is] opposed to *reflection,* [which is] equally abstract, but [is also] cold understanding, devoid of content. (γ) [It is opposed to] *representation,* [which] lacks necessity and freedom and the correspondence of content and form.

⟨The distinction of religion from philosophy and art itself first appears in the absolute religion, [where] religion consummates itself in its *determinacy.* Determinacy is content.⟩[186]

186. [*Ed.*] The absolute religion represents the *consummation* of the determinacy of the concept of religion, not the negation of determinacy. In it the concept of religion becomes fully and finally objective to itself, and in this objectivity or determinacy the concept—namely, the concept of the unity of finite and infinite, of consciousness and God—is actualized. Hence this determinacy is the true content, and in the absolute religion form and content perfectly correspond. Moreover, the distinction of religion from art and philosophy that *we* are able to grasp at the outset *itself* first appears historically in the religion that consummates all religions. In the Christian religion, representation rises above artistic intuition (as in Greek religion) and distinguishes itself in principle from reflective philosophy (as in Roman religion). As such it is identical in content with speculative philosophy.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION
THE LECTURES OF 1824

We begin with religion; that is the object of our concern. In considering it we can adopt two paths—the *empirical* approach or the *speculative*. We have a general impression of religion; we know what it is. The empirical approach is to consider it thus, to consider what characteristics this empirical impression or representation has. The other approach is the speculative. Whenever we proceed empirically, we take something immediately from the representation and consider what is characteristic of it. With the speculative approach it is likewise the case that we begin here—not at the absolute beginning but with what is wholly concrete, with what belongs "to the final stage."[1] We begin with religion, and since this means that we are beginning at the end, we have the whole remaining body of science as a presupposition. I shall first take up the empirical side, the representation of religion that people nowadays adhere to on the whole, and from which we pass over to the speculative side only subsequently. The characteristics of empirical representation are important to us, and we shall make use of them in our speculative treatment.

Since we are here dealing with religion, we do not make an abstract beginning; rather what we begin with here is already presupposed within the scope of science. This presupposition has two aspects: the immediate beginning in the empirical mode, and the scientific beginning with nothing else but what we [can] refer to in the sciences that have necessarily preceded our science of religion

1. *Thus K; P reads:* to the region of the highest

and have as their result what is now to be treated. We shall use both approaches, not just the scientific but the empirical as well, because the prevalent views that purport to be philosophical in the general culture of our time are contained in the empirical standpoint. We encounter these views at this point, and we can at this point come to terms with, and get clear about, the prevalent expres-
166 sions. | What this side empirically gives us is in any case the obvious characteristics that pertain to the abstractly subjective mode of religion generally. This standpoint, however, is nothing but hollow, empty subjectivity, the form of finite subjectivity; it is indeed also one moment in the higher standpoint, in the idea of absolute spirit, but it is merely the formal side.

A. EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION[2]

Inasmuch as we have decided that we want to proceed empirically, we may be unsure what we shall find on this path, the path of experience and observation. We may have great hopes of finding the essential, inner substance, but we may know at the same time what the limit in fact is upon what we can hope to find, what can come before us upon this empirical path. We know, to be precise, that God does not offer himself for observation, that he cannot be perceived through the external experience of the senses as a given thing or object, but also that he cannot be found in inward experience, as experience of ourselves. Outside there is the natural world; inwardly there is our world, where *we* are. What we find in this inner experience is therefore our subjectivity, our finite sub-

2. [*Ed.*] No section headings are found in the transcripts by *G* and *P*. *Ho* formulates his own headings in the margin. Our editorial headings are based in part on those in *D*, which are as follows:

A. Empirical Consideration of the Divine
 a. Immediate Knowledge of God
 b. Basis of This Knowledge in Feeling
 c. [Its Basis] in Further [i.e., More Determinate] Consciousness, as the Infinite Opposed to the Finite

B. Speculative Consideration of the Divine

jective activity apart from God. In this perspective, God is neither within us nor outside us. Inwardly we have ourselves and not God. We could still say also that we want to observe our religious *elevation* above ourselves, to observe ourselves in our elevation above our relationship as finite [beings], the relationship through which we are finite and exist over against something other. In this religious fulfillment we are no longer separated from nature or from God of whom we are still unaware. We are related to God therein in an affirmative way, and we should therefore find this content, God, in ourselves. The subject throws itself into this infinite content. But if we are of the opinion that we are finding God here, if we think to find God in this way, we must bear in mind that precisely in this devotion, in this relationless relating, where the separation has fallen away, the object of observation vanishes for us at this standpoint. Devotion *could* be a [kind of] cognition or comprehension, but precisely this mode of elevation is excluded inasmuch as we are only supposed to observe immediately, | or perceive. We confine 167
ourselves to this empirical standpoint, to the renouncing of all argumentation, because reason is not deemed to know anything of God. Thus this mode of elevation falls away.

Religious elevation could of course be our object as a *feeling,* but if we direct our observation upon it, and are minded to find God therein, we must note that feeling is always just feeling. There are any number of feelings of the most various kinds, each with characteristics of its own, and what we should learn by observation of religious feeling is not feeling as such but religious feeling in its determinate [form]. Feeling with *this* determination means nothing else than feeling that has a certain content. I have a feeling of hardness, that is, I feel something hard, it becomes at the same time an object for me, it becomes a content. To think in a determinate fashion means to think a content—and this content is the determinacy. Here the content is to be the divine spirit, but spirit is not an immediate subject [as feeling is], and it is not to be observed in this way. From the standpoint of observation, we find at most the defining character of finite subjectivity.

Three determining characteristics are found in this way by the empirical approach.

1. We have an *immediate knowledge* of God. God is not to be *conceived:* there is no question of argumentative reasoning about God; that is excluded because we never wanted to follow the route of rational cognition. Thus the conscious knowing is not in this case a *thinking* consciousness; and consequently we [merely] know that the object is God.

2. We must ask for a *basis* for this knowledge. Our knowledge is purely inward, and so the representation of God is also something subjective. Hence we ask for a ground for this knowledge, or we seek the locus of the divine being, as it were, and we say: "God *is,* his being is in feeling." In this way *feeling* achieves the status of a ground, and God's being is given to us in feeling.

3. We have immediate knowledge of God, and God is in feeling. The third characteristic is that these two [moments] are *mutually determined:* God is not I, but the other of the I; and the knowing subject is in itself the negative, i.e., it is the finite, while God is the nonnegative, what is higher, the infinite in every respect.

In general, these propositions—[namely,] that we *know* God, that we know God *immediately,* that we have a *feeling* of God, and
168 that we define | our relationship by saying that *we are the finite and he is the infinite*—these propositions are perfectly correct, and none of them should be denied; but at the same time they are so trivial that it is not worth our trouble talking about them here. They are propositions that every child has already learned from his very first instruction. If the science of religion is limited to these propositions it is not worth having, and one cannot see why there is any such thing as theology.[3]

3. [*Ed.*] Despite his remark that it is "not worth our trouble talking about [these propositions] here," Hegel does just that at length in the remainder of Sec. A. This shows that the first main section of the 1824 *Concept* is totally dominated by a continuing polemic against the "theology of our time" with which the *Introduction* has also been concerned, especially the theology of feeling or subjectivity. This is why the 1824 *Concept* does not conform to the outline surveyed at the end of the *Introduction.* It is only in the third part of Sec. B that Hegel arrives at the development of the concept of religion from the speculative point of view in the strict sense. It is clear that Hegel is preoccupied with the problem of subjectivism in modern theology to a greater extent in the 1824 lectures than in any of the others. The materials for Sec. A—the discussion of immediate knowledge, feeling, the more

1. Immediate Knowledge

We have immediate knowledge that there is a God; we know immediately that he is. That is quite correct, we may say, and our representation must conform to this. This proposition has at first sight a quite innocent sense; but it also takes on another sense that is not innocent, namely, that this so-called immediate knowledge is the *only* knowledge of God. To this extent modern theology is as much opposed to revealed religion as it is to rational cognition, which likewise denies the proposition. For it is asserted by modern theology that this immediate knowledge is the only knowledge, as opposed to conceptual cognition. Jacobi[4] was the first to bring up this immediate knowledge some thirty or forty years ago. He said: "We do not know that we have bodies, or that there is an external [world] around us, through argumentative reasoning, or through a process of proof, through reasoned cognition, but we believe it immediately." This immediate knowledge Jacobi called *faith:* we believe that there is an external world around us, and we believe that there is a God, insofar as we have immediate knowledge [of it and] of him; we believe in freedom insofar as we have immediate knowledge that we are free.

Let us consider more closely what is true in this viewpoint. We know that God is and we know this immediately. What do we mean by "knowing" [*Wissen*] here? This knowing is something different from cognizing. We have also the expression "certain" [*gewiss*], and we contrast [this sort of] knowing with truth. I "know" something—but it is still not yet true on that account. "Knowing" expresses the subjective mode in which something is for me, or is in

determinate form of consciousness, the relationship of finite and infinite—are to some extent drawn from Sec. B.3 of the *Ms.* ("The Religious Relationship as the Unity of Absolute Universality and Absolute Singularity"), but they are greatly expanded and revised, and appear here in essentially new form. In the 1827 lectures, Hegel further revised this material and incorporated it into his analysis of the forms of religious consciousness or knowledge of God. In the latter lectures, these ostensibly empirical materials are brought into a speculative context.

4. [*Ed.*] On Jacobi's designation of immediate knowledge as a form of revelation, see above, 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27. On immediate knowledge as distinguished from intuition, see below, 1827 *Concept*, n. 49.

my consciousness, in such a way that it has the character of a being. In the feverish representations of fantasy I do not, strictly speaking, *know*, although I have representations. My "knowing" is my *sub-*
169 *jective certainty* that what I know *is*. Its being and my | being are identical, and that the object is, is for me "certain"; we say, "It is as certain as I am"—that is, the being of the object is at the same time my being. What is certain for me is in my being; I distinguish the content, but its being and mine are not divided. "The truth" reminds us that certainty and objectivity can in principle split asunder. I say, "This is, it is for me," but real objectivity [*das Objektive*] can be distinguished from this being that the object has in me.

"Knowing" thus consists generally in the fact that the object, the other, is, and its being is tied up with my being. I know *that* it is, and I can also know *what* it is. That something is I may know from immediate intuition or as the result of reflection. But when I say "I *know* it," I know only its being, and this being is immediately tied up with my own. The rest is made up of more specific characteristics or qualities that come into play[5] in such a way that they are. The word "knowing" is also used to mean "having a representation"—"I have acquaintance with or a representation [of *X*]"—but it is always implied that the content *is*. "Knowing" is in this case being abstractly related [to the object]. "Cognition is already a richer mode of knowing."[6] We speak of cognition when we know something universal about a universal, and at the same time we grasp this universal in its particular determinations. We are cognizant of nature or of spirit, but we do not say we are cognizant of this house; we are not "cognizant" of single objects but of universal objects. "Nature" and "spirit" are universal terms, while "house" is particular; and we are cognizant of the rich content of the former according to their necessary relation to one another.

On closer inspection, however, this knowing, or consciousness, turns out to be quite abstract, the (for us abstract) activity of the

5. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* This being is admittedly not empty being; I also know its more specific characteristics or qualities, but of them too only

6. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* [It is] an immediate relation, while the expression "truth" calls to mind a disjoining of certainty and objectivity, followed by their mediation.

I. ¯I know that it is. If I | am thus informed, I know about its being. 170
So this knowing is just this: that some content is. It is the abstract relation of the I to the object, but under the determinate category of being. Let the content be what it may, so long as I know it, I know that it is so. Knowing and consciousness are one and the same, except that consciousness is at the same time a more specific definition of the object. To have "information" [*Kenntnis*] or "intuition" [*Anschauung*] or "cognition" [*Erkennen*] already indicates a fuller determination, not merely the abstract category of "knowing" [*Wissen*], which is the simple, abstract activity of the I.¯[7] In other words, immediate knowing is in fact nothing but thinking viewed in an entirely abstract manner, as mediating motion. "Thinking" [*Denken*] is also, of course, the self-identical activity of the I, this pure side of indeterminacy. But thinking in general is immediate knowing.

More precisely, thinking, as thinking—i.e., where the object or content also has the character of an abstract—is the activity of the abstract, the activity of the universal. This thinking is involved in everything.[8] If I sense or intuit [something], this is the pure activity too, but I only call my relation [to the object] "thinking" inasmuch as the content of my consciousness has the character of an abstract or universal.

The "knowing" involved now is not the immediate knowledge of a bodily object but of God. We can take that for granted. God is the completely universal object, not some particularity or other but the highest personality, the most universal personality itself, singularity in its absolute universality. Immediate knowledge of God is immediate knowledge of an object that is supposed to have strictly the character of the universal, so that only the product is immediate; this [process] is *thinking*. Immediate knowledge of God is thinking about God, since thinking is the activity for which the universal is.

7. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads (2d sentence similar in Ho):* whereas consciousness properly contains further determinations of content and distinguishes these from itself as object. So knowing is simply the fact that some content is found; it is accordingly the abstract relation of the I to the object, whatever the content may be.

8. *W (HgG) adds:* however concrete an attitude one adopts.

God has still no content at this point, no further significance; he is only nothing sensible, just a universal; thus we know that he does not live within the sphere of immediate intuition. ˜This immediate
171 knowledge | of God is purely and simply thinking, it is the universal as active; and thinking, inasmuch as it is active and relates itself in an unmediated way, thinks what it thinks as universal altogether. Thinking is a mediating movement insofar as it passes through different determinations. In drawing conclusions one starts from particular, distinct materials and determinations and transforms them into something universal: this is mediating thought, but the merely universal, the universal without any determination, is its immediate product. Pure thought is the content that is thinking itself; it relates itself thus immediately [to itself].˜[9] The immediacy is precisely the same as when I ask, "What does the feeling feel? What does the intuition intuit?" It feels what is felt, it intuits what is intuited: these are all empty tautologies; and it is the tautology that makes the relationship an immediate one.

Thus my "knowing" God means no more than that I think God. All the rest has now to be added on. This product or content of thought also *is*, it is an actual being; God is not merely thought of—he *is*, he is not merely the category of the universal. About this determinate category we have already made comments; and the next step is to render an account of this ˜experience of consciousness˜[10] on the basis of the concept to see how far the universal achieves the status of being inasmuch as I immediately know that God is. That "God" has a further meaning will be shown later on. [For the present] an account has to be rendered of how consciousness gets to the point of saying about this object that "it *is*," and of the extent to which this "is" is contained for us in this abstract thinking.

9. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Thinking is first consummated in truth as a mediating movement insofar as it starts from what is other, permeates it, and in this movement transforms it into something universal. But here thinking has for its object the merely universal, the indeterminately universal, i.e., a determination, a content, that it itself is, in which it is *un*mediated, in other words abstractly present to itself. It is the light that illuminates but itself has no other content than light itself.

10. *Thus P; G reads:* observation

For our assistance we must take from logic [the concept of] "being."[11] "Being" is universality taken in its most empty, abstract sense. "It is"—this is a completely abstract, simple determination. That "being is"—or universality as abstract universality—expresses this pure connection with self, without any relation outward or inward. The universal | is essentially identity with itself, and this is 172
also being, [for] being is simple [*einfach*]. But if I say "the universal," this determination of the universal contains a relationship to the particular and to the singular. I can represent this particularity to myself as outside of the universal or more truthfully as inside it. The [concrete] universal is also this connection with itself, this pervasiveness into the particular. But being sets aside all relation, every determination that is concrete; it is without further reflection, without connection to other. Being is thus contained in the [abstract] universal, and if I say "the universal is," I express at the same time its arid, pure, abstract relation to itself, this barren immediacy that being is. The [concrete] universal is not something immediate in this sense—[i.e., that] it is not to be a [mere] individual or a [mere] particular, but will rather be universality through and through—this [concrete] opening up toward the particular is not the abstract or immediate.[12] On the contrary, the abstract or immediate, this sterile connection with itself, is expressed in being, in this immediacy. So if I say, "This object is," I am expressing the acme of barren abstraction. This is the emptiest, the poorest determination of being, and it is immediate. ˜This is our consciousness of how these two determinations are bound together. The universal makes its separations ideal, it sublates them; [when it is] perfect absence of distinction without any connection, then we have "being." This object of immediate knowing, of pure knowing, of pure thinking,

11. [*Ed.*] Since "being" (*Sein*), according to Hegel, is the most empty, indeterminate, and immediate category of logic (*Science of Logic*, p. 82 [*GW* 11:43–44]), "to be" (the verb *sein*) means simply *to be possible* or *to be self-identical* in simple immediacy with self. "Being" is not yet "determinate being" or "being-there," which is *actual existence* and for which Hegel uses the term *Dasein* (*Logic*, pp. 109 ff. [*GW* 11:59 ff.]). On the translation of these terms, see the Editorial Introduction.

12. [*Ed.*] The distinction between the abstract and the concrete universal is not explicitly stated in the preceding sentences, but we believe it is what Hegel *meant*, and the distinction helps to make sense of an otherwise very difficult passage.

determines itself through the universal; and the fact *that* it is contains in a manner that is not yet expressed *what* it is for itself, as distinct from me, [namely] that it connects itself with itself. [This is a type of] thinking [that involves] my having an object, or, generally speaking, an other."[13]

This, then, is the sense of this immediate knowing. With it we are in the realm of abstract logic, and it is always so when we think we have our feet on the most concrete ground, because we find ourselves on the ground of immediate consciousness. Instead, this concrete consciousness is the very poorest in thoughts precisely because it is the most immediate consciousness, and the determi-
173 nations that it contains are the emptiest | and the most barren ones. To believe that immediate knowledge is outside the realm of thought is the height of ignorance; we struggle with distinctions of this kind, and at close quarters they vanish into identity.[14]

And if, while maintaining this standpoint, we reflect more carefully upon how what I thus know in this immediate consciousness is distinguished from anything else that I know [in this way], the distinction quickly blurs. What do I know? I know as yet nothing except that the universal is. The further content that God has we shall discuss later; the standpoint of the immediate consciousness offers no more than this. "That one can know nothing at all of God is an empty standpoint."[15] But [from this standpoint] God is also an object of my consciousness. I know about him, I distinguish God from myself: he is an other over against me, and I over against him.

If we compare other objects according to what we know of them, we know as much as this about all of them, but we also know more. They exist and are an other than we, they are forthemselves; thus they are a universal and at the same time not a universal, a universal and at the same time a particular; they have some determinate content or other. The determination of universality is still

13. *Thus P; G reads:* Knowing is thinking; this is the universal, and it contains the determination of the abstract universal, the immediacy of being.

14. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* Even with the pitifully little that immediate knowing has to offer by way of determination, religion belongs to thought.

15. *Ho reads:* That God cannot be cognized is the standpoint of the Enlightenment, and this coincides with the immediate knowledge of God.

only matter and content. For example, I say of the wall, "The wall is, it is a thing." Here I have what I have in my immediate knowledge of God. The wall is a thing; thing is a universal: this much I know of God, too, so that God has also been said to be *ens,* ˜that is, abstract *ens.*˜[16] We have said, "God *is* in immediate knowledge." We are, too, and this immediacy of being attaches no less to God, this simple connection of the same with itself. All other concrete, empirical things are too, they are self-identical with themselves. Abstractly speaking, this is their being qua being. This being they have in common with me: I am; this object | also is. But because 174
it is the object of my knowing, it is so constituted that I can strip it of its being. I know it, I represent it to myself, believe in it, but "being believed" is a form of being in my consciousness only. At this point, therefore, universality and this determination of immediacy split apart—and they *must* split. The reflection that the two aspects are separable must arise: that this is an object for me is separable from its being; for we are two, and if we are two, we must also be distinct (else we would be one). If one and the same characteristic belongs to both, they are not distinguished; in other words, some determining characteristic must be attached to one that does not belong to the other. "Being" is a characteristic of this kind. I am, so the other, the object, is not. I take being on myself, on my side; I do not doubt of my existence, with the result that, in the case of the other, existence falls away. ˜Thus if I posit a distinction, I take the distinction upon myself too. I do not doubt that I am, for it is just I who am this immediate connection with myself, so being is simply within me. I cannot abstract from my being, for thinking is the activity of the universal,˜[17] or simple connection with self. There is being even in the very process of abstracting, so being falls away from the other object. (Admittedly, I

16. *Ho reads:* But there is nothing emptier than the *ens,* in contrast with which the other *entia* show themselves to be far more filled.

[*Ed.*] See above, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 9.

17. *Ho reads:* If we now consider this being more closely, it is such that the I, in depriving the object of this being, transfers it to itself; for inasmuch as it knows only the being of the object, so that the object is only this known being, it lacks being in and for itself and acquires it only in consciousness. The object is known

can take my own life, but that is the freedom to abstract from my existence.) When I say "I am," the "I" already contains the "am."

In demonstrating how God, as the object, is in being, once one has taken being upon oneself[18] it must be demonstrated that God
175 is in *my* being—and so[19] the requirement comes to be stated thus: that the empirical state should be shown in which this object, God, is in my very being in such a way that we are not two but one. We are asked to point to an observable state where the distinction falls away, where God is in this being that remains with me while I am—to a mode of being, therefore, in which what I previously called object, God, is undividedly one within me as a being. This "region" [in] which God is in [my] being is now what we call *feeling*, and this is the second point we have to consider.

2. Feeling[20]

Well, then, people speak of religious feeling and say that our faith in God is given to us in feeling. There is this secret, inmost basis upon which the certainty that God is rests for us. About "certainty" we have already spoken. This certainty is that two kinds of being are posited in reflection as one form of being. Being is the abstract

only as known being, not as what has being in and for itself. Only the I *is*, not the object. I can doubt everything except my own being. For the I is what doubts, is doubt itself. If doubt becomes the object of doubt, if what doubts doubts the doubt, the doubt disappears. The I is an immediate connection with itself; in it is being. I can abstract from everything other than from thinking, from myself, for what abstracts is itself thinking.

[*Ed.*] According to the *Ho* version, Hegel adopted here the Cartesian argument. Cf. René Descartes, *Discourse on Method* (1637), part 4; and *Meditations on the First Philosophy* (1641), Meditations 1, 2.

18. *Ho reads:* If the I has appropriated being to itself so that it falls away from the object, then, for the object to be expressed as having being, it must be possible to adduce a ground. The I and being are inseparable.

19. *Ho adds:* since we are at the standpoint of empiricism,

20. [*Ed.*] In the 1824 and 1827 lectures, Hegel normally uses the term "feeling" (*Gefühl*) rather than "sensibility" or "sensation" (*Empfindung*) as he did in the 1821 *Ms.* The reason is undoubtedly that Friedrich Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube*, first published in 1821–22, introduced the term "feeling" as a major theological category and made it a subject of controversy. See above, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 52.

connection with self. There are now two beings, but they are only one being, and this being is likewise my being: this is what is "certain"—a characteristic about which we have reflected. When it is endowed with any concrete content, this certainty is what we

While *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* are closely related, there is a subtle distinction between them, as Hegel himself noted. "Sensibility" points to "sensations" (*Empfindungen*), which are single and transient modifications of the soul, and which are *received* in a mode of immediacy, received as they are *found (finden)*. "Feeling" by contrast points to the activity of the *self*, which integrates these sensations in a "reflected totality." Feeling represents a higher activity of self-consciousness than sensibility; it no longer strictly speaking belongs to the realm of sense, although it acts upon sensations; it belongs rather to the realm of ideality, of subjectivity. Thus when Schleiermacher introduced *Gefühl* into theological discussion, Hegel realized that he could no longer treat what was being referred to merely as *Empfindung*. Whether Hegel does *justice* to Schleiermacher's conception of feeling, especially the "feeling of absolute dependence," is another matter (see below, n. 37).

Hegel's own version of the distinction between *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* is established in two important sections of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), which we quote fully below:

"§ 402. Sensations, just because they are immediate and are found as existing, are *single* and *transient* characteristics, alterations in the substantiality of the soul, posited in its being-for-self, with which that substance is one. But this being-for-self is not merely a formal moment of sensation [alone]; the soul is implicitly a reflected totality of sensations—it senses *within itself* the total substantiality of what it is *implicitly*—it is a soul that *feels*.

In the usage of ordinary language, "sensibility" and "feeling" are not clearly distinguished. Still we do not speak of the "sensation" but of the "feeling" of right, of self. "Sensitivity" (*Empfindsamkeit*) is connected with sensibility. We may therefore say that "sensibility" emphasizes more the side of passivity, of *finding (Finden)*, i.e., the immediacy of mode in feeling, while "feeling" at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves (*die Selbstischkeit*) who feel.

§ 403. The feeling individual is the *simple ideality*, the subjectivity of sensation. What it has to do, therefore, is to raise its substantiality, its merely *implicit* content, to the character of subjectivity, to take possession of it, to realize its mastery over its own. As feeling, the soul is no longer a mere nature, but an inward individuality. The individuality which in the merely substantial totality was only a formal being-for-self has to be liberated and made independent."

It is puzzling that in the following pages Hegel sometimes seems to blur this distinction and to describe *Gefühl* rather as though it were *Empfindung*. In order to sharpen his polemic against the theology of feeling, he seems to downplay the extent to which feeling is an act of consciousness and not merely a sensation. For example, in the strict sense it would seem that animals have only sensations, not feelings.

call "feeling," and a feeling of this kind is offered as the ground of our faith in, and knowledge of, God. So let us express what is in our feeling. We say, "We know about something, and this is God." In this way feeling acquires the status of ground. The form of "knowledge" is the first thing—we and the object—and with this form enters the difference between us and the object, as well as the reflection that the being is my being, that it belongs to me insofar as I am. And there, then, is the need that, in this being that I take to myself, the object also is, God is. This is now the feeling, the locus, where my being and the being of my object exist as one.
176 Here my being and that [of the object] are | posited as one. Feeling is the locus where, so to speak, the two beings have come together into one. The being of God, as something strictly certain, as bound up with my being, [is] therefore a being for which the separability of being falls away.

We must now consider the general nature of feeling, so far as it is appropriate at this point. "I feel something hard." When I say this in this way, there is first the "I" and second the "something," making two. That is the expression of reflection. The common element is the "hardness." There is hardness in my feeling, and the object also is hard. This commonality exists in feeling: the object impinges upon me and I am filled with its determinate character. There the distinction "I and the object" is [found]. If I *say,* "I and the object," both are [there] on their own account; it is only in *feeling* that the twofold mode of being disappears and the determinacy of the object becomes mine.[21] To the extent that the other remains independent, it is not felt, not tasted. "Light is a manifestation in sensation qua light. Light is this ideal being that immediately separates me and the object from each other."[22]

This is the *formal* type or mode of feeling, [namely] that the object's being is in mine and forms a unity with mine. Let us now consider, second, the *content* of feeling from the empirical stand-

21. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* so much so that initially there is no longer any reflection vis-à-vis the object.

22. *Ho reads:* Vision on the other hand is the ideal sense, leaving the object free, in fact casting it immediately out from itself and so leading feeling over into consciousness.

point.[23] We note that it can have the greatest variety of content. We have feelings of right and wrong, of God, of color; my feeling is envy or hatred, hostility or joy. The content may be sharply contrasting—the basest as well as the highest and noblest things have their place in it. It is a universal experience—we can call upon this as a determinate mode of experience too—that feeling is completely contingent in content: it may be the most genuine thing, or it may be the worst of all. Thus if God is in our feeling, God has
| in that respect no advantage over what is worst.[24] And with this 177
is bound up the fact that everything that is also enters our feeling according to its content—not merely the [truly] real, the actual, what has being in fact [*in der Tat Seiendes*], but also the invention, the out-and-out lie, the imaginary. The content is of the most opposite kinds: everything good and everything evil, everything actual and everything that is not, is included in our feeling—all the images that I can fashion of objects or of myself. Even the unworthiest can arouse my enthusiastic response. I have hopes—that is, feelings or wishes. Hope is a feeling in which, just as in fear, are futureevents—things that do not exist immediately, though perhaps they will one day, or perhaps they never will. I can also be enthusiastic about the past, or again about what has never been nor ever will be. I can rejoice in hate or in friendship; it is present only in my representational image, and [the object] may be mere imagination and fabrication. I can imagine I am a noble, outstanding person, capable of sacrificing everything for the right or for my opinions; I can imagine I have accomplished or contributed much—but the question remains whether this is true.[25] Whether my feeling is of the genuine kind, whether it is good, depends on its content. That this content is found in feeling does not matter, for the very worst things

23. W_1 *(HgG/Var?) adds:* Feeling as such is still this lack of determinateness. With feeling we are at once reminded of its determinacy, of what kind it is. It is this that appears as content.

24. *Ho adds:* and the choicest bloom sprouts on the same soil alongside the rankest weed. The fact that there is a content in feeling thus affords no assurance of the excellence of the content itself.

25. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* or whether in fact I act as nobly and am truly as virtuous as I imagine myself to be.

are there too. Whether the content exists does not depend on whether it is in the feeling either, for imaginary things that have never existed, and never will exist, are found there too. Hence feeling is a form for every possible content, and by being felt the content gains no determinate status—"the form [of feeling] is capable of any content."[26] It is a form in which the content is posited as something completely contingent. This or that content can be posited at my pleasure or caprice, or through nature. In feeling I am at my most dependent; the content is completely contingent for me. Caprice or pleasure is [a kind of] contingency too, so that in feeling the content has the form, the character, of a contingent
178 content; i.e., this content is not | determined in and for itself, it is not posited by the universal, by the concept. This contingent content is therefore in "its essence the particular, the limited."[27] It does not matter that the content of my feeling is what it is; it could just as well be something else, but it always takes the form of a contingent particular. So if God's being is attested in our feeling, it is there in the form of complete contingency, as being, in principle, a particular content, one that takes no precedence over any other content, for the status of being a feeling can belong to the other just as easily as to it. We call this contingency of the content in our being "subjectivity," but it is so in the worst sense. For personality, the highest intensity of "spirit,"[28] is also subjectivity, but in a freer form; in the present context subjectivity is synonymous with contingency. It is only subjective, it is only something particular, which can be either this way or that, i.e., it is something contingent.

It should also be recalled at this point that people frequently invoke their feelings when they run out of rational grounds. We must leave those who do so alone since they are withdrawing back into their own particularity; the appeal to one's own feelings breaks off the commonality between us. In the field of thought or of the concept, by contrast, we meet one another on the soil of the universal, of rationality; there we have the nature of the thing in

26. W_2 *(Var) reads:* which affects its being-in-and-for-self.
27. *Thus W (HgG); G reads:* the essence of the particular, the limited.
28. *Ho reads:* spirit within itself, spirit determining itself,

question before us. We can talk about it with one another; we can come to an understanding about it; we submit ourselves to the thing itself. The thing by which we want to orient ourselves is thus a third element that we have in common, namely the objective; once we pass over to feeling, we lose this common ground and draw back into the sphere of our contingency.[29]

Moreover, feeling is what human beings have in common with the animals; it is the animal, sensuous form. So when the realm of right, | or ethical life, or God is pointed to in feeling, this is the 179
very worst way in which such a content can be posited or demonstrated. God *is* essentially in thought. The suspicion that God is only for thought, through thought, and in thought must at once arise because only human beings, not animals, have religion, and humanity distinguishes itself from the animals by thought.

Everything in the human mind that is based on thought or reason can be transposed into the form of feeling. Therefore God, whose region is the intellectual world, along with right, freedom, ethics, and so forth—all this has its root in the higher destination by virtue of which human beings are not animals but human, *spirit*. But all this that pertains to higher determinations can also be transposed into the form of feeling. Feeling, however, is only a form for this content, which belongs to quite a different field. We do indeed have feelings of right, freedom, ethics, and we have religious feelings, but feeling is the worst form in which content of this kind is posited.

Feeling is thus infinitely differentiated, for it arises only in contingent fashion. Feelings can be of the right kind if the content is true, but that it is true does not stem from feeling. An educated person can have a true feeling of right, duty, ethics, God—our feeling in these areas can be wholly right—but this is not the merit of feeling; it is because the whole formation of our thought and representational ideas is right, because the culture we see all around us, the culture we perceive outwardly in others, is just, and because

29. *W (Var) adds (similar in Ho):* merely noting how the thing is met with on this occasion. W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* In this sphere we each make the thing *our* thing, *our* particular concern; and if someone tells us, "You should feel thus and so," we are at liberty to reply, "I just don't feel that way, I'm not made like this"—for such a demand refers only to our contingent being, which can be this way or that.

our representation of it has been truly made. Thus we are deceived when we ascribe the ethical or the good in the ordinary person to the credit of feeling.

It must be added, however, that not only can every content be in feeling, but also the true content *must* be in our feeling. It is quite right to say, as we do, that we must have God in our hearts, have ethical principles at heart. But heart means more than feeling, for feeling is only momentary, ephemeral, and feeling is the extreme form of contingency. By contrast, whenever I say, "I have God in my heart, or have the right in my heart," the feeling of this content is expressed as a continuing, fixed mode of my existence. The heart
180 is what I am, | not merely what I am at this instant, but what I am in general in this respect if it really is my basic principle. The form of feeling as universal denotes basic principles or habits of my being, the settled pattern of my way of acting.

If it is in *this* sense that one says, "God, right, ethics, should also be in my feeling, in my heart," what one is thereby expressing is that this same content should not merely be represented by me but should be inseparable from me, identical with me. As an actual human, I should have these characteristics, they should be integral to my character; the general tenor of my activity should be thus, and it is essential in this sense that all true content should be in the feeling or in the heart. In this sense religion must be brought into the heart, ethical truth must be brought into the heart; and this is the sense in which individuals should be rightly educated in the religious and the ethical sphere—they must become identified with the content. But the fact that the content is located in feeling does not make it true, or self-sufficing, or good or inwardly excellent; it does not make it true in the sense of *actuality*. Feeling is the locus of subjective, contingent being. It is the task of individuals to give their feelings a true content of the kind we have discussed, ˜so that this content becomes part and parcel of their being. If individuals are going to be good, the content itself must be good; feeling, in and for itself, does not make it good.˜[30]

30. *W (HgG/1831?) reads:* But a theology that only describes feelings gets no further than empiricism, history [*Historie*], and their contingencies; it is nor yet dealing with thoughts, which have a content.

Even if we have now said that feeling is the locus in which God's being can be pointed out immediately, we have not met with being or God—our object—there in the way we wanted to, i.e., not as being that is free in and for itself. God is, and he is independently in and for himself, he is free. But this independence, that God is according to this definition free being, is not to be found in feeling; nor do we find any content as a content that is in and for itself in feeling, for the content of feeling can be any and every particular content equally well. The bad person can posit a bad content in himself, a nullity. Then the content need not be good in and for itself. | If feelings are to be genuine and authentic in their nature, 181
their content must be genuine and authentic, but it is not the feeling that makes it so.

Feeling is thus the lowest form. In recent times people no longer speak of the heart but of conviction. The expression "heart" refers to my immediate character in a more unconscious mode; "acting according to conviction," on the other hand, implies that the content is mine, and that it is a power that governs me. It is my power, and I belong to it as well; "it is an indwelling that progresses more through thought and insight."[31] If I act from conviction, then I act just as intensively; I act with my will, and recognize that this content is my own, as much as when I say, "I act from the heart." The only difference is that when the content is mine in thought, this thought-content is in me as thinker. This is just as strong as when the content is in my heart.

Such is the nature of feeling as the basis, and the characteristics that pertain to it. It is important to see how content is related to form in feeling. We like to speak of our feelings because in them we have our particularity before us. Those who live in the real world, be it practical affairs or scientific inquiry, and who act according to right and justice, law and righteousness, forget themselves in what they are doing and have no feelings in regard to it (feelings are a self-reminiscence). They are concerned with their own particularity as little as possible. Those who are vain and self-

31. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* But this power governs me in the mode of inwardness, being mediated rather through thought and insight. *Ho reads:* The indwelling of the content in conviction is mediated more through thought and insight.

indulgent, on the other hand,[32] willingly invoke their own feelings, their particularity, they want to enjoy it; and this direction of self-indulgence does not issue in true dealings and objective thought. Whoever is only concerned with feelings is on the one hand not to
182 be trusted and on the other not yet mature.[33] |

We must therefore now look for another basis, as long as we are proceeding from an empirical standpoint. Neither in immediate knowledge nor in feeling have we encountered the free absolute independence of God. We have not found God either according to his independent being or as a content that is not contingent but is in and for itself. So we still have to observe the immediate consciousness to see how this content figures therein as an object.

"It is this imperfection that compels us to go further, to see in what further mode of consciousness we can find something that corresponds better to this religious representation [of God]. We are looking for a region of consciousness in which the being of the object comes forth as objective being, as the proper being of what subsists in and for itself, distinct from us; and where, in addition, the determination of content is not merely contingent but is present in the form of absolute determinateness.

When we look around to see in what form of consciousness this is to be found, a more determinate form of consciousness emerges. We are not tied to the two forms of immediate knowing and religious feeling but can pass over to a more determinate form of
183 consciousness and at the same time still not | transcend our standpoint, namely, the empirical standpoint of simple observing that we have adopted."[34]

32. *W (HgG) adds:* to whom nothing is dearer and more precious than themselves and who have no desire beyond their own self-enjoyment,

33. *W (HgG) adds:* but is a beginner in regard to knowing, acting, etc.

34. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* In regard to the determinateness of the I, which constitutes the content of feeling, we have already seen, however, that it is distinct not only from the pure I but also from feeling in its own movement, so that the I finds itself determined in antithesis to itself. This distinction is now to be posited in such a way that the activity of the I enters into play, casting aside its determinateness as not belonging to it, setting it apart and objectifying it. We also saw that in feeling the I is implicitly externalized in relation to itself, and in the universality it contains it has implicitly the negation of its particular empirical existence. Inas-

3. Consciousness in More Determinate Form[35]

Thus we are here discussing a more precisely determined consciousness, in which the two elements posited in reciprocal opposition acquire firmer characteristics whereby they are distinguished from one another. We must now see whether these characteristics correspond in principle to our representation of religion; we must grasp more precisely what representation means in general. We have such a representation, and we want to see how it is determined in us. We want to grasp the consciousness in which what we are

much as the I now sets its determinateness aside from itself, it externalizes itself, sublates its immediacy, and enters the sphere of the universal.

However, the determinateness of spirit, the object, is initially posited simply as *external,* in the completely objective determination of temporal and spatial externality, and the consciousness that posits spirit in this externality and relates itself to it is accordingly *intuition,* which we have here to consider in its consummation as artistic intuition.

[*Ed.*] The second paragraph shows traces of editorial revision.

35. [*Ed.*] In the outline of the empirical approach at the beginning of Sec. A, Hegel states that "the third characteristic is that these two [moments, the immediate knowledge of God and the being of God in feeling,] are *mutually determined:* God is not I, but the other of the I; and the knowing subject is in itself the negative, . . . the finite, while God is . . . the infinite." This is what Hegel begins to discuss under the theme, "Consciousness in More Determinate Form"—that is, what gives religious consciousness its determinacy is the awareness of the antithesis between myself as a finite, feeling, particular, limited subject and God as the infinite, independent, universal, unlimited object. It is the interaction of these elements that constitutes the religious relationship (see *Ms. Concept,* Sec. B.3) and religious representation (see 1827 *Concept,* Sec. B.3). While mentioning the term "representation" in the first paragraph, Hegel does not develop it here and it is not the theme of this section. Rather in the present section Hegel focuses on the antithesis between the two elements—myself and the object—and on alternations in my finitude between being merely negative or finite and being affirmative, existing solely for myself. From the point of view of empirical observation, these initially appear to be the only options: either God remains what is totally other and beyond, the negation of my finitude, of which I can have no cognitive knowledge; or finitude itself is what is exhaustively real and good, existing solely for itself. A higher form of consciousness is achieved when the relationship between finite and infinite is no longer viewed as purely antithetical and mutually negating. This is what is taken up in the next section, but the stages of the analysis are not clearly delineated. Throughout, Hegel is attempting to show that the religious relationship cannot adequately be brought into view from the purely empirical perspective and that a transition to a speculative grasp of religion is therefore required. Prior to that transition, the subject matter of religion cannot be properly addressed.

looking for is to be found, and in which we can obtain what we are looking for, i.e., a determinate representation of what we call "religion" dissected into its moments.

(1) If we consider determinate consciousness, we find this distinction, or antithesis, in it, that I comprehend myself as finite vis-à-vis the object. Consciousness means in general [that] I am not what the object is, and the object is not what I am. Each is the other of the other, but in a determinate fashion. Each is only the negative. We find that we are determined as the negative for ourselves, not merely in relation; we find we are determined as the finite.

[36]We are finite. This is the more fixed determination, and it seems
184 | that there is nothing further to be said about it; everywhere we find an end, and the end of one is where another begins. Already the very fact that we have an object makes us finite. Where the object begins, that is the end of me. We know ourselves to be finite

36. *Precedes in* W_2 *(MiscP):* However, in fact it is thought alone that is responsible for the elevation and movement of the objective content. I myself as thinking am this passing over, this spiritual movement, and we now have to consider thinking as constituting this movement. In the first place, however, it is empirical observation and reflection.

b. Mediated Knowledge as Observation and Reflection.

This standpoint, which in general is characteristic of our time, proceeds according to empirical psychology, accepts what is present in ordinary consciousness and how it is present, observes appearances, and removes from the latter whatever elements of the infinite are in them.

From this standpoint religion is the human consciousness of something higher, otherworldly, having being above and beyond. In other words consciousness senses itself to be dependent and finite; in this sensing, it is consciousness to the extent that it presupposes an other on which it depends and which it acknowledges as *essence* because it itself is defined as the *negative,* the finite.

If we begin by considering them in their general form, this observation and this reflection take shape as follows.

Precedes in W_1 *(Ed):* We are now approaching the result of our investigation. We have grasped the [sort of] thinking in which will be found, and wherein we shall attain what we seek, the specific thought of religion. But thinking itself, as we have just seen it in the form of knowing or proving, has various stages. Here again we initially start from the observation of consciousness [*continuing with Ho:*] in order to see how the content, God, takes shape in it.

W continues with a sentence from Ho: In consciousness, to the extent that I know an object and am reflected into myself vis-à-vis the object, [I] know the object as the other of myself, and myself as limited by it and finite.

on many planes. We are finite in a physical sense. The life of the living is this finite life. As part of life we are externally dependent on the other, we have needs and so forth—what everyone needs for his existence—and we are conscious of this limit. We feel ourselves to be dependent, as having an animal existence. This is what we have in common with the animals, which also feel their limit. Plants and minerals are finite, too, but they have no feeling of their limits. It is the superiority of what is living to feel its limit; and still more it is the superiority of what is spiritual to *know* its limit. The animal feels its limit—it is fearful, hungry, thirsty, and so forth. There is a breach in its feeling of self-reliance; there is a negation in it, and the feeling of this negation is present. The animal feels pain and is afraid; it takes fright when it is hunted and comes to a wall; there it feels its limit. If we say that religion rests on this feeling of dependence,[37] then animals would have to have religion, too, for they feel this dependence. The limit, however, only exists for me inasmuch as I pass beyond it; in feeling, in being conscious

37. [*Ed.*] A reference to the proposition of Friedrich Schleiermacher in *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 9: "The common element in all pious excitations, and therefore the essence of piety, is this: that we are conscious of ourselves as utterly dependent, that is, we feel ourselves dependent on God." In § 9.3, Schleiermacher writes: "We shall presuppose as undeniable the fact that pious feeling in all its various forms can be described as a pure feeling of dependence and never as a relationship of reciprocity." In the 2d ed., Schleiermacher revised this paragraph extensively. The proposition statement now reads (§ 4): "The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in other words, the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being utterly dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God." He added the crucial statement contained in § 4.4 (lacking in the 1st ed.): "As regards the identification of utter dependence with 'relation to God' in our proposition: this is to be understood in the sense that the *Whence* of our receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be designated by the word 'God,' and that this is for us the really original signification of that word." He also added a note to § 4: "For the word *schlechthinig* ["utter," "absolute"], which occurs frequently in the following exposition, I am indebted to Professor Delbrück. [See Ferdinand Delbrück, *Erörterungen einiger Hauptstücke in Dr. Friedrich Schleiermachers christliche Glaubenslehre* (Bonn, 1827).] I was unwilling to venture upon its use, and I am not aware that it has occurred anywhere else. But now that he has given it to me, I find it very convenient to follow his lead in using it." While Schleiermacher did use the adverb *schlechthin* in the proposition statement of the earlier § 9, this appears to be its *only* occurrence, and the adjective *schlechthinig* is not found at all in the first edition, which commonly

of the limit, the passing beyond it is implied. (The mineral is limited for us, not for itself.) This feeling is a comparison of one's nature
185 and of one's existence at this moment generally, and the two | do not correspond. The animal is alive. What is living, in general, is what makes this comparison of existence and nature and finds they do not fit; and so far as its existence does not measure up to its nature, the living thing feels need, pain, or negative being.

˜Like a human being, an animal, qua subject, is essentially negative unity with itself, identity with itself as such; and it has the certainty˜[38] or awareness of its need, its self-relation. This self-

refers merely to our "feeling dependent on God" or the "pure [*rein*] feeling of dependence," or occasionally, the "feeling of absolute [*absolut*] dependence."

Now it is clear that, in the first edition as well as the second, Schleiermacher intended to distinguish between *religious* feeling and the feelings of reciprocity that we experience in relation to finite objects. But he did not *thematize* this so sharply by consistently designating the former as the "feeling of *utter* (or *absolute*) dependence," and by indicating that it entails an actual "relation to God." Thus it is plausible that Hegel, who knew only the first edition, would not have recognized the differentiation that Schleiermacher *intended* to express, but did not *clearly* express until 1830 (undoubtedly in response to just the sort of criticism advanced by Hegel). It is clear to us that, from Schleiermacher's point of view, no animal could have a feeling of *utter* dependence, i.e., a consciousness of being related to the ultimate Whence and Whither of existence, and that the "feeling of utter dependence" is not a sensible, empirical intuition at all but is closer to that "intellectual intuition" which Hegel once termed "speculation." Indeed it is the precognitive condition of possibility for cognizing anything whatsoever. But what is clear to us was not necessarily clear to Hegel; and, given the less rigorous conceptuality of the first edition of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, he cannot be accused of deliberately misrepresenting Schleiermacher, although he may not have made a special effort to understand him. While there are significant and irreducible differences between them, there is a sense in which these two great figures are like ships passing at night, never really establishing contact. See, e.g., the *locus classicus* of Hegel's critique of Schleiermacher, the Preface to H. W. F. Hinrichs' *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1822), pp. xviii–xix (*Werke* 18:16), translated by Merold Westphal as an Appendix to *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. Frederick G. Weiss (1974), pp. 238–239. For a detailed analysis of the two editions of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, see Richard Crouter, "Rhetoric and Substance in Schleiermacher's Revision of *The Christian Faith* (1821–1822)," *The Journal of Religion* 60 (July 1980), 285–306; see also Richard Crouter, "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-sided Debate," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (March 1980), 19–43.

38. *Ho reads:* For us a stone is limited, for itself it is not so. We are beyond its level of determinateness since it is immediately identical with what it is; what con-

relation is contradicted by the feeling of a negation in it, and the self feels itself as the power against this negation which appears as a need, and as an external object whereby this need can be satisfied. The self satisfies its need, supersedes the limit that is posited generally in the need. ¯Thus among the animals, too, it is the case that the limit is only present to the extent that they pass beyond it. Only because the animal has a feeling of self does it have a need. An animal has needs, but these are at the same time drives to transcend this negation of the self. All drives are just this, that a negation is posited in the living thing, a negation that contradicts the self, for the self is the affirmative. This affirmation of itself restores the self again. If, then, the animal feels itself to be finite, if it feels its limit, this merely means that it is living, by having a drive.˜[39] By superseding the limit, it achieves reconciliation with itself and with the world once more; it is returned to its satisfied, satiated self-feeling. This necessity within it appears at the same time as an object outside it, which it brings within its power and so restores itself.

Consequently we feel ourselves to be finite: "I am finite." Notice that the limit of finitude is only ever present for us (as it is for the animal) through the comparison with the affirmative | in opposition 186
to the limit. Only so far as we are beyond it do we feel it. Thus it is as finite that we are limited. At this level of consciousness no such patently abstract rejection as this occurs, but we hang onto the fact that I am finite. In this consciousness I am finite: the object is my nonbeing, the other-than-I that is different from me. This implies that it is posited as infinite, and qua infinite distinct from the finite me. The object is what is beyond the limit, but it is defined as an other than I. I feel only my limit, I know my boundary because I am unlimited, because I have a consciousness, an immediate con-

stitutes its determinate being does not exist for it as a nonbeing. An animal's awareness of limits consists in its comparing its universality with its existence at a given moment. For an animal as such is, as a living being, universal vis-à-vis itself and feels its limitation as negated universality, as need. The human being, as a subject, is also negative unity with itself and has the certainty of unity with itself,

39. *W (HgG) reads:* In human beings as in animals all drives are thus an affirmation of one's self, and in this way animals take up a position against the negation within them. What is living exists only

sciousness. Here what is beyond the limit is something other than I; and I am defined only as finite.

(2) The next point is that both sides are mutually related, and we have to see how this relation is determined. It is a completely simple relation.

The infinite as my object is the nonfinite, the nonparticular, the nonlimited, the universal generally. The finite is posited in relation to the infinite as the negative or the dependent, that which evaporates in relationship to the infinite. The infinite is posited as the substantial, the not-dependent; the finite [as] what has no subsistence, or [rather] has its subsistence only through its relationship to the infinite. In their being brought together a unity arises through the sublation of one side, namely of the finite, which cannot hold out against the infinite. Expressed as feeling, this relationship—[namely,] that over against me, the finite, there is another, and that [over against] the universal and infinite I therefore am only the negative—this relationship is the feeling of fear or dependence. This is the relationship between them, but there is also another characteristic within their relation—namely, that I, on the one hand, define myself as the finite, the merely negative, but on the other hand I do not perish in the relation; both sides subsist, and they do not arrive at this unity. "I am"—[this is] as such the standpoint of consciousness. I subsist; I am thus also the affirmative, that which is on its own account and subsists. On the one hand I know myself to be of no account, and on the other hand to be the affirmative, to be what counts, so that that infinite lets me survive too, does [not] demonstrate itself to be power in me. We can call this the
187 goodness of the | infinite, just as the sublation of the finite can be called its justice, according to which the finite must be manifested as finite.

"Now one may say that, if we go this far,"[40] this is all of the content of religion. We can go still further and observe that God can be known cognitively; but it is as though an arbitrary halt is called here—or, because we want to behave only as observers, we

40. *Ho reads:* This is the more determinate form of consciousness, beyond which observation does not reach. Therefore it is also said:

must abide by this definition of consciousness.[41] God means here just the infinite, he is defined here only as that, as the other of the finite, as its beyond. To the extent that God is, I am not; to the extent that God touches me, the finite disappears. In this way God is defined by an antithesis that seems to be absolute. Inasmuch as the finite is defined simply as the other of the infinite, it is said that the finite cannot cognize or attain to the infinite, cannot grasp or conceive it. God is a beyond, we cannot lay hold of him. As we said, it is still possible to go beyond this standpoint, but we are told that it contains all we need of religion—that we have in it all that we need to know of God and religion, and that whatever goes beyond this originates in evil. We could observe that we can have cognitive awareness of God and find an affirmative connection with his essence, that we know of the abundance of his life and spiritual being; but this, it is said, would be evil in origin because it goes beyond the standpoint that has been firmly established.

If one has taken up the standpoint of empirical understanding, of observation, one cannot truly go any further; for observing implies holding the content [of what one is observing] before one as an external object, as something beyond."[42] If I now go further and seek to view consciousness from a spiritually higher stand- 188
point, I find that I am no longer observing. I forget myself in plunging into the object. I immerse myself in it as I seek to cognize and to conceive God. I surrender my particularity in it, and if I do this I am no longer in the relationship which, as an empirical consciousness, I wanted to maintain. What I observe is the relationship of consciousness, and [as] we observe, we take upon ourselves a relationship to what we observe. If the relationship is altered, if God is no longer a beyond for me, then I no longer remain a pure

41. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* Observing cannot extend beyond the subject because it deliberately confines itself to an empirical approach, to what is immediately present or given, and God is not something that can be observed. Here consequently our object can only be what is within us as such and what we are as finite beings.

42. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* but this external or limited [object] is the finite, which is external vis-à-vis an other, and this other is, as the infinite, what lies beyond it.

observer, I become interwoven with the thing instead. That is this standpoint, and, as we have already said, so far as one wishes to observe one must remain at this standpoint.[43] Thus, to be more precise, it is fundamental that I remain at the level of the finitude of the subject, which counts here as what is ultimate or supreme, what cannot be moved or altered but is hard as iron and simply stands fast. Over and against this finite subject there is an other, in which it has its terminus. This other, which is called God, is a beyond, nothing else for us but what, in the feeling of our finitude, we yearn for, this and nothing more; for we are fixed in our finitude absolutely. The reflection that we have passed beyond the limit also has a place here to the extent that we have a longing for this other, a striving after it, but this surpassing of the limit, this longing, is only something attempted, a mere longing that cannot attain what it seeks. To attain the object, to have cognition of it, would involve surrendering my finitude, renouncing it; but this finitude is ultimate, it is not to be surrendered, ˜so that reaching to something beyond it is only a striving full of [helpless] longing.˜[44]

This whole standpoint must now be examined more closely to see what constitutes its general character and to assess what is essential to it.

We have seen that there is an *alternation* of determinations pres-
189 ent in this standpoint, determinations of my finitude, | my relativity; over against me stands the nonfinite, the infinite, but as a beyond. Here I am defined as just the finite, as the essentially negative, but this alternates with the definition of me as affirmative, as existing. Both definitions are only forms of one and the same definition. We will see later that the two coincide in one; the *main* element is my *absoluteness* in this my finitude. The *first* determination contains my *finitude*—and just because I am finite, it contains the passing beyond to something higher. But, what is involved in the relationship of consciousness is that I am defined as the negative of this [higher] object—with the result that it is an other opposed to me, and hence remains beyond my reach. It is an other which is not

43. *W (HgG) adds:* And the wisdom of our time reaches no further.
44. W_2 *(Var) reads:* and in it we are at an end, satisfied and reconciled with it.

definable by me, so far as the definition is supposed to convey an objective sense. This beyond has no content. All that is present is my reaching out in a general direction, a reaching into the distance. I stay here on this side, reaching into the distance, striving and longing for something beyond. The second point is that this orientation toward a beyond, this longing, is entirely my longing, my doing, my orientation, my emotion. If I use the predicates "all-bountiful" or "almighty" to define this beyond, they have meaning only within me, only a subjective meaning, and not an objective one.[45] It is my absolute, fixed finitude itself that prevents me from attaining the beyond: to surrender my finitude and to attain the beyond are one and the same; and my interest in maintaining myself in the finite, and in not attaining the beyond, are also one. This points clearly to the third feature of the definition as a whole, namely, that it is the definition of a negative—that I am finite and that the other is defined as negative. Both of these definitions, the representations of my finitude and of a beyond, belong to me myself, they fall entirely within me, they simply remain with me. The recognition of a beyond is my drive, my striving, and willing.

Thus there is present a splitting within myself. On the one hand there is in me the determination that I am the negative; | while on 190
the other hand, the negative is also defined as other over against me. This second determination belongs to me likewise. There are distinct orientations within me, one toward myself, and one directed outward, which falls within me also just as much. My orientation to the beyond and my finitude are both determining characteristics of me. I remain confined within myself in both of them. The split is posited within me in such a way that both sides of it belong to me in fact.

The *second* determination of this standpoint is my *affirmation*, not my finitude. I *am* in principle—I am affirmative. This fact that "I am" differs from the previous determination, according to which I am finite. If this is expressed more concretely in the context of an imperative, "should," then I am in principle, I am immediately, what I should be. Thus if we express this "I am" by means of

45. W_2 *(Var) adds (similar in Ho):* and pertain exclusively to this my reaching.

"should," it means, so it is said, "I am good *by nature,*" i.e., I *am* in principle, and so far as I am, I am good, I am immediately good, I am originally good, I am this affirmation: goodness is primitive. In this respect all that is needed is to keep me so. Admittedly there is in me also a possibility of being tempted by another, of sins, errors, and so on; but this is at once defined as something that comes later, as an external accident, as something contingent. To say "I am what I ought to be" would express my finitude. "I am"—here I am related to myself, this is an affirmation; I am as I should be. The negative is the failing, the lack, the sinfulness, and so forth. This, however, does not lie at my root but is a contingent complication. This is the first basic characteristic from the side of my affirmation.

The second point in this affirmative view is that I can also relate myself to something external: the good can be obscured. In connection with this liability to error and these external orientations, my affirmation also becomes, therefore, a mediating affirmation—i.e., an affirmation that reestablishes itself out of the singularizing that has taken place. Thus it is an affirmation that reestablishes itself out of what is unreconciled, and turns back upon itself, mediated through the sublation of my faultiness, which in itself is only contingent. In this way my nature is reconciled with itself again. The good in my nature has reverted to parity with itself, and this reconciliation does not touch what is within; it does not eliminate
191 anything internal, | but only removes what is external, only remakes what is original.

This is what is involved in this second [affirmative] determination. If we compare the way in which it has thus resulted in the affirmative determination that I remain constant within it, the same position is at once established that we recognized at the first [negative] standpoint. I am, my [self-]affirmation is what persists; it may, indeed, become entangled with something else and be thereby superficially disturbed, but it remains self-contained; in other words, I remain what I am, an orientation to the beyond, and this is only *my* orientation and longing. So my affirmative character stands triumphant over all. I remain what I am.

This is to say at the same time that the world is reconciled solely

with itself. I as individual am good; if I fall into error, I have thereby merely passed over to something accidental; to restore my original affirmation I need only discard that accidental something and I am reconciled with myself. When it is said, "God has reconciled the world," what is involved on this view is only *my* reconciliation; it is only my affirmative character that is to be restored. Spirit, the inward element, does not come into the transaction, it remains out of play. It is the originally good, and the negative is not included within the nature of spirit itself.

In the traditional theology the images of eternal damnation occurred. This presupposed the unqualified freedom of the will. According to this image, what I am does not depend on my nature; it depends on my self-conscious will and on that alone. It is the will that makes me guilty. It is not my nature, then, not the original nature at least, that is good; I cannot ascribe to myself any goodness without my will. According to this view goodness pertains solely to my self-conscious spirit. But in the view we are considering, only the original goodness [of nature] is assumed, and its being affected by another is sublated in such a way that the restoration of what was there originally results. If we consider this reconciling mediation more closely, it consists merely in the conscious knowledge that I am originally, by nature, good.[46] I may do what I will, | but 192
I retain my nature, i.e., the conviction, the opinion about myself that I am good. My nature is good, and all that can be added to this is my knowing it to be so, the belief and the conviction within me that I am good.

This is the abstract definition. If we developed it further, all contemporary views would fall within it. In recent times all good is supposed to rest on my conviction. For example, I hold something to be what is right. My ethical character and my worth reside in this conviction, as a conviction, in this knowledge of the right; and what is good rests once more only on the original good that I am.

46. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* [this reconciliation] is accordingly a vain, empty seesaw system. [For at one moment] I swing myself, so to speak, in the direction of longing and reaching for the beyond, or of acknowledging my past faults, [at another] this longing and emotion, which ensue solely in me, cause me to swing back to myself, so as to make me immediately present to myself.

My nature is good in principle; what is added is the knowledge that I am good. This constitutes the good, and constitutes my adherence to the good. Only the knowledge that I am good makes me good, makes my goodness. My conviction that I know that I am good suffices for my [salvation], and this rests on the fact that I am good from the start, and I know it. My longing for a beyond, my bestirring myself, belongs to me, remains within me. I am only the affirmative in general. When I make errors or commit sins it only touches my nature superficially, since in principle I cannot commit an error if I know I am good. My knowing makes me good. My longing, my striving, this elevation of mine, is the main thing. All of our contemporary views,[47] from the Kantian philosophy[48] onward, are embraced within this standpoint. I have developed the position abstractly. From Kant onward all [religious] faith has fallen within the view that I am the affirmative, the substantial, the essential, that which stands higher than all these determinations.

This is the standpoint of subjective consciousness, which remains as thus determined. It progressively develops the antitheses that are endemic to consciousness, but which persist in it, and which it holds
193 in its power because it is the affirmative. |

4. The Relationship of the Finite and the Infinite[49]

We now have to consider in more detail what *finitude* is in general, where it occurs, and what the genuine relationship of the *finite* to

47. [*Ed.*] Hegel's criticism of the view that human goodness is based on conviction (*Überzeugung*) is directed against Fichte, as the *History of Philosophy* shows, 3:504 (*Werke* 15:640). See Fichte, *Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre* (Jena and Leipzig, 1798), pp. 211–213 (*Gesamtausgabe* 5:152–153, 158). The widespread contemporary view that humanity is good by nature can readily be traced to Rousseau, especially to his *Emile*. For it was expressly in opposition to the Rousseauean acceptance of the goodness of human nature that Kant asserted the radical evil of human nature. See Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), trans. T. M. Greene & H. H. Hudson (New York, 1960), pp. 27 ff. (Kant, *Werke* 6:32 ff.). Kant held that an original kernel of goodness could be reawakened through adherence to the moral law (*ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. [*Werke* 6:45 ff.]), but this would be accomplished only through a *revolution* in human conviction, not through gradual reform as Hegel here represents it.

48. *Ho adds:* which first established belief in the good,

49. [*Ed.*] This section continues the discussion of the preceding one, advancing to an analysis of three forms of the relationship between the finite and the infinite.

the *infinite* is—for the consciousness that remains subjective falls categorically within the finite in general. We want first to discuss finitude in the popular sense, or what we have in mind when we say that being is finite; then we shall consider the nature of finitude in the general sense, and [finally] its true sublation.

When we talk of human being as finite, there are three forms to be considered in which finitude appears: first, the finitude of the *senses* generally, second, finitude in *reflection,* and third, the form of finitude as it is [found] *in spirit* and *for spirit.*

(1) When we say, "human being is finite," this means that I as a human being am in relation with an other; there is present an other, a negative of myself with whom I have ties, and this bond with an other constitutes my finitude or a dependency on my part; we are mutually exclusive and behave as independent vis-à-vis one another. This constitutes an exclusion. As a being that has sense-awareness I am exclusive and excluded in this way; all living things are exclusive and excluded thus—they are singular. When I hear or see, I have before me only singular [things]; in my practical desires I am likewise concerned only with singular [things]; the objects of my satisfaction are these same singular [things]. This is the standpoint of natural being, of natural existence generally; within the sphere of this natural existence I have a multitude of relationships, there is a manifold of external being, in my sensations. I have many kinds of need, many distinct types of relationship,

These correspond to three forms in which finitude itself appears, since finitude is defined differently according to the ways in which its limit or "other" appears over against it. In the first two forms of finitude—those of the senses and of reflection—the infinite is itself defined finitely, as that which mirrors the finite and is limited by it, a mere "duplicate" of the finite. Here finitude and subjectivity continue to prevail. The true relationship of finite and infinite comes into view only from the standpoint of reason: the infinite is now conceived as that which "overreaches" the finite, encompasses it as an essential moment, and transcends or sublates it. This is the infinitude of *spirit,* which is an "affirmative infinitude," as distinguished from the affirmative *finitude* of the self and the *negative* infinitude of the "beyond." It is affirmative precisely as the negation of negation, as the positing of finitude and the overcoming of it. Here the perspective shifts from the finite subject (or consciousness) to the infinite self-mediation of spirit. There is no way of "passing over" from the finite to the true infinite unless the infinite itself constitutes this passage: but that is the speculative insight. For the logical foundations of this discussion, see Hegel's *Science of Logic,* pp. 137 ff. (*GW* 11:78 ff.).

manifold practical or theoretical relationships to what is outside me. All of these needs are limited in respect of their content; they are dependent, or finite. The sublation of the finite falls already within this finitude; every impulse that is satisfied is finite, insofar as it is subjective; but, being satisfied, it sublates this relation to its other, this finitude. Every satisfaction is a sublation of the finite and
194 a return to | self. On the other hand, this satisfaction remains a finite satisfaction, for the satisfied impulse reawakes. Thus the satisfaction remains just as finite as the need; it has, as such, a lack—and in this aspect it is finite. Considered from the formal side, however, the fact that the need is satisfied is a sublation of its finitude. Satisfaction of the appetite is the sublating of the separation between me and my object—it is a sublating of finitude, though only in a formal fashion.

Our sentient consciousness, too, insofar as it has to do with singular [things], belongs to natural finitude. The finite is defined as the negative, and it must manifest this character. The universal manifestation [of it] is death—the finite perishes. This is the renunciation of finitude. The finite will not last; it is not what abides—instead there is posited here really and in actuality what it intrinsically is. The sentient vitality of the single being has its terminus in death. As singular, our single sensations are transient; one sensation drags away another, one impulse, one desire, drives out another. This whole realm of the senses posits itself as what it really is, in its demise. This is where finitude ceases and is escaped from. The escape from this finitude in consciousness, however, is not just what is called death; the escape from this finitude is *thought* generally—it is already present in representation so far as thinking is active in that.

(2) As we raise ourselves, at this point, out of immediate consciousness to the standpoint of *reflection,* we have to deal with a mode of finitude that enters into a determinate antithesis with infinity. This is the second form in which finitude makes its entrance.

This antithesis takes various forms, so our question is: "What are the determinate modes of this antithesis? Is there an escape from finitude at this level?" To put the question another way, "Does reflection actually manifest and posit finitude as intrinsically noth-

ing, i.e., does reflection go as far as what we call nature?" Nature is mortal; can reflection cope with that, too? Can it cause what is mortal to die? Or is the nothing immortal for it? Because the finite is nothing, ought we to let it vanish?—for | what nature can do, 195
surely infinite spirit must be able to do, and more.

The standpoint of reflection, however, is the level at which the finite maintains itself, the level at which the antithesis of finitude and infinity is perennial; the very connecting of the two is the standpoint of reflection, and the two together make up the antithesis.

If we consider the first antithesis of finite and infinite in reflection, finitude is a diverse manifold of external [elements], and this manifold of many [elements] is the bounded, over against which the unbounded defines itself as the "allness" of the many. This form of finitude, with its antithesis, occurs in a more concrete shape in our consciousness thus: in our representational imagining, we know a crowd of things, ˜or we have infinitely many bits of information; and similarly in our volition we have a crowd of objects, particular goals, drives, inclinations, and so forth. Here again there is the same antithesis: that this manifold, this plurality, is not enough [by itself], but has a [necessary] relation to "allness." The multiplicity, the present mass of information, the manifold of which I am aware, is compared with unity in "allness," and the demand comes that our information should be made complete, that it should be increased to "allness"; we require the consciousness that this multitude has been exhausted, and that "allness" or completeness of information has been reached.˜[50] Similarly, in matters of practical

50. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* but always only of singular [things]. As volitional, spirit is determined according to private purposes and interests. But in both respects—as representational and as volitional—spirit comports itself as exclusive particularity and is thus connected to other independent things. Here too the antithesis comes into play in that spirit compares the singularity attaching to its existence with its singularity defined and represented as universal. I compare the wealth of knowledge I possess with the whole mass of information I represent; I find that my actuality does not correspond to the universality that has been represented, and I demand that the actual manifold be further developed, completed, made exhaustive, and brought to universality [*similar in G:* and I demand . . . universality].

conduct, we can set our sights on a perfect completeness of impulse
196 and an "allness" of satisfaction, | which we then call "blessedness." The one totality is called universality of knowledge, the other is a totality of possession and satisfaction, of appetite and enjoyment. ˜These are the primitive forms of finite and infinite; in this infinity there is an enduring finitude. It is conceded that there are no limits to information, but we will see presently that we are finitely acquainted with them.˜[51] It is thinkable enough, for example, that natural science should know all forms of animal life, but not in their most detailed characteristics. It is the same with the satisfaction of drives: ˜[perfect satisfaction] is similarly an ideal, and for that reason it is not reached.˜[52] This finitude endures, and it does so ˜because it contains something false.˜[53] On the one hand it is a multiplicity of information, a multiplicity of drives, a multiplicity of satisfaction; on the other hand it is allness, perfection, unity, a being grasped altogether in one whole. Something of this kind, however, is not a true [concept] precisely because one side is a manifold, a multiplicity, while the other is a unity. The multiplicity would have to relinquish part of its character in order to be subsumed under unity. The goal, the ideal, is set up in such a way as to be unattainable; and it is unattainable precisely because it is inherently something untrue, a unity of many which is supposed to remain a manifold of isolated elements at the same time. ˜This finitude is now sublated in the concept in principle; the more de-
197 terminate account of this process is that of conceptual cognition.˜[54]

51. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* But the totality is here thought of only as "manyness" and "allness," and so remains opposed to finitude, which cannot possess everything. The I is another such mutually exclusive element, so that the "many" operates in such a way as simply to exclude other sorts of manyness, while the "all" is merely an abstraction from the "many" that remains external. And so it is found that there are no limits to information, interstellar flight knows no bounds, and

52. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* human beings can attain many interests and purposes but not all, not blessedness itself; "allness" is an unattainable ideal [*last three words in G*].

53. *Thus P, D; G reads:* because it is something true. *Ho reads:* because the infinite that stands over against it is itself finite, a finite that is posited as its other.

54. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Moreover the purpose and the ideal, which one does not attain, is itself essentially finite. It is just for this reason that I must not attain it, for if I did so I would still only be attaining something finite.

The second form of the antithesis of finite to infinite is the one that is [found] in reflection as such. The first form of the antithesis in reflection is separateness as against unity—here finitude is posited not merely as a predicate but on its own account. The multitude exists on its own account; in contrast, if I posit the finite as such, I bring it into relation with the infinite. This, then, is the essential antithesis, that one is determined as the other of the other, the one being defined as positive, the other as negative.

If we consider the nature of this antithesis abstractly, then we have, on one side, the finite and the infinite. We must now ask whether this antithesis has truth, that is, whether the two sides fall apart and subsist apart from one another. In this regard it has already been said that if we posit the finite as finite we have already passed beyond it. The definition of the finite contains its terminus, and it has that terminus in something else. In the barrier we have a boundary, and this is the very fact that we have passed beyond it. It is no longer the affirmative; no sooner are we at the barrier than we are projected beyond it.[55]

The finite relates itself to the infinite—the other is the infinite—and the two are mutually exclusive. If we consider them more carefully, we can equate the finite with the limited and its limit with the infinite.

In the first form [of finitude] one particular limits an other; here the finite has a limit in the infinite. If the finite is limited by the infinite and stands on one side, then the infinite itself is also something limited; it has its limit in the finite; it is what the finite is not, it has something over against it, and it has its limit and boundary in that. Accordingly the infinite is something limited and bound; they are connected to each other. Thus instead of the highest we have a finite: we do not have what we want, but rather in this infinite we have only something finite. This infinite is itself only something finite. Or if we say, on the other hand, that the infinite is not limited by the finite, then the finite is also not limited by the infinite. But if it is not limited, then it is no different from the

55. [*Ed.*] On the concept of the "barrier" or "boundary" (*Schranke*), see *Science of Logic*, pp. 131 ff. (*GW* 11:73 ff.).

infinite, but flows together with it; it is identical with it in infinity
198 just as it was previously in finitude. | This, then, is the abstract nature of this antithesis generally, an antithesis of which the abstract negative resolution has been indicated. We must bear this in mind, for to hold fast to it is of the utmost importance in regard to all forms of reflective consciousness and of philosophy. In fact the antithesis or the distinction disappears when we consider it; there is no distinction. If we now consider this disappearance of the antithesis in concrete consciousness, we find here the position that we already had before us previously;[56] we can recall it to mind at this point, and repeat briefly with reference to the concrete form of consciousness what we have already said.

The finite and the infinite: they are each of them this antithesis."[57] The finite grasped more concretely is directly "I," and the infinite is what lies beyond this finite, the negative of it. Now the finite is itself the negative; and the negative of negation is the affirmative. Affirmation falls on the side of the infinite, this subsisting affirmation, this being for self; it is what lies beyond the I, beyond my self-consciousness, beyond my consciousness as capacity and will. You will have noticed that I have just now defined the beyond as the affirmative; but this is opposed to the I which we have previously defined[58] as the affirmative: I am my self-relation, my identity with myself. I am good, I am good by nature, I am the unmediated affirmation, I am at one with myself.

The further point to be noted is that in the face of higher reflection both of these distinctions disappear. The two sides show themselves to be equally finite, in that they limit one another; or if, contrariwise, no limit is present, then the two sides are also immediately identical.

For us they are moments; and they vanish when we treat them as such. While consciousness has this antithesis before it, they are.

56. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 282.

57. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* It is precisely in their being absolutely opposed to one another that the antithesis itself disappears. The two sides of the relationship disappear into empty moments, and what is and remains is their unity, wherein they are sublated.

58. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 285 ff.

for us distinct. If consciousness defines itself as finite in this way, and says in all humility, "I am the finite, and the infinite lies beyond," | then this I makes in its humility the very same reflection 199
that we have already made: that that infinite is only something evanescent, not something that has being in and for itself, but merely a thought posited by me. It is I who produce that beyond; the finite and the infinite are equally my product, and I stand above both of them, both disappear in me. I am lord and master of this definition: I bring it forth. They vanish in and through me—and thus the second position is established: that I am the affirmation which at first I placed outside in a beyond; the infinite first comes into being through me. I am the negation of negation, it is I in whom the antithesis disappears; I am the reflection that brings them both to naught.

Let us pause here and try to see what happens to the finite ˜—whether it actually, really, gets free of its finitude and obtains its right.˜[59] It *seems* to be the case here that reflection earnestly seeks to get rid of its nothingness, but that is exactly what does not happen here. This allowing the finite to vanish, this renunciation of nothingness—the refraining from positing it *actually*—is mere show. What happens, instead, is that the finite maintains itself—that I, the finite, this self-consciousness, hold fast to myself, I do not surrender my nothingness, but precisely in this my nothingness I make myself into the infinite, the effective and active infinite.[60] In other words, this is the highest standpoint of the subjectivity that holds fast to itself; it is the finitude that persists and makes itself into the infinite in its persisting—the infinite subjectivity that despises all content and is done with it. | This subjectivity itself, this acme of 200

59. *Thus G; P reads:* because it is nothingness; that it *is* nothingness is not just a manner of speaking—for it *really* is nothing. *Ho reads:*—whether it obtains what is its right, namely to be sublated and so achieve infinity, or whether it fails to cast off its finitude and only obtains the form of the infinite by virtue of the fact that the infinite is a finite over against it, so that the finite as finite with the infinite as finite is in unity with itself.

60. *Ho adds:* What we have then is that the finite I, inasmuch as it is the positing of an infinite beyond itself, has posited the infinite itself as a finite; because it has the infinite as finite, it is therefore identical with itself as equally finite, and, as *identical* with the infinite, sees itself *as* the infinite.

finitude, maintains itself still; all content has been evaporated from it and made into mere vanity; but there remains this vanity itself, which does not vanish but still maintains itself. This acme of finitude, therefore, is what has the semblance of renouncing the finite, but still maintains finitude as such even in the renunciation. More precisely, it is thereby abstract self-consciousness, pure thought as the absolute power of negativity. This standpoint that has to dissolve, and has dissolved, all determinations—the self, the I, that has arrived at absolute identity—is of the highest importance. It is this power of negativity which still maintains itself as the I, which only maintains itself by giving up all finitude, yet still retains (just [as] its own self) this finitude, and expresses it as infinity, as the sole affirmative. So what this subjectivity lacks is precisely objectivity. In a genuine renunciation the crucial point is whether this I, this acme of finitude, still has a content, an object. It lies in the objective character of consciousness that the I as *this one* asserts its particular independence. [That is where] this standpoint fails, and [it is] the only mode or fashion in which finitude can be renounced.

The standpoint we have been considering is reflection in its con-
201 summation, abstract subjectivity. ⌜I am the determining [factor]⌝ | in which all content, everything objective, is only in ideal form, as something posited by me. Second, this I—before which everything else vanishes, through which alone everything is and has validity—exists as this single individual, as the unmediated self. I am, and this my being is the immediate self. These two determinations are what we have at this standpoint. Here all objective content vanishes; only what is posited by me has validity. I am the *abstraction,* and since only the content posited by me is valid, the content is a contingent one, a content of feeling, opinion, caprice; it is good to the extent that I am convinced of it; and the fact that it⌝[61] is good

61. *Similar (with interpolations from Ho) in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* [I am] the absolute idealizer, that for which all distinction, determination, and content is sublated and is only as posited by the idealizing. I and I alone am what determines, and I am this as this singular being, as the unmediated self, as I who am immediate.

In all content I am immediate reference to self, that is, I am *being,* and this I am as singularity, as the self-relatedness of negativity. What is posited by me is posited

depends solely on my conviction and my recognition. Thus I am here what is affirmative, positive, and real. Initially, this standpoint purports to be that of humility, "laying no claim to have any cognition of God because God and his characteristics lie beyond it. Thus there is humility in its definition of itself as the least; but the humility contradicts itself, for it consists in excluding what is true from itself, and positing itself in this world as the affimative. Only I am everything affirmative."[62] This I is the only affirmative, the uniquely essential, that is, this finite I is the infinite affirmative. The infinite, expressed as what lies beyond, is something posited only by me. This affirmative belongs only to me. The unity of finite and infinite is contained in this determination, but "it is a unity in which the finite—this finite I—has not been submerged but has become 202
what is firm, absolute, sempiternal."[63]

as distinct from me—the negative, and thus as negated, as only posited. I am, accordingly, immediate negativity. Thus *I*—this exclusive I prior to any mediation, i.e., in my feelings and opinions, in the caprice and contingency of my sentient and volitional life—am the *affirmative*, am good. All objective content, law, truth, duty, disappears for me, I recognize nothing, nothing objective, no truth; God, the infinite, is for me something beyond, remote from me. I alone am the positive, and no content is valid in and for itself; it is no longer in any sense affirmative in itself but only to the extent that I posit it. The true and the good are only what I am convinced of, and that something

62. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* and this its humility consists in the fact that the I excludes from itself and renounces the infinite, the knowledge and cognition of God, and defines itself as finite over against the infinite. But this humility thereby contradicts itself, is rather arrogance, for in this way I exclude from myself the true, so that in this world I, as this particular person, am alone the affirmative, that which has being on its own account, over against which everything else disappears. True humility rather renounces itself, renounces my particularity as the affirmative, and recognizes as the affirmative only the true and what has being-in-and-for-itself. By contrast, this false humility, while recognizing the finite as the negative and limited, at the same time makes it the sole affirmative, the infinite and absolute.

63. *Ho reads:* the fact that this unity is posited by the finite I means that it itself becomes *finite* unity. And this version of the standpoint, carrying to the ultimate extreme the finite subjectivity that posits itself as the absolute, is what makes it difficult to comprehend this standpoint. The I feigns humility, whereas in fact it is so proud it all too easily turns to vanity and nothingness. W_2 *(MiscP) interpolates into the preceding text from Ho:* On the other hand, since knowledge of something higher falls away and all that is left is subjective emotion and pleasure, single individuals are bound by nothing objectively common, and, given the arbitrary diversity of their feeling, are opposed to one another in hostility, hatred, and mutual contempt.

The first difficulty with this standpoint is that it is abstract in this way. What emerges is that this finite [self] posits itself as the uniquely affirmative, the uniquely essential. The second difficulty is that of the philosophical concept. This standpoint borders on the philosophical one, because it is the highest standpoint in reflection. It contains intuitions and expressions that, superficially regarded, seem to be the very same expressions and definitions as those of speculative philosophy. It involves [for instance] *this* ideality, *this* negativity, and subjectivity as a negativity of everything determinate. Considered on its own account, this is an essential, genuine moment, the moment of freedom, an essential moment of the idea. Moreover, this standpoint also contains the unity of finite and infinite; and it can and must be said of the idea that it is the unity of the finite and infinite. In spite of this, however, what seems to be as close as can be, is the furthest away.[64] This ideality, this fire in which all determinations are consumed, is at this standpoint still unconsummated negativity: I as this one, without mediation, am the unique reality; all other determinations are posited ideally and turn to ashes, and only I, this one, maintain myself. [There is] just this certitude of myself, this certainty that all determinations are posited only through me, that they are valid or invalid only on my account. To this extent, ideality is not carried through [to its conclusion], and this last acme of finitude still contains what must be negated: that I as this one, in my immediate being, or particularity, do not have truth or reality. The unity of finite and infinite is also
203 posited in reflection: I, the finite, | am the infinite, the negative of all content. Everything is comprehended, everything is limited, everything *is,* only insofar as it is posited by me, or is a negative for me.[65] This unity of the finite and infinite is itself a definition of

64. *Ho adds:* And the reason is that speculative philosophy is subjectivity that develops all objectivity out of itself. As form it thus transforms itself into content and for the first time becomes true form by reason of its true content. On the other hand, from the present standpoint this subjectivity and infinity are only pure form, devoid of content.

65. *Ho adds:* But I myself am still only positive, since it is after all only by negation that anything becomes affirmative. This standpoint is self-contradictory: it erects ideality as principle, yet what brings ideality about is itself not ideal.

the idea; ˜but here this unity is still formulated one-sidedly, in that the unity is still in the category of the finite. Or, there is the proposition: "I, this finite one, am the infinite." The singularity of my immediate being, my immediate I-hood, must still be separated from this affirmation, from this infinite [being]. What makes this distinction is reflection itself, which[66] here attains to unity, but to a unity that is merely finite.[67] This is what is lacking in this standpoint: the antitheses in it can only be judged if they are referred back to these last thoughts.˜[68]

It is the standpoint of our time, and through it philosophy enters into a relationship peculiar [to this age]. If we consider the difference between this standpoint and the religious standpoint of tradition, we notice that the traditional religious consciousness (i.e., consciousness that | adopted the standpoint of truth, that of its own 204
worth) had a content that was in and for itself fixed, a content that described the nature of God. The first commandment was to be cognizant of God;[69] and what he is has been vouchsafed to humankind in the content of the creed. Blessedness or damnation, or absolute worth or worthlessness, was bound up with accepting the truth of this content which expressed the nature of God.[70] Now-

66. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* here, however, neglects its task of separating and distinguishing, and

67. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* It here neglects to separate the immediate singularity of the I, of this particular one, from the infinite and affirmative; and instead of submerging the (of itself foundationless) singular in universality and comprehending the affirmation in its absolute universality, wherein it comprises the singular within itself, it grasps singularity itself immediately as the universal.

68. *Ho reads:* however, in such a way that the infinite is the positing of itself as the finite while the finite is the finite of itself, namely, this sublatedness, the negation of its negation, and consequently the infinite. But this infinite *is* only as the positing of itself within itself as the finite, and the sublating of this finitude as such. From this subjective standpoint, however, infinity is one-sided in being posited by the finite itself, thus displaying itself *as* finite and only becoming infinite by virtue of the fact that in the infinite posited as finite, the finite I is identical with itself and thus infinite. In this way this infinity is itself the finite, and, to the extent that the finite does not become the infinite by a process of self-sublation, one-sided.

69. *Ho adds:* to worship him in spirit and in truth.

[*Ed.*] Cf. John 4:23–24.

70. *Ho adds:* In the same way right and duty were a divine commandment, an objective content.

adays, on the contrary, the highest [achievement] is to have no cognition of God, have no knowledge of truth at all, so that we no longer know what right and duty are. In this standpoint it also follows explicitly that I am naturally good, i.e., it is not through my own freedom, not through myself or by my own will that I am good.[71] The standpoint opposed to this has it, on the contrary, that it is only through my freedom, only through my spiritual activity that I am good. It is not originally, not by nature, that I am good, but only through the work of my freedom; my goodness must come forth in my consciousness, it belongs to my spiritual world. This view could be confused with the representation of the grace of God. But my being open to grace as consciousness is strictly a function of my will. The other view [i.e., the standpoint of our age] holds to the goodness of nature, and what is good, then, is my caprice, for every content is posited by me.

In view of this monstrous antithesis in the view of the religious person, we see that we must of necessity face up to a revolution that has occurred in Christendom.[72] The religious consciousness contains the root of everything through which humanity has its truth, the root of all duty for it; all other rights and duties depend on the form of this inmost root. Just what counts as truth for spirit
205 at its root is the foundation of all actuality.[73] | Looking more closely at what has emerged from this standpoint, what we have seen is that at this standpoint of consciousness no religion is properly speaking possible. For it is I, as this single individual, who am the affirmative—that is [what] this standpoint [says]—but the idea that has being in and for itself ought to be in religion simply in and for itself; it ought not be posited by me as this single one, i.e., by me in my particularity. What has thus emerged is a determination, or form, of the highest import. Thus there can here be no religion.[74]

71. W_2 *(Var) adds:* rather I am good to the extent that I *lack* consciousness.

72. *W reads:* recognize *instead of:* must face up to W_2 *(MiscP/Var?) adds:* A completely different self-consciousness in regard to the true has come upon the scene.

73. *Ho adds:* However, this inmost root only has truth if it is the form for the objective content.

74. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* any more than at the standpoint of sentient consciousness.

It may still be noted that from this standpoint philosophy is likewise something particular: it is [merely] a general cultivation of consciousness. Philosophy [so it is said] is a concern, a way of looking at things, that lies outside of the [religious] community, a concern that has its particular place. Likewise, according to the contemporary view, philosophy of religion is not something that has a significance, an actual import, for the [religious] community, but stands in opposition to it and must expect to meet with hostility from it.

˜(3) So far as the *higher* standpoint is concerned, it is the third standpoint or relationship—[the relationship] of the finite to the infinite in *reason.* The first was the *natural* relationship, the second that which obtains in *reflection,* the third, now, that which obtains in *reason.*˜[75]

We shall first consider this third standpoint or relationship as it is related to the view we have just been studying or in connection with the form of reflection at its highest extreme. By its very nature the transition from this extreme to the higher standpoint must be properly dialectical, must be made dialectically. But this is a matter for logic.[76] We shall here proceed by presenting this standpoint in a concrete manner; and with respect to the necessity of the transition, we shall at the same time invoke only the consequence | that 206
is properly involved in this standpoint. It claims: "This finitude—I as finite am a nullity that must be given up." ˜This we grant, but it is not to be given up in such a way that I, as this one, this unmediated singularity, at the same time persist, and persist in such a way that just this I becomes the affirmative (as is asserted by the standpoint of reflection). But precisely the standpoint is indicated in which the surrender does in fact happen: that I do not [persist] as this one, as an immediate singular individual, nor yet as affir-

75. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* If the first relationship of finite to infinite was the *natural* and *untrue,* inasmuch as the manifold plurality of particularity was adhered to over against universality; and if we further regard as the second relationship that obtaining in *reflection,* where finitude lies in the wholly consummate abstraction of pure thinking, which does not actually comprehend itself as universal, but remains as the I, as this single one—we have now to consider this relationship as it reveals itself in *reason.*

76. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* pp. 137 ff. (*GW* 11:78 ff.).

mative, nor as the infinite."[77] A standpoint must be pointed out wherein the I in this singularity *has* renounced and *does* renounce itself. This higher renunciation takes place at the higher standpoint.

I must be the particular subjectivity that has indeed been sublated; hence I must recognize something *objective,* which is actual being in and for itself, which does indeed count as true for me, which is recognized as the affirmative posited for me; something in which I am negated as this I, but in which at the same time I am contained as free and by which my freedom is maintained. [78]This implies that I am determined and maintained as universal, and I only count for myself as universal generally. But this is now none other than the standpoint of *thinking reason* [*denkende Vernunft*] generally, and *religion itself* is this activity, it is thinking reason in its activity. *Philosophy* also is "thinking reason, the only difference being that in philosophy the activity that constitutes religion appears simultaneously in the form of *thought* [*Denken*], whereas religion,"[79] being thinking reason in naive form, so to speak, abides
207 rather in the mode of *representation* [*Vorstellung*]. |

From this standpoint we have now to examine the universal categories in their universality more closely, the pure categories of thought.

To begin with, then, we have seen that, in recognizing an object, an objective [element] in general, subjectivity surrenders its sin-

77. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* But this sublation cannot be said to have been achieved if this immediate singularity at the same time remains, and remains in such a way that only this I becomes the affirmative, as is asserted by the standpoint of reflection. The finite that inflates itself to the infinite is only abstract identity, inwardly empty, the highest form of untruth—all that is false and evil.

78. *Thus also* W_1; *precedes in* W_2 *(MiscP):* The freedom of reflection is such as not to allow anything to originate within itself, but since it must allow such origination, it proceeds, when it posits anything, without law and order, i.e., it does not allow anything *objective* to originate. If something objective is actually to be recognized,

79. *Ho reads:* the activity of thinking reason. To posit oneself in one's singularity as the universal, and then, transcending oneself in one's singularity, to produce one's *true* self as the universal—this is religion, with the distinction vis-à-vis philosophy that philosophy is reason in the mediated form of thought [*Gedanke*], whereas art portrays reason immediately in time and space, in stone and sound, while religion internalizes this externality, and

gularity, its reflectedness-into-self. This object must not be anything sensible; with objects of sense I know that there is for me the thing that subsists—but my freedom is not still there in it. The untruth of the sentient consciousness is something that must here be presupposed.[80] The next point is that this objective [element] is [known] as affirmative, and has the character of a universal; in my recognition of an object, a universal, I do renounce my finitude, I renounce myself as this one. The universal counts for me as essence; there would be no such thing if I were preserved as this one. This [recognition] is already present in the immediate knowledge of God too. In the immediate knowledge of God there is this too: that I know of the objective universal that is in and for self, but at that stage this is only an immediate knowledge or [practical] behavior. If reflection ˜does not yet˜[81] come on the scene, ˜then this universal, this object constituted by the universal, is itself only something subjective; and all these determinations˜[82] remain and are enclosed in reflection.

The ultimate [form of] reflection, then, is only a development of the highest determination of this reflection—that these characteristics are enclosed solely in the subjective consciousness, and that this subjective consciousness has not yet renounced itself in the mode of its immediate particularity. It follows, therefore, that these points are not yet sufficient ˜—the basis is more concretely in something objective and universal—and that this determination [of reflection] is still insufficient.˜[83] Rather | what is entailed is that the 208
objective abstract universal also has a content and determinations in it. Only thus is it for the first time present for me as actual being in and for itself. If it is empty, the determinateness is only conjectured; the conjecture is mine, and I remain the source of all content,

80. [*Ed.*] Hegel alludes here especially to his critique of sense certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, chap. 1, pp. 58–66 (*GW* 9:63–70).

81. *Thus Ho, W; G, D read:* does still

82. *Ho reads:* then this object exists and, to the extent that the objectivity having being in and for itself is lacking, retains subjectivity only in the knowing of the I. Subjectivity thus came to be vested in feeling. For all the determinations we had previously

83. *Ho reads:* —the object, as the universal as such, is still insufficient.

all activity, all vitality, ˜and all determination.˜[84] I have only a dead, empty God, a so-called absolute essence, and it is because of this emptiness of the objective that this representation becomes purely subjective, does not attain to true objectivity. ˜Cognition contains more precisely the moment in which the object is determined for me, or is rendered something more determinate within itself and on its own account.

The universal must therefore be utterly affirmative and must be determined within itself; it must have all content within itself.˜[85] It is not merely for philosophy that the object is full of content. This is a feature shared by philosophy and religion. A distinction in their viewpoints is still not present at this stage. The question of how the subject is determined within the universal is linked with this. The subject is within the universal precisely in its relation to this universal object, which it recognizes as *being*, defined as nothing other than *thinking*, the activity of the universal; or, it has a universal, the universal generally, as its object, and this universal is supposed here to be the strictly absolute universal. The relation to an object of this kind is for that reason the thinking activity of the subject. The universal is the essence for the subject, it is the actual being. Thought is not merely subjective but also objective.

When I reflect upon the sensory object, I am both myself and the object. I am distinguished from the object. My thoughts are still subjective just because they are still thoughts about the matter [*die Sache*]. But when I am in control of these thoughts about the matter, and have thoughts about it, my connection to the matter as a particular is removed—[the connection that makes] the thoughts merely subjective—and I comport myself objectively. Just because the universal has for me the determination of being true,
209 [in that recognition] I have | renounced myself as this one according to my particularity.[86] This renunciation, and my thinking that the

84. W_2 *(Var) reads:* and to me alone belongs the function of determining, of objectifying.

85. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* At this latter standpoint only certainty occurs, not truth, and I can still remain determined wholly as this single one, something finite. Objectivity is then only show.

86. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* and I am the universal.

universal, the affirmative, the substantial, is my object, are one and the same. I renounce my particularity here—actually and really.[87]

It may be noted that it is an essential characteristic of thought that it is a mediating activity, mediated universality; but at the same time it is the negative of affirmation. It is the negating of the particular, the negation of negation, and thereby, affirmation: *the absolute negativity is affirmation.* Thought is mediation through the sublation of mediation. Universality, substance, are affirmations of this kind; they are only through the negation of negation. The mode of immediacy is contained in thought too, just exactly immediate knowledge as negation, but not only that. Thus, the expression occurs: "We have immediate knowledge of God." [But] thinking is pure activity and is only what negates the impure and immediate. If it is empirically the case that we have immediate knowledge of God, then it must be remembered that I need do nothing whatever except direct my thoughts on him. This universal object is thus immediately before me: I need no proofs, there are no middle steps to go through. This immediacy in the empirical subject is itself in part the result of many mediations; and in part it is itself just one aspect of this activity. A difficult piano piece can be played with ease once it has been gone through often, many individual times. It is played with immediate activity—but this immediate activity is the result of many individual mediating actions. In the same way, for example, once Columbus discovered America, many others followed after him.

This kind of immediacy is the result of many previous individual mediations, deliberations, and actions, but the nature of such an action, which appears as immediate, is different from its appearance. What it is in itself can be a mediation. Thus the nature of thought lies in this likeness with itself, | this pure self-transparency 210
of the activity, which, however, simply *is,* i.e., it is in itself the negation of the negative.[88]

87. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Truthful acknowledgment of finitude, real humility, is to live and operate in objectivity.

88. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* and it is the result that makes itself the immediate, that appears as the immediate.

In this connection with the object I am therefore determined as a thinking being, and not merely in philosophy but also in affirmative religion generally: in devotion—which stems from thinking[89]—God is present for me. This moment of devotion, this thinking of the substance, of the universal, is then one way in which what and how I am is determined. I exist as a pure thinker. The second point is that in this devotion, in this connection with the universal substance, I reflect back upon myself. I distinguish myself both from this object ⌜and from this pure thinking attitude of mine. This sacrifice of what is mine in my thought is the distinguishing of what is mine from this attitude.⌝[90] How am I initially determined in this respect? The answer lies immediately in what was just said. Namely, I am determined here as finite, but in a genuine fashion; I am finite as distinct from this object, I am the particular over against the universal, what is accidental to this substance. But I am determined as a moment, as something distinct; thus I am defined simultaneously [as something] that does not have being for itself, but which *really* has renounced itself, and knows itself as finite. ⌜For this universal object has the content within itself—it is not the hollow or empty universal, but rather the inwardly self-moving substance. Hence it is the absolute fulfillment: all content, all determination, all particularity belong to it.⌝[91] Thus I am in the same case; my intuiting of myself as finite is my knowing about myself that I am a moment in this life, a moment that has its subsistence
211 | as this particular being only in this substance.[92] In this way I am

89. [*Ed.*] The noun *Andacht* ("devotion") is related to *gedacht*, the past participle of the verb *denken* ("to think"). On the relation of *Andacht* and *Denken*, see *Ms. Concept*, n. 66.

90. *Ho reads:* for I have to surrender myself; therein lies my consciousness of myself, and to the extent that I am merely devout, sublating myself vis-à-vis God, I exist at the same time merely as a reflection from God into me. Consciousness of myself is thus preserved in devotion.

91. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var/MiscP?) reads:* [with the result] that the universal object is now implicitly thought and has the content within itself. It is inwardly moving substance, and, as the inner process in which it generates its content, it is not empty but absolute fulfillment. All particularity belongs to it; as universal it overreaches me.

92. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var/MiscP?) adds:* and in its essential moments.

now *actually* posited as finite. And thereby I sublate myself, I do not maintain myself as something immediate, something affirmative. The universal is, and I only have my subsistence in it, I am only a moment of it. I can only posit myself as renouncing myself. ¯Abstractly speaking, therefore, this is the concrete, true relationship of the subjective I in religion, in which God, the absolute in principle, is the affirmative.¯[93]

In reflection the finite and the infinite only stand opposed in such a way that the finite is duplicated. This is the abstract relationship of finite to infinite, which we have just considered more concretely as the relationship of the subjective I to the universal. The first finite was the sensory finite, the second was the finite in reflection, and the third was the inseparability of the two, the finite contained within the infinite itself. The true determination of the finite in its relation to the infinite is the immediate unity of both. I am only an essential moment of the infinite, which is contained within the infinite itself. The infinite is grasped as affirmation. This absolute negativity, the unity, this affirmation, is an abstract, free power, which, however, is a mediation in itself. This ¯unity¯[94] of the infinite is in itself no truth; on the contrary, the infinite seeks self-diremption in order to be only the affirmative as negation of negation. Therein it is, first, affirmation, then, second, the differentiating of the negative; thus that first affirmation is also still a particular, a negative. It is the standpoint of the finite; this is where the finite has its place. Third, affirmation takes its place beside the particular, and it is only at this stage that we have truth. The standpoint of the finite is so far from true that it must first sublate itself, and this negating [of itself] is the primary truth. | The finite is therefore an essential 212
moment of the infinite in the nature of God; and it may consequently be said that God is the very being who finitizes himself, who posits determinations within himself. ¯God creates a world, that is, he

93. W_2 *(HgG) reads:* We have so far been considering the I's relationship to the universal substance in concrete fashion; thus it still remains for us to consider the abstract relationship of the finite to the infinite in general.

94. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var/MiscP?) reads:* simple unity, identity, and abstract affirmation

wills a world, he thinks a world, and determines himself—outside him[self] there is nothing to determine; that is, he determines himself, he posits for himself an other over against himself so that there is God and there is the world—they are two. In this relationship God himself is held fast as the finite over against another finite, but the truth is that this world is only an appearance in which he possesses himself. Without the moment of finitude there is no life, no subjectivity, no living God. God creates, he is active: therein lies the distinguishing, and with distinction the moment of finitude is posited. This subsistence of the finite, however, must be sublated once more. On this view there are two kinds of infinity, the true infinite, and the merely bad infinite of the understanding. Thus the finite is a moment of the divine life, and one sees what is involved in trying to express a true content in propositions."[95]

Propositional forms are no longer valid here.[96] "God is infinite,"
213 or "Spirit is infinite," and "I am | finite"—these are false, defective expressions.[97] The last two are forms that are not concordant with what the idea is, or with the nature of the matter. The finite is not actual being, it is not something subsistent; similarly the infinite is

95. *Ho reads:* This might initially strike us as ungodly, but it is also to be found in the commonest representations of God, for we are accustomed to regarding him as creator of the world. God creates the world out of nothing; i.e., outside the world there is nothing sensible, nothing external, for the world is externality itself. Only God is, but God [is] only by virtue of his being mediated with himself. God wills the finite, posits it as his other and so himself becomes an other of himself, a finite, for he is confronted by an other. But this other being is the contradiction of what he is. It is of God, for it is *his* other, and is therefore determined as the other of God. It is the other and the not-other, it dissolves itself, it is not itself but an other, it is its own ruination. But other-being vis-à-vis God has in consequence disappeared, and God recognizes himself therein, by reason of which he maintains himself as what he has made of himself by his own effort. God is this inward movement, and only by virtue of so being is he a living God. However, the subsistence of finitude must accordingly not be adhered to, but also sublated: God *is* movement toward the finite, and, by sublating the finite, movement toward himself.

96. [*Ed.*] On the inability of the proposition to grasp truth, see *Science of Logic*, p. 90 (*GW* 11:49).

97. *Ho adds:* For God is likewise the finite and I am likewise the infinite; God returns to himself in the I as what sublates itself as finite, and he *is* God only as this return. Without the world God is not God.

not fixed. These definitions do not express the nature of spirit; they must rather be grasped only as moments of the process.[98]

The finite is a moment of the infinite. These abstractions were especially prevalent in antiquity, being the offspring of the beginning of reflective abstract thought. ⌜In due course Plato[99] equated the infinite with the bad and the determinate with the higher, and he defined the idea as the balancing of both, containing the boundary as bounded within itself.⌝[100] The truth is the unity of the infinite in which the finite is contained.

With this insight, then—the more precise treatment [of which] belongs to logic—one sees what the situation is respecting determinations and propositions of this kind. The result is that we must emancipate ourselves from the bogey of the antithesis between finite and infinite. Against the posture of knowing God, even against the posture ⌜of wanting to know God,⌝[101] this bogey is let loose: that it is presumptuous ⌜for the finite to want to grasp the infinite.⌝[102] This presumption attends not only upon philosophy but upon any religious attitude which has a content that describes the nature of God. | From this standpoint it matters little whether I cognize some- 214
thing about the nature of God through the thoughtful concept of him, or hold it to be true on the basis of authority[103] and of revelation. This distinction has no significance here, for the bogey of presumption is raised as much against one as against the other—

98. W_2 *(MiscP) adds (following on a sentence from Ho):* The "is," which is regarded in such propositions as a hard-and-fast element, has, when grasped in its truth, no other meaning than those of "activity," "vitality," and "spirituality." Nor are predicates sufficient for the definition [of the idea], at least not one-sided and purely transitory ones. Rather what is true and is the idea, *is* solely as movement.

99. [*Ed.*] See Plato *Philebus* 24a–26d.

100. *Thus G with D; P reads:* —for example, Plato's contention [that] the infinite is nothing, just as the finite is nothing if its determination is external to it, and that these are vacuous abstractions of the understanding. *Ho reads:* thus Plato explained the πέρας, the inwardly self-limiting limit, as higher than the unlimited.

101. W_1 *reads:* of knowing God, W_2 *(Var/MiscP?) reads:* of wanting to know God and to have a positive relation with him,

102. W_2 *(MiscP/Var?) reads:* and we are warned against this presumptuousness in a highly unctuous, edifying manner, and with irksome humility.

103. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP/Var?) adds:* or with the heart, by inner illumination, or by any other means,

wanting to cognize God, to grasp the infinite through the finite. What a bogey! As if it were presumption to want to know the affirmative nature of God. ⌜We must decisively throw off this bogey through insight into what the real situation is regarding definitions of this kind, and regarding this antithesis of finitude and infinity.⌝[104]

The other form that runs counter to the affirmative knowledge of God is subjective untruth,[105] which maintains the finite for itself, confessing its vanity, yet still retaining this acknowledged vanity and making it the absolute.[106]

This vanity of self-preserving subjectivity, this I, we cast away from us when we sink ourselves in the content, in the matter at hand, and recognize ourselves in it, since we are then in earnest about this vanity; we renounce it in the cognition and recognition of the being that is in and for itself. This is a consequence of our
215 activity.[107] |

5. Transition to the Speculative Concept[108]

⌜We have now attempted to arrive at religion by the path of observation, and so we have come to the consciousness of the antith-

104. *Ho reads:* Unless we throw off this bogey we sink into vanity, for we posit the divine as powerlessness, unable to come to itself, while we hold fast to our own subjectivity and secure [*Ho actually reads:* deny] from this the powerlessness of cognition.

105. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var/MiscP?) adds:* deceit,

106. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var/MiscP?) adds:* and so abstains from cognition and from objective religion and religiosity (i.e., religion having a content), eliminating or suppressing it.

107. W_2 *(HgG) adds:* in science.

108. [*Ed.*] The third form of the relationship of the finite and the infinite—the relationship grasped from the standpoint of reason or the self-mediation of spirit—cannot, in the final analysis, be brought into view by empirical observation, which is limited to the sphere of finitude because it can only observe relationships among externals. Thus observation cannot obtain genuinely cognitive knowledge of God, the absolute, truth. It knows the infinite only as the "beyond" of reflection and is conscious, therefore, only of the *opposition* between finite and infinite: either the finite cancels out the infinite in its own self-affirmation, or the infinite negates the finite as that which is totally other and unknowable. The actual relationship between God and humanity that obtains in religion has not been (and cannot be) brought into view empirically. Awareness of the limits of observation entails, then, an advance to the speculative concept, which is the only ground or soil (*Boden*) on which religion can be at home. Thus in the final analysis there are not two equally valid approaches to religion, but only one.

esis of the finite and the infinite, and to the standpoint where consciousness is ultimate, so that the finite *this* maintains itself and makes itself into the one and only affirmative.

The observer finds this standpoint and sticks to it. Then he says[109] that there is only a relationship of this kind to be found, and it is therefore impossible to know anything about the absolute, or God, or the truth. This "impossibility" is based on the fact that no such entity is perceived in the observing consciousness. We should notice here that "possibility" and "impossibility" are taken in a determinate sense;[110] a definition of this kind concerns the inner core, or concept, of an object, what the object is in itself generally. So if anything is to be said about possibility or impossibility, it must be decided by the nature of the concept in question. From the point of view of the observing consciousness, however, there can be no discussion of the inner core or of the concept, for from this standpoint consciousness renounces any cognizance of what pertains to the inner core; it has before it only what falls within external consciousness as such. But possibility and impossibility do not fall within this sphere. More exactly, this standpoint pretends that the observing consciousness will in the end be found to be that from which the concept arises. The possible will be just what arises from experience,[111] while what runs counter to experience will be the impossible.

In reference to this point it must be said that observation arbitrarily limits itself to the sphere of finite consciousness; | there are 216
in fact other spheres that can be observed—not just this one, whose content is merely finite versus finite. Consciousness remains free to make other observations in another sphere, in which the affirmative relationship of consciousness to what has being in-and-for-itself is

109. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* The negative relationship of consciousness to the absolute is justified by reference to observation. Only the finite exists for consciousness, we are told, while the infinite is merely lacking in all determination (hence, as we have seen, [it is] in itself only subjective), and consciousness has only a negative relationship to it. Because of this, it is said

110. [*Ed.*] On the conceptual definition of possibility and impossibility, see Hegel's modal theory in *Science of Logic*, pp. 542 ff. (*GW* 11:381 ff.).

111. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP/Var?) reads:* that what *is*, i.e., what impinges on this perceiving consciousness, is what yields the criterion of possibility and consequently the concept of possibility,

contained. Hence it is capricious to stick at the point where one can observe only that in virtue of which the finite is set against the finite, so that this posited infinite is in fact nothing but a finite and subjective [entity]. To be precise, religious consciousness can be observed—[either] in the form of naive religiosity or devotion, or in that of religious cognition—and this yields a different result from that reached at the standpoint of finite consciousness. "The observation can be conducted upon others or upon the very ones who wish only to occupy the standpoint of finite consciousness. If cognition is limited to this standpoint,"[112] it may well be that religious sensibility,[113] the heart, devotion, is more affirmative than consciousness in itself. There may be more in the heart than in the consciousness insofar as consciousness is a determinate, cognizant, and observing consciousness. The two can be distinguished—this possibility must be conceded. This is the standpoint of cognition, and I must here weigh my consciousness against what I am in and for myself as spirit.

All that I know, all that affects my consciousness, is contained in me myself. So when this possibility is conceded, it must be noted that the conviction that spirit has only a negative relationship to the content, to God, vitiates sensibility and ruins devotion. The conviction of consciousness that it has only a negative relationship to God ruins religious sensibility itself. For *thinking* is the source, the very ground upon which God, or the universal in general, *is:* the universal is in thought, *only* in thought, and for thought. This thinking, spirit in its freedom, supplies the content of truth, the concrete deity, and delivers it to sensibility; its content is what
217 sustains sensibility in regard to religiosity. | If we hold firmly in our thinking consciousness that there is no affirmative relationship to God, then all content goes out of sensibility. Its very stuff is taken from it. If the thinking sphere empties itself, then sensibility too is without content, in the same way that I cannot use my eyes without

112. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP/Var?) reads:* the observing subject may observe these higher forms of consciousness in others or in itself. For given the perversity of this standpoint,

113. [*Ed.*] Here and for the next few paragraphs Hegel lapses back into the language of *Empfindung* rather than *Gefühl.* (See above, n. 20.)

a light source. If light is taken away in the physical realm, I cannot have the sensation of seeing. Similarly, I can have no religious sensation if this content is not present in the territory of religion. If the content is denied in this realm, and banished from it, then there is present no longer that which yields the characteristic of sensibility. Hence, if it may on the one hand be granted that there can be more in devotion than there is in the religious consciousness, this [extra element] could be observed; on the other hand, it is caprice or ineptitude that what is present either in one's own consciousness or in that of others should not be observed. In point of fact, however, this caprice or ineptitude does not come on the scene for the first time at this juncture, but rather when the decision is taken *merely* to observe. This limits observation to the sphere of finitude, for observing means being related to something external, something that is to be and to remain external for me. But it is only externally posited. That which is external to itself is the finite. If I adopt the standpoint of pure observation, then *ipso facto* I have something before me ˜that is itself an external object, existing on its own account; in other words, it is the finite in general. The external [thing] is not just external to me, but to itself; it is the finite.˜[114] I can observe thinking, even speculative thinking, or religion or philosophy—but thinking *is* only for the thinker himself. Similarly, if I want to observe piety, that too is present only for the pious; just as thinking is only for the thinker, so religion is only for the religious, that is, for those who actually are what at the same time they observe. In the case we have here the observer is not by any means *merely* observing; rather he is outside the object in a relationship such that what is observed is not simply something external, | and 218
the observer is not simply an observer, nor merely in a negative relationship to the object observed.

It follows, then, that in order to find the ground of religion we must abandon the abstract relationship of observation; we must renounce this empirical standpoint for the very reason that it is only this standpoint of observation. It is therefore the case that the determinations of reflection, of the finite, posit the determinations

114. W_2 *(HgG) reads:* that is worthy of this standpoint and accords with it.

of the infinite. But the infinite is itself posited only as negative. Reflection does, to be sure, go so far as to require that the finite should be posited as finite, but we have shown[115] that this demand must be made only in reference to the affirmative.

"With this we make the transition to the treatment of the speculative concept of religion."[116]

B. THE SPECULATIVE CONCEPT OF RELIGION[117]

1. Definition of the Concept of Religion

We will now consider the speculative concept of religion, the only ground (it has already defined itself) on which religion can be at

115. [*Ed.*] Hegel apparently alludes here not to a specific passage but to the preceding discussion of the relationship of finitude and infinitude first in reflection and then in reason (only the latter being able to grasp the infinite as truly affirmative).

116. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP/Ed?) reads:* However, once the finite and the standpoint of reflection have been sublated, we have arrived at the standpoint of infinite observation and the speculative concept, i.e., the sphere in which the true concept of religion will disclose itself to us.

117. [*Ed.*] The first two sections of the second main part of the 1824 *Concept* are transitional in character and draw together materials from Secs. B.2 and C of the 1821 *Ms.* Hegel begins by introducing a definition of the concept of religion from the speculative point of view: religion is not merely the *consciousness* of the absolute (the "affirmative" relationship of finite consciousness to the infinite), but also the *self-consciousness of absolute spirit,* mediated in and through finite consciousness. Thus on the highest plane, religion is not merely a human but a divine affair, and it is the divine process or movement that makes the religious relationship possible. However, philosophy requires that the *necessity* of this concept of religion be *demonstrated,* not merely presupposed. Hegel turns to this task in the second section (having made a premature beginning part way into the first section), by means of a brief "phenomenological" description of the rise of nature and finite spirit to the absolute, the articulation of which is the task of the whole of philosophy after the logic and prior to the philosophy of religion. (Hegel does not use the term "phenomenology" here, but the reference to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the parallel passages of the *Ms.* shows that this is what is intended.) Once this phenomenology has reached its goal, it discovers that its result is its real presupposition, namely, that absolute spirit "is the first and alone true," the real foundation of the rise of consciousness to it. This is the speculative insight, and phenomenology, like empirical observation, ends by passing into speculation. However, phenomenology has been able to go much further than empirical observation: it is able actually to trace the *rise* of consciousness to the absolute, which could never be observed empirically.

home. Its basic defining character, as we have seen, is just the affirmative relation of consciousness, which exists only as the negation of negation, or as the self-sublating of the determinate [moment] of the antithesis—and hence the self-sublating of just those determinations that reflection takes to be independent, hard and fast. To this degree the ground of religion is what is called the *rational* [sphere], and more precisely the *speculative* [sphere]. But religion is not therefore something abstract, as thus defined, not just an affirmative relation of consciousness to the universal in general. Religion is not just this abstract determination. | If it were 219
merely an abstract determination of this sort, all further content would lie outside it, or, if we posited this abstraction in the field of the actual as well, there would still have to be some other actuality alongside this abstraction and outside religion.

For the affirmative relation to the universal, to what is true, is the relation to right, to ethics, to something true, to the true generally. The standpoint of religion, then, is in principle precisely the affirmative relation of consciousness, consciousness generally; it is [the affirmation] that the truth with which consciousness is actively related *embraces all content within itself*. Hence this relation of consciousness to this truth is itself the highest level of consciousness, its absolute standpoint.

[118]What we have just said we could let stand as the concept of religion in general. But in philosophy it is necessary to demonstrate the *necessity* of this standpoint, the *genesis* of the concept that is advanced here as a definition; or we must indicate precisely the

The 1827 lectures begin only with the third section of the second part of the 1824 *Concept*—the development (or "realization") of the speculative concept of religion in terms of its logical moments. The whole preceding interplay of observation, phenomenological description, and speculation is in 1827 absorbed into the logically articulated structure, which defines the moments of the concept of religion—universality, particularity, subjectivity—in a strictly rational sense. The 1827 *Concept* begins, structurally speaking, where the 1824 version ends.

118. [*Ed.*] The next five paragraphs initiate in a preliminary (or premature) way the discussion of the *necessity* of the concept of religion as thus defined. But Hegel then abruptly returns to the problem of definition and further advances it significantly (with the paragraph beginning, "If the concept of religion is to be further elucidated . . . ") before getting into the matter of necessity. These five paragraphs would make better sense if transposed to the beginning of Sec. 2.

place where the necessity of this standpoint, of this content, which is spoken of as religion, resides.

We could, for example, establish some [principle] regarding religion and prove that this is the situation in our representation of it; but there are other representations of religion, and in principle our representation cannot be the criterion of what is in and for itself true. What we have to do, then, is to give some account of the necessity of the content, and to show that the content is necessary in itself and in principle; once this is done we can say in more detail, "This content is religion"; and we need not worry whether others find another content, or other determinations, in their representation of it. That will not matter to what we are discussing then, for we are concerned with content, and disagreement could only be about whether something pertaining to the representation is religion or not. The content, however, is valid in and for itself if its necessity is firmly established. To say, "This is religion," is just one type of arbitrariness.

First, then, we must give an account of what "necessity," and "showing the necessity of something," means. There is a content of which we say, "This is religion." As regards necessity, we know this much, that if the necessity of something is to be demonstrated,
220 one has to start from *something else*, | from which, by virtue of its nature, one arrives at a certain content, and that which follows [from what] one began with is termed "necessary."

But it is clear that if we want to start with religion, this other content lies behind us. Moreover, if we view necessity in this way, it includes the definite moment of mediation, so that the content, which is thereby defined, which we call religion, appears as mediated or as resulting from something else; but this definition, being one-sided, appears to be inappropriate if religion is to be the highest level, if it is intrinsically the first standpoint, which is not posited through [the mediation of] another, but must be posited purely and simply through itself. In this way we become involved through this "other side" in an inadequacy; but this inadequacy, this process according to which necessity has the appearance of something mediated through something else, is sublated as soon as we consider true necessity. Or [in other words], it is a feature of rational necessity

that it cancels this [mere] show and lifts itself up to the affirmative.

In this respect three stages in the process must be kept in mind: (1) necessity is a process in which what is called religion is in the situation of deriving its content from something other and of being posited; (2) the stage where the one-sidedness of this relationship, this mode of necessity (that even religion is the sort of thing that emerges from something else) is shown to be self-sublating, with the result that what we have defined as necessity (a positing emanating from another) is a process contained within religion itself; (3) the determinations of these forms within religion itself are to be noted.

If the concept of religion is to be further elucidated, an additional prior remark is called for.[119] Since, as we have said, the necessity of religion occurs within religion itself, it is also the case that the concept of religion will be generated within religion itself; and the syllogistic outcome of religion, the true religion, is the one which produces the consciousness of itself, the one which has for its object what religion is. | 221

The concept of religion must be expressed. Religion is a consciousness of the absolutely universal object. If, however, we have so far used the term "consciousness," this word expresses only the side of the *appearance* of spirit. Insofar as I have a consciousness, I am actively related to an object. I am thus defined as relationship; but it is the essence of spirit not to be *merely* in relationship, not to be a connecting of two sides. Consciousness encompasses [only] the finite. Here I am the knower, the subject, which is implicitly spirit; the other side, the object, remains standing independently over there. Spirit is not merely in the relational mode, and does not merely have the form of consciousness. It is precisely in abstracting from this relationship that we can speak of spirit, and consciousness is then encompassed as a moment within the being of spirit. So it is in speaking of *spirit* that we intend to use the term "spirit" instead of "consciousness"; thus in using it we have an affirmative rela-

119. [*Ed.*] The text adds: "namely, that this concept of religion itself, however—." Hegel breaks off and begins the sentence again. The original sentence would have continued with the words: "will be generated within"

tionship of *spirit to absolute spirit.* Where we have spoken in this way, we have in mind the relationship of spirit [to spirit] as such. But this is not merely a [separable] connection between [finite]
222 spirit and absolute | spirit; rather it is what is essential, it is inner connectedness. Absolute spirit is itself that which connects itself with what we have put on the other side to distinguish it. Thus, on a higher plane, religion is this idea, the idea of spirit that relates itself to itself, *the self-consciousness of absolute spirit.* Within this its *self-consciousness,* there falls also its *consciousness,* which was previously defined as relationship. Thus in the highest idea, religion is not the affair of the single human being; rather it is essentially the highest determination of the absolute idea itself."[120]

I have now set forth the concept of religion provisionally.

In that spirit differentiates itself implicitly, the finitude of consciousness comes into play. The consciousness of spirit, for which [absolute] spirit is, is finite consciousness—but this finite consciousness is a moment of absolute spirit itself. Absolute spirit is what differentiates and determines itself, i.e., it posits itself as finite con-

120. *Ho reads:* However, spirit is not merely a knowing in which the being of the object is separated from the knowing itself; rather it is a knowing in which the object [is] the same as the knowing, and consciousness consists in knowing this identity. This identity, that knowing should be its own object for itself, is first attained in *spirit,* in *reason,* which is for itself as objective. Religion is therefore the relation of [finite] spirit to absolute spirit. But, as knowing, spirit is thus what is known or absolute spirit itself, and religion is *the self-consciousness of absolute spirit*—its relation to itself as the object of its knowing, which is *self*-knowing. Thus religion is the idea of spirit—it is subjective spirit or the knowing that has as its content the entire content of spirit, the truth of spirit, and knows itself to be this content. Subjective spirit is accordingly not separate from the object, and this object, or absolute spirit, is knowing itself, it is what knows the object of its knowing. Consciousness as such is finite consciousness, knowing something that is other than the I. Religion is also consciousness, and has therefore finite consciousness within it, though sublated as finite because absolute spirit is itself the other that it knows, and it is only by knowing itself that it becomes absolute spirit. Consequently, however, it is only mediated through consciousness or finite spirit, so that it has to *finitize* itself in order by this finitization to come to know itself. However, if the divine, in order to be spirit in this way, finitizes itself so as to become human, i.e., to become a knowing, singular, immediate consciousness, [this] is not on the other hand the affair of the single human being; rather, what is singular is precisely sublated thereby, and religion is *the self-knowing of divine spirit through the mediation of finite spirit.*

sciousness. Consequently it is not from the standpoint of finite consciousness that we consider religion. Already, even in this superficial consideration of it, the [absolute] idea is developing itself.

2. The Necessity of the Religious Standpoint

The next point [to be discussed] is the *necessity* of this standpoint. In fact absolute spirit is in its consciousness a knowing of itself: if it knows something else, then it is no longer absolute spirit. So it is this definition of which we speak. This definition is here maintained from the standpoint of religion in order that this content[121] may be the absolute truth, simply the whole truth, so that this idea encompasses within it all plenitude, all the riches of thought, all the riches of known truth; it constitutes the sole substance and truth of this wealth. | Furthermore it is maintained in order that 223
the absolute idea may alone be this truth; all things have their truth only in it, as moments of its life and activity. [122]These assertions that this content of religion is the absolute truth—this [is] what is to be proved, what has to be demanded. This deduction lies outside our science. To prove that this content is the absolute truth means nothing other than to demonstrate its necessity. Necessity involves our starting with something else. So the procedure used in the proof of the content has as its first step the exhibiting of the content as the result of another content.

First we must indicate where this procedure is to be found, and, second how it is structured, what it looks like. The other that is taken as a starting point is nothing else but what we call, quite generally, the *finite world,* and the *consciousness* of the finite world. This provides the general starting point from which the result is necessarily inferred. (Concerning this necessity, it will be noted later[123] that it is an essential moment in absolute spirit itself.) What must be shown therefore is the transition from a finite starting point to a more or less abstract, absolute content. This transition

121. W_2 *(HgG) adds:* which the knowledge of absolute spirit has of itself,

122. [*Ed.*] Beginning at this point, and continuing almost to the end of this section, W_2 offers a much-abbreviated version of the argument (see below, n. 127).

123. [*Ed.*] See below, p. 324.

can be kept on an abstract plane, or developed more fully, and in such a way that the development occurs through thought, through the concept. This transition occurs in the [movement of] spirit, but it may do so abstractly or in a more developed way. The transition is more abstract when we have expressed the content of nature as
224 the universal, | or as negation of the negative, as essentially containing this mediation within itself. In this way it is possible to make the transition from the finite to the absolute. As Vanini says, a single straw suffices to prove the existence of God.[124]

But if the process is accomplished in all relevant detail by progressive development, determined by the concept, then what we have is philosophy in general, or, more specifically, the philosophy of religion; and the unmediated [starting point] is in that case *nature* in general. So we must [first] show how the *logical* [*idea*] unlocks itself in the resolve[125] to become nature, to pass over into nature and lose itself in this externality. The next stage in philosophy is the consideration of nature [itself], a beginning [having been] made with the logical. The treatment based on the *concept* presents itself as this movement: the indwelling concept of nature sublates the externality in which the concept exists as nature; as contradictory to the concept, this externality is dissolved and the concept takes upon itself a higher, more appropriate mode than the natural ex-

124. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms. Concept*, n. 104.

125. [*Ed.*] We have translated *sich entschliesst* rather freely as "unlocks itself in the resolve" in order to bring out the root sense of un-locking (*ent-schliessen*) that is contained in the act of resolving upon something. In the Heidelberg *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817), § 191, Hegel refers to the *Sichentschliessen der spekulativen Idee*, while in the *Science of Logic*, p. 843 (*GW* 12:253), it is the *Entschluss der reinen Idee*, the "resolve of the pure idea." Hegel begins here a compact summary of the major transitions of his philosophical system: the self-resolution of the *logical idea* to go forth into nature, into the externality of the natural world; the concentration of *nature* into its center (the concept) so that it may pass over into spirit (finite consciousness); the rise of *spirit* from its natural origins through various determinate phases of consciousness until it attains its home in the absolute. The task of philosophy is to demonstrate the *necessity* of these transitions. It does this by means of a description of the way in which things progressively present themselves as phenomena to consciousness, and the method is therefore (in the Hegelian sense) phenomenological. In fact what is offered here is a summary of the leitmotivs of both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the second and third parts of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* as they bear upon and found the philosophy of religion.

ternality in which it has reality as nature. The treatment of nature exhibits its progression as a sequence of steps or moments, and thus shows how the concept, which exists in nature only implicitly, breaks through its "rind" and comes forth to makes its appearance, until it gets to the point of being explicit, of appearing as it is. Or, what comes to the same thing, nature recollects itself; it is its destination [that it should] go back into its center, or that the center should emerge into external existence. What results is *spirit* in general. *The necessity of nature is to posit spirit as its truth,* that spirit *is* its truth. In nature the concept is lost in externality. Nature is the eternal emergence and dissolution of this externality. Nature has the implicit destination of becoming spirit.

Spirit generally—the truth of nature—that is what spirit is. Spirit in its immediacy is finite, natural spirit; it has potentialities, that is, it is initially no more than the abstract concept of itself. It is the abstract identity of its concept and its appearance. Nature is implicitly idea; thus it is for us when we contemplate it in thought. Those two aspects, its being as idea for us, and as idea in itself, fall apart in nature; in spirit there is this identity, this being *for* itself what it is *in* itself. [There is the potential] that it might be, like nature, idea implicitly; but [there is also the fact] that what it is in itself also appears to it, i.e., the idea exists in its appearance. | The 225
consideration of finite spirit, then, has as its result the idea of absolute spirit.

Thus it is through this process [*Gang*] of the cognizing concept that the content of which we have spoken, absolute spirit conscious of itself, is exhibited as necessary, as the truth of all things, as the absolute truth into which, precisely through itself, all this other content returns. Philosophy, then, is the methodical proof that this content is what is genuine, that it is the absolute truth. This is the process that lies before [i.e., precedes] our science; so we have to presuppose this result here. If we did not presuppose it, we would have to expound philosophy as a whole. This is the only way in which the demonstration can be carried out, the proof that this content is the absolute truth.

The second point to remark upon about this process is that it is still one-sided: it has a distorted and false character, namely, the determination that we begin with something else, either with the

logically abstract or with concrete being, with nature, finite being. Because we begin from something else of this kind, this very content does not appear as absolute but as a *result.* The process seems to have this distorted aspect implicit in it, but *absolute truth cannot be a result; it is what is purely and simply first, unique.* It is what takes up simply everything into itself—the absolute plenitude in which everything is but a moment. In this connection it should be noted that, even though the process appears initially as a mediating process, nevertheless it is in this result itself that the one-sidedness is abolished: the result casts off its position as result and develops a *counterthrust,* so to speak, against this movement.[126] To be more precise, the process is so defined that even this starting point, the first [moment] from which we begin—whether it be the logical abstraction of being or the finite world, the [moment] which appears to be immediate, and therefore to be something that is not posited—is itself posited in the result *as* something posited and no longer as something immediate; it is reduced from an immediate to a posited [status], so that absolute spirit is what is true, rather [than that first moment].

In this final result, then, *absolute spirit,* conscious of itself, *is the first and alone true.* But there is also this in it: the fact that nature, the finite world, is posited, that it is something posited, is therefore
226 one moment in this spirit, in this content itself. It is not only consistent with the method (or the external modality of our proceeding) that this immediacy, nature, appears as something posited, and that the immediate sublates itself in this way; but also this pertains essentially to the result itself, it belongs to its content. [This content is] the positing of [a moment] such that it [first] appears as something immediate and second retains this quality of being posited, of sublating itself and of going back to its truth.

Thus, therefore, what we have posited, this process of necessity,

126. [*Ed.*] Cf. the reference to a stream flowing in opposite directions in the special materials relating to the 1821 lectures (*Ms. Concept,* n. 115), which makes the same point metaphorically. This "counterthrust" might be described as a "speculative reversal," in which what emerges as the *result* of philosophical demonstration, namely, absolute spirit, proves also to be the *foundation,* the speculative premise of the whole phenomenological process of the rise of consciousness out of nature and of its being drawn toward its telos.

is the first moment. But the other moment, the positing of something immediate, is equally a determination in the absolute content itself. Together they make up a single movement, a mediating [process] which comes together with itself; together these two moments make up the activity of God within himself. It is from this standpoint that the first process comes before us, but also the second moment that appears as immediate—a nature, a finite world is posited. This happens within the idea, as the activity and movement of the idea itself. This is nothing else but [what is meant by] the popular statement that "God creates the world." In other words, God posits the world as something that is other, distinct from him (hence something naturally posited); [yet] the world is [also] what continues to belong to God and to be posited by him, so that it has the movement of betaking itself back to him."[127]

What we have said so far, then about this process[128] is in the first place that it shows itself as a process outside religion; but that, second, this process is a moment within religion itself. Inside religion, however, it has a shape and form different from what it had in that first mode, wherein it is, so to speak, merely innocent with respect to God. Here God is strictly the first [moment].[129] And this

127. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* The proof of necessity, namely, that this content of religion is the absolute truth, already lies behind us and our science inasmuch as this proof starts from the immediate and shows the content to be the result of another content. In adducing this proof at the appropriate point above, we already saw how the one-sidedness of this process—that the content does not appear as absolute but as result—is self-sublating. For precisely the first [moment]—either the logical abstraction of being or the finite world—this first, immediate [moment], which appears without being posited, *is* posited in the result itself as something posited, not as something immediate; it is reduced from an immediate to a posited [status] in such a way that absolute spirit is rather the true, the positing of the idea, as well as the positing of nature and finite spirit. Or [we can say that] *absolute, self-conscious spirit is the first and alone true,* in which the finite world, which is thus something posited, exists as a moment.

[*Ed.*] Instead of following the 1824 lectures at this point (beginning at n. 122), W_2 gives a much-abbreviated version from *MiscP,* and refers editorially ("In adducing this proof at the appropriate point above, . . .") to its own version of the proof of the necessity of the religious standpoint (*Werke* 11:102–112), which is drawn from the *Ms.* (Sec. C) and *Hn* or *MiscP* rather than 1824.

128. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 317.

129. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* and that process is the internal activity and movement of the idea of absolute spirit.

is just what is implied in the idea of absolute spirit. We have to consider these moments as they are conceived in relation to this idea. Spirit is *for itself,* that is, it makes itself the object, it is what subsists on its own account over against the concept; it is what we call generally the world, or nature. This diremption constitutes the first moment. The second one is that this object returns to its
227 source,[130] and this | movement constitutes the divine life as a whole. Thus spirit as absolute is initially what shows itself, what appears to itself, it is a being-for-self that has being on its own account. That is why it is first what appears. But appearance as such is what nature is; spirit is not only what appears, what has being, for us; it is what-has-being-for-itself, what-appears-to-itself, and with that, consciousness as such is posited. So what we initially regard as necessary is [present] as a moment within spirit itself. We have that necessity in its very essence within religion too—not as an immediate existence but essentially as an appearing of the idea, not as the being but as the appearance of the divine. This then is the relationship of *necessity* to our content, and it is this relationship of necessity to it that supplies our content with its *definition*, or yields the concept of what our object is.

With respect to that object, we could now say that we have established the *concept* of it, and that we are in a position to pass on to its *exposition.* It is to be noted that the exposition of this concept is nothing other than that *the concept develops itself into the idea,* and that we *contemplate* this *realization of the concept as the idea.*

3. The Realization of the Concept of Religion[131]

The concept of religion that we have given is still highly abstract at this point, still confined to very general terms. It might be de-

130. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* to which it continues to belong and to which it must betake itself back,

131. [*Ed.*] The connections in the argument up to this point and beyond are important. The demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint has brought us back to the speculative definition of the concept of religion and completes it, since what emerged as the result of demonstration proves also to be the speculative premise, namely, that "absolute, self-conscious spirit is the first and alone true, in

manded that we should set it forth in a more concrete form; but the more concrete mode of the concept is in fact a producing, a bringing forth, of the concept *through itself*. As a concept it is abstract; but it is the concept itself that makes itself concrete, consummating itself as a totality, so that this concept itself comes to be the object. The simple concept that we have established is *the self-consciousness of absolute spirit,* its self-consciousness of being *for itself* as spirit. *For itself* it is spirit: this is the respect in which there lies a distinction in its being, and this [distinction] is the moment of *natural life* in general. In common speech this means that God is the unity of the natural and the spiritual; but the spirit is at the same time *lord* over nature, so that the natural and the spiritual are not | of equal weight in this unity—which indeed is 228
such that the unity is spirit itself. Spirit is not some *tertium quid* wherein the two are neutralized; rather the absence of difference between them is itself spirit. Spirit *is* spirit and nature. It is on the one hand one side of the union, and on the other hand what also *overreaches* the other side; hence it is the unity of itself and an other. Consequently, our further exposition will be nothing but the laying out of the further concrete determinations of spirit.

The concept of God, then, is the concept of the idea. This content

which the finite world . . . exists as a moment" (see n. 127). Our preliminary definition of the concept of religion as "the self-consciousness of absolute spirit" (p. 318) having thus been verified by the demonstration of its necessity, we are now ready to pass on to the expositon of this concept. The exposition, however, is not something *we* achieve; rather we "contemplate" the concept as it "develops itself into the idea" or "realizes" itself as the idea. If the concept is absolute spirit in its self-mediation, then we can expect that it will develop or realize itself in the three moments of its substantial self-unity, its self-differentiation, and its self-reaffirmation (or return to self). These moments correspond to the logic of the concept itself (universality, particularity, individuality) (*Science of Logic,* pp. 600 ff. [*GW* 12:32 ff.]) and are definitive of the moments of religion (the abstract concept of God, religious consciousness or representation, and religious cultus). The concept of God does not remain a purely logical concept; it becomes an actual, existent concept or "idea" by positing a real, external world with which it enters into relationship. This is intrinsic to and constitutive of the very essence of God, and likewise the religious relationship in its theoretical and practical forms is intrinsic to religion. It is just this relationship that could not adequately be brought into view from the empirical perspective, but may now, finally, be properly considered.

must develop itself as idea; and the exposition of the philosophy of religion displays nothing but this development of the concept of the idea. The more detailed moments of it display for us at the same time the more detailed subdivisions or forms in which religion has to be considered; this characterization of the development of the idea is what supplies the pattern of the general sections into which our exposition breaks up.

We have defined the idea as the absolute unity of the spiritual and the natural, and the spiritual as the substantial, so that the "other" is only something posited by spirit and sustained within it. This idea comprises the following moments:

(1) the *substantial,* absolute, subjective *unity* of both moments:[132] the idea in its self-equivalent affirmation;[133]
(2) the *differentiation* itself, the being for one and for an other—these two moments [as distinct];
(3) the self-positing of what is differentiated in this *absolute affirmation.*"[134]

132. *Ho adds:* God and his other, God without consciousness, unconscious being-in-and-for-self,

133. [*Ed.*] The "idea in its self-equivalent affirmation" is the logical idea as the unity of nature and spirit, that which mediates between them as the universal principle of both—the so-called "logical mediation," the first of the three mediations that make up the whole system of philosophy (*Encyclopedia* [1830], § 187). As logical idea, God is absolute, universal substance, not yet outwardly differentiated, inwardly self-related but not yet entering into real relationship with the world; he has not yet "appeared." This is the "abstract concept" of God that is present in different forms in all religions, and it constitutes the first moment of the concept of religion. But in the 1824 lectures Hegel does not consider it further because here he is focusing on the religious *relationship,* and relationship presupposes differentiation. The first two moments together—the substantial, unitary God and differentiated human consciousness—constitute the "theoretical" religious relationship; while the third moment, the affirmative overcoming of the difference, constitutes the second, "practical" relationship. In the 1827 lectures, the exposition is structured according to the three moments, not the two relationships. Further clarification of how the three moments become two relationships is provided by the passage from W_2 in n. 136.

134. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* within spirit itself, so that it now posits itself as having being for this [other] that is distinguished from it, and which it has itself posited. (c) Inasmuch as this distinguishing is itself posited within that unity of affirmation [the first moment], it becomes the negation of negation, affirmation as infinite, as *absolute being-for-self.*

The first two moments are those of the concept, the ways in which the connection of the spiritual and the natural are contained in the concept. Further, they are not merely moments of the concept, but are themselves the two sides of the differentiation—what is then termed the second moment. | 229

This second moment is what, in [the realm of] spirit, is *consciousness*. Consciousness is a positing of two that are supposed to be distinct, but this is nothing else than what has been stated, namely this differentiation of the moments themselves. This differentiation takes on the character of a relationship, and in this way the two moments constitute the content of the two sides of the relationship. In consciousness one side is the solid, substantial unity of the idea—God as having being, the God that has being as a self-relating unity. The other side of the distinction is the act of differentiating itself, which is consciousness, the side for which the other, the solid unity, exists; this side consequently takes on the character of being finite. God is thereby determined as an object, as appearance, as having being and appearing for consciousness. ˜He does not merely have being, but inasmuch as he has being *for an other*, he is appearing. God is not to be grasped as [a being] that is enclosed within itself and that does not appear, [but rather] as *spirit*. A God who is not appearing is an abstraction. The essential moment is self-differentiation; and precisely thereby an other is posited.˜[135] This differentiation, or the aspect of consciousness, has to be grasped in a reversion to the *absolute affirmation*—an appearing which elevates itself just as eternally to the truth of appearance. ˜As we have said, the differentiation contains both | moments, the substantial unity 230 and the differentiation. Accordingly, that substantial unity is [only] one aspect of the relationship, for God *is* only as spirit: he is essentially for an other and to appear to his other. The return of the differentiated to the absolute affirmation constitutes the third moment. It is these three moments that must be accounted the reality of the concept.

These two aspects are also to be defined thus: the first, the unity,

135. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* But as spiritual unity he is essentially determined in his substantiality not merely as appearing but as appearing to self, i.e., appearing to the other in such a way that he therein appears to self.

is the *theoretical* aspect, the mode of God's *appearance,* the mode of *representation* of what has being, the objective, the representation of divine appearance and divine being. The second is the *practical* aspect, the activity of *sublating the rupture,* the aspect of form, the form of *freedom,* which is what *subjectivity* is as such; here, then, what we have to consider is subjectivity, self-consciousness in motion, in its characteristic activity and behavior. The first aspect is that of the *representation* of God, and the second that of the *cultus.* The two are connected; the definition that pertains to God pertains also to consciousness in its connection with the cultus."[136]

a. The Theoretical Relationship: The Representation of God[137]

The first [aspect] is the *representation* of God. Here we are considering, not God in general, but God in his representation. God appears, then, but he does not merely appear in general—he is essentially this, to appear to himself. For God is spirit in principle, [so] the divine appearance is at the same time reflection into self.

136. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Even if we have initially distinguished the substantial unity from the act of distinguishing itself and then defined the return of the second moment into the first as the *third* moment, the content of the relationship is such that these two ways of defining it must now themselves be taken as only *one* side of the relationship, so that they together constitute only one of its determinate elements, and the second moment then becomes what previously appeared as the third. It is these two determinations that, in accord with the concept, make up what must be accounted the *reality* of the idea: the one as the relationship into which the concept dirempts itself, [i.e.,] consciousness, or God's appearing; and the other as the self-sublating of this merely relative, still antithetical relation. In the first relationship, finite consciousness is [merely] one side, and the way in which its finitude is determined is the way in which it reveals to us how its *object* is determined for it. The manner of divine appearance belongs here, i.e., representation or the *theoretical* side. In the other relationship, however—the *practical* one, or the activity whereby the rupture is sublated—it is in consciousness [itself] that the activity appears. The form of *freedom, subjectivity* as such, therefore, belongs on this side, and it is here that *self-consciousness* is considered in motion. This is appearance in the mode of *cultus.*

137. [*Ed.*] The larger portion of this section is devoted not to representation per se as a mode of religious consciousness or knowledge (as in the 1827 lectures), but to a survey of different modalities of the "appearance" of God in the history of religion, from nature religion to the absolute religion. God "appears" not as absolute substance but as an object of representation. Hegel offers here the beginnings of a survey of the development of the concept of religion through its history as treated in the second and third parts of the lectures, a survey which is continued

Hence God's appearing is more precisely defined thus: that he appears to himself, that his appearing is an appearing to himself; thus God is an object, indeed he is an object in the sense that he is an object for himself. The second point is that God appears to himself in the way in which he is in and for himself. These two specifications are in this respect fundamental. | 231

To provide a more concrete determination of this in detail, the first [moment] is *appearance in general,* abstract appearing generally. This is *natural life,* or nature in general. Appearing is being for an other, an externality, being differentiated one for an other; initially, therefore, it is unmediated appearing for the other, not yet reflected being for the other. This is its logical definition, but it has to be taken in its concrete significance—and that is natural life generally. What is for an other is in a sensory mode; "even thought, where it is not to remain something purely subjective but is to be for an other who is an independent thinker, needs a sensory medium, speech, gesture, a sensible sign that has to stand in for it."[138]

"But, second, God is essentially an appearing *to himself,* so that the [divine] object is no longer characterized merely as a natural essence, as a natural element generally, but as appearing to itself at the same time, as consciousness, spirituality."[139] This is a more

in greater detail in the next section in the form of a phenomenology of the cultus. These surveys appear to be a considerable expansion of materials from Sec. A of the *Ms.,* while in the 1827 lectures they are revised and placed at the end of the *Introduction,* where they more properly belong. The 1824 lectures are oriented more to a treatment of the *development* or *realization* of the concept than to its logical moments. The brief discussion of representation at the end of the section follows upon a consideration of the distinction between religion and philosophy, which in turn has been adopted from Sec. D of the *Ms.* Thus the transitional character of the 1824 lectures remains evident throughout.

138. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Thought that is to be posited for another thought and that has being as distinguished from it, i.e., as an independent subject over against it, is only communicable for this other thought through the sensory medium of the sign or of speaking, or through some other form of corporeal mediation.

139. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* But inasmuch as God is essentially only by appearing to himself, this abstract relationship of human beings to nature does not belong to religion; in religion the natural is only a moment of the divine, and, since it exists for religious consciousness, it must therefore at the same time have the character of spirituality.

or less formal definition. Initially it is wholly formal. Of no religion can it be said that its adherents simply worshiped nature—the sun, the sea, etc. In their worship, it was not any longer a prosaic sea as it is for us. In that they pray to them, these natural images are divine and God is [there] for them. These are still natural objects, to be sure, but in virtue of their being also the objects of religion, they are represented in a spiritual fashion as well. The study of the sun, moon, stars, and so forth falls outside religion; but it is well known that this distinguishing of a merely natural world, this so-called prosaic view of nature, nature as it is for the understanding consciousness, is a later separation; the presence of this separation
232 belongs with | a reflection into self that goes much deeper. When we speak of the unity of nature with the spiritual by the standards of our usual training, we think as though spirit were united with nature only by dint of phantasy; their separation is the starting point, and this presupposes a higher freedom of reflection.

Both of these moments are [found] initially in the appearance of God. The first mode of appearance is that of natural life, which has the subjectivity of consciousness, of spirit in general, as its foundation and focus. "We now have to see what the relation of these two determinations to one another is."[140]

It must be noted that in himself God is spirit, i.e., he is spirit first for us—this is our concept of him. The other thing is that he should be *posited* as spirit. This involves the equivalence of his determinateness, the side of reality in the idea, with his concept. What is here termed determinateness is what we have regarded as natural life. This mode of appearance constitutes the determinateness of the concept of God. The important point, now, is to see the relationship of this reality to the divine concept, to see whether [absolute] spirit is for itself *as* spirit, i.e., [whether it is not only] the concept [but] also reality as this spirit.

"Another point to be noted is that natural life generally, natural being, or the unmediated natural essence, is also this first level of

140. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* These two determinations have thus not yet entered in a reflected manner into relationship. For this to occur is the second [mode of appearance].

determinateness | in another fashion. Determinacy does not need 233
to be this natural state. It can, in other words, also be a reflected determinateness (which may, however, be at the same time so constituted that it is not yet the fully determined, concrete determinateness that expresses the concept of spirit). This determinateness of reflection is certainly no such externality as the natural essence. No. Along with reflection there enters the need that the determinacy should have an equivalence with the concept, though initially it is no more than an abstract equality. Reflection has before it the concept: the general need of the concept. Reflection simplifies the infinite diversity of the external world, brings it into the realm of the concept, but only within its frontier; this thinking, although it has universality, the realm of the concept, as its principle, makes the universal itself into a mere determinacy, because it just gets stuck in abstraction. Or [it] amounts to identity, unity. For example, the Brahmā of India is a divine concept of this kind; it is a supreme being, but one that merely thinks itself, or is merely at home with itself, outside which all other content and configuration still lies. This content and shaping is the countless legion of Indian divinities. The God of Judaism, too, is the jealous God who tolerates no other gods beside him; but this uniqueness is itself still abstract oneness, not yet the determinacy, the reality, that corresponds to the concept of spirit (which is utterly and inwardly concrete). He is a determination, an abstraction, God *in* the spirit but not yet God *as* spirit. The Jewish God [is], just like Brahmā, imageless and supersensible, but a supersensible that is a mere abstraction of thought, which does not yet have within it the plenitude that makes it spirit.

The second determinacy is that of thought, of reflection. But since thought remains so abstract, this abstract identity, | although 234
it is pure and simple, is insensible. Nevertheless it is here only a determinacy over against the concept of spirit."[141] Thus these two forms of determinateness are in general the main ones, that is, those

141. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* What we see initially, however, is that the natural state is what here constitutes the determinateness of the concept of God, or the side of reality in the idea. Thus the emergence of spirituality, of subjectivity, from natural life first appears only as a battle between the two sides, which are still locked in conflict with one another. Thus this stage of determinate religion too does

that must initially appear to us as the modes of spirit's reality. As modes of determinateness they do not match the concept of spirit; they are finitudes. Also this infinity, that there is a God, is only just abstract affirmation. ⌜The determinacies do not correspond to the concept;⌝[142] in other words, these religions are thus not yet the authentic religion, not yet the idea of God in his truth, for the absolute content of spirit is lacking in them. The authentic idea is that the content should be the genuine content of spirit—the concept in principle, which *is* its content.

Authentic religion corresponds to its content; in it we have the ultimate summit where the content raises itself up to itself, where spirit appears as it is in and for itself, and the *content* accords with the *concept* of spirit. In this authentic mode, God is manifest to himself or quite generally has become manifest, for there is no longer anything hidden in him. His appearance is equivalent to his being. God is still not manifest as long as the mode of this appearing is unequal to the concept of God. His content is still shut up, unfulfilled.

Here, then, we have the consummate religion, in regard to which it should be noted that this content itself, this determinacy, the reality, this mode of appearing that constitutes the content of God

not advance beyond the sphere of natural life and together with the preceding stage forms the stage of natural religion in general.

3. Still within the succession of determinate religions, the movement of spirit endeavors to match the determinateness to the concept, but this determinateness appears here still as abstract, or the concept still appears as finite. These [successive] attempts, in which the principle of the preceding stages, namely *essence*, endeavors to win through to infinite inwardness, are: (1) Jewish religion, (2) Greek religion, (3) Roman religion. The Jewish God is a uniqueness that as such remains an abstract oneness and is not yet concrete within itself. While such a God is, to be sure, God *in* the spirit, he is not yet God *as* spirit; he is something supersensible, an abstraction of thought, which does not yet have within it the plenitude that makes it spirit. The freedom toward which the concept seeks to develop in Greek religion still lives under the scepter of the necessity of essence. And in the form in which it appears in Roman religion, seeking to gain its independence, the concept is still limited, since it is referred to an externality standing over against it, in which it is only to be objective, and so takes the form of external purposiveness.

142. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* It no more corresponds to this totality than its antithesis does;

(God according to his concept or his essence), is a purely spiritual content, which can, however, still be in the mode of natural being, but always in this mode of representation—not a sensuous but a spiritual natural being. Regarding the distinction from what has gone before, therefore, it is to be noted that in this religion the reality is equal to the concept, the content displays the nature of spirit; and natural life, the mode of sensory representation, is only the form, which no longer affects the content. This is the point of distinction between religion and philosophy. Philosophy may appear opposed to religion, i.e., it happens in philosophy that the configurations, the modes of appearance and forms of relationship that are present in religion, in which religion has its consciousness—that these forms | are replaced by others. So, insofar as these forms 235
are deemed essential in positive religion, philosophy seems to be at war with religion. Where reflection, finite understanding, has become involved, and faith is no longer simple and naive, it is these forms which have been mainly emphasized. Religion then becomes something wooden and dead; this is the old dogma of theology, the orthodoxy [of the old days]. They said then that dogma must be accepted, but the spirit had vanished from it because what is only form was seen as essential, and then understanding made a game of it. This [play of understanding] became the Enlightenment, [whose goal it was] to attack these forms, to show what was unsatisfactory in them and gain mastery over them.

It is the distinctive task of philosophy to transmute the *content* that is in the representation of religion into the *form* of thought; the content [itself] cannot be distinguished. Religion is the self-consciousness of absolute spirit: there are not two kinds of self-consciousness—not both a conceptualizing self-consciousness and a representing self-consciousness, which could be distinguished according to their content. There can only be a diversity in form, or a distinction between *representation* and *thought,* and we can presuppose a more detailed acquaintance with that.[143]

It must be borne in mind that representation has a more or less

143. [*Ed.*] Hegel refers here to his Heidelberg *Encyclopedia* (1817), esp. §§ 385–386.

external, sentient mode of configuration or form of externality. Representation stands between an immediately sentient sensibility and thought properly speaking. Representation has already brought the sensible into the inner dimension; the content is of a sensible kind, but thought has already ventured into it, although it has not yet fully penetrated or dominated the content. Thus representation readily seizes on figurative expressions, analogies, and indeterminate forms. "Begetting," "the Son," etc., are [figurative] representations of this kind, which are derived from the web of connections belonging to the natural living state, [while] "creation" is an *indeterminate* representation, expressing in a general fashion the speculative connectedness of God and the world.

A second point is that the [logical] coherence between elements of content appears in representation as sequential. This coherence
236 does not appear in its necessity, which | can be apprehended as such only through the concept; hence in religion it is narrated that "such and such has happened"; and what has happened, which is an essential part of the content of the life of God, then appears, figuratively, as a natural occurrence, something that happened in time, and the next moment of the determinate content seems then to follow after it. But the concept is the "in-itself" of this coherence, the inner dimension of the web.

Thus the coherence between general principles and particular events is not contained within religion. Religion includes faith in [divine] providence; but the believer can say, "The ways of providence are unfathomable; the path of an individual's fate, or that of the great world-process, are past our finding out." This is a surrendering of all the connectedness that faith gains from providence, according to which the connection of events is rationally determined. The development of the world-process in respect of the particular remains "infinite," and is not posited. The idea that there is a rational connection of this kind is maintained, but it is not demonstrated.

There is also a third type of connection in the representation of religion that is taken as more external—or one could say its necessity is not gone into very closely. This is what is called the verification of a content in religion. The connection of this content

with me, with my knowing, can be represented as follows: I am convinced, I believe in the content, and this conviction rests on these or those witnesses, external circumstances, miracles, and so forth.

As for the pattern of connection between the subjective consciousness and the objective content, we have to consider this in the context of the reality of the concept. We have called the second [aspect] of representation the *cultus.* This is the relationship of subjective consciousness to the object, which is God—more precisely, it is the *practical* relationship of self-consciousness to this object. For representation is also my relation to an object as it has being *for me,* so that we can also speak here of *faith.*

More precisely, the cultus is the practical relationship of the subject to the object, insofar as the distinction and rupture between them ought to be sublated—the rupture that can appear to be in the first type of relationship [the theoretical]. | What we have to 237
consider here is the aspect of freedom, or subjectivity, as opposed to the first aspect, which is that of being. Thus we can say that the first aspect is God in his being, while the second is the subject in its being, i.e., in its subjective being. We have already called the first aspect *representation;* but we have to take note that it can be designated equally essentially as the aspect of God in his *being.* For God *is,* God is there, i.e., he is strictly related to consciousness. [If] God is determined, he is not yet the true God; where he is no longer determined, no longer limited in his existence, or in his appearance, he is *spirit,* because he appears to himself as he is in and for himself. God's being, therefore, involves his being related to consciousness; only as an abstract God does he have being for consciouness as something beyond, something other. Since he now is in his appearance *as* he is, [namely] spirit or absolute spirit, and since he thus is as he is, he is in and for himself. His appearing includes consciousness, essentially self-consciousness.[144] In other words, we must not separate this at all: God is essentially consciousness, essentially self-consciousness. The determination of consciousness in

144. *W (HgG) adds:* for all consciousness is self-consciousness.

general is thus also comprehended in the first [aspect], and what we have called "the representation of God" can just as well be called "the being of God."[145]

b. The Practical Relationship: The Cultus[146]

The second aspect is the cultus, which seems initially to pertain to subjective self-consciousness, or to consciousness generally as such, to knowledge. The cultus makes its appearance as the practical relationship, and in its being-for-itself it is precisely the [self-]awareness of spirituality. The cultic aspect [of religion] is precisely spirituality as spirituality, and it is to be regarded as [self-]knowing spirituality.

The first [element] that emerges in this relationship is what we call *faith.* In regard to it, we should notice that in the first instance

145. [*Ed.*] This paragraph helps to explain why the 1824 *Concept* lacks a separate treatment of the "abstract concept of God," God in his being apart from the relationship to consciousness. For it is here stated that "God's being . . . involves his being related to consciousness." While not abandoning this position later, Hegel recognized that all religions do have such abstract concepts of God, although not much can be said about God as absolute, unitary substance except that he *is.* Thus in his treatment of the determinate religions already in the 1824 lectures, Hegel includes a discussion of each religion's abstract concept of God in which he considers the form of the proof of the existence of God implicit in the faith of the religion under consideration. Accordingly, a tension exists at this point between the structure of Parts I and II in 1824, a tension resolved in 1827.

146. [*Ed.*] This section is something of a potpourri of topics, and Hegel has not yet arrived at a systematic analysis of the main structural features of the cultus as in 1827. He begins with "faith" as the characteristic epistemological activity of the cultus, expanding brief remarks found in Sec. D of the *Ms.* The primary concern is with the verification or attestation of faith—whether it is verified by appeal to the external authority of history and miracle, or by the inner witness of the spirit. In the 1827 lectures, while faith in general is considered as a form of "immediate knowledge," the matter of the verification of faith is reserved to Part III. Hegel turns next to a defense of speculative theology against the charge of "pantheism." The topic does not fit well here; it clearly had become a controversial issue in 1824, and Hegel sought to deal with it in whatever context presented itself. In 1827 it was transferred to the first section, the abstract concept of God. Finally Hegel launches into a rather detailed consideration of the concept of the cultus in its determinate aspects, offering in the process a kind of phenomenology of religion (from nature religion to the Christian religion) in terms of the way in which various aspects of cultic activity come to the fore. This completes the survey of the ensuing parts of the lectures (see n. 137).

what seems to be crucial is the ground of faith—the question *why*, the reason for believing something. | Now the content of faith can 238
be given this form of mediation: faith is a mediation; it is knowledge of God, knowledge of the abstract idea, and according to its definition, this knowledge is in principle thought; thought is a process, a movement, a [mode of] vitality; there is always mediation in it. We have said[147] that it is the standpoint of freedom. It is an inherent feature of freedom[148] that it is not what we have just called substantial, solid unity, it is not representation. No. In freedom I exist as this [singular] agency; the infinite inward negation is [implicit] in my affirmation. Wanting to give this mediation generally the form of an external mediation (as the ground of faith) is a distortion of the form. This mediation to the effect that the ground of my faith is something external is false. My faith may come to me through instruction, miracles, by force of authority, and so on. Thus these things can be the ground of faith as subjective faith. But in this verification the formulation of the content as the "ground" of my faith is just what is wrong. If it is a matter of faith, this externality, this separation of the ground from myself, must fall away. I appropriate in faith that which is the ground of faith so that it ceases to be something other for me. Authentic faith can be defined as the witness of my spirit, the witness of spirit concerning the spirit,[149] which implies that there is no place in it for any other external content. Spirit witnesses only concerning spirit, not about external things. Finite things have their mediation only through external grounds. The authentic ground of faith is itself, the witness of spirit concerning spirit; and the witness of spirit is certainly something inwardly alive—this inward mediation. Cognition is the exposition [of this witness]; it is essential to hold fast to this. The

147. [*Ed.*] See Hegel's characterization of the practical relationship as the standpoint of freedom, above, pp. 328, 335.

148. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* which is the inner determination of faith,

149. [*Ed.*] Cf. Rom. 8:16: "It is the Spirit [of God] bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God." In Pauline theology, as in the New Testament generally, it is the Spirit of God that bears witness, not our spirit, which appears to be Hegel's intention in defining faith as "the witness of [my] spirit concerning the [absolute] spirit." Of course Hegel also recognizes that it is absolute spirit which is really witnessing in our witness concerning it.

verification [of faith] *can* appear in this external, formal way, but this external formality must [eventually] fall away.

Thus it can be that faith in a specific religion starts from such testimonies, from miracles; the appearance of the divine occurs in a finite content. Christ himself spoke out, however, against miracles,
239 reproaching the Jews | for demanding miracles from him, and telling his disciples, "The Spirit will lead you into truth."[150]

With respect to the verification of faith, then, there are external modes and stories that provide a starting point for what turns into faith. Belief in these external modes is also called faith, but it is still formal. This belief may be what faith begins from, but authentic faith must then take its place—the faith which is the witness of spirit concerning spirit. If this distinction is not made, then people are expected to believe things which those who stand at a certain level of culture no longer *can* believe. For example, they are supposed to believe in miracles, and this is supposed to be a ground for the highest faith, faith in Christ. It may be a means for it, but this belief is also always required on its own account, as belief in a content of this kind. The belief in miracles, however, is faith demanded for a content that is ˜contingent,˜[151] and hence it is not true faith, for true faith has no contingent content. This is especially noteworthy with respect to the Enlightenment, which took "faith" in this sense, and stuck to this sense, and proved its mastery over this mode of faith. If orthodoxy demands faith of this kind, it is powerless to maintain it once people view things in a certain way, for it is just a formal belief, a faith in a content that is not by nature divine, nor the spirit, nor any moment of the spirit. This is especially to be noted in regard to miracles. For example, Christ healed a withered hand[152] and at the wedding in Cana [he changed water into wine].[153] Whether the guests at the marriage of Cana received more wine or not does not matter in the slightest; that is a wholly

150. [*Ed.*] The quotation is from John 16:13, but it is in the Synoptic Gospels (Mark 8:11–13 and parallels) that Christ "reproached the Jews for demanding miracles of him"—i.e., the controversy over seeking a sign.

151. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* finite and contingent

152. [*Ed.*] See Mark 3:1–5 and parallels.

153. [*Ed.*] See John 2:1–11.

insignificant content, and it is no less a matter of contingency whether the man with the withered hand was healed. One ought not to begrudge a man an undamaged hand, but that occurrence carries no special weight, for millions of people go about with withered or crippled limbs, and no one heals *them.* We are told other stories—for example, in the Old Testament, that in the exodus from Egypt the doors of the Jewish houses were marked with red | that the angel of the Lord might spare those within.[154] If, indeed, 240
it *is* the angel of the Lord who smites the firstborn, ought he not to have recognized the Jews even without this sign? When [belief in] a content of this kind is demanded, that is no witness of the spirit; Voltaire's bitterest attacks are directed against the demand for this sort of belief. He says, among other things, that it would have been better if God had taught the Jews about immortality of the soul rather than teaching them how to go to the privy (*aller à la selle*).[155] This is to make latrines part of the content of faith. This is an unspiritual content, and, though there may perhaps be a place for it in these circumstances, [there is] an enormous contrast between God and it. When God speaks, what he says is spiritual, for spirit reveals itself only to spirit.

In recent times, importance has been attached by theologians, in their exegesis of the divinity of Christ, to the question how many codices a particular disputed passage occurs in—that is what his divinity rests on! Thus, there is a passage in the first Epistle of Timothy that according to the Greek text reads, "God, blessed forever." But an old fragment of parchment found in Oxford reads, "Christ, blessed forever." "God" is, of course, written with the Greek letter θ, and so the question is whether the little stroke really is in the center of the θ; if it is not there the meaning is "Christ." One codex has the little stroke; another does not. Now, however,

154. [*Ed.*] See Exod. 12:12–13, 23. Contrary to Hegel's version, it is the Lord himself, not the angel of the Lord, who requires the sign, although according to v. 23 at least, it is the angel ("the destroyer") who does the slaying.

155. [*Ed.*] See Deut. 23:12–14. Voltaire's attack is found in his *Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke* (*Œuvres complètes* [1784], 33:18), and *La Bible enfin expliquée* (London, 1776), p. 209 (*Œuvres complètes* 34:173).

it has been ascertained that the stroke shows through from the other side, and so on.[156]

If the critique of our knowledge of God's nature rests on little strokes like this, these are testimonies that are no witness of the spirit. The content of religion is the eternal nature of God, not such contingent externalities!

When Mendelssohn was urged to change over from Jerusalem to the Christian religion,[157] he replied that his religion did not bid him to believe in eternal truths, but only in certain laws, ways of acting, and ceremonial prescriptions; he deemed it an advantage of Jewish religion that it did not impose eternal truths on its adherents.

156. [*Ed.*] Hegel has conflated two biblical passages, 1 Tim. 3:16 and Rom 9:5 (since *G* and *P* agree at this point, the conflation must be traced to Hegel himself). In 1 Tim. 3:16 the question is whether the subject of the phrase " . . . was manifested in the flesh" is ὅς (the relative pronoun "who") or θεός ("God"). Since θεός was sometimes abbreviated θς, if the stroke inside theta were to be dropped, it could be read as ὅς. However, even if one reads ὅς, the antecedent of the pronoun is clearly God, and there is no possible confusion between "God" and "Christ" in this passage; nor does the phrase " . . . blessed forever" occur in it. The variation between "God, blessed forever" and "Christ, blessed forever" is found rather in Rom. 9:5, where the reading depends on punctuation and sentence division, not on the variation between ὅς and θεός. According to the most reliable codices, the passage should be punctuated so as to read: " . . . and of their [the Israelites'] race, according to the flesh, is the Christ. God who is over all be blessed forever, amen." But according to the Oxford fragment and other manuscripts, the punctuation varies so as to read: " . . . and of their race, according to the flesh, is the Christ, who is God over all, blessed forever, amen." On the basis of the Oxford codex, then, the passage can be construed as a proof of the divinity of Christ. But this reading is based, not on the substitution of ος ("who," i.e., "Christ") for θεός, as Hegel implies, but on the location of commas and periods. A further indication of Hegel's exegetical imprecision is that when in the 1821 *Ms.* he makes reference to this passage by way of criticizing the reliance on "externalities" as a proof of faith, he does so by quoting apparently from memory the Greek words θεὸς ἀγαπητός ("God the beloved"), instead of θεὸς εὐλογητὸς ("God the blessed"). The latter is the expression found in Rom. 9:5, whereas the former occurs nowhere in the New Testament.

157. [*Ed.*] The phrase "When Mendelssohn . . . Christian religion" is found only in *G* and must be an error. Hegel is not using "Jerusalem" as a reference to the Jewish religion but is referring to Mendelssohn's book *Jerusalem*, in which the author responds to objections against Judaism brought by an anonymous opponent. See Moses Mendelssohn, *Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum* (Berlin, 1783), 2:30–44, 48–57. A similar theme is found in Mendelssohn's controversy with Jacobi; see Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 91–92, 217 (in Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:115–116, 211–212).

Reason was greatly enhanced as a result, and the remainder had been ordained by God. These eternal truths were the laws of nature, mathematical truths, and so forth.

We must grant, to be sure, that these laws are eternal, but they are of | very limited content; they contain nothing of the eternal 241
spirit in and for itself. Religion, on the other hand, must contain nothing but religion, and as such it contains only eternal truths about the nature of spirit. This is its definition; all that other [content] concerns the external modes of divine service—and to the extent that the commandments of God are concerned with moral actions, here again the main thing is the spiritual element, the disposition. However, if they are carried to an extreme, these commandments are highly inflexible and may become irreligious.[158] The faith that is to be held must have a religious, spiritual content. (How faith [can come about] by persuasion, punishment, threats, or miracles [is] another aspect [of the question].)

We have now defined faith[159] in this regard as the *concept* of the cultus, as its inner kernel, or as the first moment that presents itself for consideration in the cultus. [160]—*Faith is the witness of spirit* | 242

158. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* and refer to a limited content.

159. *W (HgG) adds:* —and the verification [of faith], as mediation—

160. *W (MiscP?) reads (parallel in main text follows):* Faith belongs to this practical relationship on its subjective side, to the knowing subject, inasmuch as, in faith, self-consciousness does not know its object merely as theoretical but is *certain* of it—indeed, is certain of it as what has being absolutely and alone is true. In this certainty it has relinquished its being-for-self, which should be the truth in regard to its formal knowledge of itself. Since faith must be defined as the witness of spirit concerning absolute spirit, or as a certainty of truth, this relationship, in regard to the distinction between object and subject, contains a mediation—but within itself—for in faith, as here defined, external mediation and all particular forms of it have already disappeared. This mediation consequently belongs to the nature of spirit in and for itself, and is spirit's substantive unity with itself, which essentially is also infinite form. Expressed in more concrete terms, faith's certainty of truth, or this union of the absolute content with knowing, is the absolute divine nexus itself, according to which the knowing subject, self-consciousness, to the extent that it knows the true content as free, as divesting itself of all the peculiarities of its particular content, knows *itself*, but only its *essence.* In this free, absolute certainty of itself it has itself the certainty of truth; as knowing, it has an *object*, and this object, as essence, is the *absolute* object. At the same time it is no alien, other, otherworldly object of consciousness but its in-itself, its essence, for as absolutely

concerning absolute spirit. It is the certainty of the truth of the divine intrinsic connectedness of spirit within itself and in its community; it is the community's knowledge that this is its essence. This is the substantial unity of spirit with itself. It is not the abstract unity, but the unity that is essentially infinite form, knowledge self-contained. More precisely, there is contained in it, therefore, first of all subjective self-consciousness, though this is now only subjective in a formal way. | For the self-consciousness that already has 243 the knowledge of the absolute content, and is the certainty of it, is free. In other words, it discards its particularity, the inflexibility of

certain it is identical with this certainty. This content is the *in-itself* of self-consciousness, and this determination is *for us*. To the extent that it is only being-in-itself it has objectivity for self-consciousness, or constitutes the side of its *consciousness*. This is the innermost, abstract kernel of personality; and personality can only be grasped speculatively as this unity of self-consciousness and consciousness, of knowing and its essence, of infinite form and absolute content. And this unity occurs simply and solely as the knowledge of this unity in objective fashion, knowing it as the essence that is *my* essence.

In this exposition what counts is each moment taken singly, and at the same time the way they are essentially united, so much so that if only one of them is focused on, with abstraction of the other, or even if they are focused on more fully, but without attention to their identity, this concept can easily seem to revert to the one-sided forms of reflection considered earlier and be confused with them. This happens all the more readily because these forms of reflection are nothing other than the moments of the concept here expounded, apprehended singly and in one-sided fashion; analysis of this distinction will serve to elucidate further both the genuine concept and these prior forms of reflection.

If therefore it has been shown that truth itself is contained in the certainty of spiritual, pure self-consciousness, and that the two are indissolubly identical, this way of defining truth can easily seem the same as the representation of the immediate knowledge of God, in which—as immediate—God's being is as certain to me as I am, as is my certainty of myself. Such an assertion, however, would essentially imply a persistent adherence to the immediacy of knowing as such without having the insight that all knowing, as such, is inward mediation—an immediate affirmation, which is such simply and solely as the negation of negation. It would imply further that the immediacy of the knowing subject does not disappear, but that the latter persists in its finite being-for-itself, so that it too remains devoid of spirit, as does its object; and it is only the speculative nature of the two moments and of the spiritual substance that is neither grasped nor expressed.

[*Ed.*] The source of this passage is probably *MiscP* because of its close thematic agreement with the 1824 lectures. Otherwise it would have to be assigned to 1831 because of its occurrence in W_1 as well as W_2.

its being-for-itself, which shuts itself off in its singularity from its object. Thus it has knowledge of the essence of the object, and this is the witness it gives to its object, "[namely,] that it is the truth. It has herein the certitude of truth."[161] As knowledge, self-consciousness has an object; as the essence, this object is the absolute object. For self-consciousness, insofar as it is free (i.e., insofar as it has freed itself from its object through its exclusion of it), this is nothing else than the witness of spirit. Spirit is only known to self-consciousness in its freedom; hence, to the extent that this knowledge is free knowledge, we have the unity of self-consciousness, and the absolute content is the substantial unity, so that singular individuality is strictly sublated. This unity, which is expressed as the witness of spirit concerning its essence, the witness of spirit concerning absolute spirit, is the unity of pure self-consciousness and of consciousness. Or it is the infinite form of knowledge as such and of the absolute content. The unity of the two is the absolute content, which is the form of self, i.e., it is knowledge of itself, and hence defines itself as universal as opposed to singular, so that the latter exists simply and solely as semblance. This unity, then, is what lies at the basis of faith. This is what is innermost, what is at the heart of speculation, the deepest point which in this regard must come to speech. It is a point that can only be apprehended speculatively. If it is not so apprehended, then misunderstandings can arise—and it may seem as if these lead to forms [of reflective thought] that we have already dealt with earlier.[162]

We have spoken of immediate knowledge and said that God is known in such a way, and that cognition of God is an immediate certitude that I have of him in myself. This view differs from what we have just said (concerning the conviction of spirit about the spirit) because it stops at the immediacy of knowledge as such and lacks the insight that all knowing is inward self-mediation, | an 244
affirmative immediacy, to be sure, but one that is a negation of negation, which occurs only when self-consciousness is no longer

161. *Ho reads:* which witness is at the same time the production of absolute spirit itself, which also for the first time produces itself therein *as* absolute spirit.

162. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 262 ff.

immediate self-consciousness but directly submerges its immediacy, its being-for-itself, in the thing [apprehended or known].~~ In devotion one forgets oneself as an individual; one is filled with the object of devotion, one surrenders one's heart. One is at home with oneself, one is knowledge, but one does not maintain oneself as an immediate being; one enters into this devotion only insofar as one
245 has elevated oneself to universal knowledge. [163]~~If we thus | take

163. *W (MiscP?) reads (parallel in main text follows):* Further development of the unsublated immediacy then yields the infinitude of the vain subject in its vanity. This acme of vanity persists; and if this is at the same time the unity of self-certainty with the content, then this unity is one in which vanity as such is defined as the true, the absolute. Subjectivity, on the contrary, is determined to be true subjectivity to the extent that it is a free knowledge, liberated both from immediacy and from that being-for-self which maintains itself and reflects itself back into self, in opposition to substance—i.e., insofar as it is this negative unity of infinite form with substance, as against its particular characteristic property.

The concept here adduced may also remind us of another view, bringing to mind the fact that even some theologians flatly accuse this concept of *pantheism.* For there are also theologians who, even if in other respects they believe they have departed very far from it, are often so tightly confined to the beaten track of our common contemporary reflective culture that unless they see God referred to in such a way that he is defined as something absolutely otherworldly, their thought is incapable of going any further than to comprehend such an affirmative relation merely as a commonplace, abstract identity. They are incapable of cognizing God as spirit: spirit is an empty representation, meaning no more than rigid, abstract substance. Pantheism sees and knows God in the sun, in stones, trees, animals, only to the extent that sun, trees, and animals *as such* do not pass beyond the limits of this immediate, natural existence. The sun, the air, etc., are in fact also universal matter; indeed, plants and animals are life, and if no higher definition of God is known than that of universal being, universal life, universal substance, and the like, then such existents contain this so-called divine essence, contain it as a universal devoid of spirit. In the same way, if the single self-consciousness is defined as a natural and simple *thing*—this being the way in which the soul is usually understood—it also pertains to the pantheistic view to regard the soul as a divine existent; but in the same way too, if self-consciousness is taken, not as a natural thing, but as something *immediately* actual, so that it is true as knowing in immediate fashion (in the same way as it thinks solely in terms of its original determinacy), if it is taken in this sense for a divine actuality, then here again it still falls within this pantheistic view. And this representation cannot do other than define the single self-conscious being in these terms. I *am*, I *am* a thinking [being]; that way of representing the matter grasps this form of immediate being as what constitutes the ultimate definition and abiding shape of a thinking being. If this is also termed spirit, the word remains meaningless, for the I that merely has being, the knowing that is merely immediate—regardless of *what* it knows in immediate fashion, even God—is only spirit devoid of spirit, and no more.

the *immediacy* of knowledge as our starting point, and ascribe this knowledge to the subject, it follows that the individual adheres obstinately to this finite being-for-self and remains this acme of vanity. This | immediate subject as such is taken for the affirmative, 246
although the affirmative can [actually] only be taken as what is forgetting itself, giving itself up, in its object, as what is fulfilled by its object, so that this affirmation, which appears as immediate, only falls within this content.

It is from this way of comprehending spirit as something devoid of spirit that the two assertions derive that human beings can only know God in immediate fashion and that they are originally, naturally good. Or conversely, if these two assertions are made, it follows that spirit is taken as the I that has being, and the latter is taken as the ultimate, true definition of self-consciousness, and as itself constituting absolute, eternal being. Spirit only becomes spirit as concrete freedom when it dissolves its natural or immediate being in its universality, or more precisely in its essence as its object, when it submerges the natural singularity that defines itself as finite in the [genuine] *matter* [*Sache*], i.e., in the absolute content that defines itself as object. If, in regard to the immediacy that is to be given up, we think only of corporeal immediacy, then its surrender takes the form, in part, of natural death—through which human beings can be united with God—but, in part also, of *thinking*, which abstracts from the life of the senses and sensible representations and constitutes a return to the free region of the supersensible. But if it here remains merely present to self as *abstract* thinking, it retains the reflected vanity of simple, unmediated being-for-self, the inflexible oneness of the I that [merely] has being, whose attitude is to *exclude* its essence and negate it within itself. Of such an I it is rightly said that God would not be in it nor it in God, and that it has to do with God only in external fashion. Thus it would be a pantheistic view, unworthy of God, if this I were taken as an actual existence of God, since, abstractly at least, God must be defined as purely universal essence.

But this pantheistic view is utterly different from the relationship self-consciousness has to God as to spirit, in that, in its comportment toward God, self-consciousness is itself spirit, and by giving up the exclusive characteristic it has as an immediate oneness it enters into an affirmative relation, a spiritually living relationship, to God. If theologians see pantheism in this relationship, and consequently even count spirit among the all—the all things among which indeed they reckon the soul and the I that is reflected into its being-for-self, and which they then are justified in excluding from God in respect of their individual actuality in which they are finite—and if they know spirit only as negation of God, then they are forgetting not only the doctrine that human beings were created in the image of God, but especially the doctrine of the grace of God, of justification through Christ, and, most emphatically, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which leads the community into all truth and is eternally alive in its community.

[*Ed.*] The source of this passage is probably *MiscP* because of its close thematic agreement with the 1824 lectures. Otherwise it would have to be assigned to 1831 because of its occurrence in W_1 as well as W_2.

On a view of this kind one might come up with the accusation that any such philosophically speculative view is *pantheistic* in nature. It has been a common opinion in recent times that this kind of philosophical identity is pantheism.

Pantheism means in principle nothing other than that all things generally, such as the sea, the stars, the trees, springs, lakes, etc., are taken as divine just as they immediately are, so that the divinity has this existence and is actualized in it as God in actuality. Thus it is certainly pantheism when I—the subject in its immediacy, the subject as this one thing, as exclusively one in this being-for-self—am characterized as divine. But here we have the consciousness that this content, this substance or God, this absolute universal, is to be posited, viewed, apprehended in a form that is purely and simply finite and does not correspond to this [divine] content. Animals and plants are life, the sun is the universal moment of manifestation—all such definitions are finitudes not appropriate to the content. The I, too, as this particular [one], this immediacy, or as the inflexible being-for-itself, is the acme of the form that remains finite, and still clings to its own being-for-self. This is therefore a finitude that is not yet true form. This I that has being on its own account,
247 the self in the certainty of itself, or in the consciousness | of its abstract freedom, is itself only a point, a rigid unit that excludes [all else], and keeps at arm's length the infinite content within which it preserves itself. The I is thus finitude concentrated in an abstract point. Once more, then, this is a form that is not in accordance with the content, whereas pure knowledge, the pure self-consciousness, which is no longer a self-consciousness of itself as this [single one], is infinite form, the knowing that is unlimited, universality self-contained, appropriate to its content. This is the very opposite of that pantheism. It is the divine spirit that is for itself within itself.

Consistently with this view, if the finite I is retained in its immediacy, there results the form according to which God becomes immediately known to human beings, that human beings are immediately good, that they are good by nature just as they naturally are, i.e., that each single [person] is as such an affirmative [reality]. But the individual is affirmative only as pure knowledge, knowledge that has consumed its object, has submerged its own particular

thisness in it, its natural state. The teachers of the Christian church declare that by giving up this natural state—if this surrender is grasped in a natural manner in the form of natural death—human beings can be united with God. Related to this view, moreover, are the church doctrines about the grace of God and how it operates in the human heart, about how a Holy Spirit is active in the community, leading the members of the community into truth, about its justification of humanity, and so on." If we comprehend all this in the concept, in thought, without changing the content, then the characteristics that we have just adduced in abstract fashion are involved in it. Such doctrines are just speculative throughout, and any theologians incapable of acceding to "their concept"[164] should leave them alone. Theology is not just religious piety as such in the form of religious content, but rather the *comprehension* of religious content; and those theologians who confess their inability to comprehend it should at least not presume to pass judgment on comprehension, | or at least not seek to condemn it with expressions 248
such as pantheism or the like.

Earlier theologians saw to the very bottom of this depth, especially Catholic theologians; "for in the Protestant Church, philosophy and this kind of scientific approach have been left entirely to one side."[165] Meister Eckhart,[166] a Dominican monk of the fourteenth century, says in the course of one of his sermons on the inner life, "The eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see him; my eye and his eye are one and the same. In righteousness I am weighed in God and he in me. If God did not exist nor would

164. *W (HgG) reads:* the concept of such doctrines, concerning as they do the innermost depths of the divine essence,

165. *Ho reads:* whereas present-day Protestants merely have criticism and history.

166. *Ho adds:* (according to Baader),

[*Ed.*] On his return from St. Petersburg, F. X. von Baader stayed in Berlin from December 1823 to May 1824 and met with Hegel several times. On one of these occasions, according to his own later testimony, he acquainted Hegel with the work of Eckhart. See F. X. von Baader, *Sämtliche Werke,* vol. 15, ed. Franz Hoffmann (Leipzig, 1857), p. 159. However, according to the testimony of Rosenkranz, Hegel was already familiar with Eckhart, having read and copied some passages as early as 1794.

I; if I did not exist nor would he. But there is no need to know this, for there are things that are easily misunderstood (and that can be grasped only in the concept)."[167]

Thus the cultus in general is faith and the witness of spirit concerning its essence, concerning the spirit that has being in and for itself. We have remarked[168] that the cultus belongs to the practical side, the side on which form is in the spirit and by virtue of which God is spirit, precisely the knowledge through which this moment enters [our awareness]. The first feature of faith is that this singular self-consciousness renounces its singularity and becomes a witness of this kind. More specifically, the cultus is the activity of producing and of being conscious of this unity and of its enjoyment, so that what is implicit in faith is accomplished, is felt and enjoyed. As far as self-consciousness and will are concerned, the cultus is practical throughout and involves primarily the single human being. It is often said that human being is infinite in will but finite in comprehension and cognition. This is childish; it is the opposite that is more nearly true, although it, too, is one-sided. First of all as a will, human being posits itself for itself over against an other; it singles itself out as individual, has a goal, an inner project vis-à-vis the other. First as a will it is set against the other, confronts the other, and works on this other in such a way as to produce a
249 transformation in the object. In its action, | human being always has a purpose, and the action consists in the realizing of the purpose or content, that is, to take the form of subjectivity from this content and cast it back into an objective existence.

The cultus is also a form of acting, and hence there is a goal in it; but the goal that it involves is the inwardly concrete totality of the natural and the spiritual. The object of faith is the goal of the cultus. What the cultus has to achieve is not to abstract anything from the objective, asserting itself in what is [properly] the object.

167. [*Ed.*] This quotation draws together material from three of Eckhart's sermons. In its complete form it is found only in *G*; it is lacking in *P*, while *D* and *Ho* give briefer versions. The formulation in *G* may be based on a secondary source. See Meister Eckhart, *Die deutschen Werke*, ed. J. Quint (Stuttgart, 1958 ff.), 1:201, 478 (Sermon 12); 2:252, 684, 503–504, 730 (Sermons 39, 52). The words in parentheses were probably added by Hegel.

168. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 335.

Its purpose is real, it is absolute reality in and for itself, though it is not straightaway that this purpose is to be brought about. Rather [the first step] that has to be accomplished in the cultus is to bring it about that the goal should be actual in me. The cultus is thus practical, in that the purpose is to be realized in me in opposition to me and my particular subjectivity, this subjectivity is the covering that must be stripped away, so that I may be filled by the spirit and this object may be in me as spiritual.

˜What is called the grace of God or the operation of grace presents this difficulty for reflection in its relationship to human freedom. On this side what we mean by humanity˜[169] is not at all like a stone, and the operation of grace is not merely a mechanical action working upon a passive material (as if humanity were the passive material, not involved in the action). In the cultus there is activity, certainly, but only activity that is my particular subjectivity as such, my reserve, my singular individuality on its own account. The goal, God, is to be attained by me and in me, and that toward which the action (which is my own action) tends is just this surrender of myself, with me no longer clinging possessively to the self as personal property existing on its own account. This [is] the realization [of the cultus], the practical [moment].

The standpoint of religion is this: that reconciliation is achieved in and for itself absolutely; it is accomplished in God as the absolute unity. I am to make myself such that the spirit dwells in me, | that 250
I should be spiritual. This is opposed to the merely moral standpoint of Kant and Fichte,[170] according to which the good must first be

169. *Ho reads:* This is a two-sided action: the grace of God and human sacrifice. There is a difficulty here for representation with respect to the action of God because of human freedom. But human freedom consists precisely in the knowing and willing *of God* through the sublation of human knowing and willing. Hence in virtue of grace the human being is the same activity [as God].

170. [*Ed.*] Hegel here touches briefly on his criticism of Kant and Fichte developed more fully elsewhere—e.g., in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:461, 498 (*Werke* 15:593, 633). He criticizes, on the one hand, their view that the good remains bound to the moral activity of the individual subject, and on the other hand, their view that the good can be realized only in infinite progress. Cf. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, esp. p. 126 (Kant, *Werke* 5:122); and Fichte, *Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre)* (1794), trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (New York, 1970), esp. p. 231 (Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* 2:397). That Hegel had these particular passages in mind is shown by his *History of Philosophy* 3:498 (*Werke* 15:633).

brought about and realized within—as though it were not already there in and for itself, as though there were a world, forsaken by God, outside me, waiting for me to introduce the goal (or goodness) for the first time. The sphere of my moral activity is [actually] a limited one. In religion the good is [found] ¯in and for itself: God is [good].¯[171] The question is only about me: I have to rid myself of my subjectivity, do my share and play my part in this good, in this work, which is accomplished eternally and divinely, of itself. On this view the highest good is no mere prescription but eternal truth, divine power and truth, on which account it is the business of the singular subject to realize itself through the negation of its singularity.

The cultus thus contains a negative moment, but in such a way that it is a practical activity of the subject upon itself, [namely] to surrender and let go its subjectivity. This moment of renunciation occurs concretely in positive religion in the shape of sacrifices; admittedly the negation is more concerned with externals here, but there is an essential reference to the inner life, as the inner life comes increasingly to the fore in confession, purification, repentance, and so on.

This, then, is the concept of the cultus in general, for which the character of what we have called faith supplies the foundation.

We have next to discuss the cultus in its *determinateness.*[172] For, as we have said of faith, the innermost core of the concept is the most spiritual [aspect] of it; the concept of absolute spirit itself resides in the innermost [dimension]. This content is [present] for us, initially, as the concept—this is how we have grasped it—but it is still not yet posited as such, thereby, in existence. The becoming-

171. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var/MiscP?) reads:* and reconciliation is achieved absolutely and in and for itself; the divine unity of the spiritual and natural worlds is presupposed (and the particular self-consciousness belongs to the latter).

172. [*Ed.*] The various aspects or elements of the cultus that Hegel will describe in the following pages correspond to determinate moments in the history of religion, and we shall attempt to designate the correlations in the editorial notes. It should be kept in mind, however, that Hegel is intending to offer what can best be described as a phenomenology of the cultus, not a survey of its historical development. He does, however, introduce more specific historical allusions in the extended passage contained in n. 178.

posited of the concept for self-consciousness is a further determination beyond the concept itself. The concept is the inward, substantial core, present through us and in us—in our cognitive thinking. But it is only in [our] comprehension, [our] cognition; the idea does not yet possess this shape and this content in the self-consciousness that has being as such. To begin with, the idea is 251
as concept, as the substance identical with the subjective self-consciousness, so that the subjective self-consciousness has its essence, its truth, in the object. In this idea the subject is essentially posited as free, but this freedom is at first only relative freedom; what is required is the subject's freedom vis-à-vis its universal essence, in such a way that it does not cut itself off from its essence, does not stand fast, or stick, at a barrier by which it is cut off from this its object, so as not to have the affirmation of its universality. The freedom of the subject consists solely in its unimpeded continuity with its essence. ˜˜But this continuity can be a communal characteristic both in the subject and in the object. Or freedom is only this formal freedom of the subject, consisting in the fact that its consciousness accords with the concept which we have set up. ˜For this concept to constitute its reality, this content must be present: absolute spirit itself, or˜˜[173] its absolute, perfect freedom, the consciousness of its formal, inward infinity, or of free and perfect personality.˜[174] If this self-consciousness is unmediated, however, it is in the first place only formally free, caught up in a natural determinacy, and its freedom is only formal freedom in general, not the consciousness of its infinite freedom. The second [moment is that] it remains absolute on its own account, [it is] infinite subjec-

173. *Ho reads:* But God himself is not spirit in an unmediated fashion, nor consequently is consciousness of him immediate. So freedom itself or reconciliation is, in the cultus, initially *formal* reconciliation and freedom. For the subject to be in conformity with its concept, the latter, absolute spirit, must be an object to it as spirit, *Follows Ho in* W_2 *(MiscP):* for only in this way can subjective spirit itself be free in the object, because in that absolute content it relates itself to what is its *essence,*

174. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* However, true faith as defined above presupposes the self-consciousness of the absolute freedom of spirit, the consciousness that, according to its basic determination, human being is in and for itself free and knows itself as infinite personality.

tivity, the subject possesses absolute, infinite value on its own account, being conscious that it is the absolute object of the infinite love of God. God is concerned about the subject—which is coherent
252 | with the immortality of the soul, [or with the claim] that the soul is eternally in and for itself.

[175]God is seen, in the first case, as the unity of natural and spiritual, in the second, as the absolute unity that is itself spiritual. The different moments or aspects of the cultus correspond to this difference. Thus God is characterized immediately either as an abstract entity or as a constant determinacy of nature; then he is defined as absolute infinite spirit. To the extent that God is posited with some natural determinacy, to the extent that he has a natural determinacy in his content affirmatively, he is indeed the unity of the natural determinacy with the spiritual itself; but inasmuch as this natural determinacy still subsists, the unity of the two is *ipso facto* only a natural, immediate unity itself—not a genuinely spiritual one. Among human beings the body is recognized as a positive ingredient no less than the soul;[176] viewed in this way, the unity of body and soul is likewise only a natural one.

Just as we said about the concept of God that it is represented with some natural determinacy or other, or with a determinacy of abstract reflection, so on the side of self-consciousness (or on the side of the cultus), too, human being is characterized by an immediate naturalness or unfreedom in freedom. Because human being is [initially] only a naturally free [being] (freedom constrained by a natural determinacy, a definition which is properly a contradiction in terms), its relation to its object, its essence, its truth, must also be a natural, immediate unity of this kind; and the basic characteristic of human faith and cultus is consequently that it is an immediate relation, a reconciledness with its object from the very outset. This is, then, one characteristic of the cultus, its general

175. *Precedes in W (Var):* The cultus also develops in accord with the representation of God set out above. *Precedes in Ho:* In the same way that we had three ways of representing God, we will also have three ways of reconciling God and consciousness.

176. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* when it is said human beings consist of body and soul;

mode in a determinate religion in which the absolute essence of God is not yet manifest; likewise human being in its freedom is not yet manifest to itself, | has not yet secured its absolute subjectivity. 253
As a whole, this is the *serene cultus*,[177] which has no need that the subject should be absolutely reconciled with itself. Thus, [on the one hand,] the cultus here is already what human beings represent to themselves as the ordinary way of life, and their life is lived in this substantial unity. Ordinary human life coincides with the cultus; the two are not distinguished, [178]or there are only contingent dis-

177. [*Ed.*] In general the cultus of the religions of natural immediacy, including not only the religion of magic but also the religions of India, Persia, and Egypt.

178. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(parallel in main text follows):* At the first stage of immediate unity between finite and infinite, self-consciousness has not yet evolved into a totality, and to this extent the distinction is not taken seriously. While there must *be* negativity in general, it has not been *imagined* by self-consciousness itself, so that the negative is excluded from the inner relationship of subjectivity, stands over against it, and has to be shut off from the immediate unity as a realm of evil and darkness. Conflict and struggle with such a negative *can* come about, but in such a way that it is represented rather as an external war, and the hostility and its cessation do not exist as an essential moment of self-consciousness. This stage accordingly constitutes no genuine reconciliation, which presupposes the absolute rupture of mind and soul.

The essential characteristic of the cultus here is then that it does not constitute something distinctive, set apart from the rest of life, but a life lived continually in the realms of goodness and light [Persian religion]. The temporal life of need, this immediate life, is itself the cultus, and the subject has not yet distinguished its essential life from the maintenance of its temporal life and the steps it takes to ensure immediate, finite existence.

While the subject must at this level have an express consciousness of its God as such, must be raised up to the thought of absolute essence, and must worship and praise it, this is initially an abstract relationship on its own account, in which concrete life has no part. As soon as the cultic relationship assumes more concrete shape, it takes up within itself the individual's entire external actuality, and the whole span of ordinary everyday life, eating, drinking, sleeping, and all activities for the satisfaction of natural needs, are related to the cultus; and the course of all these deeds and actions forms a life of holiness.

These actions are at the same time characterized by need and externality, so that if they are elevated into that essential unity, *particular attention* must be paid to them and they must be carried out in a carefully considered, deliberate manner, to the exclusion of all arbitrariness. In this way the commonest actions of life are imbued with solemnity and dignity. The concrete existence of finite life is not yet regarded as a matter of indifference, not yet degraded by freedom to the level of externality, since inner freedom has not yet endowed itself with an independent

254 crepancies | due to caprice, etc., that have to be ironed out. Or, on the other hand, the cultus [of these religions] is a particular condition, an explicit [state of] enjoyment, an express consciousness vis-à-vis ordinary life; and sacrifice, the negative aspect, remains a
255 merely formal sacrifice, | involving no piercing of the heart. Rather the natural state of humanity (or the state to which it has attained in the other aspects of life) is what it is supposed to be. It already

sphere. The actions of ordinary everyday life are accordingly referred entirely to the religious domain and are regarded as substantive. In order that these actions that we regard as contingent may be suited to the form of substantiality, they must be performed with solemnity, calm, and due regularity and order. All this is accordingly determined by universally applicable regulations, and there is no semblance of contingency since finitization has not yet broken away on its own account and endowed itself with its own sphere of action. Orientals, who stand at this level, regard neither their bodies nor finite affairs and their execution as their own but as a service to be rendered to another, to the universal, essential will; in the most trivial actions they must therefore proceed with dignity and deliberation in order that they may perform them fittingly, as befits the universal will for whom they are performed.

Such solemnity, however, is only a *form;* the content still consists in the *doing and being of the finite,* and the antithesis is thus not raised to the level of truth. Since the order governing the affairs of daily life is thus only an external form imposed on this finite content, external life—and what, for consciousness, is the absolute object—is still marked by actual diversity. Subjective existence must therefore be expressly sublated, and the manner in which this here comes about has to do with reflection on finitude and its opposition to the infinite. However, the negativity of the finite can also only come about in finite fashion. Here we have come to what is generally called *sacrifice.*

The immediate content of sacrifice is the surrender of an immediate finitude, in the sense of my testifying that this finitude ought not to be my own possession and that I do not want to keep it for myself. From the standpoint of this religious self-consciousness, sacrifice is therefore sacrifice—offering up—in the proper sense. Because the depths of mind and heart are not yet present, negativity cannot here reveal itself in an inner process. Sacrifice does not consist in a turning about of heart, mind, soul, and natural inclinations, that these should be broken. Rather what the subject is for itself, it is in immediate possession, and since in the cultus it surrenders its finitude, this is only to surrender an immediate possession and a natural existence. In this sense sacrifice is no longer to be found in a spiritual religion, and what is there called sacrifice can only be so in a figurative sense.

More specifically, sacrifice can be mere offering up of adoration and praise, whereby I bear witness that I have nothing that belongs to me but give it up in that I think myself in relationship to the absolute. The one to whom the possession is to be given up is not thereby enriched—such is not the purpose; rather the subject acquires the consciousness of separation superseded, and to this extent the subject's action is utterly *joyful* action. This is also the significance of gifts in the East in

contains unity with its absolute object. In this way sacrifice is purely the formal sacrifice of an external possession, | and the cultus on 256
the whole, as an explicit consciousness, is then merely the organization of festivals, the conscious enjoyment of one's express unity [with one's object]. There are numerous cultic activities of this sort; this is where art enters into this sphere. | To the extent that the unity of natural and spiritual is only placed on a higher plane 257

general; the king's subjects and conquered enemies bring him gifts, not so that he may become richer, for everything is in any event ascribed to him and belongs to him.

A further character which sacrifice can assume is as sacrifice of purification in regard to a specific contamination. A *sin*, properly speaking, is here not committed; the specific sacrifices of purification pertain rather to the whole sphere of finite action. They are also not repentance or punishment, nor is their purpose spiritual conversion; and they do not in any way represent some loss or damage that was incurred. This notion is not that one has done something evil and must suffer another evil in its place. To define sacrifice in any of these ways would involve the representational idea of the subject's justification, but this is a form of representation that is here still completely excluded. According to *our* standpoint such sacrifices would be regarded as a loss, in that through them some item of property is given up, but at the standpoint we are here considering this way of looking at the matter does not arise; here sacrifice is rather essentially something *symbolic*. Contamination has occurred, and must be done away with in no less immediate fashion; however, the subject cannot undo what has been done, nor repent over having done it. There must therefore be a *substitution;* something must be given up other than what was, properly speaking, involved. The value of what is sacrificed may be much less than the value of what I keep, what I have acquired. For example, the harvest I have reaped, the beast I have slaughtered—these I take into possession, and if I now have to show that I do not take these possessions seriously, this is done in a symbolic manner. It is not as if what I do ought not to happen, for these actions are necessary; all it means is that through the sacrifice this being-for-me (which is simply a form of finitization) is again sublated.

The general character of these activities relating to the service or worship of deity is what we call *ceremonial*. These ceremonies consist in what we would regard as ordinary, everyday actions, which at the same time are necessary actions, determined by ordinance. We have the right to proceed in such matters as we will or blindly to follow custom; in the same way we do not deem purification a necessity just because such actions as harvesting and slaughtering animals are necessary. Moreover, since such sacrifices and purifications involve a reference to the religious aspect, there is no distinction in regard to them that is unimportant. Thus the various foods are viewed not merely in regard to taste and health. The different ways the various elements in sacrifice and purification are combined are also relevant; the action whereby the purification of another action is effected may have no necessary relation to it, and the combination may consequently be merely contingent and

because the spiritual predominates in it, so that the natural is represented as subjugated, as idealized through the spiritual unity—to this extent self-consciousness cannot accept an immediate natural object (for instance, the sun or the sea) in the way it occurs in
258 external existence as satisfying this requirement that the | natural only exists as the expression of the spiritual. This [spiritualized] image can only become visible through human labor, the labor of

external. This is why this kind of cultus makes a painful impression. Whatever significance lies, or has lain, in these ceremonies and combinations is a trivial, superficial significance, and inasmuch as they become a habit, such actions lose whatever little significance they may once have possessed.

At this standpoint we also encounter *punishment* in the specific sense, insofar as a deed that is opposed to a given regulation has to be annulled, and insofar as what is involved is a transgression. Punishment for such an injury is another injury, and something is relinquished—life, property, etc. But such punishment has here the sense of an utterly dry, formal punishment in the manner of civil punishment. This is not directly concerned with the amelioration of the criminal, whereas ecclesiastical repentance in our sense is a punishment whose essential purpose is to better and convert the one who is punished. At this standpoint punishment cannot have a moral or, more accurately, a religious sense. Civil laws and the laws of the state are here identical with religious laws. The law of the state is the law of freedom, presupposes human dignity and personality, and refers essentially to the will, leaving aside a sphere of free choice for decisions on contingent, indifferent matters. At this standpoint, however, this distinction is not made, and what obtains in general is a situation of sheer necessity.

From the finite mode of being and acting, which the cultus just described brings into relation to what has being in and for itself, is to be distinguished a more fully determinate mode of acting, which *conforms to a purpose.* While the performance of actions that refer immediately to our need does not occur according to a purpose but is regulated in immediate fashion, purposive or expedient action is not merely necessitous action according to habit but is determined according to *representations.* Admittedly it is still finite action insofar as it has a finite purpose; but since prominence is here given to the principle that the finite should be elevated to the infinite, the finite purposes have also to be expanded to an infinite purpose. In this way the *labor* of religion enters into play, bringing forth works of devotion that are not destined for a finite purpose but are designed to be something that is in and for itself. This labor is what the cultus itself here consists in. Its works and productions are not to be regarded as our church buildings, which are only undertaken because they are needed; rather, as a *pure bringing forth* and as *perennial,* labor here is purpose for its own sake and accordingly never comes to the end of its task.

This labor is of differing kind and differing degree—from the purely bodily movement of dance to enormous towering edifices, whose prime significance is that of monuments, the erection of which is never at an end since as soon as one generation has completed its work a start must always again be made from the beginning.

spirit; thus the field of art emerges, and the labor through which God is represented is then at the same time the sacrifice, the exertion of the particularity of self-consciousness, the disavowal of subjectivity. The subject holds fast to what has been generated within it by the substantial idea, and brings it forth into the outward range of intuition."

The cultus begins as a whole from this immediate substantial unity of self-consciousness and its object. The sacrifice [here] is of

The characteristic feature of such works is not free phantasy; what is produced has rather the character of the monstrous and colossal. Production is still linked essentially to what is natural and given, and all that remains open for the builder's activity is for the dimensions to be exaggerated and the given shapes to be rendered monstrous.

All these works too still fall within the sphere of sacrifice. For, as with sacrifice, the purpose is the universal, vis-à-vis which the characteristic properties and interests of the subject must be surrendered in action. All activity involves a *giving up*—a giving up no longer of something merely external but of inner subjectivity. This giving up and sacrificing involved in activity is, as activity, at the same time objectifying—it brings something about, but not in such a way that what is produced stems solely from me; rather it comes about according to a purpose, a purpose imbued with content. Human labor, whereby the unity of finite and infinite only comes about to the extent that it is permeated by spirit and wrung out of the action of spirit, is, however, already a more profound sacrifice and an advance beyond the kind of sacrifice that originally appeared merely as the giving up of an immediate finitude. For the sacrifice involved in productive human labor is the *action of spirit*—the effort that, negating particular self-consciousness, holds fast the purpose that dwells within representationally, and brings it forth outwardly, for intuition.

[*Ed.*] This lengthy passage in W_2 clearly forms a parallel to *Ms.* sheets 37a–38a, which describe the cultus of "immediate religion" (the religon of nature). It can belong to either *Hn* or *MiscP*. In favor of *Hn* as the source is the fact that elements from the main text and marginal additions of the *Ms.* could form the basis for an oral presentation of this sort in 1821. Favoring *MiscP* as the source is the fact that in this section the *Ms.* has not been as fully worked out as is normally the case. Not only are the left and right columns filled with marginal notes, but also the bottom half of sheet 38a contains notes in outline form. Thus it is plausible that Hegel reformulated the text on the basis of these notes, and that the new sheets were used for the treatment of the cultus in 1824. In the latter case, Hegel would have removed this theme from the treatment of the religion of nature in Part II and introduced it into the concept of the cultus in Part I, since in 1824 the various cultic forms of the nature religions were much more sharply differentiated. Hence what originally served as the entire treatment of the cultus of the religion of nature now only offers a historical preview of the various cultic forms of these religions. Because of the uncertainty in identifying the source, this passage of special material will be given once again in vol. 2 as a footnote to the *Ms.* at the appropriate place.

a superficial kind, it does not touch the ground of the subject, its inwardness, and what is affirmed is the enjoyment, the feast, the festivity. [179]--At this point, however, there occurs a departure from

179. W_1 *(1831) reads (parallel in main text follows, ending at n. 189):* Here there is a separation of the divine and human, and the meaning of the cultus is not to enjoy this unity but to sublate the rupture. Here too there is the precondition for reconciliation in and for itself.

This separation is of two kinds, taking place either in the *natural* realm or in the *spiritual* realm. The former is the greatest misfortune that can befall a people. Here God is the substantive power, the power over spiritual and natural alike, and if the land is oppressed by famine, military disaster, plague, and other calamities, the cultus is directed toward recovering the former good will of the gods. The separation here consists in misfortune affecting only the natural sphere, the outward condition in regard to bodily existence and so on. The presupposition here is that this natural condition is not contingent but depends on a higher power, defined as God: God has posited it, brought it about. A further characteristic is that whether an individual or a people fares well or ill is morally connected with the *will*. They have brought misfortune on their own heads by reason of their guilt. And this results in the course of nature being disturbed in a manner contrary to human purposes. What is needed is to restore the unity of the divine will with human purposes. In this way the cultus assumes the shape of propitiation, brought about through certain actions, through sacrifice and ceremonial, through repentance, showing that the person concerned is in earnest. This implies that God is the power over nature, that nature depends on a higher will. The only question that now arises is to what extent the divine will is displayed in events, how it can be recognized from such events. It is to be noted in this respect that the natural power contains within itself purposes that are alien to it as such, namely purposes of the good, which impinge on human well-being and on which it depends. We also recognize this as true; but the good is something abstract, universal, and when people speak of their good they have in mind wholly particular purposes for themselves, so that here finitude and contingency come into their rights. Piety ascends from the single individual to God, to the universal; and this is to recognize the universal, the divine majesty, above the particular. However, the next step is to apply this universal to the particular; and this is where the representation becomes defective. This relationship here finds expression. Peoples stricken by calamities look for an offense by which they were occasioned; they then seek recourse from a power that is characterized in terms of purpose. Now even if such a universal is granted, there is a contradiction in applying it to particulars.

Another kind of separation is in the *spiritual* realm, but this also fuses with the foregoing. Pure separation, on its own account, is that of the will, the subject [separated] from the divine will, the separation of good and evil. The cultus is here rooted wholly in the spiritual realm: evil as such is in the will, and good also. Here the cultus acquires another meaning, namely that human beings are simply severed from God, estranged from him; this is the unhappiness of spirit. This unhappiness is now to be sublated *by* spirit, *in* spirit: persons must attain to the certainty that they have been received again in favor, are well-pleasing to God, and are at one

this original | unity, so that there is no longer the same reconciled- 259
ness or the same absence of any need for reconciliation. These departures arise partly from the caprice of the subject, from the

with God. The cultus accordingly here takes place in the spiritual realm. The sinner is only restored to union with God by casting off evil will, forsaking evil and repenting it. On the one hand it is actual sins the sinner has to repent of (what particular sins is a matter of contingency); on the other hand, in the abstraction of finitude and infinity, held rigidly apart, whatever is finite comes to be regarded as evil. This separation, regarded as originating in the human race, has to be sublated. At all events the natural will is not the will as it should be, for the will should be free, and the appetitive will is not free. Spirit is not what it ought to be "by nature," but only becomes so as the result of freedom. The way this is represented here is that the will is evil by nature. But it is only evil as long as it does not advance beyond its natural state. Right and ethics are not the natural will, for in their natural will human beings are self-seeking; they will only their singularity as such. The purpose of the cultus is to transcend evil. It is not that people should be innocent in the sense of being neither good nor evil; such natural innocence does not occur on the basis of human freedom. On the contrary they are *educated* to freedom, and freedom is only essential, only expresses its essence, when it wills the essential will, namely, the good, the right, the ethical.

Human beings must become free, i.e., acting in accord with the principles of right and ethics, and this can only come about through education. At this level of representation such education is expressed as the conquest of evil, which is to place it on the plane of consciousness, whereas education happens unconsciously. In this form of the cultus the antithesis of good and evil is transcended. Human being as natural is portrayed as evil, and this has to be overcome. Evil is the sphere of separation and estrangement, which has to be negated. This presupposes that reconciliation is implicitly accomplished, and this assurance is produced by the cultus. Reconciliation has been accomplished by God, and what human beings have to do is to *appropriate* it, make it their own.

The question now is, What must people renounce in order to make the reconciliation their own? This question is gone into more fully in the *revealed religion*. The call is to renounce one's particular will, one's appetites and natural instincts. This can be understood as meaning that the natural instincts should be not merely purified but eradicated, that the vitality of the will should be destroyed. This is quite wrong. In fact, only the impure content has to be refined; it is, on the contrary, making a false demand when renunciation is grasped in abstract fashion, as meaning that vital impulses should be inwardly annulled. What people have as their own includes their possessions, their property; together with their will, it is *theirs*. Now people could also be called upon to give up their possessions (the call for celibacy is a similar demand). Human beings also possess freedom and conscience; similarly the demand may be made of them that they give up their freedom, their will, so that they sink to the level of stupid creatures, lacking will. These are the extremes to which this demand can go. To this also belongs that I should undo what I have done and suppress the vacillating movements of ill-doing. All these singularities can also, broadly speaking, be regarded as evil. That being so, renunciation means that

260 enjoyment the individual | derives from its world, and partly from the power of nature and from human misery—the misery of in-
261 dividuals, of peoples and states. These disturbances | disrupt the substantial unity;[180] they require an expiation, a more radical process of negation, in order to reestablish it. It may be noted in the second place, then, that these disruptions are random, and though they call for a more radical negation, this still does not affect what is innermost.

In the third place, it is to be noted[181] that over this presupposed harmony, over the enjoyment of this harmony, something still higher, the highest, hovers, and must hover. For this original unity is only natural oneness, and hence it is a oneness with spirit that is in principle limited; it is encumbered with a natural element, it does not have the reality which, according to its concept, it ought to have. This inappropriate situation must also be present for consciousness, since consciousness is intrinsically thinking spirit in prin-

I choose to regard certain actions I have performed as not mine, that I desire to regard them as not having happened, in other words repent them. On the temporal plane they are already past beyond recall, but in my inner spirit they are still stored up; to destroy them then means to un-do them. For the spirit has the energy to modify itself inwardly, to erase all that has happened, and to destroy inwardly the maxims of its will. To the extent that it comes under my basic principle, I can relinquish an action. Renunciation here means destroying the maxim, the intention. Human beings have the certainty of being reconciled when they renounce their cleavage from God; through this renunciation they become partakers in reconciliation. As it is realized in the subject, religion brings it about that the subject achieves inner peace and acquires the consciousness of having done so. In the cultus the subject is put on an identical footing with the divine.

[*Ed.*] This passage from the 1831 lectures (contained in both editions of *W;* we have given the fuller version from W_1) is not, of course, a variant related genetically to the 1824 lectures. But, in contrast with most of the fragments from 1831 preserved in *W,* it parallels the 1824 text more closely than 1827. In both the main text and the variant, a transition takes place at this point from the religions of natural immediacy to the religions of spiritual individuality (Jewish, Greek, Roman), in which a breach has occurred between nature and spirit. The higher religions of nature, Persian and Egyptian, are transitional in character, for the breach has already emerged there but is still represented in natural images.

180. *Ho adds:* individuals for their part are not *spiritual* self-consciousness and are therefore inclination, desire, themselves [exhibiting] the same disturbance;

181. *W (MiscP/Ed?) reads:* In the disturbances we find at this first state, unity appears as something limited; it can be rent asunder; it is not absolute

ciple. The representation and the need for an infinite absolute unity must emerge in it—a unity that floats beyond all the satisfaction enjoyed in the feast and the festival. There must emerge an absolute unity that, however, remains merely abstract in this mode [of emergence] because the fulfilled foundation [i.e., the model for fulfillment] is that original harmony. "Above this sphere, there hovers a grief that is not resolved, the consciousness of a fate, an unknown power, a necessity that is not cognitively understood, and with which no reconciliation takes place."[182] This is a moment that is bound up with this definite level of self-consciousness.[183]

Fourth and last, another specific aspect of the cultus must be underlined. We have said that [thus far] the practical moment in the cultus is only superficial or formal, and that where it becomes more serious, it is penance. The thought of some necessity, the impression of necessity, hangs over it. This necessity does not remain merely an image, but takes a real grip on human beings: the natural human being passes away; | death is the grip that really grips it. 262
Fate devours it, and it is past all consolation, for even reconciliation or unity is not the reconciling of the inmost depth; natural life remains an essential component, it is not given up. The separation or rupture has not yet gone that far; there [still] remains a unity of the natural and the spiritual in which the natural was defined in affirmative terms. This final negation of death, this fate that is not objectively reconciled, must now be reshaped into an affirmation in representation by a subjective means. Thus the *manes* are the unreconciled [power] that must be reconciled; they must be avenged. This is the aspect of the cultus that still remains—the service of the dead generally, which is an essential part of the cultus.[184] We have now considered the principal aspects of the cultus.

182. *Ho reads:* So the joy of this vital unity is shot through with an unresolved note of pain and sorrow; an uncomprehended fate, a compelling necessity, recognized without being cognized, hovers above the heads of gods and mortals alike.

183. [*Ed.*] The cultus of the religions of sublimity (Jewish religion) and of beauty or necessity (Greek religion).

184. [*Ed.*] Historically speaking, the veneration of the *manes*, the souls of the dead, while present in earlier forms of the cultus, reaches its culmination in Roman religion, the religion of purposiveness.

The second [standpoint] to be discussed, in contrast with the standpoint of the cultus [in determinate or finite religion], is that wherein the subject has inwardly attained to consciousness of its *infinity;*[185] at this stage religion and the cultus enter wholly into the field of *freedom.*[186] Precisely because humanity has attained to absolute consciousness, to the infinite perfection of the human spirit, because it has entered into itself, the highest level of rupture vis-à-vis nature in general and against human beings themselves as natural individuals has been posited. This highest rupture is what generates the field of true freedom. Here the view is that human beings are no longer naturally good; rather the natural state, the immediate life of the heart, is what must be renounced, since it is the moment of immediate naturalness that does not leave spirit free—as natural spirit, humanity is not self-posited. In this view, therefore, the natural state is not what should be but what should not be, and thereby
263 everything that humanity | ought to be depends on its freedom, is transposed into the field of its freedom. The cultus therefore passes over essentially at this point into the field of the inner [life]. Now there is the requirement that the heart should break, i.e., that the immediate will, the natural self-consciousness, should be given up. Consistent with this determination of freedom is the corollary that spirit can and must appear now in the subject as it is authentically in and for itself, in accord with its content; and moreover, that this content is nothing otherworldly, but rather that free subjectivity has its essence before itself as its object. ˜˜The cultus at this stage is ˜the *cognition,* the *knowledge*˜[187] of the content that constitutes

185. *Follows in Ho:* By death the subject is sublated, fate is reconciled. This unity with what is not cognized, which here is first implicit, now becomes an object of consciousness. The subject knows itself as infinite inasmuch as it *is* subject; for this to come about, what was previously undisclosed has within itself the moment of singularity, which thereby acquires absolute value. But singularity only has value as this absolute and thus purely universal singularity. It is only by sublating its immediate singularity—and so producing absolute singularity within itself—that the single individual becomes what is single, and therefore inwardly free, and that this freedom, as the movement of absolute spirit, is in what is now single as a result of the sublation of what is natural and finite.

186. [*Ed.*] This is the cultus of the absolute religion, the Christian religion.

187. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* the presence

absolute spirit; and it is the *intuition,* the *impression* that this history, which is the content of absolute spirit, has at the same time a side by means of which it is essentially the history of humanity, and in which human being is involved. The final [moment] of the cultus, then, is precisely that individuals work through this process on their own and so remain members of the community in which the spirit is living.[188~~189]

In this way we have distinguished between *determinate, restricted* cultus and cultus in the element of *freedom.* Similarly, we have made this distinction in regard to the representation of God:[190] there is God in his *determinacy,* the way he is as an object for consciousness, the circumscribed God, and there is the *free* God, God as *spirit* in accord with his concept. These two aspects constitute the overall reality of religion: spirit in its *objectivity,* preeminently God, and then spirit in its *subjectivity*—these two aspects constitute the reality of spirit. | The two determinations that we 264
have given correspond to one another. The one side, the subjective, corresponds to the determinacy of the [other] side, which has being [objectively]; it is thoroughgoing determinacy. Through it the whole of the idea stands on a particular level, and this interconnection constitutes the totality of spiritual self-consciousness.

We now have to consider the reality in more detail. Its two sides are distinguished from one another in such a way that the one is only *determinate* religion, religion circumscribed. The other [is] the reality of religion so [consummated] as to correspond to the *concept* of religion, so that in this religion the *content* of religion is [present], and *absolute spirit* itself is the content that is known as object;

188. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Humanity knows itself to be essentially contained within this history, involved with it; by immersing itself in it intuitively, humanity traverses this content and process and confers on itself the certainty and enjoyment of the reconciliation contained in it.

189. *Ho reads:* This consciousness must be intuited: the eternal history of God and humanity, of God's movement toward humanity and humanity's movement toward God, presents itself, and consciousness intuits it with the consciousness of itself being part of this history. For individuals must blend into this process themselves and so be members of the universal spirit that presents itself therein.

190. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 328 ff.

hence the spirit lives in its community, appears as finite, as subjective, [and the subject] itself is involved in this reality of the absolute spirit.

We thus have two modes of the reality of religion, one that does not correspond to the concept, and another that does correspond to it.

The ensuing discussion will be divided on the basis of this distinction. In Part II we shall treat *determinate religion,* while Part III is the *realization* of the concept, the authentic reality, that which is equivalent to the concept. In ordinary life we distinguish between "reality" and "idea," and so the religion treated in Part II is [also] a determinate "reality."[191]

191. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* of the absolute concept of God, who, as the absolute unity of these his two moments, is absolute spirit. The determinacy on one of these two sides corresponds to the other side. Such determinacy is thoroughgoing, universal form, in which the idea stands, and yet it is at the same time a stage in the totality of the idea's development.

As regards these stages of realization, we have already made the general distinction that, according to the one form of reality, spirit is confined to a [specific] determinacy of its being and its self-consciousness, whereas according to the other it is its absolute reality, in which it has for its object the fully developed content of the idea of spirit. This form of reality is the true religion.

On the basis of this distinction, it is determinate religion that we shall begin considering in the following section.

THE LECTURES OF 1827

The question with which we have to begin is: "How are we to secure a beginning?" For it is of course at least a formal requirement of all scientific knowledge, and especially of philosophy, that nothing should occur in it that has not yet been proved. At the beginning, however, we have not yet proved [anything] ˜and we cannot yet appeal to anything antecedent.˜[1] In the superficial sense "proving" means that a content, proposition, or concept is shown to result from something prior to it. In that way we cognize its necessity. But when we are supposed to make a beginning, we do not yet have before us any result, anything mediated or posited through something else. At the beginning we are in the presence of the immediate. The other sciences have an easy time of it in their own way. In geometry, for example, we begin with the proposition: "There is a space, a point, a line, etc." There is no talk of proving, for the fact is directly conceded. In philosophy we are not allowed to make a beginning with the phrase "there is" or "there are"; for that would be the immediate.

[2]In the present case, however, we are not beginning philosophy afresh. The science of religion is one science within philosophy; indeed it is the *final* one. In that respect it presupposes the other philosophical disciplines and is therefore a result. In its philosophical aspect we are already dealing with a result of premises that lie

1. *Thus Hu; An reads:* but we do presuppose something.

2. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in* W_2*):* With regard to philosophy as a whole there may be a difficulty here. Logic elucidates how such a difficulty is met.

behind us. We have only to begin from religion, and to make sure that this standpoint of religion has been proved and that we can advert from it to our own consciousness; ˜the truth will become evident in the progression itself.˜[3] The original content, the foun-
266 dation of the philosophy of religion, is a result, namely a lemma or subsidiary proposition to the effect that the content with which we begin is genuine content. [4]In regard to this initial content, however, we can also appeal to the general consciousness and in that way take hold of a starting point that is ˜generally valid˜[5] at least empirically. Whatever is to be valid in science must be something proved; [whereas] something conceded is what is presupposed in a subjective way, so that the beginning can be made from it.

A. THE CONCEPT OF GOD[6]

The beginning of religion, more precisely its content, is the concept of religion itself, that God is the absolute truth, the truth of all things, and subjectively that religion alone is the absolutely true

3. *Thus Hu; L (Var) reads:* and that, too, ought then to occur here.

4. *In B's margin:* 14 May 1827

5. *Thus L; B reads:* correct

6. [*Ed.*] After the preceding brief introductory remarks on the problem of securing a beginning, in which there are only faint echoes of the earlier discussion (in 1824 and especially 1821) of the need to prove the necessity of the religious standpoint (a matter briefly pursued further at the beginning of Sec. A), the 1827 lectures move immediately to an exposition of the moments of the concept of religion, which correspond to the moments of the self-explication of the concept of God as absolute idea. Since the speculative definition of religion as the self-consciousness of absolute spirit had been arrived at in 1824, in 1827 it was only necessary to spell out the logical aspects of this definition, dispensing with all preliminary matters or absorbing their contents into the speculatively structured treatment. The three moments of the concept of religion correspond to the logical moments of the concept qua concept, as is evident from the syllogism: the moments of universality, particularity, and individuality or subjectivity (cf. *Encyclopedia* [1830] §§ 183–189; *Science of Logic,* pp. 600–622, 666–681 [*GW* 12:32–52, 92–106]). In terms of religion these three yield the abstract concept of God, religious consciousness or the knowledge of God (the theoretical religious relationship), and the cultus (the practical relationship). This heading, like all those in the 1827 *Concept,* is editorial.

knowledge. For us who have religion, what God is, is something well-known, a content that can be presupposed in subjective consciousness. Scientifically regarded, the expression "God" is, to begin with, a general, abstract name that has not yet received any genuine import, for only the philosophy of religion is the scientific development and cognition of what God is. Only through it do we come to a cognitive awareness of what God is, for otherwise we would have no need at all for philosophy of religion. ˹It is said to develop this awareness in us for the first time.˺[7]

˹˺Our starting point (namely, that what we generally call "God", or God in an indeterminate sense, is the truth of all things) is the result of the whole of philosophy. According to our division of it, philosophy considers first the logical domain, or pure thinking ˹in its development, and then | nature.˺[8] The third division is spirit, 267
which as finite spirit stands in connection with nature and elevates itself to absolute spirit. The course of philosophy leads to the point that the final result of all this is God. This highest point is then the proof that God is, or in other words that this universal, which is in and for itself, embracing and containing absolutely everything, is that through which alone everything is and has subsistence—that this universal is the truth. This *One* is the result of philosophy. We make our beginning straightaway from this result of philosophy.

This may give the distorted impression that God, so represented, becomes a *result*. But anyone acquainted with philosophical method knows that "result" has here the meaning of "being the absolute truth." This implies that just because what appears as result is the absolute truth, it ceases to be something resulting—that this very attitude, whereby what results derived from an other, is thus sublated or abolished. The proposition, "God is the absolutely true," means just as much that God is not the result, but rather that,

7. *Thus An; L (Var) reads (similar in W):* God is this representation that is so familiar to us, but a representation that is not yet developed and cognized scientifically.

8. *Thus Hu; L (Var) reads (similar in* W_1*):* which resolves itself upon nature, resolves itself to exist externally, as nature.

inasmuch as it is the last thing, what is absolutely true is just as much the first. But it is only the true insofar as it is not just the beginning but also the end or result, insofar as it results from itself. "In this sense the result of philosophy is here the beginning."[9]

At this point you have only my assurance that this is the result of philosophy."[10] With respect to this assurance, however, we can appeal to the religious consciousness. Religious consciousness has the conviction that God is really the midpoint, the absolutely true, that from which everything proceeds and into which everything returns, that upon which everything is dependent and apart from which nothing other than it has absolute, true independence. This then is the content of the beginning.

At the same time we must notice here that, however full one's heart may be with this representation, the beginning remains scientifically abstract. In the scientific domain we are not dealing with what is in feeling, but exclusively with what is outside it—and indeed is set forth for thought—as an object for consciousness, more explicitly for the thinking consciousness, in such a way that
268 it has attained the form of thought. | To give this fullness [of content] the form of thought or of the concept is the business of our science.

Because this beginning (as the initial content) is still abstract, this universality has, so to speak, a subjective status, as if the universal were universal in this way only for the beginning and would not remain in this universality. But the beginning of the content is to be grasped in such a way that, in all the further developments of the content, inasmuch as the universal itself will show itself to be something absolutely concrete, rich, and full of content, we never step outside this universality. The consequence is that the universality, which under one aspect we leave behind (according to its

9. *Thus Hu; L (Var) reads (similar in* W_1*):* This has also been asserted quite generally about the concept of spirit.

10. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* With [i.e. because of] the indication of this self-justifying development within our science, we take it [only] as an assurance, to begin with, that the result of philosophy is that God is the absolutely true, the universal in and for itself, that which comprehends and contains everything and bestows subsistence on everything.

form) because it proceeds to a determinate development, to a richness of content, to greater concreteness, nevertheless maintains itself as the absolutely enduring foundation and is not simply a subjective beginning. At the beginning, God is for us inasmuch as God is the universal; in relation to the development, God is what is enclosed within itself [*das in sich Verschlossene*] or is in absolute unity with itself. If we say, "God is the [self-]enclosed," we are of course speaking with reference to a development that we anticipate. But in its reference to God himself, or to the content itself, this enclosedness (as we have labeled God's universality) is not to be grasped as an abstract universality outside which, and over against which, the particular might still be independent. "God is the enclosed." The particular seems in this definition to be distinct from this universal, but the latter is to be grasped in such a way thatthe development does not step forth out of the universality. Thus it is to be grasped as the absolutely full, replete universality. [To say that] God is this universal that is concrete and full within itself is [to say] that God is only *one* and not in antithesis to many [other] deities. Instead there is only the One, who is God.

The things and developments of the natural and spiritual world constitute manifold configurations, and endlessly multiform existence; they have a being differentiated in rank, force, intensity, and content. The being of all these things is not of an independent sort, however, but is quite simply something upheld and maintained, not genuine independence. If we ascribe a being to particular things, it is only a borrowed being, only the semblance of a being, not the absolutely independent being that God is.

God in his universality, this universal in which there is no limitation, finitude, or particularity, is the absolute subsistence and is so alone. Whatever subsists has its root and subsistence | only in 269
this One. If we grasp this initial content in this way, we can express it thus: "God is the absolute substance, the only true actuality." All else that is actual is not actual on its own account, has no subsistence on its own account; the uniquely absolute actuality is God alone. Thus God is the absolute substance. I will speak at once about how this substance is related to subjectivity.

God is the absolute substance. If we cling to this declaration in its abstract form, then it is certainly Spinozism or pantheism.[11] But the fact that God is *substance* does not exclude *subjectivity,* for substance as such is not yet at all distinguished from subjectivity. That God is substance is part of the presupposition we have made that God is *spirit, absolute spirit,* eternally simple spirit, being essentially present to itself. Then this ideality or subjectivity of spirit, which is the perspicuity or ideality of every particular, is likewise this very universality, this pure relation to itself, the absolute being-

11. [*Ed.*] The relation of Spinozism to pantheism and the viability of these doctrines were hotly-debated issues in the *Aufklärung* and German idealism. The controversy began when the prominent eighteenth-century critic and dramatist Lessing showed sympathies with Spinoza's thought in his own rationalistic essays on philosophical and theological topics. F. H. Jacobi wrote to Moses Mendelssohn in 1783 that he had heard Lessing confess to being a Spinozist just before his death (see below, n. 31). In his *Morgenstünden* or lectures on God's existence (1785), Mendelssohn rebutted Jacobi's probably inaccurate charge and tried to draw some distinctions regarding pantheism and the teachings of Spinoza and of Lessing. The problem is complicated by the fact that the term "pantheism" appears in English deism some time after Spinoza's death, and the propriety of applying it and its associations retrospectively to Spinoza is open to question. Jacobi replied immediately to Mendelssohn in a series of letters *Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza* (1785), and the debate continued with a further published exchange between them the following year. Herder joined the fray from the literary side with his *God, Some Conversations* (1787), a dialogue presenting a Spinozistic philosophy of nature in sympathetic fashion. Jacobi remained the central figure in the "pantheism controversy" because of the argument of his *Briefe* that Spinozism is the only consistently logical system and that it is equivalent to pantheism, atheism, and fatalism. (On the interpretation of Spinozism as atheism, see below, n. 28. On the charge of fatalism, see Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Pars posterior, § 709; and Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:55, 59 ff., 71, 223.) Jacobi intended by his critique to discredit rationalistic philosophy in order to make room for his own "faith philosophy," a type of fideism grounded in feeling and partly based on Hamann's thought. For the philosophers of German idealism Jacobi's treatment of these issues seemed a grotesque caricature that they sometimes attacked and sometimes ridiculed. Schelling presented Spinozism appreciatively in his *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* (1795), which nevertheless supported Fichte's moral idealism as an equally coherent, and to Schelling preferable, rational philosophy. Hegel criticized Jacobi's "faith philosophy" in his essay, *Faith and Knowledge* (1802). Schelling made careful distinctions regarding pantheism and the God-world relation (obviously with Jacobi's polemic in mind) in his *Of Human Freedom* (1809), and brutally parodied Jacobi's attempt at an irrational "leap of faith," in an essay published in 1812 (Schelling, *Werke* 8:19–136). Hegel surely has this long-standing controversy in mind when he makes conceptual distinctions regarding pantheism and Spinozism here and elsewhere in these lectures.

with-self and abiding-with-self; it is absolute substance. At the same time, when we say "substance" there is then the distinction that that universal is not yet grasped as internally concrete. Only when grasped as concrete is it spirit; but even in its determination as internally concrete it remains this unity with itself, this one actuality that we have just now denominated as substance. A further determination is that the substantiality or unity of absolute actuality with itself is only the foundation, only one moment in the definition of God as spirit.[12] The determination, the concrete being, the unity of differentiated determinations, only arises when we proceed further. It presupposes a one and an other, though at the beginning we do not yet have differentiated determinations, a one and an other. At the beginning we have before us only the one, not the other. If we are concerned with the other, we have already gone further. So if we speak of the beginning, we have this one actuality as a relating of itself to itself and not to an other; | we do not yet 270
have an advance, not yet concrete being. Therefore even the content exists in the form of substantiality. Even when we say "God" and "spirit," they are empty, indeterminate words or representations. It all depends on what has entered into consciousness. What enters into consciousness in the beginning is the simple, the abstract. In this initial simplicity we have God as substance, but we do not stop at that point.

This is the form of the content at the beginning, and this content remains the foundation. All through the development God does not step outside his unity with himself. In God's creating of the world, as tradition has it, no new principle makes an appearance, nor is something evil established, something other that would be autonomous or independent. God remains only this One; the one true actuality, the one principle, abides throughout all particularity.

12. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* Thus substance is only one determination in what we affirm about God. This statement is preliminary, in order to prevent misconceptions. The disparagement of philosophy arises especially from this quarter. It is said that philosophy must be Spinozism if it is to be consistent, and that consequently it is atheism and fatalism. What is implied in this content of the beginning is that we only have this abundance or this concrete being before us insofar as it is still wholly universal.

We express this beginning thus, as a content within us, an object for us. *We* have this object, and so the immediate question is: Who then are "we" who have the content within us? When we say "we," "I," or "spirit," that is itself something very concrete, something manifold: I am intuiting, I see, I hear, etc. I am all of that—the feeling, intuition, sight, and hearing. Therefore the more exact meaning of our question is: Under which of those determinations is this content for our awareness? Is it representation, will, phantasy, or feeling? What is the place in which this content or this object is at home? What is the soil for this content? If we recall the usual answers, then [they are that] God is within us as believing, feeling, representing, and knowing beings. Later on[13] we shall have to consider rather more closely these forms, capacities, and aspects of ourselves (namely feeling, representation, and faith), especially in connection with the very point under discussion here. But [at the moment] we are not casting about for just any sort of answer, and are not guided by experiences or observations to the effect that we have God in feeling, etc. To begin with, we keep to what we have before us—this One or universal, this abundance, which is the transparent aether remaining unchangeably itself.

If we take up this One that we have before us, and ask for which of our spiritual capacities or activities this One, this utterly universal being, *is*, then we can name, as the soil in which this content can be at home, only the activity or mode of our spirit that corresponds to it. If we now ask ourselves what we call this aspect of our
271 consciousness | for which the universal on the whole is, whether it be determined abstractly or concretely within itself, then the answer is *thought*. For thought is alone the soil for this content, is the activity of the universal—the universal in its activity and efficacy. Or, if we speak of it as the apprehending of the universal, then it is always thought for which the universal is. The product of thought or what is engendered by means of thought is something universal, a universal content. The form—that within us which apprehends the universal—is for that very reason thought. As we said, this universal—which can be produced by thought and is for thought—

13. [*Ed.*] See below, pp. 387 ff.

can be wholly abstract. Then it is the immeasurable, the infinite, the sublating of all limits and all particularity, and this *negative* universal likewise has its seat only in thought.

It is a universal and ancient preconception that human beings are thinking beings, and that by thinking and thinking alone they distinguish themselves from the beasts. Animals have feelings, but only feelings. Human beings think, and they alone have religion. From this it is to be concluded that religion has its inmost seat in thought. No doubt it can subsequently be felt, "as we shall show later in our discussion."[14]

We also express this process thus: When human beings think of God, they elevate themselves above the sensible, the external, the singular. We say that it is an elevation to the pure, to that which is at one with itself. This elevation is a transcending of the sensible, of mere feeling, a journey into the pure region; and this region of the universal is thought. This is the content of the beginning, and in the subjective mode it is the soil for this content.[15] | 272

What we have before us is this single absolute. We cannot yet call this content or this determination "religion," for to the latter there belongs subjective spirit, consciousness. Thought is of course the locus of this universal, but, to begin with, this locus is absorbed in the One, the eternal, this actual being in-and-for-itself. In this genuine, absolute determination, although it is not yet developed or consummated, God remains absolute substance and does so

14. *Thus B; L (Var) reads:* but it is a faulty objection that religion and the like should be [only] a feeling, as if the content that is in one form belonged essentially to that form alone.

[*Ed.*] See below, pp. 390 ff.

15. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* The content is this absolutely undivided and continuous being, an abiding with self, the universal, and thought is the mode for which this universal is.

We have called God the universal, and there is for thought a distinction between itself and the universal, which we initially called God. This distinction belongs in the first instance to our reflection and is by no means contained explicitly in the content as yet. It is the faith of religion and the result of philosophy that God is the one true actuality and that there is no other actuality at all. From this standpoint an actuality that we call thinking has as yet no proper place. *In W_2 (Var) the final sentence reads:* In this one actuality and pure clarity, the actuality and distinction that we call thinking has as yet no place.

through all of the development. For this universal is the foundation, the beginning point, the point of departure, though at the same time it is simply the abiding unity and not a mere soil out of which the distinctions grow. Instead all distinctions remain enclosed within this universal.[16] It is also not an inert, abstract universal, however, but rather the absolute womb or the infinite fountainhead out of which everything emerges, into which everything returns, and in which it is eternally maintained. This basic determination is therefore the definition of God as substance.[17]

Some people have wanted to designate this representation of the philosophical idea that we make for ourselves—namely, that God is this actual being, this abiding with self, the one truth, the absolute actuality—by the term *pantheism*, and the philosophy [associated with it] as *identity-philosophy*.[18] Identity-philosophy is also said to be more precisely pantheism, for here everything is identity, or unity with self. This can be entirely superficial, and when speculative philosophy is said to be an identity system, "identity" is being taken in the abstract sense of the understanding. Rather than "pantheism" it could more accurately be called "the representation of substantiality," because in it God is defined above all only as substance. The absolute subject (the spirit) also remains substance, although
273 it is defined not only as substance | but also inwardly as subject. Those who say that speculative philosophy amounts to pantheism

16. [*Ed.*] Thus in the Christian religion we arrive at the insight that this absolute substance is also internally self-differentiated: it is the immanent Trinity. God is not *sheer* substance, an undifferentiated monad, but rather an "abiding unity." In going out from himself and entering into determinacy, God actually never leaves himself, for the distinctions are already present within God.

17. W_2 *and L add (MiscP):* The universal therefore never steps forth out of this aether of equality with itself and of presence to itself. As this universal, God can never come to the point of being in fact along with an other whose subsistence is more than a [*L reads:* more a] play of illusion. Compared with this pure unity and clear transparency, matter is nothing impenetrable, and spirit or the I does not have the rigidity to possess true substantiality on its own account.

18. [*Ed.*] Schelling gave the name "identity-philosophy" to his main writings of 1801–1804. In the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* of 1801 (*Werke* 4:105–212), he elucidated his notion of the absolute identity as the prius and ground of the real and ideal realms (nature and spirit).

usually know nothing of this distinction; as always, they overlook what matters most.[19]

We need to make more explicit some of the characteristics of the pantheism that pious people usually reproach in philosophy.[20] "Pantheism" in the proper sense means that everything, the whole, the universe, this complex of everything existing, these infinitely many individual things—that all this is God. And the accusation made against philosophy is that it maintains that everything is God, "everything" meaning here this infinite multiplicity of individual things—not the universality that has being in and for itself but the individual things in their empirical existence, as they exist immediately but not in their universality. If one says, "God is everything, is this paper," and so on, then that is pantheism. When I say "genus," that is also a universality, of course, though quite a different one from when I say "totality." The genus is the universal only as the inclusion of all individual existences. Actual being, what lies at the foundation—the proper content is all individual things, [so it is said].

Now it is a wholly false contention that pantheism of this sort is effectively present in any ˹philosophy˺[21] whatsoever. It has never occurred to anyone to say that everything, all individual things collectively, in their individuality and contingency, are God—for example, that paper or this table is God. No one has ever held that. Still less has this been maintained in any philosophy. We will become acquainted with Oriental pantheism or genuine Spinozism later, in [treating] Oriental religion. Spinozism itself as such, and Oriental

19. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* and they disparage philosophy in that they make something false out of it.

20. [*Ed.*] Explicit attacks on Hegel's "pantheism" began to appear in the mid-1820s. See F. A. G. Tholuck, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), p. 231; and Anonymous [Hülsemann], *Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: Absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus* (Leipzig, 1829). The proximity in time to the Preface to the 2d ed. of the *Encyclopedia* (1827), as well as the mention of "pious people," makes it certain that Hegel is here aiming especially at the theologian Tholuck. In addition to the work mentioned above, see Tholuck's *Blüthensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik nebst einer Einleitung über Mystik überhaupt und Morgenländische insbesondere* (Berlin, 1825), pp. 33, 37.

21. *Thus B, Hu, An; L and W read:* religion

pantheism, too, comprise the view that the divine in all things is only the universal aspect of their content, the *essence* of things, but in such a way that it is also represented as the *determinate* essence of things. For example, the Orientals state that Krishna, Vishnu, and Brahmā say regarding themselves: "I am the luster or brilliance in metals, the Ganges among rivers, the life in the living, the understanding in those who have understanding."[22] For in saying, "I
274 am the luster in | metal, etc.," one has thereby already superseded [the contention] that everything (metal, river, understanding) is God. Each of these (the one with understanding, the rivers, the metals) is something existing immediately. Krishna is not metal but the luster in metals. The luster is not the metal itself but the universal or substantial [aspect], separated out from the individual [aspect] but no longer the πᾶν or the all as the sum of individual [things]. Therefore what is expressed here is no longer what [the critics] call pantheism, for what is designated is the *essence* within such individual things. Many other features belong to individual things, such as spatiality and temporality; but here the focus is only upon the imperishable element in this individuality.[23]

The usual representation of pantheism derives from the practice of focusing on the abstract unity rather than the spiritual unity, and from entirely forgetting that—in a religious representation in which only the substance or the One has the value of genuine actuality—individual things, in this very contrast with the One, have disappeared and no actuality is ascribed to them. Instead one retains this actuality of individual things. Against this the Eleatics[24] said, "There is only the One," and expressly added, "and nothing is not at all." Everything finite would be limitation or negation of

22. [*Ed.*] These words are spoken by the Hindu god Krishna, an avatar of Vishnu. Hegel conflates parts of three verses from the *Bhagavad-Gita* (10.36, 31, 22). The Sanskrit of Hegel's "luster or brilliance in metals" is rendered in exceedingly diverse ways by modern translators.

23. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* But if we say, "Everything is God and God is everything," then individuality is being taken according to all of its limitations, its finitude and transitoriness. The "life of the living" within this sphere of life is the unlimited, the universal.

24. [*Ed.*] Hegel refers to a statement of Parmenides (Fragment 6), transmitted by Simplicius (*in Phys.* 117.4): "That which can be spoken and thought needs must be; for it is possible for it, but not for nothing, to be" (G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* [Cambridge, 1957], p. 270).

the One (*omnis determinatio est negatio*[25]), but they say, "nothing, limitation, finitude, the limit and the limited, simply are not." Thus, stopping short at this kind of philosophical definition[26] means that no actuality at all is ascribed to individual things, and that Spinozism is *acosmism*[27] rather [than pantheism]. Spinozism has also been reproached as *atheism;*[28] however, in Spinozism this world or this "all" simply *is not* [*ist gar nicht*]. Certainly the "all" appears, one speaks of its determinate being [*Dasein*], and our life is a being within this existence [*Existenz*]. In the philosophical sense, however, the world has in this view no actuality at all: it simply *is not.*[29] But
| the accusers of Spinozism are unable to liberate themselves from 275
the finite; hence they declare that for Spinozism everything is God, because it is precisely the aggregate of finitudes (the world) that has there disappeared. [30]If one employs the expression "all isone"[31] and [claims] therefore that unity is the truth of multiplicity, then

25. [*Ed.*] This expression ("all determination is negation") goes back to Spinoza. See his letter No. 50 (to Jareg Jellis) in *Chief Works* 2:369–370.

26. *L (Var) adds:* such as that of the Eleatics or of Spinozism

27. [*Ed.*] Hegel may have first encountered the interpretation of Spinoza's system as "acosmism" rather than as "pantheism" or "atheism" in Salomon Maimon's *Lebensgeschichte* (Berlin, 1792), or in C. T. de Murr's *Adnotationes* on Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (The Hague, 1802). This interpretation assumes that for Spinoza finite things are absorbed into the infinite and that therefore his system is one of "cosmotheism." Hegel accepted this interpretation in contrast with Jacobi, who contended that there really is no difference between acosmism (or cosmotheism) and atheism (Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:xxxiv–xxxv). For Hegel's view of Spinozism as acosmism, see his *History of Philosophy* 3:276, 280–282 (*Werke* 15:404, 408), and the *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 50 remark and § 573 remark.

28. [*Ed.*] The interpretation of Spinozism as atheism is found, among other places, in Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Pars posterior, § 716. But above all it was Jacobi who advanced the charge, "Spinozism is atheism" (*Briefe über Spinoza,* p. 223 [*Werke* 4/1:216, cf. pp. xxxvi–xxxvii]). On Hegel's criticism that "the accusers of Spinozism are unable to liberate themselves from the finite" and that "hence they declare that for Spinozism everything is God," see above, *Ms. Concept,* p. 254, incl. n. 184.

29. *L (1827?) adds:* No actuality is ascribed to "the all," to these finitudes. There are finitudes, and about them it is said that they simply *are not.*

30. *Precedes in L (1827?):* There has never been a pantheism of the sort they have in mind.

31. [*Ed.*] Hegel alludes to the alleged deathbed confession of Lessing, as reported by Jacobi: "The orthodox conceptions of the deity are no longer for me; I cannot take pleasure in them. "Εν καὶ Πᾶν ["One and All"]! I know no other" (Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza,* pp. 22, 23, 62 [*Werke* 4/1:54, 55, 89]).

the "all" simply is no longer. The multiplicity vanishes, for it has its truth in the unity. But those critics cannot master the "being-vanished" of the many, or the negativity of the finite that is implied in it.

Furthermore there is the general accusation that Spinozism has the following consequence. If everything is one in the way this philosophy asserts, then it asserts with it that good is one with evil, that there is no distinction between good and evil, and therewith all religion is annulled. In this connection it is entirely correct that if "everything" actually were God, then God would be sublated. But here it is all the finite that is sublated instead. It is said that in Spinozism the distinction of good and evil has no intrinsic validity, that morality is annulled, and so it is a matter of indifference whether one is good or evil. That is no less superficial a consequence. For they indeed say that this would be an inevitable inference from this philosophy, but for charitable reasons they were not willing to draw this conclusion. It can in fact be conceded that the distinction of good and evil is sublated implicitly, that is, sublated in God as the sole true actuality. In God there is no evil. [However,] the distinction between good and evil exists only if God is also evil. But it will not be conceded that evil is something affirmative and that this affirmative element is in God. God is good and good alone. The distinction of good and evil is not present in this One, in this substance, for it first makes its entrance along with distinction in general.

[32]The distinction of good and evil makes its entrance together with the distinction of God from the world, in particular from human beings. With regard to the distinction of God and humanity, the basic determination in Spinozism is that human beings must
276 have God alone as their goal. | For the distinction, i.e., for human beings, the law is the love of God,[33] that they be directed solely toward this love and not grant validity to their distinction or wish

32. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W):* God is the One, abiding absolutely as present to self. There is no distinction within substance.

33. [*Ed.*] Hegel refers to Spinoza's *Ethics*, Part V, Prop. 36: "The intellectual love of the mind toward God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intel-

to persist in it, but have their orientation toward God alone. This is the most sublime morality, that evil is what is null, and human beings ought not to let this distinction, this nullity, be valid within themselves nor make it valid at all. We can will to persist in this distinction, can push it to the point of opposition to God, the universal in and for itself. In so doing we are evil. But we can also deem our distinction to be null and void, and can posit our essential being solely in God and in our orientation toward God. In so doing we are good.[34] This distinction is not [applicable] within God as such, within God under this definition as substance. But for human beings there is this distinction, since distinctiveness in general enters with human existence, and more specifically the distinction between good and evil.

In regard to the polemic [of the theologians] against philosophy generally, there is an unfortunate circumstance: on the one hand philosophy must become polemical, and on the other hand the objections are so shallow that philosophical instruction must begin from the primary elements. A further superficiality that is employed in the polemic against philosophy is that philosophy is said to be an identity-system. It is entirely correct that substance is this identity with itself—and so is spirit.[35] But to speak of identity-philosophy is to stick with abstract identity, or unity in general, and to neglect the point on which alone everything hinges, namely the inherent determination of this unity, whether it is defined as substance or as spirit. The whole of philosophy is nothing else but a ˜study˜[36] of the definition of *unity;* and likewise the philosophy of religion is just a succession of unities, where the unity always [abides] but is

lectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself" (*Chief Works* 2:264 f.). Cf. the corollary and note that follow in Spinoza's text.

34. *L (1827?) adds (first sentence similar in W):* Thus the distinctiveness of good and evil certainly enters into Spinozism. God and the human being confront one another, and indeed do so with the specification that evil is to be deemed null and void. Therefore it is so far from being the case that morality, ethics, and the distinction between good and evil are absent from this standpoint that, on the contrary, this distinction here stands entirely in its place.

35. *Thus also* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* Identity or unity with self is, in the end, everything.

36. *Thus B, An, W; L (Var) reads:* system

277 continually becoming more determinate. We can | make the one-sidedness of the polemic clear with an example drawn from nature. In the physical domain there are a lot of unities, such as water, into which earth is introduced. That is a unity, too, although a mixture. When I have a base and an acid, and a salt or a crystal forms from them, I also have water there. Similarly, it is present in muscle fibers and the like, although it is not visible. In this case the unity of the water with this material is again one that is quite differently determined from the unity that results if I mix water and earth. In all these things the unity of water with other substances is there, although the determinations of this unity are different in each case. If we now omit this particular determination upon which everything depends and cling to the unity abstractly, we are finally reduced to applying the poorest category, that of mixture, to all these higher configurations, to crystals, plants, living organisms, etc. The main thing is the distinction of these determinations of unity. Thus the unity of God is always unity, too, though everything turns quite strictly upon the manner in which this unity is defined. It is just this definition, however, that is overlooked by such a superficial apprehension, namely the apprehension on which everything depends.

B. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD[37]

The first [moment] in the concept of religion is this divine universality, spirit wholly in its indeterminate universality for which there is positively no distinction. ˜The second [moment] after this

37. *In B's margin:* 17 May 1827

[*Ed.*] *B*'s notation is actually adjacent to the beginning of the second sentence below. The heading is editorial, although *An* writes: "Starting from ourselves, how do we arrive at the knowledge of God?" Into this section, which treats the various forms of the knowledge of God or of religious consciousness—namely, immediate knowledge, faith, feeling, representation, thought—Hegel incorporates much of the material from Secs. A and B.1 of the 1824 lectures, and from Secs. B and D of the 1821 *Ms.* This previously dispersed material now finds its logically appropriate place in the second moment of the concept of God, the moment of particularity or differentiation, the moment of relationship. Under the theme of "Religious Knowledge as Elevation to God" (a subcategory of "Thought"), Hegel also gathers together his treatment of the proofs of the existence of God, previously dispersed across Parts II and III and considered in conjunction with specific religions. (See below, n. 109.)

absolute foundation is distinction in general, and only with distinction does religion as such begin. | 278

This *distinction* is a spiritual distinction, it is consciousness. In general the spiritual, universal relationship is the knowledge of this absolute content, of this foundation. This is not the place to analyze the cognition of this absolute judgment [or primal division]. The concept judges, that is, the concept or the universal passes over into primal division, diremption, separation. Because it is one of the logical determinations and these are presupposed,[38] we can express it here as a fact that this absolute universality proceeds to the internal distinction of itself, it proceeds to the primal division or to the point of positing itself as determinateness.

Thus we arrive at the standpoint for which God (in this general indeterminateness) is object of consciousness. Here for the first time we have two [elements], God and the consciousness for which God is. Because we have these two, in representation we can start just as readily from one as from the other."[39]

"Suppose that we take *God* as our point of departure."[40] Then God or spirit is this judgment [or primal division]; expressed concretely, this is the creation of the world and of the subjective spirit for which God is object. Spirit is an absolute manifesting. Its manifesting is a positing of determination and a being for an other. "Manifesting" means "creating an other," and indeed the creating of subjective spirit for which the absolute is. The making or creation of the world is God's self-manifesting, self-revealing. In a further and later definition we will have this manifestation in the higher form that what God creates God himself is, that in general it does not have the determinateness of an other, that God is manifestation of his own self, that God is for himself—the other (which has the

38. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 623 ff. (*GW* 12:53 ff.).

39. *Similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* But upon this absolute foundation—we still express it primarily as fact—there now also arises distinction in general, which, as spiritual distinction, is consciousness; only with it does religion as such begin. In that the absolute universality proceeds to judgment [or primal division], i.e., proceeds to posit itself as determinateness, and in that God *is* as spirit for spirit, we thus arrive at the standpoint for which God is object of consciousness, and the initially universal and distinct thought has entered into relationship.

40. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads (similar in* W_1*):* We can say that the judgment [or primal division] proceeds absolutely from God.

empty semblance of [being] an other but is immediately reconciled), the Son of God or human being according to the divine image.[41] Here for the first time we have consciousness, the subjectively knowing spirit for which God is object.[42]

From this it follows that God can be known or cognized, for it is God's nature to reveal himself, to be manifest. Those who say that God is not revelatory[43] do not speak from the [standpoint of
279 the] Christian | religion at any rate, for the Christian religion is called the revealed religion. Its content is that God is revealed to human beings, that they know what God is. Previously they did not know this; but in the Christian religion there is no longer any secret—a mystery certainly, but not in the sense that it is not known.[44] For consciousness at the level of understanding or for sensible cognition it is a secret, whereas for reason it is something manifest. When the name of God is taken seriously, it is already the case for Plato and Aristotle[45] that God is not jealous to the point of not communicating himself. Among the Athenians the

41. *L*, W_1 *add (1827?):* Adam Kadmon.

[*Ed.*] As the ontologically primordial human being of ancient and medieval Jewish mysticism and later heterodox Christian theosophy (including Jacob Boehme, whose works Hegel knew), Adam Kadmon is the first spiritual configuration to emanate from the divine light.

42. *L (1827?) adds (first sentence similar in* W_1*):* God *is* in being revelatory for spirit, and the self-revealing is at the same time the begetting of spirit. Creation means nothing other than that God reveals himself.

43. W_1 *(1827?) adds:* that we can know nothing of God

44. *L (1827?) adds (similar in* W_1*):* (All Athenians knew the Eleusinian mysteries.) A mystery is something profound, and later among the Neoplatonic philosophers it is the speculative element that expresses the immediate God.

[*Ed.*] Cf. Hegel, *History of Philosophy* 2:448 (*Werke* 15:72; cf. 91n.): "However, μυστήριον has not to the Alexandrians the meaning that it has to us, for to them it indicates speculative philosophy generally." Hegel sees such a connection of mystery and speculation for Proclus in particular. Here he is probably thinking as well of the existential unity for Proclus of faith in the mysteries and philosophical speculation. Cf. Marinus, *De vita Procli;* and Proclus, *Theologia Platonis,* the Introduction and especially the trinitarian teaching of Book 3, chaps. 9–14.

45. [*Ed.*] On the absence of jealousy on the part of divinity, see Plato *Phaedrus* 247a and *Timaeus* 29d–e, and Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 982b–983a. None of these passages, however, speaks of the divine as actively communicating itself to human beings (except for the *Timaeus,* in the specific sense of an ontological communication).

death penalty was exacted if one did not allow another person to light his lamp from one's own, for one lost nothing by doing so. In the same way God loses nothing when he communicates himself.[46] Therefore this knowledge on the part of the subject is a relationship that issues from God; and, as issuing from God, it is the absolute judgment that God *is as* spirit *for* spirit. Spirit is essentially a being for spirit, and spirit *is spirit* only insofar as it is *for spirit.* This is how we can represent to ourselves the relationship of consciousness to its content, when we take spirit as our point of departure.[47] | 280

46. *L, W_1 add (1827?):* God reveals himself, or gives himself to cognition.

47. *In W_1 there follows an interpolation from 1831 that, in the amplified form given below, is also contained in W_2:* In the doctrine of God we have God before us as object quite simply on his own account. It is true that the relation of God to human beings is then appended. Whereas this relation did not appear to belong essentially to the doctrine [i.e., to God as object for himself] according to the usual representation in former times, modern theology by contrast treats of religion more than of God. All it requires is that human beings should have religion: that is the main thing, and it is even regarded as a matter of indifference whether or not they know anything of God. Or else it holds that this [knowledge] is only something wholly subjective, and that we have no proper knowledge of what God is. In the Middle Ages, on the other hand, God's essence was given more consideration and definition. We have to acknowledge the truth implicit in the [modern practice] of not considering God in isolation from the subjective spirit. But we do so not for the reason that God is something unknown, but only because God is essentially *spirit,* is [God] as *knowing* [spirit]. Thus there is a relation of spirit to spirit. This *relationship* of spirit to spirit lies at the basis of religion.

If we were now to be excused from beginning with the proof that God is, we still would have to prove that *religion* exists and that it is *necessary,* for philosophy does not have its object as something given.

We could indeed say that that proof is not needed, by appealing to the fact that all peoples have religion. But that is only taken for granted, and in general we do not get around [the issue] particularly well with the expression "all." For there are also peoples of whom it can scarcely be said that they have religion; their highest [being], what they in some way worship, is the sun, the moon, or whatever else is striking to them in sensible nature. There is also the phenomenon of a cultural extreme where the being of God has been denied altogether, and where it is likewise denied that religion is the most genuine expression of spirit. Indeed it has been seriously contended by this extreme that, by instilling religion in human beings, priests are only deceivers, since their intention in so doing was only to make people subservient to them.

[*Ed.*] The accusation of priestly deception occurs above all in the French Enlightenment. See, e.g., Boulanger (= d'Holbach), *Le christianisme dévoilé; ou,*

On the other hand, if we take the *human being* as our point of departure, in that we presuppose the subject and begin from ourselves because our immediate initial knowledge is knowledge of
281 ourselves, and if we ask how we arrive at this | distinction or at the knowledge of an object and, to be more exact in this case, at

Examen des principes et des effets de la religion chrétienne (London, 1756), esp. chap. 15; and *Théologie portative; ou, Dictionnaire abrégé de la religion chrétienne, par l'abbé Bernier* (London, 1768), esp. entries "Sacerdote" and "Sacrilège." Hegel's acquaintance with these writings is not verified. He did at least know this accusation from Lessing's publication, *Aus den Papieren des Ungenannten* [Reimarus], Fragment 5: *Über die Auferstehungsgeschichte* (Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften* 12:397–428, esp. 402).

Follows additionally in W_1 *(1831):* Consequently it is by no means superfluous to exhibit the necessity of religion, and it can rightly be demanded in a scientific consideration. But we must excuse ourselves from this exhibition when we consider the means through which alone it can take place. Philosophy of religion constitutes one part of the whole of philosophy. The parts of philosophy are the links of a chain or the parts of a circle. They are developed within this context, and their necessity is presented within it. The necessity of religion must therefore follow from the whole content, so that religion stands within it as result and is to that extent mediated. This demonstration lies already behind us, for it is present in philosophy, this relationship has already been noted. When something is a result, it is mediated through another. When we have carried out the proof that God is, then God is represented as a result; this appears as nonsensical, for it is God's very nature not to be a result. It is this way with religion, too, for it is substantial knowledge; likewise this implies that religion ought not to be a result, but rather the foundation. But the more precise sense of this "being-mediated" does need to be provided here.

The procedure through which the genuineness and necessity of religion is demonstrated is briefly the following. We begin from intuitions of nature, and we know first about the sensible realm; that is natural consciousness. But spirit presents itself as the truth of nature: it is shown that nature returns into its ground, which is spirit in general. Nature is cognized as a rational system: the final peak of its rationality is that nature itself exhibits the existence of reason. The law of the vitality of things is what activates nature. But this law is only in the inner being of things; in space and time it exists only in an external manner, for nature knows nothing of the law. Spirit or the true exists in nature in an existence not conformable to itself. The genuine existence of that which is in itself is spirit; thus spirit goes forth out of nature and shows that it is the truth (i.e., the foundation) and the highest [moment] within nature. At first, spirit stands in relationship to nature as to something external, and in this mode it is finite consciousness; it knows the finite and stands over against nature as an other—for, to begin with, spirit exists as finite spirit. But the finite has no truth and passes away; finite spirit returns into its ground, for as finite it is conceived in contradiction with itself. Spirit is free; to be [present] in what is external is contradictory to its nature, for it is itself the freeing of itself from what is null

the knowledge of God,[48] then in general the answer has already been given: "It is precisely because we are thinking beings." God is the absolutely universal in-and-for-itself, and thought makes the universal in-and-for-itself into its object. This is the simple answer that contains within itself much that we are to consider later on.

1. Immediate Knowledge[49]

At this point we are at the standpoint of the *consciousness* of God and hence for the first time at the standpoint of religion in general. We have now to consider this consciousness or this standpoint more closely. We begin at once by taking up the content of this relationship and describing the way in which we find it before us and what its particular forms are. These forms are partly psychological in character and fall on the side of the finite spirit. We have to take them up here inasmuch as we are dealing with religion as a wholly concrete content of science. | 282

As we said, the universal is, to begin with, the consciousness of God. It is not just consciousness but, more precisely, it is certainty,

and the elevating of itself to itself (i.e., to itself in its genuineness)—and this elevation is the emergence of religion. This process, which is exhibited in its necessity, has, as its final result, religion as the freedom of spirit in its true essence. True consciousness is solely the consciousness of spirit in its freedom. In this necessary process lies the proof that religion is something genuine, and the same process immediately brings forth the concept of religion. Thus religion is given through what precedes it in science, and is therefore cognized as necessary.

48. W_1 *(1827?) adds:* or how this primal division is to be grasped, starting from our side,

49. [*Ed.*] Hegel begins his description of the forms of religious knowledge with an analysis of "immediate knowledge" or "faith"—the certainty that God *is* independently of my awareness of him. He does not begin with "intuition" (*Anschauung*), as in Sec. D of the 1821 *Ms.*, because faith is something other than sensible intuition; we do not have immediate sense-experience of God, although our consciousness of God may be given expression in sensible, artistic form, as in the religion of art, in which case it takes on the form of intuition. On the other hand, faith is something less than what might be called "intellectual intuition" or the speculative "insight" into the necessity of this content (God), which comes only with mediated knowledge or cognition. Hegel also distinguishes between faith as such (the immediate certainty that God is) and its *forms* or *modalities*, namely feeling and representation, which are taken up in the following two sections. These various distinctions become clear in the course of the discussion.

too. First among its more specific aspects (and bearing upon the *subjective* side) is *faith*—i.e., certainty inasmuch as it is *feeling* and exists in feeling. Second, there is the *objective* side, the mode of the content. But the form in which God initially is for us is the mode of *representation*, and the final aspect is the form of *thought* as such.

First of all we have the consciousness of God in general, namely the fact that God is object for us, that we have representations of God. What we are conscious of, however, is not only that we have this object as our representation but also that it is not merely representation, that it *is*. This is *certainty* of God, *immediate knowledge*.

The fact that something is an object in consciousness or a representation means that this content is within me, is my own. I can have representations of wholly imaginary or fictitious objects. In this case the content is only mine, it is only in representation, and I simultaneously know that it *is not*. In dreams I am also consciousness and have objects, although [apart from me] they are not.[50]

However, we take the consciousness of God to be the consciousness that God also *is*—not merely [as] my own or [as] a subject within me, but [as] independent of me and of my acts of representing and knowing. God is in and for himself: that is implied in this content itself. God is this universality having being in and for itself, outside me and independent of me, not merely having being for me. This [feature] is present in every intuition, in every consciousness, and indeed these two different determinations are combined within it [consciousness]: I have this content, it is within me; but it also is on its own account. That is *certainty in general*. God is distinct from me, is independent, absolutely in-and-for-himself, and, vis-à-vis myself, this actual being that is in-and-for-itself is at the same time my own, is in my I or self. Even as this content is independent, it is also inseparably within me.

Certainty is the immediate relation of the content and myself. If

50. *L (1827?) adds:* What constitutes the general character of representation is the fact that something is an object of my consciousness.

I wish to express this relation forcefully, then I say, "I know this as certainly as [I know that] I myself am." The certainty of this external being | and the certainty of myself are both one and the 283
same certainty.[51] This oneness of certainty is the inseparability of the content that is distinct from me;[52] it is the inseparability of the two aspects that are distinguished from one another, and this undivided unity is within the certainty. Thus both an independent being, an actual being in-and-for-itself, and I as the one who knows of it, are contained within this consciousness of God. I am certain that it is; there is this one certainty, this immediate relation.

It is possible to stop with these abstract definitions; it is even asserted that we must stop with this certainty. But as a rule people straightaway make the following distinction. Something can be *certain*, but it is a different question whether it is *true*. We set certainty in opposition to truth, for in that something is certain it is not yet true.[53]

For the time being we stick with the topic of certainty. Its universal aspect is this primal division between God and the knowing subject. Certainty is the undivided unity of these two together.

The first particular form of this certainty is that of *faith*. Faith properly has an antithesis within itself, but one that is more or less indeterminate. Faith is set in opposition to knowledge, [but] this is a vacuous antithesis because what I believe, I also know—it is a content in my consciousness. Knowledge is the universal, whereas belief is only a part of knowledge. If I believe in God, then God is in my consciousness, and I also know that God is. But by "knowledge" we ordinarily mean a mediated knowledge that cognizes and demonstrates, and that is something else again. Still, knowledge in general cannot be placed in opposition to faith in this way.

More precisely stated, a certainty is termed "faith" partly inasmuch as it is not immediate sensible certainty and partly inasmuch

51. W_2 *(1827?) adds:* and I would annul my own being and not know of myself were I to annul that being.

52. W_2 *(1827?) adds:* and my own self;

53. [*Ed.*] In another philosopher one might have expected: "not necessarily true." However, since cognition of truth is for Hegel a function of mediated knowledge, to which we have not yet come, his "not yet" is likely intentional.

as this knowledge is also not a knowledge of the necessity of this content. In one respect immediate certainty is said to be *knowledge.* I do not need to believe what I see before me, for I know it. I do not believe that a sky is above me; I see it. On the other hand,
284 when I have rational insight into the necessity of a thing, | then, too, I do not say "I believe." For example, it is assumed that one does not accept the Pythagorean theorem on authority but rather has gained insight into its demonstration for oneself. Thus faith [being neither of these] is a certainty that one possesses apart from immediate sensible intuition, apart from this sensible immediacy, and equally without having insight into the necessity of the content. In recent times faith has also been taken wholly in the sense of "certainty," in a sheer antithesis to insight into the necessity of a content. Jacobi[54] in particular introduced this meaning. He says that we only believe we have bodies; we don't know it. Here knowledge has the narrower meaning of "awareness of necessity." ˜Jacobi says specifically that it is merely a belief that I see this. My intuiting and feeling, and all such sensible knowledge, is wholly immediate, unmediated—there is no ground for it.˜[55] Here belief in general has the meaning of "immediate certainty."

The expression "faith," however, is used chiefly for the certainty that there is a God; and it is indeed used inasmuch as we do not have insight into the necessity of this content. And to that extent we say that "faith" is something subjective, as opposed to which the knowledge of necessity is termed objective. [56]For this reason, too, we speak of "faith in God"—according to ordinary linguistic usage—because we have no immediate sensible intuition of God.

54. [*Ed.*] See above, 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27.

55. *Thus L, similar in W; An reads:* Jacobi says I merely believe that paper lies before me. I look there and so I see it, but I do not see the necessity.

[*Ed.*] In the form given by *An,* this citation is not identifiable in Jacobi's writings. When Hegel said (according to *L*) "it is merely a belief that I see this," he may have picked up or pointed to a sheet of paper. According to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* Hegel introduced a reference to paper—"paper lies here"—into a quotation from Jacobi's *Briefe über Spinoza* that makes no mention of paper (see Hegel, *Werke* 15:545 [not in the Eng. trans.]; Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:211).

56. *Precedes L (1827?) (similar in W):* We *believe* in God because we do not have insight into the necessity of this content, namely *that* God is and *what* God is.

But we do believe in God, and to that extent we have the certainty that God is. Of course we also speak here of the "*grounds* of faith." But that surely is not to be taken literally. When I have grounds, that is to say, objective and proper grounds, then the thing is proved for me. But again the grounds themselves can be of a subjective nature, whereupon I let my knowledge pass for a proven knowledge and say "I believe."[57] The main ground, the one ground for | faith 285
in God is *authority,* the fact that others—those who matter to me, those whom I revere and in whom I have confidence that they know what is true—believe it, that they are in possession of this knowledge. Belief rests upon testimony and so has a ground. But the absolutely proper ground of belief, the absolute testimony to the content of a religion, is the witness of the spirit[58] and not miracle or external, historical verification. [59]The genuine content of a religion has for its verification the witness of one's own spirit, [the witness] that this content conforms to the nature of my spirit and satisfies the needs of my spirit. My spirit knows itself, it knows its essence—that, too, is an immediate knowledge, it is the absolute verification of the eternally true, the simple and true definition of this certainty that is called faith.

This certainty (and faith with it) enters into an antithesis with thought, and with truth in general; but it is only later[60] that we have to discuss this antithesis. First we want to deal with the next two forms that emerge in the company of this certainty, namely feeling and representation. Feeling comes under consideration more in a subjective regard, whereas representation concerns more the objective mode of the content, i.e., how it is an object of consciousness for us—the determination of objectivity.[61]

57. *Similar in* W_1; *follows in* W_2 *(MiscP/Ed?) as transition to the section on feeling:* The first, simplest, and still most abstract form of this subjective grounding is this, that in the beginning of the I the being of the object is also contained. This grounding and this appearing of the object is given as the first and immediate grounding and appearing in feeling.

58. [*Ed.*] Cf. Rom. 8:16.

59. *In B's margin:* 18 May 1827

60. [*Ed.*] See below, pp. 407 ff.

61. *L (1827?) adds:* To begin with, we have only to describe these two forms, and in doing so to indicate their limitedness and imperfection.

2. Feeling[62]

As far as the *form* of feeling is concerned, we ask first what it means to say, "I have that in my feeling" or "I have a feeling of something," e.g., of sensible or even of moral objects. We will find that possession in feeling is nothing else but the fact that a content is *my own*, and indeed is my own as this particular individual—the fact that it belongs to me and is for me, that I have and know it in its determinateness and that at the same time I know myself in this determinateness. It is the feeling of a content and | the feeling of oneself— 286 both at once. The content is in such a way that my particularity is at the same time bound up with it.

Any content can be in feeling, just as it can be in thought generally. In feeling, however, we at no time have the content or the thing as such (for example, law or right) alone before us. Instead we know the thing in its connection with ourselves, and thereby we take pleasure in ourselves, i.e., in our own fulfillment with the thing. Feeling is for this reason such a popular theme, because when we feel [something] we are personally and subjectively involved, too, according to our particularity and personal character. In feeling we give validity to ourselves at the same time as to the thing we feel. [63]A [person of] "character" who has a firm purpose, and pursues this purpose throughout an entire life, can be very dispassionate about it. Such a person has only the thing, has only this purpose. "Warmth of feeling," on the other hand, signifies that at the same time I am fully with the thing in all my particularity, and that is an anthropological aspect. The particularity of our own person is its corporeality so that feeling pertains also to this corporeal side. With [aroused] feelings the blood becomes agitated and we become warm around the heart. That is the character of feeling. The whole complex of feeling is what we call "heart" or "emotional temper" [*Gemüt*].

62. [*Ed.*] Cf. below, n. 75.

63. *Precedes in L (1827?):* In our thinking we forget ourselves and possess the objective content [in thought] rather than our own self-consciousness. But along with thinking we can also have feeling, and then we concurrently involve ourselves with the content and bind ourselves to it, so that our particularity is there, too. We speak of warmth of feeling for the thing; this is not "interest" in the general sense.

It is required not only that we know God, right, and the like, that we have consciousness of and are convinced about them, but also that these things should be in our feeling, in our hearts. This is a just requirement; it signifies that these interests ought to be essentially our own—that we, as subjects, are supposed to have identified ourselves with such content. ˜A human being who has the right in his heart is one who is identified with the spirit. In the same way the phrase "religion of the heart"˜[64] expresses this identification of the | content with the subjectivity and personality of 287
the individual. It is also part of "acting upon principles" not only that one knows the principles but also that they are in one's heart. There can also be bound up with bare conviction the fact that other inclinations exert force against it. But if the conviction is in the heart, then the agent acts upon it; one has this disposition and acts in accordance with what (in this dispositional manner) one *is*. What one has in one's heart belongs to the being of one's personality, to one's inmost being. So far as I am moral, honest, or religious, then duty, law, or religion is identified with me; my actuality is in them and they are in my actuality; they constitute my being, for that is the way I am.

We cannot say of feeling that it is good or not good, that it is correct and genuine on the one hand, or false or spurious on the other. This indeterminateness is feeling [per se]. Where there is feeling, our attention is drawn at once to the *determinateness* of the feeling, to what kind of feeling it is: feeling of fear or anxiety, base feelings, etc. This determinateness is what appears as its content. To the extent that we have a representation of this determinateness and are ourselves conscious of it, we have therefore an object that also appears at the same time in a subjective mode, as an object of feeling. In the case of outwardly sensible feeling its

64. *Thus B, similar in Hu; L (Var) reads:* As something actual, as this one, I should be determined thus throughout. This determinateness should be peculiar to my character, it should constitute the general mode of my actuality, and it is therefore essential that every genuine content should be in feeling, or in the heart. What we carry in the heart in this way is our disposition: that is how we are. For instance, to one human being right is custom and usage, and it is part of the being of this person. Feeling as a whole

determinateness is the content—for example, when we feel something hard, the determinateness of the feeling is therefore a hardness. But we also say about this hardness that there is a hard object present. The hardness therefore [both] is subjective and exists as an object. We reduplicate the feeling. ˜We swiftly pass over from it to consciousness,˜[65] and we say at the level of consciousness that there is a hard object that has this effect upon us that we call feeling. Before we have felt it, we do not know that it is a hard object. Only after the [experience of] feeling do we assume that it is constituted thus and so.

But then we also have other feelings: feeling of self, feeling of God, feeling of right and of ethics. Here the very determinateness of the feeling *is* the content. God, or the right, is equally something
288 subjective and something objective, | i.e., something having being in-and-for-itself, independently—in this case as the external object. When I know God in this way, and know the right, and have religious feeling, then I know this content; I know this content within myself and myself within this content. I am this content, [for] I know the unification of myself with it, and in that knowledge I at the same time have knowledge of my own particular person. [I know] that I have assimilated this content to myself and myself to it, the content that is nevertheless in and for itself—such as right, the ethical realm, and the like. When I know God and the right, then consciousness has made its entrance, and [with it] a parting or division that was not yet in feeling. In vision we not only know ourselves, but we place the object outside us and withdraw ourselves. Consciousness is the ejection of the content out of feeling; it is a kind of liberation.

If we dwell on the fact that in feeling the content is identified with us, what transpires is that we have the representation of feeling as the *source* of this content, of religious and honest feeling as the source of faith and of the knowledge of God, right, and ethical life. At the same time we represent the fact that the content is in our heart as the confirmation and justification for the claim that it is

65. *Thus An; L (Var) reads:* We make this conversion instantly in the case of the sensible content that we have in our subjective feeling, for we assume the presence of an external object that corresponds to that content,

the genuine content. "We find it in our heart"—that is the point it is important to consider, because in recent times it has been declared that we must consult the human heart in order to learn what is just and ethical. The opinion is that we discover within our hearts what God is. The heart is alleged to be the source, the root, and the justifying [factor] for this content. How are we to evaluate this opinion? ˹Is this religion of feeling the true religion? Is it feeling that justifies our acting in this way or that?˺[66] | 289

I can even grant that for me the heart is the seed, root, and source of this content, though that is not saying very much. Calling it the source amounts to saying the heart is the initial mode in which such content appears to the subject. In the first instance the human being perhaps has religious feeling, but perhaps not. To that extent the heart has, to be sure, the significance of the seed. But, just as in the case of a single vegetable seed that is the first mode of existence of a plant, feeling is also this enveloped mode. The seed with which the life of the plant begins is the first [phase] only in the empirical mode, or only in appearance; for it is just as much a product or result, the final [phase]. It is therefore a wholly relative moment of origin (as we have already seen in the case of immediate knowledge). The enveloped being of the tree's nature, this simple seed, is the product or result of the entire developed life of this tree. And in feeling, too, the entire genuine content is within our subjective actuality in this enveloped fashion. But it is something else entirely [to say] this content as such is supposed to belong to feeling as such—˹for example, contents such as God, right, and duty.˺[67] God

66. *Thus An; similar in B, Hu; L (Var) reads:* Thus the religion of feeling is in fact the genuine one. The heart is what justifies faith in this content, and action according to its specifications. *In* W_2 *(MiscP), two paragraphs earlier:* Indeed, it is so far from the case that we can find God solely and truly in feeling, that we must already be acquainted with this content from elsewhere if we are to be able to find it in feeling. And if it means that we have no cognition of God, and can know nothing of God, how then are we to say that God is in feeling? We must first have searched elsewhere within consciousness according to specifications of the content that is distinguished from the I; for we can identify the feeling as religious only insofar as we rediscover in it just these specifications of the content.

67. *Thus An; L (Var) reads (similar in* W_1*):* The most we can say is that contents such as God, the human being's relationship to God, right, duty, etc., are brought before representation [in the way they are] determined by feeling. W_2 *(Var) adds:* A content such as

is a content that is universal in and for itself; and in the same way the definitions of right and duty are a determination of the *rational will*.[68] As will, I exist in my freedom, in my universality itself, in the universality of my self-determination; and if my will is rational, then [self-]determination is a determining in general, something universal, a determining according to the pure concept. Rational will is sharply distinct from contingent willing or willing according to contingent impulses and inclinations, for it determines itself in accord with its concept, and the concept or substance of the will is pure freedom. All rational determinations of the will are developments of freedom, and the developments that issue from it are duties and are thereby rational. Determination by means of, and in accordance with, the pure concept is the constituent element that
290 belongs to rationality. | Therefore it belongs just as essentially to thought.[69] Even in the case of God we have already drawn attention to the fact that this is a content that belongs to thought, for thought is the soil in which this content is both apprehended and engendered alike.

[70]Now insofar as it is the nature of this content to be only in thought in its authentic mode, it follows that the way in which it is in feeling is an inadequate mode. The fundamental determination of feeling is the specificity or particularity of my own subjectivity. As subject, as both intelligent and willing subject, I may be convinced with such fixity that other, particular grounds avail nothing against this fixity of my conviction, or that indeed they are not present at all. If I am ethical will, then I have this very determination within me. I am it, without my conviction or my will being conjoined with a consciousness of the particularity of my person. But all the same, this content belongs to my actuality also, and then what we say is that "I have it in my heart," for this *is* "my heart." In other words, the content is within my own self-certainty, in my intellect

68. *L, W add (1827?):* I am will and not only desire, [for] I do not just have inclination. The I is the universal.

69. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* Will is rational only insofar as it is thinking. It is an erroneous representation that will and intellect are two different compartments within spirit, and that will could be rational and ethical without thought.

70. *In B's margin:* 21 May 1827

and will as such, or else the consciousness of the particularity of my person is conjoined with it. In this latter case it is in feeling.

Is then something true or legitimate because it is in my feeling? Is feeling the verification, or must the content be just, true, or ethical in and for itself? These days we often find the former contention advanced.[71] We have means enough in our consciousness for evaluating this contention. In our consciousness we know very well that, in order to know that a content is of the right kind, we must look about for grounds of decision other than those of feeling. For it is true that every content is capable of being in feeling: religion, right, ethics, crime, passions. Each content has a place in feeling. | 291

If feeling is the justifying element, then the distinction between good and evil comes to naught, for evil with all its shadings and qualifications is in feeling just as much as the good. Everything evil, all crime, base passions, hatred and wrath, it all has its root in feeling.[72] The murderer feels that he must do what he does. Everything vile is the expression of [some] feeling. In the Bible it says that wicked thoughts of blasphemy and the like proceed from the heart.[73] Undoubtedly the divine or the religious is in feeling, too, but evil has its own distinctive seat in the heart. This natural particularity, the heart, is its home. But that the human being's own particularity, egotism, and selfhood as such should be legitimated is not what is good or ethical. On the contrary, that is evil. ˜The content˜[74] must be true in and for itself if the feeling is to count as

71. *L (1827?) adds:* We have a feeling of God, a feeling of our dependence, and a feeling of right, too. The feeling of right is on that account a just feeling, and this content or higher element is something true just because we have this feeling. On this view the feeling is made into the criterion of what is true and ethical.

72. *L (1827?) adds:* The evil person, for whom at this moment this determinate purpose or this interest transcends all other determinations, is, by his feeling, lifted beyond all that is upright and ethical. It is the same way with opinion. One person opines and feels this, another that; one and the same person now this, now that.

73. [*Ed.*] Cf. Matt. 15:19.

74. *L (1827?) reads:* The element of selfhood is the subjective element that we call heart in general. It must, of course, be the case with respect to the good also that the content belongs to me myself, that I have my own self within it. But that is only the form for a content that comes from elsewhere. Its distinguishing or proper feature is the very fact that feeling is a form, and that what matters is the content of the feeling; this

true. For that reason it is also said that one's feelings or one's heart must be purified and cultivated; natural feelings cannot be the proper impulses to action. What this says is precisely that what is genuine is not the content of the heart as such, but instead what ought to be the heart's *goal* and *interest*—this content and these determinations should become and be what is genuinely true. But what the genuinely true is we first learn through representation and thought.

3. Representation[75]

The form of feeling is the subjective aspect, the certainty of God. The form of representation concerns the objective aspect, the content of the certainty. The obvious question is: "What is this content?" The content is God. For human beings God *is* primarily in
292 the form of representation. | ˜[Representation is]˜[76] a consciousness of something that one has before oneself as something objective.

The fact that the religious content is present primarily in the form of representation is connected with what I said earlier,[77] that religion is the consciousness of absolute truth in the way that it occurs for all human beings. Thus it is found primarily in the form of representation. ˜Philosophy has the same content, the truth; [it is] the spirit of the world generally and not the particular spirit.

75. [*Ed.*] Both religious feeling (*Gefühl*) and religious representation (*Vorstellung*) are forms or modes of expression of the immediate certainty that God *is*. Feeling describes the subjective aspect of this certainty, namely, its connection with our own determinate, particular existence. But feeling as such can make no judgments with respect to the *content* of whatever it is that we feel. This is a matter of consciousness, in the form first of representation but ultimately of thought (*Denken*). Representation, or nonsensible intuition (see n. 76), attends consciously to the *objectivity* of what is in feeling, but it does not yet penetrate this content rationally or cognitively. It continues to view it imagistically or reflectively, in terms of the finite categories of the understanding (*Verstand*). While all these forms of the religious relationship—faith, feeling, representation, etc.—are knowledge (*Wissen*) in the broad sense, the knowledge of God does not reach its goal until it becomes thought (*Denken*) or cognition (*Erkenntnis*) in the strict sense.

76. *L (1827?) reads:* For "representation" we may also use the term "intuition." Thereby we are not speaking of sensible intuition; it is only that, in using the word "intuition," one always denotes

77. [*Ed.*] See above, 1827 *Intro.*, p. 180.

Philosophy does nothing but transform our representation into concepts. The content remains always the same. The true is not for the single spirit but for the world spirit. But for the latter, representation and concept are *one*. The difficult thing is to separate out from a content what pertains only to representation. In its paring away of what pertains to representation, philosophy is reproached for removing the content, too. | This transformation is therefore held to 293
be a destruction. These are the moments that are to be considered more closely. But first we are to consider the characteristics possessed by representation."[78]

In the first place, sensible forms or configurations belong to representation. We can distinguish them by the fact that we call them *images* [*Bilder*]. Those sensible forms for which the principal content or the principal mode of representation is taken from immediate intuition can in general be termed images. We are directly conscious that they are only images but that they have a significance distinct from that which the image as such primitively expresses—that the image is something symbolic or allegorical and that we

78. *Thus An with Hu;* W_1 *(Var) reads (cf. n. 88):* Here then it is quite important in principle to be acquainted with the distinction between representation [on one side] and thought and concept [on the other]—and to know what is peculiar to representation. Philosophy is the transformation of what is found in the form of representation into the form of the concept. The content [of each] is the same and should be the same, i.e., the truth. What is true is [true] for the spirit of the world generally, for the human spirit. This content, this substantial element, cannot be one thing for spirit in its representing and another thing in its conceptualizing [activity].

But insofar as human being thinks, and finds the need to think essential, the same content that is found at first in the form of representation gets elevated into the form of thought. That is where the difficulty comes of separating, in a content, what is content as such, or thought, from what pertains to the representation as such.

The reproaches that are directed against philosophy boil down to this: that philosophy strips off the forms that pertain to representation. Ordinary thinking has no awareness of this distinction; because truth for it is conjoined with these determinations, it supposes that the content has been removed altogether. This is the general point. But it can also be the case that a philosophy has a content different from the religious content of a particular religion; this recasting or translation is usually taken to be a total alteration or destruction.

We have to consider these moments more closely—i.e., what pertains to philosophy and what pertains to the mode of representation as such.

have before us something twofold, first the immediate and then what is meant by it, its inner meaning. The latter is to be distinguished from the former, which is the external aspect. Thus there are many forms in religion about which we know that they are only metaphors. For example, if we say that God has begotten a son, we know quite well that this is only an image; representation provides us with "son" and "begetter" from a familiar relationship, which, as we well know, is not meant in its immediacy, but is supposed to signify a different relationship, which is something like this one. This sensible relationship has right within itself something corresponding for the most part to what is properly meant with regard to God.[79]

So there are many representations that derive from immediate sensible intuition as well as from inner intuition. Thus we soon know that talk of God's wrath is not to be taken in the literal sense, that it is merely an analogy, a simile, an image. The same holds true for emotions of repentence, vengeance, and the like on God's part. Moreover, we also find developed allegories, for instance the stories of Prometheus, who instructs human beings, and of Pandora's box[80]—these, too, are images having a nonliteral meaning. Thus we hear of a tree of the knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] of good and evil.[81] When the story arrives at the eating of the fruit, it begins to become dubious whether this tree should be taken as something
294 historical, as a properly historical tree, | and the eating as historical, too; for all talk of a tree of knowledge is so contrary [to ordinary experience] that it very soon leads to the insight that this is not a

79. *Thus also* W_2; W_1 *(1831/Var?) adds:* But one who relies entirely on sense sticks with his representation and gives little thought to it, and the present-day theologies of feeling and understanding, for their part, also know how to make nothing of it; they either discard the thought-content along with the image, or they hold fast the image and let go the thought.

80. [*Ed.*] The myth of Pandora's box is first given by Hesiod, *Erga* 79–105 and *Theogony* 570–590. But Hegel is not referring directly to Hesiod's version, since he speaks also of Prometheus as the instructor of human beings—an expansion of the Prometheus myth that is not found in Hesiod but for the first time in the literature of the fourth century B.C.

81. [*Ed.*] Cf. Gen. 2:9, 16–17.

matter of any sensible fruit, and that the tree is not to be taken literally.[82]

However, it is not merely things that are manifestly figurative that belong to the mode of representation in its sensible aspect, but also things that are to be taken as historical. Something can be expounded in a historical mode and yet we do not take that to be its serious sense; we certainly do attend to the story with our imagination, but we do not ask whether it is meant seriously. We enjoy the narratives of Jupiter and the other deities, but we do not in the main inquire further about what Homer reports of them to us, we do not take it in the way we do some other historical report. Still, there is also something historical that is a divine history—a story, indeed, that is supposed to be history in the proper sense, namely the story of Jesus. This story does not merely count as a myth, in the mode of images. Instead it involves sensible occurrences; the nativity, passion and death[83] of Christ count as something completely historical. Of course it therefore exists for representation and in the mode of representation, but it also has another, intrinsic aspect. The story of Jesus is something twofold, a divine history. Not only [is there] this outward history, which should only be taken as the ordinary story of a human being, but also it has the divine as its content: a divine happening, a divine deed, an absolutely divine action. This absolute divine action is the inward, the genuine, the substantial dimension of this history, and this is just what is the object of reason. Just as a myth has a meaning or an allegory within it, so there is this twofold character generally in every story. Undoubtedly there are myths in which the outward appearance is the predominant feature. But ordinarily a myth contains an allegory, as in the case of Plato.

Generally speaking, every history contains this external sequence of occurrences and actions; but they are occurrences with respect to a | human being, a spirit. What is more, the history of a state is 295
the action, deed, and fate of a universal spirit, the spirit of a people.

82. *Thus also* W_2; W_1 *(Var) adds:* This is the mode of representation, of the figurative.

83. *Thus An; Hu reads:* birth, death, passion, and resurrection

Histories of this kind already have a universal feature within them, implicitly and explicitly. If we take this superficially, we can say that from every history a moral may be extracted. The moral encapsulates at least the essential ethical powers that have contributed to the action and have brought about the event, and they are the inner or substantial element. So history certainly has this aspect of segmentation, of singularity, of extreme outward individuation; and yet the universal laws and powers of ethical life are also recognizable within it. These universal powers, however, do not exist for representation as such; for representation, history exists in the mode in which it presents itself as story, or the way in which it exists in appearance. But all the same, even for those whose thoughts and concepts have not yet attained any determinate formation, that inner power is contained in a history of this kind. They feel it, and have ˜an obscure˜[84] consciousness of those powers. Thus the historical as such is what exists for representation, and on the other hand there are images. For ordinary consciousness, for consciousness in its ordinary formation, religion exists essentially in these modes, as a content that primarily presents itself in sensible form, as a series of actions and sensible determinations that follow one another in time and then occur side by side in space. The content is empirical, concrete, and manifold, its combination residing partly in spatial contiguity and partly in temporal succession. But at the same time this content has an inner aspect—there is spirit within it that acts upon spirit. To the spirit that is in the content the subjective spirit bears witness—initially through a dim recognition lacking the development for consciousness of this spirit that is in the content.

In the second place, however, nonsensible configurations also belong to representation. The spiritual content as it is represented in its simple mode—an action, activity, or relationship in simple form—is of this kind. For instance, the creation of the world is a representation. God himself is this [sort of] representation. God,

84. *Thus W; L reads:* a thinking *Hu reads:* although obscurely, a

after all, is the universal that is determined within itself in manifold ways. In the form of representation, however, God is in this simple manner in which we have God on one side | and the world on the 296
other. Again, the world is internally this endlessly manifold complex, or the complex of this endlessly manifold finite reality. But when we say "world," we have it in the simple mode of representation. Now we say "the world is created," and designate thereby a kind of activity completely different from an empirical activity.[85]

Every spiritual content and all relationships generally—of whatever sort they may be (sovereign, court of judgment, etc.)—are representations; spirit itself is a representation. Though they do indeed proceed from thought and have their seat and soil in thought, they are all still representations on account of their form. For they are determinations that are related simply to themselves, that are in the form of independence. In saying, "God is all-wise, wholly good, righteous," we have fixed determinations of content, each of which is simple and independent alongside the others. The means for combining the representations are [the words] "and" and "also." On the other hand determinations such as "all-wise" and the like are concepts, too. But to the extent that they are not yet analyzed internally and their distinctions are not yet posited in the way in which they relate to one another, they belong to [the realm of] representation.[86] What we say is, "something happens," "change occurs," or "if it is this, it is also that, and then it is in this way." Thus these determinations have, to begin with, the contingency that

85. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* If we employ the expression "activity from which the world arises," it is indeed an abstraction, though one that is tailored to representation and still not a concept; for the coherence of the two sides is not posited in the form of necessity. Instead it is either expressed according to the analogy of natural life and events, or designated as the sort of coherence that is supposed on its own account to be wholly one of a kind and inconceivable.

86. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* Thus, insofar as it is not something figurative, sensible, or historical, but rather something spiritual, something thought, the content of the representing activity is taken in its abstract, simple *relation to itself.* Insofar as such content contains manifold determinations within itself in any case, the connection of this manifoldness is taken in a merely external fashion by representation, and therefore only an external identity is posited.

297 gets stripped away from them only in the form of the concept.[87]

Because the form of feeling stands over against that of representation, and because feeling concerns the form of subjective faith whereas representation on the contrary concerns the objective aspect or the content, there arises here, too, a relationship of representation to feeling. Representation concerns the objective side of the content, whereas feeling concerns the manner in which the content exists within our specific being, or within the specificity of consciousness. It is true that religion is a matter of feeling, but it is also just as much a matter of representation. Thus the question can directly arise: "Should we begin from representation, and are religious feelings awakened and determined through it, or should we begin on the other hand from religious feeling, and do religious representations proceed from it?"

If we begin from feeling, making it the first or original factor, then we say that religious representations derive from feeling. From one point of view that is entirely correct, for the feelings contain this enveloped subjectivity. But feeling is, on its own account, so indeterminate that everything possible can be within it, and, as we have seen, feeling cannot be the justifying [criterion] for the content.

87. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W_2, though in a different sequence):* The essential content stands fast by itself in the form of the *simple universality* in which it is enveloped. Its passing over through itself into another, or its identity with the other, is lacking, for it is only identical with itself. The single items lack the bond of necessity and the unity of their distinction. Hence as soon as representation makes a start at grasping an essential connection, it also lets it stand in the form of contingency, and does not advance to its genuine in-itself and to its eternal, self-permeating unity. For example, the thought of providence is in representation in this way, and it draws the movements of history together and grounds them in God's eternal decree. But this very connection is straightaway transferred into a sphere in which it is supposed to be incomprehensible and inscrutable for us. Therefore the thought of the universal does not become determinate within itself, and is no sooner expressed than it is instantly sublated again. *Precedes in W_2 (MiscP):* Or if the representation contains relationships that are already closer to thought—for example, that God created the world—the relationship is nevertheless grasped by it in the form of contingency and externality. Thus in the representation of the creation, God remains by himself on one side and the world on the other. *Follows instead in W_1 (Ed?):* These determinations are clearly and explicitly considered, to the extent that we pass over to a higher level and first of all take up together and compare the two sides considered previously.

In its objectivity the content appears first as representation; this is the more objective mode in which it is present within consciousness. In this connection we do not have to discuss the relationship of subject and object exhaustively. We need only to recall here in a general fashion | something that in one way we know very well, 298
namely that whatever I hold as true, whatever ought to be valid for me, must also be in my feeling, must belong to my being and character. The highest peak of subjectivity is the certainty that I have about something. This certainty is found in feeling, although it can also be in another form. But feeling is still nothing justificatory, for everything possible is capable of being in feeling. If what is in feeling were true just for that reason, then everything would have to be true: Egyptian veneration of [the sacred bull] Apis, Hindu veneration of the cow, and so on.

In contrast, representation already contains more of the objective—that which constitutes the contents or determinacy of feeling. This content is what matters, for it must justify itself on its own account. That it should legitimate itself, or offer itself to cognition as true, therefore falls more on the side of representation.

Regarding the necessity of representation and the path through representation into the heart, we know that religious instruction begins with representation. By means of doctrine and teaching the feelings become aroused and purified; they are cultivated and brought into the heart. But this bringing of feelings into the heart essentially has the other aspect also that its original determinacy lies in the nature of spirit itself. It is still another question whether the deteminacy lies implicit in one's essence, or whether one knows from it what one essentially is. Representation is necessary for it to come to feeling and to consciousness, for it to emerge into consciousness and be felt. Instruction and teaching belong to this [process of] representation, and religious formation everywhere begins from this point.

4. Thought

What now holds our closer interest is *thinking*—the stage at which what is properly objective comes under consideration. We have an immediate certainty of God; we have faith in him and feeling and

representations of him. But we also have this certainty in thought, and here we call it "conviction." Conviction involves grounds, and
299 these grounds essentially exist only in thought. ¦

a. The Relationship of Thought and Representation

We have therefore still to consider the form of thought from the side [of representation], and first of all to give an account of how thought differentiates itself from the form of representation.

As we last said above, representing holds all sensible and spiritual content in the mode in which it is taken as isolated in its determinacy. Under the sensible content we have sky, earth, stars, color, and the like, and with respect to God we have wisdom, benevolence, etc. But the general form of thought is *universality,* and universality even played a role in representation, for that has the form of universality within it, too. We take the expression "thinking" in this respect, insofar as thinking is reflective or still more is comprehending—not merely thought in a general sense, but rather insofar as it is first reflection and then concept.

The first point, therefore, is that thought dissolves this form of the simple, in which the content is found in representation, ˜in such a way that˜[88] distinct determinations within this simple reality are grasped and exhibited so that it is known as something *inwardly manifold.* To inquire after the concept of a thing is to inquire after the relationship of the distinct determinations within the thing itself. We have an instance of this as soon as we ask, "What is that?" Blue, for example, is a sensible representation. If we ask, "What is blue?" it is first set before our eyes so that we may obtain the intuition. The intuition is then already contained within the representation. However, with that question we also want to know

88. *Thus L, similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads (cf. n. 78):* and that is the very reproach that is usually directed at philosophy, when one says that it does not allow the form of representation to subsist, but instead alters it or strips away the content. And because for ordinary consciousness the truth is conjoined to that form, one supposes that when the form is changed the content and the subject matter are lost, and one declares that the recasting is a destruction. When philosophy transposes what is in the form of representation into the form of the concept, there does certainly emerge the difficulty of separating, in a content, what is content as such or thought from what belongs to representation as such. But to dissolve the simple reality of the representation principally means only [that]

the concept, to know blue in its relationship to itself, in its distinct determinations, and in their unity. Thus according to Goethe's | 300
theory blue is a unity of light and darkness, and that in such a way that the darkness is the ground and the cause of opacity while the light is an illuminating element, a medium through which we see this darkness.[89] The sky is dark and dim whereas the atmosphere is bright; through this bright medium we see the blue darkness. That is the concept of blue. The representation of blue is quite simply blue; the concept of blue is first of all a representation of distinct determinations [and afterwards] a unity of them.

If we now ask, "What is God?" or "What is justice?" we still have these representations at first in the form of simplicity. But when we think them, different determinations should be given of which the unity, their sum so to speak or more exactly their identity, constitutes the object. The determinations of this unity exhaust the object. But if we say that God is just, omnipotent, wise, and gracious, we can go on in this way without ceasing. The Orientals say that God has an infinite number of names, that is, of characteristics; what God is cannot be exhaustively expressed. If we are therefore supposed to grasp God's concept, then distinct determinations have to be given and this multitude of characteristics has to be reduced to a restricted set, so that the object may be completely exhausted by means of this restricted set of distinct characteristics and their unity.

[90]In representation, however, the distinct characteristics stand on their own account; they might either belong to a whole or be placed outside one another. In thought the simple character is resolved into distinct determinations, or else those determinations that lie outside one another are compared in such a way that what comes to consciousness is the contradiction of the very factors that are at

89. [*Ed.*] This theory, presented in his *Zur Farbenlehre* (Tübingen, 1810), pp. 57–59, is one product of Goethe's speculative studies in natural science. See Goethe, *Theory of Colours*, trans. Charles Lock Eastlake (1840; reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1970), §§ 151, 155.

90. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W):* Insofar as something is thought, it is put in relation to an other. The object is known inwardly as a relation of distinct elements to one another, or as a relation of itself to an other that we know externally to it.

the same time supposed to constitute a unity. If they are mutually contradictory, it does not seem that they could belong to *one* content. The consciousness of this contradiction and its resolution belongs to thought. When we say that God is both gracious and just, we require no deliberation to come to the conclusion that benevolence contradicts justice. It is the same when we say that God is
301 omnipotent and wise, the power in the face of which everything disappears or does not exist—this negation of everything determinate is a contradiction of the wisdom that wills something determinate, the wisdom that has a goal and is the limitation of the indeterminacy that omnipotence is. It is this way with many things. In representation everything has its place peacefully alongside everything else: the human being is free and also dependent; there is good in the world and there is evil as well. In thought, on the contrary, these things are drawn into mutual connection, and thus contradiction becomes visible.

The precise category that enters in along with thought is *necessity*. In representation there is a space. Thought demands to know the necessity of it. In representation there is [the content] "God is." Thought requires to know why it is necessary that God is. This necessity lies in the fact that in thought the object is taken not as having being, not just in its simple determinacy, its pure relation to itself, but essentially in relation to an other, so that it is essentially a relation of distinct elements. We call something "necessary" when, if one [element] exists, the other is thereby posited. The first only exists determinately insofar as the second exists, and vice versa. For representation the finite is "what is." But for thought the finite is at once just that sort of thing which does not exist on its own account, but instead requires something else for its own being and exists by means of an other. For thought generally, and more precisely for comprehension, there is nothing immediate. Immediacy is the principal category of representation, where the content is known in its simple relation to itself. For thought there is nothing immediate but only the sort of thing in which mediation is essential.[91]

91. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W)*: Such are the abstract, universal characteristics, the abstract distinction between religious representing and thinking.

b. The Relationship of Immediate and Mediated Knowledge

If we relate this [distinction] to our field [of interest], then all the forms that we have [considered thus far] belong to the side of representation. The more precise question with reference to our object here is whether knowledge of God, i.e., religion, is | an 302
immediate or a mediated knowledge. Mediated knowledge emerges more nearly in the form of the so-called proofs for God's existence [*Dasein*].

God is. ˜We spoke of this statement in connection with immediate knowledge.˜[92] But because we have now passed over to the determination of thought and so to that of necessity, a knowledge of necessity or of mediation enters in, a knowledge that requires mediation in any case, and includes it. This knowledge comes in as opposed to immediate knowledge, faith, feeling, and the like. ˜Thus it is in this respect that we have to address this issue.˜[93]

It is a very widespread view or tenet that knowledge of God is found only in an immediate mode; the question about this seems in contemporary culture to be the most interesting one. We say that it is so, that it is a fact of our consciousness,[94] that religion or the knowledge of God is only faith. Mediated knowledge is ruled out; it corrupts the certainty and security of faith as well as its content.[95]

We may remark here in advance that thought, i.e., concrete thought, is a mediated knowledge. Mediated knowledge is knowl-

92. *Thus B; L (1827?) reads (similar in* W_1*):* Until now we have spoken of this statement (which we took at first as fact) only as of a form of the knowledge of God, which we have so far only described [by saying]: religion is knowlege of God and knowledge that God is.

93. *Thus B;* W_2 *(Var) reads:* and it is to be considered initially in terms of this antithesis.

94. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* We have a representation of God and in addition the certainty that the representation is not just within us subjectively but also exists. It is said

[*Ed.*] The reference to "facts (*Tatsachen*) of consciousness" is found initially in Fichte; see his *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung*, 2d ed. (Königsberg, 1793), p. 15 *(Gesamtausgabe* 1:140). But since Fichte later criticized the mere appeal to such facts, it is possible that Hegel's criticism is directed not against Fichte but rather against similar phrases in Jacobi (see above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15) and his disciples. See esp. K. Köppen, *Ueber Offenbarung, in Beziehung auf Kantische und Fichtische Philosophie*, 2d ed. (Lübeck and Leipzig, 1802), pp. 17, 115 ff.

95. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* Here we have the antithesis of immediate and mediated knowledge.

edge of necessity regarding the content. But immediacy and mediation of knowledge, the one as well as the other, are both equally one-sided abstractions. We do not here assume or hold the opinion that correctness or truth should be attributed to either of them by itself in isolation. We shall see subsequently that true thought or comprehension unites both of them within itself and does not exclude either. To mediated knowledge belongs conclusion from one
303 thing to another, dependence, conditionality of one | determination upon another, i.e., the form of reflection. Immediate knowledge removes all distinctions, these modes of coherence, and has just one simple thing, just one coherence, namely the subjective form or the knowing [itself], and so the determinacy of the "it is." It is therefore the coherence of myself with being. To the extent that I assuredly know that God is, the knowledge is my own being, is the coherence of myself with this content. As certainly as I am, so certainly God is, too.[96]

In considering immediate knowledge in a more explicit and specific way, we do not want to begin with speculative considerations; at first we only want to take up the issue itself in an *empirical* fashion. That means we must place ourselves at the standpoint of immediate knowledge. "Immediate knowledge is empirical knowledge."[97] I find the representation of God within myself; that is an empirical [datum]. The standpoint requires that one should not go beyond this empirical knowledge, for only what is found within consciousness is supposed to have validity. I should not inquire why the knowledge of God is found within me. I do not ask why I find it or in what way it is necessary, for that would lead [me] to cognition. And the assertion is that cognition is the very evil that has to be kept at a distance. What accordingly presents itself is the empirical question of whether there is an immediate knowledge.

We deny that there is because, as we have already shown, there

96. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* My being and the being of God are *one* nexus, and being is the connection. This being is something simple and at the same time something twofold. In immediate knowledge this nexus is wholly simple, for all modes of relationship are wiped out.

97. *W (Var) reads:* In general this is what we call empirical knowledge: that I know just this, that it is an actual fact of consciousness.

is no mediated or immediate knowledge in isolation. [98]The object is mediated knowledge, to which the knowledge of necessity belongs. What is necessary has a cause; it must be, and there is essentially something other as well through which it exists. Inasmuch as this other exists, the first itself exists; here we have a nexus of distinct things. Now the mediation can be merely finite and can be grasped in a merely finite manner. The effect, for example, is taken to be something that is on one side, and the cause as something that is on the other. | The finite is something that is dependent upon 304
something else.[99] In contrast, the higher mediation, the mediation of the concept or of reason, is the concept's mediation with itself. This cohering of two things belongs to the mediation of reason; it is a coherence such that the one [term] exists only insofar as the other exists.

Now when we claim to have immediacy of knowledge, mediation is excluded. Whatever else immediacy involves, this is the first thing to be said. We speak of an "immediate existence." But even though we empirically relate ourselves [to the world] only in external fashion, there is still nothing at all that is immediate. There is nothing to which only the determination of immediacy is applicable to the exclusion of mediation; instead what is immediate is likewise mediated, and immediacy itself is essentially mediated. It is the nature of finite existences to be mediated. It is the nature of every thing, of every individual, to be mediated. Every thing such as a star or an animal is created or generated, it exists. If we say of a human being that he is a father, then the son is mediated and the father appears as the immediate; but in that he is begetter, he himself is also something begotten. In the same way every living thing, in that it is a begetter, is defined as something originative and immediate; but nevertheless it is itself something begotten and therefore mediated.

98. *In B's margin:* 25 May 1827

99. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* and does not exist in and for itself; something else pertains to its existence. Human beings are physically dependent and so have need of external nature, of external objects. We posit these things through ourselves, though they appear to have being independently of us, and we can prolong our lives only so long as they exist and are utilizable.

Immediacy means being in general; being, or this abstract relation to self, is immediate to the extent that we remove relationship. But if we posit being as one side of a relationship, then it is something mediated. Thus the cause is cause only to the extent that it has an effect, and therefore the cause is mediated, too. Hence when we define an existence as such, which is one of the sides within a relationship, as the effect, then what is relationless, namely the cause, is recognized as the sort of thing that is mediated. Everything that is immediate is also mediated. This is a most paltry and trivial insight, had by everyone—that everything which exists *is*, to be sure, but only is as something mediated (first of all the finite, for we are not yet speaking of mediation with self). But it *is mediated*, is relative, is essentially a relationship; some other is necessary to
305 its being, | to its immediacy. To that extent it is mediated. The logical is the dialectical—where being, considered as such on its own account, turns out to be the untrue, even turns out to be nothing; and the next determination, the truth of being, is becoming. Becoming is a simple representation relating itself to itself, something wholly immediate, although it contains within itself the two determinations, being and nonbeing. What becomes already is, although in another sense it is not but only comes to be for the first time. Thus becoming is mediated, although it is also immediate insofar as it is a simple thought. Only book-learning wrestles with immediacy. It is an inferior understanding which believes that there, in immediacy, one has something independent as opposed to something mediated.

It is the same with immediate knowledge, a particular mode or type of immediacy. For there is no immediate knowledge. We distinguish an immediate knowledge from a mediated knowledge. Immediate knowledge is knowledge in which we do not have any consciousness of mediation; but mediated it is. We have feeling, and that seems to be immediate; we have intuition, and it appears under the form of immediacy.[100] If we consider an intuition, then

100. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W)*: But if we are dealing with thought-determinations, then we must not stop at this point in the way it initially occurs to us; we must rather ask whether in fact this is the case.

first I am the knowing or intuiting, and second I know an other, an object—"I have knowledge only by means of the object."[101] I am mediated in sensation, and only through the object, through the determinacy of my sensing.[102] Knowing is quite simple; but I must know *something*, for if I am only knowing, then I know nothing at all. Similarly, I must see *something*, for if I am pure vision, then I see nothing at all. Therefore the universal or knowing, a subjective element, belongs together, in the second place, with an object, something determinate. There is a subjective element and a content in all knowledge. It is essentially a relation | of distinct things to one 306
another, and this essentially contains a mediation. With immediate knowledge, therefore, it is the case that there is no such thing. If someone tells us that immediate knowledge is the true knowledge, then we must first see what this brings to mind—and it is evident that immediate knowledge is an empty abstraction, pure knowing.[103]

But it is more specifically the case in regard to religious knowledge that it is essentially a mediated knowledge. In whatever possible religion we may find ourselves, we know that we have been educated within this religion and have received instruction in it. This instruction and education provide me with a knowledge that is mediated through doctrine. Moreover, if we speak of positive religion, then the religion is revealed, and indeed revealed in a manner that is external to the individual. So faith in this religion is essentially mediated through revelation. In rejecting mediation, therefore, one manifestly rejects along with it whatever the revealed element is in a positive religion[104]—one rejects instruction, educa-

101. *Thus B, similar in Hu; L (1827?) reads (similar in W):* or, if it is taken not as something objective but as something subjective instead, a determinateness.

102. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* There is always a content present to which two aspects belong.

103. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* This pure knowing can be termed immediate, for it is simple. But if knowledge is actual, then both knower and known are present, and hence relationship and mediation, too. But it is not permissible to consider knowledge as real and genuine just because it is mediated; knowledge that is *only* mediated is likewise an empty abstraction.

104. [*Ed.*] This stress on the importance of the "positive" (historically mediated) dimension of religion is characteristic of the 1827 lectures. It is introduced again at the beginning of Part III.

tion, etc.[105] We can, to be sure, draw this distinction here and consider revelation or education as an external condition by means of which religion can indeed be implanted within me, but which I have transcended if I have faith. In that case the education is behind me, just as the revelation is also a thing of the past for us. Religion exists only within self-consciousness; outside that it exists nowhere. We might now discuss how far it is justifiable to abstract from such mediation. Even if we regard the mediation as a thing of the past, the kind of determinations we have just now called external conditions must still always belong to the actuality of religion nonetheless, and hence they are essential and not contingent.

But if we now look back to the other, inward, aspect and abstract from, or forget, the fact that faith or conviction is something me-
307 diated, | we are in the position of considering the inward aspect by itself. The assertion of immediate knowledge bears especially upon this point. "We know God immediately; this knowledge is a revelation within us." That is an important principle to which we must essentially hold fast. It implies that ˜neither positive revelation nor education can˜[106] bring about religion in such a way that religion would be something effected from outside, something mechanically produced and placed within human beings. Knowledge of religion is certainly necessary, for that mediation belongs to it. It must not be considered as something mechanical, however, but as a *stimulation* [*Erregung*] instead. Plato's ancient saying is apropos here: that we learn nothing, but only recollect something that we originally bear within ourselves.[107] Taken in an external and nonphilosophical way, this means that we recollect a content that we have known in a previous state [i.e., before this present life began]. That

105. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* These circumstances of doctrine and revelation are not contingent or accidental, but essential. They do, of course, concern an external relationship, but not one that is unimportant just for the reason that it is external.

106. *Thus B; L reads:* positive revelation alone cannot *Hu reads:* neither revelation nor education can *An reads:* instruction cannot *W (Var) reads:* positive revelation cannot thus

107. [*Ed.*] See Plato *Meno* 81c–d.

is its mythical presentation. But its implication is that religion, right, ethics, and everything spiritual in human beings, is merely aroused [*erregt*]. We are implicitly spirit, for the truth lies within us and the spiritual content within us must be brought into consciousness.

Spirit bears witness to spirit. This witness is spirit's own inner nature. It involves the important specification that religion is not mechanically introduced into human beings but lies within them, in their reason and freedom generally. When we abstract from the condition of being aroused, and consider what this knowledge is and how this religious feeling and self-revelation in the spirit is constituted, then, like all knowledge, it is immediacy, to be sure; but it is an immediacy that equally well contains mediation within itself. The immediacy of knowledge by no means excludes mediation.

As an example we can further cite the fact that something can seem wholly immediate, yet be the result of mediation. What we actually know we have immediately before us—say a mathematical result. It was arrived at by many intermediate steps, though it finally appears as something that one knows immediately. It is the same with drawing or with performing music, each being a result of practice or something mediated | by an endless number of actions. 308
This is true of every skill and so on.[108] But when we consider *religious* knowledge more specifically, then it is indeed an immediate knowledge. When I represent God to myself, then I have God immediately before me. Yet mediation is also contained in this simple, immediate relation. First, I am the knower, and second, there is an object, which is God. My knowing God is in general a relationship, and therefore is something mediated. I am a knower and a religious believer only through the mediation of this content, through this object. We cannot point to anything at all that does not contain mediation within itself.

108. *L (1827?) adds:* Thus immediate knowledge proves to be a result. This is a simple psychological consideration that we do not remember in the context of that view.

c. Religious Knowledge as Elevation to God[109]

If we thus consider religious knowledge more closely, it proves to be not only this simple connection of myself with my object, but is something inwardly much more concrete instead. This total simplicity, this knowledge of God, is inwardly a movement; more precisely, it is an *elevation to God.* We express religion essentially as an elevation, a passing over from one content to another. It is the finite content from which we pass over to God, from which we relate ourselves to the absolute, infinite content and pass over to it.

The characteristic nature of mediating is what is determinately expressed in the passing over. This passage is of a double kind. First it is a passing over from finite things, from the things of the world or from the finitude of consciousness and from this finitude in general that we call "we"—or, as this particular subject, "I"—to the infinite, to this infinite being more precisely defined as God. The other kind of passing over has abstract aspects that relate to a more profound and more abstract antithesis."[110] Here the one aspect is defined as God or the infinite in general as it is known by us (therefore as a subjective content), and the other aspect, to which
309 we pass over, | is determinacy as something objective in principle

109. [*Ed.*] If the *being* of God is what is at stake in the various forms of the *knowledge* of God, and if the task of thought, as the highest form of knowledge, is to demonstrate the *necessity* of what is known in the mode of immediacy and representation at earlier stages, then it is not surprising that the primary task of thought with reference to God is to demonstrate the necessity of God's "existence" (*Dasein*), although in the strict sense, from Hegel's point of view, God cannot be said to "exist" (see below, n. 111). Such demonstration constitutes the cognitive dimension of the "elevation to God," which Hegel characterizes in 1821 as intrinsic to the religious relationship when viewed speculatively (cf. *Ms.* Sec. B.3). Religion is no mere passive receptivity but an active passing over to the infinite, a passage that occurs above all by means of thought.

This section is exceptionally long because Hegel gathers into it his version of the proofs, which in the earlier lectures were considered in relation to the concept of God in the specific religions—the cosmological proof being implicit in the religions of nature, beauty, and sublimity; the teleological proof, in the religion of purposiveness; and the ontological proof, in the revelatory religion. This gathering has the advantage of logical, speculative precision, but it loses the phenomenological matrix in which the proofs were first considered.

110. *Thus L, W; Hu reads:* to more profound and more abstract laws.

or as actual being. In the former passage the common element is *being*, for this content common to both sides is posited as finite and infinite [respectively]. We can represent being to ourselves as a straight line that is determined on one side as finite. The passage occurs from this side to the other or infinite side. Being remains common to both sides. The passing over is simply the fact that the finite disappears. In the second passage the common element is the *infinite*, which is posited in the form of the subjective and the objective. These are the forms that were formerly called the *proofs of God's existence.*[111]

[112]Knowledge of God is in principle mediation, because here there

111. [*Ed.*] That is, the cosmological and teleological proofs in the first case, and the ontological proof in the second. Here and elsewhere in this section, in deference to the tradition, Hegel uses the expression *Dasein Gottes*, although in the strict sense God cannot be said to "exist" or have "determinate being." (The literal sense of *Dasein* is "there-being"; in the *Logic*, pp. 109 ff. [*GW* 11:59 ff.], Hegel defines it as "determinate being" [*bestimmtes Sein*]. Our translation of *Dasein* as "existence" blurs whatever distinction Hegel may have intended between it and the term foreign to German, *Existenz*, which he also sometimes uses.) God "is" (*ist*), he "has being" (*seiend*) in and for himself, absolutely, or is utterly "actual being" (*das Seiende*); but only finite being "exists" (*existiert*) or has being in a determinate, limited, worldly sense (*Dasein*). When the tradition speaks of the "existence of God" (*Dasein Gottes*), it does so representationally or figuratively; but conceptually it is more appropriate to speak of the "being of God" (*Sein Gottes*), and the distortion of speaking of God's "existence" must be removed from the proofs if they are to be grasped rationally. (See the third paragraph below and n. 132 below. See also the Editorial Introduction.) God as the universal does, to be sure, have existence (*Existenz*), says Hegel (see below, p. 433), but we normally understand this representationally as finite existence (i.e., as *Dasein*), whereas we must be clear that God's *Existenz* is infinite and that therefore he is *subject* but not something *subjective*. (Here the distinction between *Existenz* and *Dasein* is important.) It is another matter, though, if one wishes to argue that concrete, determinate existence *also* belongs to or is included within the concept of the absolute: in order to be itself, the absolute becomes something other than itself, positing an actual finite world in which it determines and particularizes itself and from which it returns to itself "spiritualized" or "existentialized," as it were, because it encompasses finitude within itself (although as negated, sublated). In this sense reference to the "existence" (*Dasein*) of God may not be entirely inappropriate, but it is properly grasped only from the point of view of the religion of incarnation, the Christian religion, and is an aspect of the ontological proof, which is associated with this religion (see below, pp. 436 ff.).

112. *In B's margin:* 28 May 1827 *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W):* The relationship of knowing God has therefore now to be considered within itself. Knowing is relationship, and is mediated within itself either through another or inwardly.

obtains a relation between myself and an object, God, who is something other than I am. Where a relation of distinct things is present, and one of them is essentially related to the other, the relation is called mediation. One is this and the other is something else, so that they are distinct from one another; they are not immediately identical, not one and the same. God and I are distinct from one another. If both were one, then there would be an immediate self-relation, one without mediation and without relation, i.e., a unity without distinction. In that the two are distinct, each one is not what the other is. But if they are nevertheless connected, or have identity at the same time in their distinctiveness, then this identity itself is distinct from their distinct being; it is something different from both of them because otherwise they would not be distinct.[113]

The mediation accordingly is in a third [term] over against these two distinct sides, and is itself a third that brings them together and in which they are mediated and are identical. Here we have the familiar relationship of the syllogism, in which there are two distinct [terms] and a unity in which both of them are posited as one through a third. Hence it is not only obvious but inherent in
310 the matter itself that, whenever we speak of knowing God, | our discourse at once takes the form of a *syllogism*.[114] For this reason the form of the knowledge of God occurs more specifically in the form of the *proofs of God's existence*. The knowledge of God is presented in this way as a mediated knowledge, for what is abstractly just One is what is unmediated. The proofs present the knowledge of God because this knowledge contains mediation within itself, and the mediation is religion itself, or the knowledge of God;[115] and this mediated knowledge, the explication of the proofs of God's existence, is the explication of religion itself.

113. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* Both are distinct, for their unity is not they themselves. That in which they are one is that in which they are not distinct. But they are distinct. Therefore their unity is distinct from their distinctness.

114. *W (Var) adds:* Both are distinct, and there is a unity in which both are posited in one through a third [term]: that is the syllogism. Hence we have to discuss more precisely the nature of the knowledge of God, which is mediated essentially within itself.

115. *An adds:* the cultus being [for now] excluded from it;

Still, this form of proof does, to be sure, involve some distortion, and it is in order to exhibit this distortion that this knowledge is itself looked at as a series of proofs. This distortion has been the target of [philosophical] criticism; but the one-sided moment of the form that this knowledge has does not bring the whole matter to naught. On the contrary, our task is to restore the proofs of God's existence to a position of honor by stripping away that distortion. When we hear the expression "proofs of God's existence," it brings in straightaway the possibility that some distortion is involved in it. There is talk of God and his "existence" [*Dasein*]; "existence" is determinate, finite being—and *Existenz*, too, is used in a determinate sense. But God's being is in no way a limited being. It would be better to say, "God and his being, his actuality or objectivity." The demonstration has the aim of showing us the coherence between the two determinations [God and being] because they are distinct, not because they are immediately one. Everything is immediate in its relation to itself, God as God, being as being. What is demonstrated is that these initially distinct things also cohere together and are identical—though they do not have an abstract identity, which would be sameness and hence immediacy.

To show coherence means in general to prove. The coherence can be of different kinds, and the proof leaves this difference undefined. For instance, there is a coherence that is *wholly external* or mechanical. We see that a roof is necessary to the walls, because the house has this characteristic protection against weather and the like. The purpose is | what links the walls with the roof, and we 311
can therefore say it is proved that a house must have a roof. This is no doubt [logically] coherent, but we are aware at the same time that the coherence of the walls with the roof does not affect the being of these objects. Or again, the fact that wood and tile make up a roof does not concern their being, and is for them a merely external nexus.[116] But there are also [types of] coherence that are *involved in the thing* or the content itself. This is the case, for

116. *Follows in W (Var)*: What is involved here in "proving" is the showing of a coherence between determinations of a kind for which the nexus itself is external.

instance, with geometrical figures. "The three angles in a triangle add up to two right angles."[117] That is a necessity of the thing itself, whereas beams and stones are what they are even without being joined together. In the triangle the connection is not of the kind where the coherence is external; in this case, rather the one [term] cannot be without the other, for the second is directly posited along with the first. But the proof that we give for this, or the kind of insight [we have] into this necessity, is distinct from the coherence that the determinations have within the thing itself. The procedure that we follow in demonstration is not a process of the thing itself—it is something other than what is involved in the nature of the thing. We draw auxiliary lines. But it would not occur to anyone to say that, in order to have three angles equal in magnitude to two right angles, a triangle should adopt the procedure of extending one of its sides, and that only by that means would it arrive at this determination. That, by contrast, is the path of our insight; the mediation through which we pass and the mediation in the thing itself are separate from one another. Construction and proof serve only as an aid to our subjective cognition; they do not constitute the objective mode by which the thing attained this relationship through mediation. It is indeed a subjective necessity, but not the coherence or mediation within the object itself.

With regard to the knowledge of God, to the internal coherence of God's determinations and the coherence of our knowledge of God and of God's determinations, this type of demonstration is
312 directly unsatisfactory | on its own account. In this procedure of subjective necessity we start from certain initial definitions that are already familiar to us. There are assumptions or initial conditions, for example that the triangle or the right angle is given. Definite [logical] connections are presupposed, and we then show in proofs of this kind that if there is one determination then the other is, too. That is, we make the result dependent on given specifications al-

117. *Thus Hu, similar in An; L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* In the case of the right triangle there is also present the determinate relationship of the square on the hypotenuse to the squares on the shorter sides.

ready present. What we arrive at is represented as something dependent upon assumptions.[118]

In the application of this model [*Vorstellung*] of demonstration to the formulation [*Vorstellung*] of proofs of God's existence, what appears at once is the inappropriateness of wishing to exhibit a coherence of this kind in the case of God. This appears particularly in the first procedure, which we called the elevation of the finite to God, so that (if we embrace the process within the form of the proof) we have a relationship in which the finite is the foundation from which the being of God is demonstrated. In this [logical] nexus the being of God appears as a consequence, as dependent upon the being of the finite. This is the distortion, that this progression that we call "proving" is unsuited to what we represent to ourselves under [the name] "God"—for God is, of course, precisely the nonderivative, he is utterly actual being in and for itself. But if we now suppose that, by pointing this out, we have shown this procedure as a whole is vacuous, then this, too, is a one-sided view—and one that directly contradicts the universal consciousness of humankind. For what this nexus contains when we strip away that *form* of demonstration is the elevation to God, and the proofs are nothing more than a description of the self-elevation to God. It is because of the Kantian critique of reason that these proofs of God's existence have been discarded, consigned so to speak to the rubbish heap.[119]

[120]Human beings consider the world and, because they are thinking and rational beings (since they find no satisfaction in the contingency of things), they elevate themselves from the finite to absolute necessity. | They say that, because the finite is something contingent, 313
there must be something necessary in and for itself which is the

118. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* As sheer demonstration for understanding, the geometrical proof is undoubtedly the most perfect example. It is the demonstration for understanding that is carried through most consistently, so that one thing is in fact exhibited as dependent upon an other.

119. [*Ed.*] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 611–658.

120. *Precedes In L (1827?):* We will take into account later what is false and what is omitted in this description.

ground of this contingency.[121] Human beings will always go through this concrete procedure so long as they have religion, and will conclude that, because there are in the world living things, each of which organizes itself internally for the sake of its vitality as such and is this sort of harmony of its different parts, and because all these living things in like manner need external objects, such as air and the like, which are independent of them and which, without being posited by them, harmonize with them in their turn—because of this, some inner ground of these harmonies must be present. There is this one harmony in and for itself; this presupposes an activity through which it has been produced, a being that acts purposively. ˜This universal procedure is involved in the present demonstration of God's existence; it is not upset by criticism of this demonstration, for it is necessary.˜[122]

[123]Against the proofs of God's existence it is also said that they do not lead to inner and strong conviction.[124] The proofs leave us cold, for we are dealing with objective content and can see well enough that if this is the case, then so is that, but the insight remains something external only. This is a deficiency only for subjective cognition, since what also comes into prominence is the fact that in the proof we have a cognition concerning something external. But when this procedure is said to be too objective and to produce only a cold conviction (whereas conviction must be in the heart), then the deficiency is expressed from the opposite side. What is

121. *L*, W_1 *add (Var):* This is the course of human reason, or of the human spirit. W_2 *(Var) adds further:* and this proof of the existence of God is nothing but the description of this elevation to the infinite.

122. *Thus Hu, similar in An; L (Var) reads (similar in W):* This is what we call "admiring the wisdom of God in nature," or this marvel of the living organism and the harmony of external objects with it. Human beings raise themselves up from this harmony to the consciousness of God. We are mistaken when we suppose that, because their form is attacked, the proofs of God's existence have become antiquated with respect to their content. But the content is, of course, not presented in its purity. *W adds:* We can even draw attention to this deficiency.

123. *In B's margin:* 29 May 1827

124. [*Ed.*] Hegel apparently alludes here not to a specific work but to a complaint about the proofs heard fairly commonly at his time. See, e.g., F. Köppen, *Ueber Offenbarung, in Beziehung auf Kantische und Fichtische Philosophie*, 2d ed. (Lübeck and Leipzig, 1802), pp. 52–53, 139.

more precisely involved in this reproach is the demand that this procedure of demonstration should rather be *our own elevation,* that our spirit or heart ought to elevate itself, that we | ought not 314
merely to behave as if we were considering a nexus of external determinations. No, the feeling and believing spirit, the spirit as a whole, ought to be elevated. Spiritual movement, the movement of our own selves and our will, ought to be there in the demonstration, too—and this is what we are missing when we say that it is an external nexus of determinations. This is the deficient feature.

There are two determinations present, which are conjoined—namely, God in general or the indeterminate representation of God, and being. These two are to be united—being is to be exhibited as the being of God, and God is to be exhibited as having being. Inasmuch as there are two determinations, so that a progression occurs, we can therefore begin from being and pass over to God, or begin from God and pass over to being. Because this procedure has been characterized as elevation, the immediate beginning is pure being, and the result is the union of both determinations as the knowledge that *God is.* When we consider this first procedure, which we have called elevation, then the form of the proof of God's existence contains the proposition: Because there is something finite, there must also (on that account) be something infinite and not bounded by an other, or an absolutely necessary essence. The finite is what is not inwardly its own ground, it is what is contingent; there must therefore be something that is not in turn grounded in an other.[125]

Human beings certainly follow this procedure within their own spirit; it exhibits itself more precisely as the following mediation. We have a consciousness of the world as an aggregate of endlessly many contingent phenomena, of many singular objects that determine themselves for us as finite. When our consciousness or our thought is enveloped in the form of feeling or of devotion, then the movement of our spirit is that the finite has for it no truth but is something contingent; it is a being, to be sure, but one that in fact

125. [*Ed.*] Hegel orients his presentation of the cosmological proof largely toward Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 632 f.

is only a nonbeing. This nonbeing of the finite in positive form is inwardly affirmative; this affirmative nonfinite is the infinite, it is absolute being, and to begin with we have only this definition for God. Thus there is here a mediation of finite and infinite. But the essential point is that, in its departure from the finite, the mediation ˜negates this finite in the elevation, does not allow it to subsist. The finite has a negative determination; the affirmative element is the
315 infinite, absolute being.˜[126] |

So if we therefore consider this mediation more precisely in its moments, then distinct determinations are present, which have to be gone through: immediate existence, the existence of mundane things, and God. The point of departure is the finite; the most proximate determination is that the finite is not genuine, it has no genuine being, it is negative.[127]

To begin with, therefore, we have the negative aspect, the negation of the finite, the fact that it is its inner nature to be contradiction, i.e., not to be but rather to destroy itself—it is self-sublation. In its speculative significance and form this proposition is treated in logic.[128] But we are also convinced of it per se, and can therefore address a challenge to ordinary consciousness: that finite things have the characteristic of perishing—their being is the sort that directly sublates itself. Accordingly we have at first only the negation of the finite. The second [determination] is that this negation of the finite is also affirmative. There is a spurious affirmation that consists in the repetition of the finite, in the fact that it only brings forth again the finite that was there before, with the result that one finite thing posits another, and so on unto the spu-

126. *Thus B with Hu; L (Var) reads:* does not merely negate this finite in the elevation but also allows it to subsist. The finite has indeed no truth, for in it as finite there is essentially negation. The infinite, however, is the affirmative of the finite, it is absolute being.

127. *L (1827?) adds:* The third [determination] is that this negation of the finite is itself affirmation, and is therefore infinite, absolute being.

[*Ed.*] *L* apparently construes *nächst* to mean "next" rather than "nearest" or "most proximate," as we have done. What *L* designates as the *third* determination is identical with what is described as the *second* determination in the main text below.

128. [*Ed.*] Cf. *Science of Logic*, esp. pp. 137–138 (*GW* 11:78–79).

rious infinite. Heraclitus said that everything is changeable, everything flows.[129] In this there is only a progression from negation to ceaseless transformation; this affirmation would be an accumulation of nongenuine existences in which change would be the ultimate feature. This intermediate form is taken into consideration in logic; here this much can be said, that by it the finite is changed not one whit. For the finite is indeed the sort of thing that changes itself and passes over into an other, although this other is in turn something finite. Another thing becomes another thing; both are therefore the same. The one is the other, for the one is the finite and the other is the finite. In this way the other coincides with itself; it comes to itself and the negation is superseded. The passing over into an other, or this spurious affirmation, is the spurious progress of the finite; it is simply the tedious repetition of one determination; but the true affirmation is already contained within it. The finite changes itself; it appears as an other, [and so] | other comes to other. 316
What is the case here is that both are the same. The other coincides with itself and in the other comes to itself, to its equality with itself, to its connection with itself. This is the affirmation, this is being. Genuine transition does not consist in change, in perennial alteration. Instead *the genuine other of the finite is the infinite,* and this is not bare negation of the finite but is affirmative, is being. That is the quite simple consideration involved here. This affirmative process is the process of our spirit; it brings itself about unconsciously within our spirit; but philosophy is having the consciousness of it. We bring the same thing to pass when we raise ourselves up to God. Thus the infinite itself is at first something finite or negative. The second [moment] is that it is something affirmative. There is a progression through different determinations, and it is by no means an external one but is rather necessity itself. This necessity is the deed of our spirit.

If we compare this inner mediation with the proofs for God's existence, the distinction is as follows. In the proofs it is argued

129. [*Ed.*] Heraclitus's words are transmitted by Plato and Aristotle. See Plato, *Cratylus* 402a, Aristotle, *De caelo* 298a29 ff., *Metaphysics* 987a33 f. and 1078b14 f. On the "spurious infinite" (*schlechtes Unendliche*), see n. 128.

that, because the finite is, for that reason the infinite is, too. What is expressed here, therefore, is that the finite is; this is the point of departure, the foundation. From this arises the objection against these proofs that they are said to make the finite into the foundation for the being of God. The finite is an abiding point of departure, and in this procedure the being of God is mediated through the being of the finite. In our procedure, on the contrary, the conclusion is rather as follows. In the first place there is indeed the finite. But in the second place, because the finite is not, is not true in itself but is rather the contradiction that sublates itself, for *that* reason the truth of the finite is this affirmative element that is called the infinite. Here there is no relationship or mediation between two elements each of which *is* [abides]; for rather the point of departure sublates itself; there is a mediation that sublates itself, a mediation through the sublation of mediation. The infinite does not constitute merely one aspect. For the understanding there are, in the mediation, two actual beings: on this side there is a world and over yonder there is God, and the knowledge of the world is the foundation of the being of God. But through our treatment the world is relinquished as a genuine being; it is not regarded as something permanent on this side. The sole import of this procedure is that *the infinite alone is;* the finite has no genuine being, whereas God has only genuine
317 being. [130]This is a | distinction that relies upon the most wholly refined abstractions; but they are precisely the most universal categories within our spirit. That is just what makes it important to be cognizant of the distinction, in order not to be mistaken in regard to it.

The principal objection to this procedure rests upon the erroneous determination that the finite is and endures. This criticism is also expressed in the following way. There is no passage from the finite to the infinite, no bridge between the two. We are these limited natures [*Wesen*]; hence we cannot with our consciousness get across

130. *Precedes in L (1827?):* The first [element], which is our starting point, does not abide but rather relinquishes itself, is sublated. That is the point on which everything turns. The first [element], the starting point, sublates itself.

the abyss, we cannot grasp the infinite.[131] The infinite is just infinite, and we are finite, for our knowledge, feeling, reason, and spirit are limited and persist in their limitedness. But this talk is already contradicted in what has been said. It is undoubtedly correct that we are limited; so we are not talking about the limitedness of nature but about the dependence of reason. However, it is equally correct that this finite element has no truth, and reason is precisely the insight that the finite is only a limit. But inasmuch as we know something as a limit, we are already beyond it. The animal or the stone knows nothing of its limit. In contrast, the I, as knowing or thinking in general, is limited but knows about the limit, and in this very knowledge the limit is only limit, only something negative outside us, and I am beyond it. We must not have such absurd respect in the presence of the infinite. The infinite is the wholly pure abstraction, the initial abstraction of being according to which limit is omitted—a being that relates itself to itself, the universal within which every boundary is ideal, is sublated. Therefore the finite does not endure, and inasmuch as it does not endure, there is also no longer a gulf present between finite and infinite, [they] are no longer two. Because the finite vanishes into a semblance or a shadow, it therefore also admits of no passage to infinity. The starting point is certainly the finite, but spirit does not leave it subsisting. This is the more precise development of what is called knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is this very elevation.[132] 318

131. [*Ed.*] Hegel here touches on the old problem of the *finitum (non) capax infiniti*, which had become a decisive issue in his time in light of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Jacobi's insistence on the *non capax* (Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:56). See also Schelling, *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus*, (1795), (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/1:308 ff., 314 ff.); and *Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre* (1796–1797) (Sämtliche Werke 1/1:367–368).

132. [*Ed.*] In the last paragraphs Hegel again touches on a theme found in the 1821 and 1824 lectures, which we have described as a "speculative reversal" in the relationship between the finite and infinite. While the finite is the starting point, it itself does not serve as the ground for passing over to the infinite, which would then appear to be a result. Rather the finite negates or sublates itself, cognizes its own nonbeing in knowing its limits, and thus also knows the infinite as not simply "one aspect" but as the whole, that which overreaches both finite and infinite, includes

[133]At this point we can also make some historical observations. The first of the familiar proofs of the existence of God is the *cosmological,* where the starting point is the contingency of the world. Here the affirmative element is defined not merely as the infinite in general but rather—in direct antithesis to the determination of contingency—as the absolutely necessary or, represented as subject, as the absolutely necessary essence. Hence some even more specific determinations enter in, and these proofs can in principle be multiplied by the dozen; every step of the logical idea can serve this purpose, for instance [the step] from essence to the absolutely necessary essence.[134]

Absolutely necessary essence, taken in the general or abstract sense, is being not as immediate but as reflected into self, as essence. We have defined essence as the nonfinite, as the negation of the negative—"a negation that we call the infinite."[135] So the transition is not made to abstract, arid being but to the being that is negation of the negation. Therein lies the distinction. This being is the dis-

negation within itself, and thus alone truly is. What appears to be the result develops a "counterthrust" and shows itself to be "the first and alone true" (cf. 1824 *Concept,* p. 322). Or, as Hegel describes it metaphorically in the 1821 lectures, the progression from finite to infinite is like "a stream flowing in opposite directions" (*Ms. Concept,* n. 115). It is by means of this insight that Hegel proposes to restore the proofs to a position of honor by divesting them of distortion—the distortion that finitude is the ground from which God's "existence" is demonstrated. The "elevation" to God is not an autonomous self-elevation of finite spirit into what could only be aspurious infinite, but, speculatively expressed, the return of true and infinite spirit, i.e., absolute spirit, to itself.

133. [*Ed.*] From this point to the end of the section, both editions of the *Werke* print the 1827 text as an appendix to the "Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God" at the end of volume 2. Hegel gave these lectures in the summer of 1829 and was preparing them for publication when he died in 1831. His treatment of the proofs in the 1827 and 1831 philosophy-of-religion lectures is obviously closely related to the separate series of lectures on this topic—a topic that increasingly occupied him during his last years in Berlin. But there was no justification on the part of the editors of *W* for taking the philosophy-of-religion material out of its original context.

134. [*Ed.*] An exact account of a transition of this kind, i.e., from essence to the absolutely necessary essence, is not given in the *Science of Logic.* Hegel is probably thinking of the development of essence to absolute necessity (cf. esp. p. 552 [*GW* 11:391]).

135. *Thus B; L (Var) reads (similar in W):* a negative that we call the finite.

tinction that takes itself back into simplicity. Involved within this essence is the determination of ˜what is distinguished; but it is a determining of what is distinguished as it relates itself to itself, a self-determining. Negation is determination. Negation of determination is itself a determining.˜[136] Where there is no negation, there is also no distinction, no determination. Determination is posited together with the positing of distinction, for without that there would be only affirmation and not negation. So determining in general is involved in absolute being, or in the unity of the essence; it lies within it and is therefore self-determining.[137] Distinction does not come into it from outside, for this unrest lies within it as being itself the negation of the negation. More precisely, it determines itself as *activity*. This self-determination of the essence within itself, namely the positing of the distinction and its sublation in such a way that it is an action, | and that this self-determining remains in 319
simple connection with itself, is inward *necessity*.[138]

[139]The *physicotheological* or *teleological* proof is another formulation in which this same mediation is the foundation; i.e., the proof is the same with regard to its formal characteristics, but the content is more extensive. Here, too, there is finite being on one side, though it is not just abstractly defined, or defined only as being, but rather as being that has within it the more substantial determination of being something physically alive. The elaboration of this proof can be made very wide-ranging, because the more detailed determination of the living thing is apprehended to mean that there are purposes within nature and an [overall] arrangement

136. *Thus B with L; W (Var) reads:* the distinction—negation of the negation—but as it relates itself to itself. But such a thing is what we call self-determining. Negation is determination, and negation of the determination is itself a determining, a positing of a distinction; determination is posited right along with it.

[*Ed.*] See above. n. 25.

137. *W (Var) adds:* Thus it is determined as determination within itself.

138. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* Finite being does not remain an other, for there is no gulf between infinite and finite. Finite being is what sublates itself, so that its truth is the infinite, is actual being in and for self. Finite, contingent being is the intrinsically self-negating; but this its negation is equally the affirmative, and this affirmation is the absolutely necessary essence.

139. *In B's margin:* 31 May 1827

that, though suited to those purposes, is not at the same time brought forth by means of them, so that the arrangement comes forth independently on its own account. (In another definition it is also purpose, but in the sense that the [living thing] met with previously shows itself to be compatible with that purpose.)

The physicotheological mode of treatment involves the consideration of merely external purposiveness.[140] Hence it has come into disrepute, and deservedly so; for in that mode we are thinking of finite ends that require means, and the process of specification goes on forever. For example, human beings have needs; they require any number of things for their ˜animal˜[141] life. If we assume that such ends are primary and that means for their satisfaction are available, but that it is God who allows the means for these ends to arise, then any such consideration soon shows itself to be inadequate to what God is and unworthy of God. For to the extent that these ends are divided up and specialized, they become something unimportant on their own account, something for which we have no regard and which we cannot represent to ourselves as direct objects of God's will and wisdom. This attitude of mind, which thus turns into something trivial, is captured in one of Goethe's
320 satirical epigrams, | where the creator is extolled for creating a bottle and also the cork tree in order to have a stopper for it.[142]

With regard to the Kantian philosophy we should observe that in his *Critique of Judgment* Kant led thought back to the important concept (which he himself established) of *inner purposiveness*—i.e.,

140. [*Ed.*] Cf. Kant's *Critique of Judgment,* §§ 61 ff., for the background of this discussion of purposiveness in nature. See especially §§ 63, 66, and 82 for the distinction (that Hegel draws below) between the inner purposiveness of organic beings and the merely external purposiveness of nature expressed in the notion of utility or expediency. Kant defines "physicotheology" as "the attempt on the part of reason to infer the supreme cause of nature and its attributes from the *ends* of nature—ends which can only be known empirically"; from which he distinguishes "moral theology" or "ethicotheology," which is "the attempt to infer that cause and its attributes from the moral end of rational beings in nature—an end which can be known *a priori*." See *Critique of Judgment,* § 85.

141. *Thus W; L reads:* moral

142. [*Ed.*] See the *Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1797,* ed. Friedrich Schiller (Tübingen), Epigram no. 202, "Der Teleolog." Cf. Schiller, *Werke: Nationalausgabe,* vol. 1 (Weimar, 1943), p. 311, no. 15.

the concept of *organic life*.[143] This is also Aristotle's[144] concept of nature [according to which] every living thing is a *telos* that has its means implicit within it—i.e., its members and its organization. The operation of these members constitutes the *telos* or purpose, its organic life. This is *nonfinite* purposiveness in which end and means are not external to one another—the end brings forth the means and the means brings forth the end. The principal determination is that of organic life. The world is alive; it contains organic life and the realms of organic life. At the same time the nonliving (inorganic nature, such as sun and stars) exists in an essential relation with the living, with human beings insofar as they are living nature on the one hand, and insofar as they themselves devise particular purposes on the other. This finite purposiveness falls within human [experience].

That is the definition of organic life generally, but [in the form of] extant, worldly organic life. The latter, to be sure, [aims at] being *inward* vitality, *inward* purposiveness; but at the same time it [achieves this] in such a way that every singular living thing and its species is a very narrow sphere, a very limited nature. The proper progression, then, is from this finite organic life to absolute organic life, to universal purposiveness—such that this world is a *cosmos*, i.e., a system in which everything has an essential connection to everything else and nothing is isolated. The cosmos is something internally ordered in which each thing has its place, is embraced within the whole, subsists by means of the whole, and is in the same measure active and effective for the generation and life of the whole. Thus the main thing is the movement away from finite ends toward a universal organic life, toward the one purpose that articulates itself in particular ends—so that this particularization exists within harmony, within a reciprocal and essential relation.

143. [*Ed.*] The discussion in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Part II, Critique of Teleological Judgment, concerns the unique reciprocal causality between the parts and the whole that is characteristic of living things, i.e., the evidently purposive structure inherent in organic beings. To keep this feature firmly in view the biologically (though not philosophically) redundant term "organic life" is sometimes used for *Lebendigkeit*, which means literally "vitality" or "liveliness."

144. [*Ed.*] See Aristotle *Physics* 2.8–9, esp. 199a21–32.

God is initially defined as the absolutely necessary essence. As Kant already noted,[145] however, this definition is by no means sufficient for the concept of God. Certainly God alone is absolute necessity; but this definition does not exhaust the concept of God,
321 | and the definition [in terms] of organic life or of one universal life is already as much nobler as it is more profound. Since "life" is essentially something living and subjective, this universal life is also something subjective, a soul, Νοῦς. Soul is thus contained within universal life; it is the determination of the one, all-disposing, governing, and organizing Νοῦς. This is as far as the teleological proof goes initially.

With regard to its formal aspect, we should recall the same point in the case of this proof as we did in that of the preceding one. That is to say, the transition is not in truth concluded in the following manner (as the understanding supposes): Because there are arrangements and purposes of this sort, therefore there is a wisdom coordinating and disposing all things. The transition is simultaneously an elevation that equally includes the negative moment (which is the main thing), specifically that this living thing in its immediacy, and hence these purposes as they exist in their finite organic life, are not the true. Instead their truth is really that one organic life, the one Νοῦς. There are not two distinct forms, for the initial starting point does not persist as the foundation or condition. Instead the untruth or negation of the initial point is contained in the passage away from it, i.e., the negation of the negative or finite aspect in it, of the particularity of life. This negation is negated, for in this elevation finite organic life disappears and, as truth, the object of consciousness is the system, the Νοῦς of the one organic life, the universal soul.

But here again it is the case that the [resulting] definition is still not yet adequate for the concept of God: "God is the one universal activity of life, the disposing soul bringing forth, positing, and or-

145. [*Ed.*] Hegel is probably alluding to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 614–615, also B 639. In these passages Kant's interest lies, of course, in the link between the concept of the absolutely necessary being and the concept of the most real being. Cf. also B 660–661. Cf. also Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 85 ff., 91 n.

ganizing a cosmos."[146] The concept of God contains essentially the determination that God is *spirit*. We can make the transition, then, in such a way that this being [*Wesen*] who governs the world is a cause sundered from the world, is a wise being. But "cause" and "wisdom" are further specifications that strictly do not yet occur at this point; the highest feature that emerges from the determination of finite organic life is just the very universality of organic life, the Noῦς. That is as far as the content involved in the starting point goes.

The third and most essential form of this transition, the one which from this point of view is absolute, has still to be considered. We noted just now | that the content of the transition is organic 322
life; similarly in this third form the content that lies at its foundation is *spirit*. If we wanted to convey the transition in the form of an inference, we would have to say: Because there are finite spirits (i.e., the being that is the starting point here), therefore the absolute, infinite spirit is, and here we arrive at the definition of God as spirit. But this "because" or this solely affirmative relationship in turn contains a deficiency, in that finite spirits would be the foundation and God the consequence of the existence of the finite spirits—and this is the distortion again. The negative aspect of the finite spirits must be negated. For that reason the genuine form is as follows: there are finite spirits. But the finite has no truth, for the truth of finite spirit and its actuality is instead just the absolute spirit. The finite is not genuine being; it is implicitly the dialectic of self-sublating or self-negating, and its negation is affirmation as the infinite, as the universal in and for itself.[147] It is surprising that this transition was not specified in the proofs of God.

146. [*Ed.*] It is not certain whether this formulation of the results of the physicotheology refers to Hegel's own formulation given at the end of the second paragraph above, or to a specific text, and, if so, which one. The idea of an all-disposing Noῦς is found since Anaxagoras, the idea of the world-soul since Plato (e.g., *Laws* 896–899). See Schelling, *Von der Weltseele* (Hamburg, 1798) (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/2:345 ff.). In terms of content, Hegel's criticism of the proof of God in physicotheology corresponds to that given by Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*, § 85, which provides the occasion for his advancing to moral theology.

147. W_2 *(Var) adds:* This is the highest transition, for here the transition is spirit itself.

With reference to this relationship we could take account of what is called *pantheism.* But we have already stated[148] that a pantheism in the strict sense has never been propounded. "Pantheism" means "all is divine," and amounts to the notion that every thing taken singularly is God—this [snuff] box or the pinch of snuff.[149] What is meant by this absurd label is that God is thought of as substance, and the finite is thought of in terms of accidents of the divine substance. I said that finite organic life is not the true; rather, the truth of finite spirit is absolute spirit, so it is this negation of spirit on the one hand, while on the other hand it is absolute spirit. For Spinoza the absolute is substance, and no being is ascribed to the finite; his position is therefore monotheism and acosmism. So strictly is there only God, that there is no world at all; in this [position] the finite has no genuine actuality. Our modern babblers, however, cannot break free from the view that finite things as well as God have actual being, that they are something absolute. But as for *our* transition, we have the finite as our starting point; and it turns out to be something negative, the truth of which is the infinite,
323 | i.e., absolute necessity or, by a more profound definition, absolute vitality, or spirit. In this [their] relation comes about as I have exhibited it, but still without any determination whether absolute spirit in its relationship to the finite has being as *substance* only or as *subject,* and whether finite spirits are effects or accidents of the infinite. This last is certainly a distinction, but it does not deserve so much fuss. The main thing is whether the absolute is defined as substance, or as subject and spirit. "Those who speak of pantheism are wanting in the simplest categories of thought."[150]

We have set being and God in opposition. Insofar as we begin from being, then according to its initial appearance being is immediately the finite. But inasmuch as there are these determinations,

148. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 375.

149. [*Ed.*] Hegel used snuff. At this point he probably held up his snuffbox and took a pinch.

150. *Thus B; L (Var) reads:* However, that is not yet pertinent here. In our consideration of spirit we will see that subjectivity is an essential feature of spirit.

we are equally well able to begin from God and to pass over to being.[151] When we begin from God, the starting point or God is posited in finite form, of course, because it is not yet posited as identical with being and represented as having being [absolutely]; for a God who *is not* is something finite, and not genuinely God. The finitude of this relation is that it is subjective: God [is here defined] not as *subject* but as something *subjective.* God, this universal in general, does indeed have existence [*Existenz*], but, in terms of our representation, only this finite existence. This is one-sided. We have God or this content as afflicted with the one-sidedness and finitude that is called *representation* of God. It is our interest that representation should strip away this blemish of being merely something represented and subjective, and that the definition for this content should become that of *being.*

We are to consider this second aspect of the mediation as it occurs within the finite form of the understanding as the *ontological* proof. This proof passes over from the concept of God to the being of God. The ancients, i.e., Greek philosophy, did not have this transition; even within the Christian era it was not accomplished for a long time, because it involves the most profound descent of spirit into itself. One of the greatest Scholastic philosophers, the profoundly speculative thinker Anselm of Canterbury, | grasped this 324
representation for the first time in the following way. We have the representation of God. But God is no mere representation, for God *is.*[152] How then are we to accomplish this passage, how are we to gain the insight that God is not merely something subjective within us? Or, how is the determination of being to be mediated with God? For being and God are two different things.

151. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* ("We are able"—though we shall see later, in [discussing] the concept of God, that then there is no talk of "being able," for God is absolute necessity.)

152. [*Ed.*] See Anselm's well-known proof in his *Proslogion,* chap. 2: "Well then, Lord, you who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may understand, as much as you see fit, that you exist as we believe you to exist, and that you are what we believe you to be. Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought. . . . For it is one thing for an object to exist in the

The Kantian critique has directed itself against this so-called "ontological" proof, too[153]—and, in a manner of speaking, it emerged triumphant in its day. Right up to the present the assessment is that all these proofs for God have been refuted as empty efforts of the understanding. But just as the preceding proofs are elevations to God, or the action of spirit (more precisely the peculiar activity of thinking spirit, which humanity will not renounce), so it is with this proof. In reference to the historical aspect we saw that the ancients did not have this transition. Only when spirit has grown to its highest freedom and subjectivity does it grasp this thought of God as something subjective and arrive at this antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity.

[154]Anselm expressed the mediation in the following way. A feature of the representation of God is that God is absolutely perfect (a very indeterminate expression).[155] We can say that on the whole that is quite correct. But if we hold fast to God only as a representation, then what is merely represented is something deficient and not what is most perfect. For that which is perfect is something that is not merely represented but also *is, actually* is. Therefore,

mind, and another thing to understand that an object actually exists. . . . And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-*cannot*-be-thought is that-than-which-a-greater-*can*-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality." Eng. trans. by M. J. Charlesworth in his *St. Anselm's Proslogion* (Oxford, 1965).

153. [*Ed.*] Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 620–630. Kant's criticism of course does not bear directly upon the argument in the form in which Anselm presented it.

154. *In B's margin:* 1 June 1827

155. [*Ed.*] In his proof, Anselm does not speak of God as "absolutely perfect" in the way that Hegel here implies. Rather he calls God "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought" (see n. 152), or (though not in the context of the proof) "that-which-is-greater-than-can-be-thought" (*Proslogion*, chap. 15). In other places he uses equivalents for "absolutely perfect," such as "supreme good" (*Proslogion*, Preface), but not as premises of the proof. Hegel's criticism of the indeterminacy of Anselm's expression adopts the criticism already advanced by Gaunilo in his *Response*.

because God is that which is perfect, God is not only a representation, for actuality and reality belong to God as well. The Kantian critique objects first to the abstract universal, namely that the concept of God is presupposed, that it is taken as point of departure, and reality (i.e., being and thought) is supposed to be deduced or "plucked" from the concept itself.[156]

In the subsequent and more extensive elaboration of Anselm's thought by understanding, it was said that the concept of God is that God is the quintessence of all reality, the most real essence.[157] Now being is also a reality; so being also belongs to God. The objection to this is | that being is no reality,[158] is not part of the 325
reality, of a concept. The reality of the concept means the concept's determinateness of content; through being, however, nothing is added to the content of the concept. If we have some content and define it, for instance that gold has a certain specific gravity, then this feature is one of its realities. To this accrues further the yellow color and the like, as other realities of the concept. Hence Kant constructed this plausible case. I represent to myself a hundred dollars.[159] The concept or the determinateness of content is the same

156. [*Ed.*] Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 631: "To attempt to extract from a purely arbitrary idea the existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural procedure and a mere innovation of scholastic subtlety." Hegel's *herausgeklaubt* ("plucked") and Kant's *ausklauben* are more colorful expressions, suggesting an even more high-handed procedure than Kemp Smith's "extract," for which there are a number of ordinary German words.

157. [*Ed.*] A reference to the concept of the *ens realissimum;* cf. also Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 624 ff. Hegel may be using "most real essence" as analogous to "most perfect essence" (*ens perfectissimum*), which was more predominant in the tradition to which he is referring. See Descartes, *Meditations*, chap. 3; or Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars posterior, § 6. The designation of God as *ens realissimum* as distinguished from *ens perfectissimum* is found, among other places, in Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§ 806, 810.

158. [*Ed.*] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 626: "'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves."

159. [*Ed.*] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 627: "A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express

whether I represent the determinateness to myself or have the money in my pocket. Using the hundred-dollar example we can also restate plausibly the objection to the first Anselmian form of the argument, according to which being is supposed to follow from the concept in general, namely the objection that concept and being are distinct from one another, that each is on its own account, and that being must be introduced from without or from elsewhere because it does not lie within the concept. The concept of a hundred dollars has no bearing whatever on the existence of the money. This is therefore the criticism directed against the ontological proof; it is what has counted as valid until now. Thus the main issue is whether being lies within the concept and may be deduced from it.

To these objections there is the following rejoinder. In ordinary life we do indeed call a representation of a hundred dollars a concept. It is no concept, however, but only a content-determination of my consciousness; an abstract sensible representation such as "blue," or a determinacy of the understanding that is within my head, can of course lack being. This sort of thing, however, is not to be called a concept. We must take the concept as such, we must take the absolute concept in its consummate form or the concept in and for itself, the concept of God—and this concept contains being as a determinacy.

The concept is what is alive, is what mediates itself with itself; one of its determinations is also being. This can be shown very easily in two ways. First, as far as the concept is concerned, it is immediately this universal that determines and particularizes itself—it is this activity of dividing, of particularizing and determining itself, of positing a finitude, negating this its own finitude and being identical with itself through the negation of this finitude. This is the concept as such, the concept of God, the absolute concept;

the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept."

this is just what God is. As spirit or as love, God is this self-particularizing. God creates the world and produces his Son, posits an other to himself and in this other has himself, | is identical with 326
himself. This is the case in the concept as such, and even more so in the idea: through the negation of the particularizing (for which particularizing the concept itself is equally the positing activity) the concept [comes] to be identical with itself or to relate itself to itself.

If we further inquire what being is—this attribute, determinacy, or reality that we are under such necessity to know as united with the idea of God—then we must reply as follows. "Being is nothing more than the inexpressible or the conceptless; it is not the concrete, which the concept is, but is wholly and only the abstraction of relation to self." Whatever is, is; it relates itself to itself. We can say that it is *immediacy*. Being is the immediate as such, and conversely, the immediate is being and is in relation to self—which means that mediation is negated. This definition of "relation to self" or "immediacy" is now directly explicit in the concept in general, and in the absolute concept or in the concept of God; it is the wholly abstract and most meager definition that God is relation to self. This abstract relation to self lies directly within the concept itself, and logic begins with it. [160]To that extent being is different from the concept, because it is not the entire concept but is only one of its determinations, only this simplicity of the concept (the fact that it is by itself, or is identity with self, relation merely to self). This is the simple insight, that being is within the concept. Thoughtlessness concerning being prevails to the point that it is asserted that being is not within the concept. It is indeed different from the concept, but only as a determination of the concept. Thus this determination is immediately within the concept. "Concept" must not be exchanged for "representation" as we do in ordinary life.

[161]The other [way of proving that the concept of God involves

160. *Precedes in L (1827?):* One must directly have this simple insight.

161. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W):* Being is therefore this determination found within the concept, but different from the concept because the concept is the whole, whereas being is only one determination.

being] would be as follows. We have said that the concept contains this determination in itself; it is *one* of the concept's determinations. But being is also different from the concept because the concept is the totality. Insofar as they differ, mediation also belongs to their
327 union, | for they are not immediately identical. All immediacy is true and actual only insofar as it is inwardly mediation, and, vice versa, all mediation is true only insofar as it is inwardly immediacy or has relation to itself. The concept is different from being, and the difference is of the kind where the concept is what sublates the difference.

The concept is this totality, the movement or process of self-objectifying. The concept merely as such, as distinct from being, is something merely subjective; that is a deficiency.[162]

To grasp the movement of the concept as activity is a task that clearly belongs to logic. Still we can at least make it palpable. First we must cease thinking of the concept as such as something that we only have or form within ourselves. The concept is the purpose of an object, the soul of the living thing. What we call soul is the concept, and in spirit and consciousness the concept as such comes to existence as free concept, or in its subjectivity—as distinct from its reality in itself. The sun or an animal only *is* the concept but does not *have* the concept. The concept does not become objective for them. There is not this separation [of being and having] in the sun or in the animal; but in consciousness there is what is called the "I," the existing concept, the concept in its subjective actuality, and I, this concept, am the subjective. But no human being is satisfied with a bare selfhood; the I is *active*, and this activity is a self-objectifying, the giving of actuality and determinate being to oneself. In its further and more concrete determination this activity of the concept (already in the animal and then also in the I or in spirit) is what we call a *drive*. Every satisfaction of a drive is for the I this

162. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* The concept is, however, the deepest and the highest thing; it is the nature of every concept to sublate its deficiency, its subjectivity, this difference from being; it is itself the action of bringing itself forth as having being objectively.

process of sublating subjectivity, and thus positing its subjective or inner being as something likewise external, objective, and real; it is the process of bringing forth the unity of what is only subjective with the objective, of stripping away this one-sidedness from both of them. When I have a drive, that is a condition of deficiency, something subjective. The satisfaction of the drive procures for me my feeling of self. If I am merely in a state of longing | or striving, 328
then I am nothing actual. The striving must come into existence. All the action in the world is a sublating of the subjective and a positing of the objective, and so is the production of the unity of both. There is nothing else of which everything is so illustrative as the sublating of the opposite, and the bringing forth of the unity of the subjective and the objective. To posit itself not only subjectively but also objectively, or even neither subjectively nor objectively—that is what the concept is. Hence on the one hand the concept has in itself this impoverished, abstract determination of being. But inasmuch as it is differentiated—and because it is living it must be differentiated—the concept is just what, as living thing, negates the subjective and posits it objectively.

This, then, is what ought to be called the critique. Anselm's thought is thus a necessary and true thought according to its content; but, as with the preceding modes of mediation, the form of the deductive proof undoubtedly has a deficiency. It presupposes the pure concept, the concept in and for itself, the concept of God, but it also presupposes that this concept at the same time *is,* that it has being. The unity of concept and being is a presupposition, and the deficiency consists in the very fact that it is a mere presupposition, ˜which is not proved but only adopted immediately.˜[163] If we compare this content with that of faith or immediate knowledge, what faith means is that God is a fact of our consciousness,[164] that I have a representation of God and the being of God is bound up with it. What is declared, therefore, is that being, too, is insep-

163. *Thus Hu; W (Var) reads:* —the presupposition that the pure concept, the concept in and for itself, the concept of God, *is,* that it contains being, too.

164. [*Ed.*] See above, n. 94.

arably conjoined with the representation of God. In the case of the concept, being is not supposed to be a mere *esse in idea* [being in thought] but also an *esse in re* [being in fact]. It is thus the same content as Anselm's presupposition. To presuppose means to accept something immediately as primary and unproved. It is the same with faith. ˜As the saying goes, "we know it immediately, we believe in it."˜[165] Therefore since Anselm's day we have come no further in any respect. But, as we said, the defective feature is the fact that this is a presupposition and therefore something immediate, and so
329 one does not recognize | the necessity of this unity. The presupposition is now ubiquitous, even in Spinoza, for he defines God or the absolute cause in no other way. He says that substance is that which cannot be thought without existence [*Existenz*], the concept of which includes existence within itself[166]—in other words, that the representation of God is immediately conjoined with the being [of God]. That is what Anselm said and what is said in the faith of the present day.

Spinoza says that substance includes being within itself. This inseparability of concept and being is only absolutely the case with God. The finitude of things consists in the fact that the concept (and the definition of the concept) and its being according to its definition are different. The finite is that which does not correspond to its concept, or rather to *the* concept. [167]We say that human beings are mortal. We even express that mortality as the ability of body and soul to separate, for body is finite whereas soul is the concept. Here there is separation, but only inseparability is present in the pure concept. We have said that every drive is an example of the concept that realizes itself. By the drive of spirit or of the living thing we must understand not only the formal aspect, but also

165. *Thus B; W_2 (Var) reads:* If we say "we believe that, we know it immediately," this unity of representation and being is expressed as a presupposition just as much as it is by Anselm.

166. [*Ed.*] See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. VII (*Chief Works* 2:48).

167. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W):* We have the concept of soul. Its reality or being is corporeality. *W_1 (Var) adds before this sentence:* Moreover, the [following] ordinary rejoinder has been made to Anselm.

together with it the content of the drive. The satisfied drive is in any case infinite according to its form; but the drive has a content according to which it is finite and limited, and so it does not correspond to the concept, to the pure concept.[168] | 330

C. THE CULTUS[169]

[170]In the second topic that we have dealt with—the *knowledge of God*—I have God as my object and am engrossed therein; the object alone is before me and is a certainty to me, and to that extent alone I know it. Of course I also know the finite from which I set out; but I have passed over from its negation to the knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of God. I have raised myself into this spiritual domain and set myself upon the spiritual soil that is God or the divine. This relationship is therefore *theoretical;* it still lacks the *practical* element, which comes to expression in the cultus.

168. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* This is the explication of the standpoint of the knowledge of the concept. What we have considered finally is the knowledge or certainty of God in general. Its principal characteristic is as follows. If we know an object, then the object is before us and we are immediately related to it. But this immediacy contains mediation—what we have called elevation to God, in that the human spirit deems the finite to be worthless. By way of this negation the human spirit raises itself up to God and joins itself together with God. This conclusion, "I know that God is," or this simple connection, arose through that negation.

After inserting materials from 1824 and MiscP, L appends a passage that purports to be from the 1827 lectures: The first [moment] that we have dealt with was the realm of religion in general, and the second was the knowledge of God. The third, which we have yet to consider, is that negative moment as it occurs in religion, the moment that we call the cultus.

169. *In B's margin:* 14 June 1827

[*Ed.*] The heading is found in *B, An.* In this section Hegel gathers together material found in Sec. A of the *Ms.* and Sec. B.3 of the 1824 lectures, giving it a systematic organization not hitherto achieved. The 1824 "Cultus" treats certain preliminary matters—the question of faith and its grounds, the issue of pantheism—and provides a detailed survey of the various developmental forms that cultic practice assumes in the history of religions, but it does not offer an analysis of the religious cultus in its essential forms, as the 1827 lectures do.

170. *Precedes in L (1827?):* What the cultus is we find already contained in what we have considered in the concept of religion generally.

In the theoretical relationship I am immersed in my object and know nothing of myself.[171] But this knowledge, this connection without relationship, is not the whole of what is in fact present. I stand over against the object with which I am filled. That I am and that I have an object is a reflection upon consciousness; I consider my knowledge of the object: thus I am, and the object is. Thus, inasmuch as I have this reflection—I and the object—there are two elements, and these two are different. In intuition or in the theoretical relationship there is only one object with which I am filled; I know nothing of myself. The true, however, is the relationship of myself and this object.

At this point the practical relationship commences, in which I exist on my own account, I stand over against the object, and I now have to bring forth my own union with it. I have not only to know the object, to be filled, but to *know myself* as filled by this object, to know it as within me and likewise myself as within this object that is the truth—and so to know myself in the truth. To bring forth this unity is *action,* or the aspect of the cultus. This parting of subjectivity and objectivity has its proper beginning first
331 in the practical relationship, in the will; | for in the theoretical domain I am filled by the object.[172] Only here, in the will or in the practical domain, do I exist on my own account, am I free, and related to myself as subject; only now do I stand over against the object. To that extent, limitation first begins within the practical domain, not within the theoretical relationship. It is said that there is unlimitedness in will, that only in knowledge am I limited. But the latter can properly be said of will. In willing I exist for myself; other objects stand over against me and so they are my limit. The will has an end and moves toward this end; it is the activity of sublating this finitude, this contradiction, the fact that this object is a limit for me. In the practical determination there is finitude

171. *L (1827?) adds:* The conclusion of the knowledge of God is an immediate relation. It is also this way with more mundane examples. For instance, I know this paper. In this knowing I am filled by the representation of the paper and in this context know nothing of my own self.

172. *L (1827?) adds:* and do not posit myself over against it. To the extent that I know the object, it is and I am not.

because I exist on my own account as will or subject, and there is another object to which I am directed. Insofar as I act, I have the need to assimilate this object to myself, to sublate my finitude in relation to it, to reinstate my feeling of self. In the state of need I am limited, and the lack appears as the fact that for me the object appears as external.

In the practical domain, therefore, we have an other as object. In religion this object is God, whom we know. Inasmuch as human beings look back upon themselves, this object is an other for them, something lying beyond them. In the theoretical domain they do not reflect upon this antithesis; what is there is this immediate unity, immediate knowledge, faith. In the theoretical domain they include themselves with this object; that is how we can express theoretical consciousness according to its result or its conclusion. In the cultus, on the contrary, God is on one side, I am on the other, and the determination is *the including, within my own self, of myself with God,* the knowing of myself within God and of God within me.[173]

The cultus involves giving oneself this supreme, absolute enjoyment.[174] There is feeling within it; I take part in it with my particular, subjective personality, | knowing myself as this individual included 332
in and with God, knowing myself within the truth (and I have my truth only in God), i.e., joining myself as myself in God together with myself.

The presupposition in the cultus is that the reconciliation of God with humanity is implicitly and explicitly consummated, that it is not a matter of first having to bring this reconciliation about absolutely; instead it only needs to be produced for me, the particular person, because I am actual in the practical domain as this single individual. Participation in this reconciliation that is implicitly and explicitly accomplished is the action of the cultus. Universally, this

173. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* —this concrete unity. For our consideration, theoretical consciousness, too, is concrete consciousness, but only implicitly so; that it should be concrete for the subject also is precisely the practical relationship.

174. [*Ed.*] *Genuss* is the term Hegel uses to describe the communion with deity that is at the center of all cultic activity. At root is the quite physical image of eating and drinking. It also has the connotation of "enjoyment," "pleasure," "gratification."

reconciliation is accomplished; it is the foundation of all religious consciousness.

We have begun with the solid soil of religion, with this substantiality. Implied in it is [the awareness] that God alone is truth, or in a more developed form that God is gracious, has created human beings, etc. The presupposition is that God alone is true actuality, that insofar as I have actuality I have it only in God; since God alone is actuality, I should have my truth and actuality in God. That is the foundation of the cultus.

[175]Today this aspect of the cultus is more or less pushed to one
333 side and no longer stands forth in all its importance; we talk | only of eliciting faith in God within human beings. But it is something outside of religion [altogether], if one wants to elicit it for the first time.[176] We will have occasion later to enlarge upon different forms of this cultus. In dogmatic theology the traditional chapter *de*

175. *Precedes in L (1827?):* It is presupposed either that the reconciliation is accomplished, or that it is implicitly and explicitly present from the outset. Thus among the pagans there is the consciousness of their bliss, the consciousness that divinity is near to them, that the gods are friendly to them.

Precedes in W_2 *(MiscP):* And so, too, if today we have only the perpetual urgency of injecting faith into human beings, and we talk only of eliciting misery within them and therewith the faith that God is, then this is not only not the cultus, but this perpetual wishing just to elicit religion for the first time is [something] outside of religion [altogether]. The cultus, on the other hand, exists within religion; and the knowledge that God is, and is [all of] actuality, is in the cultus the soil to which I have only to assimilate myself. Unhappy the age that must content itself with being forever told only that there may be a God!

Since the cultus, on the contrary, presupposes the being-in-and-for-self of the ultimate goal of the world, but on this presupposition is aligned in opposition to empirical self-consciousness and its particular interests, [W_2 *(1831) continues (similar in* W_1*):*] a world of absolute finitude has not yet set up an absolute infinity over against itself. Thus, among the pagans the consciousness of their bliss prevails, the consciousness that God is near to them as the God of the people and the city, this feeling that the gods are friendly to them and grant them the enjoyment of what is best. If in this way Athena is known by the Athenians as their divine power, they know themselves thus as originally at one with it, and they know the divinity as the spiritual power of their people itself.

176. *L (1827?) adds:* However, the cultus exists only within religion; it is within the cultus itself that God is, and that God is the true actuality, namely this ground. What is elicited by means of the cultus is what was formerly called the *unio mystica*, this feeling, this gratification [*rejoins main text 3d sentence below*]

unione mystica deals with this cultus."[177] As a whole the mystical is everything speculative, or whatever is concealed from the understanding. Feeling—the gratification that I am with God in his grace and that God's spirit is alive within me, the consciousness of my union and reconciliation with God—this is the innermost feature of the cultus.

The first form of the cultus is what is called *devotion* in general. "Devotion is not the mere faith that God is, but is present when the faith becomes vivid, when the subject prays and is occupied with this content not merely in objective fashion but becomes immersed therein; the essential thing here is the fire and heat of devotion. The subject takes part in this way; it is subjectivity that possesses itself therein, that prays, speaks, passes through [and beyond] representations, knows itself and the object itself, and is concerned with its elevation. Devotion is the self-moving spirit, holding to itself in this movement, for this object. This inwardness is devotion in general."[178]

To the cultus belong, in the second place, the external forms through which the feeling of reconciliation is brought forth in an external and sensible manner, | as for instance the fact that in the 334
sacraments reconciliation is brought into feeling, into the here and now of present and sensible consciousness; and [further] all the manifold actions embraced under the heading of *sacrifice*. That very negation, about which our insight (in the case of theoretical consciousness) was that the subject rises above the finite and consciousness of the finite, is now consciously accomplished in the cultus, for here the subject is concerned chiefly with itself.

In the ardor and liveliness of devotion there is indeed a removal of representations—this energy and forcefulness of holding oneself

177. *Thus Hu; L (Var) reads:* In dogmatics we had a *unio mystica.* There is [now] a great aversion to the mystical.

178. *Thus L; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* When the subject, in the fire and the heat of devotion, becomes immersed in the object, it does indeed take part itself; the subject is the very one that possesses itself in this devout enterprise, the one that prays there, speaks, passes through [and beyond] representations, is concerned with its own elevation. But in devotion the subject does not maintain itself in its particularity, but only in its movement within the object and only as this self-moving spirit.

firmly and in active manner within the truth, in opposition to the consciousness with its former interests. Negation exists within devotion and even maintains an outward configuration by means of sacrifice. The subject renounces something or negates something in relation to itself. It has possessions and divests itself of them in order to demonstrate that it is in earnest. On the one hand this negation is accomplished in a more intensive fashion only through the sacrificing or burning of something—even through human sacrifice; on the other hand the sensible enjoyment [of the sacrifice], for instance the eating and drinking, is itself the negation of external things. Thus from this negation or from the sacrifice one advances to enjoyment, to consciousness of having posited oneself in unity with God by means of it. The sensible enjoyment is linked directly with what is higher, with consciousness of the linkage with God.

The third and highest form within the cultus is when one lays aside one's own subjectivity—not only practices renunciation in external things such as possessions, but offers one's heart or inmost self to God and senses *remorse* and *repentance* in this inmost self; then one is conscious of one's own immediate natural state (which subsists in the passions and intentions of particularity), so that one dismisses these things, purifies one's heart, and through this purification of one's heart raises oneself up to the realm of the purely spiritual. This experience of nothingness can be a bare condition or single experience, or it can be thoroughly elaborated [in one's life]. If heart and will are earnestly and thoroughly cultivated for the universal and the true, then there is present what appears as *ethical life*. To that extent ethical life is the most genuine cultus.[179] But consciousness of the true, of the divine, of God, must be directly bound up with it.

To this extent philosophy [too] is a continual cultus; it has as
335 its object the true, and the true in its highest shape | as absolute spirit, as God. To know this true not only in its simple form as God, but also to know the rational in God's works—as produced by God and endowed with reason—that is philosophy. It is part of

179. [*Ed.*] See below, *Religion and State*, n. 1.

knowing the true that one should dismiss one's subjectivity, the subjective fancies of personal vanity, and concern oneself with the true purely in thought, conducting oneself solely in accordance with objective thought. This negation of one's specific subjectivity is an essential and necessary moment.[180] | 336

180. *In* W_2, *and also in shorter form in* W_1, *the following material from the 1831 lectures, which serves as a transition to the treatment of the cultus, is associated with text from the 1824 lectures:* The "I," this empirical existence [*Existenz*] from which essence is of course still distinct, is that which is without essence.

Subjective consciousness itself, however, is a limited, determinate consciousness: i.e., particular spirit. For this particular spirit, for spirit with determinacy, truth, too, exists only in this determinate mode. The way in which subjective spirit is constituted is also the way in which there is objective truth for it.

Consciousness and knowledge themselves, however, lie within God. There is one content, and inseparable from it is the form that consists in this content being the object of consciousness. With consciousness we are in the domain of *particular spirit,* and faith adapts itself to the developmental stages of the spirit and determines itself to another content. Thus it is quite right to talk already to a child about God, its creator, and thereby the child comes to have a representation of God, of a higher being; this higher being is grasped by consciousness in the early years, although only in a limited way, and a foundation of this kind gradually develops further. The *one spirit* is in principle the substantial foundation; this is the spirit of a people in the way it is determined within the individual periods of world history—the *national spirit.* This national spirit constitutes the *substantial foundation* within the individual, for all of us are born within our own people and belong to its spirit. This spirit is what is substantial in general, and is by nature, as it were, what is identical; it is the absolute ground of faith. By this standard it is determined what counts as truth. In this way the substantial element exists for itself as against the individuals; it is their [sovereign] power in its connection with them as individuals, and within this relationship to them it is their absolute authority. As belonging to the spirit of their people, all individuals are thus born into the faith of their forefathers without either being responsible for it or deserving it, and the faith of their forefathers is something holy for them, and is their authority. This constitutes the ground of faith that is given by historical development.

There arises here the question of how a religion is grounded, i.e., in what way the substantial spirit comes to the consciousness of peoples. This is a historical matter; its beginnings are inconspicuous. Those who know how to express this spirit are the prophets and the poets. Herodotus [*Histories* 2.53] says that Homer and Hesiod made the gods of the Greeks for them. On this view Homer and Hesiod have an authority, but that is only because their declarations were in conformity with the Greek spirit. Still earlier beginnings, which were the first glimmer of the divine, preceded even these poets; for we cannot say that the cultural formation as it appears in Homer had been there from the beginning. Awe in the presence of the

Stated in a cursory way, religion is our relation to God. We have said that this relation is found in thinking. God is for thought because God is the universal in and for itself. The primal division
337 [or judgment] of this implicit and explicit | universal, or the creation, is self-particularizing, the differentiating of the particular spirit over

supersensible expressed itself initially in a manner still unrefined. Fear is the beginning, and in order to banish it and to ingratiate themselves with that supersensible power, people employed magical charms and prayed in hymns. In this way consciousness developed little by little, and the few who (at that stage) know what the divine is, are the patriarchs and the priests; or there can even be a caste or a particular family marked out just for the supervision of teaching and worship. Every individual is accustomed to live within these representations and sensations, and so a spiritual contagion spreads among the people; education plays its part, so that the individuals dwell within the atmosphere of their people. Thus the children, suitably attired and adorned, go along to worship; they share in the rites or have their own role to play in them; in any event they learn the prayers and attend to the representations of the community and of the people, taking their own place within these contexts and accepting them in the same immediate way in which standardized styles of dress and the manners of everyday life are transmitted.

This is natural authority, but its power is greatest in the spiritual realm. However much pride individuals may take in their independence, they cannot fly above this spirit, for it is the substantial, it is their very own spirituality itself.

At first this authority is quite constrained and stands fast immediately in the people, without any prohibition of an opposing position. In that situation the single individuals are neither free nor unfree, for no antithesis of reflection or of subjective thought is present at all. We say "the people believed this"; but they themselves do not call it "believing," insofar as this term implies consciousness of an antithesis [to this faith].

There are, however, different forms of faith and different religions that can come into collision with one another. While this encounter *can* occur upon the soil of representation and reflection, and advocacy may be supported by reasons and proofs for the truth, it can also take the form of one people compelling others to acquiesce in its faith. In the latter case faith becomes a compulsory state authority, both within the inner life of the state itself on the one hand, and in its foreign affairs on the other. This collision has precipitated countless wars. Into this category, for instance, fall the wars of the Muslims, and the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants as well as the Inquisition; and further the battles between the devotees of Shiva and those of Vishnu, among the Indians. Such conflicts are fought for the glory of God, so that God will be acknowledged in consciousness and the truth of the people will meet with recognition. Freedom of faith in general rises up against compulsion of this kind; but this freedom can then also assume more sharply the attitude of standing above the different contents that are asserted as the truth. So, in a formal sense this is what freedom of faith as such is; while *what* is believed should remain irrelevant. This is then the formal requirement of freedom, which looks not to the truth of faith and relates only to subjective freedom; the content

against the absolute spirit. The first relationship that we considered was that of knowledge, the theoretical | relationship. The second 338
is the practical relationship or the knowledge of this elevation (and the elevation is itself knowledge). The third moment is the knowing of this knowing. That is actual religion."[181]

may be of whatever stripe one pleases. This is where the distinction arises between the inner self or the locus of conscience in which I am by myself, and the essential content. The inner self is the holy place, the locus of my freedom, which ought to be respected; this is an essential demand that human beings make insofar as the consciousness of freedom is awakened within them. The ground here is no longer the substantial content of faith but its formal aspect.

When we consider the matter in the perspective of abstract thinking, however, freedom of faith appears at once as a contradiction in itself, for in the very act of believing one accepts something given, something already present; whereas freedom demands that this given should be posited or produced by me. But in that requirement of freedom, belief is in fact grasped as my personal faith, as my own most special and inmost certainty. My faith has its source and its locus in this certainty of my self, in my conviction, and I am free on my own account as against others, let the type of my faith itself be what it will; in other words, the definite grounds, reflections, and feelings upon which it is built are irrelevant here. Faith is of course still not free in itself in regard to the content, and it is only thought that seeks to be free with regard to the content, too.

Here then, where freedom relates also to the content, is where the breach between thought and faith arises, the breach that we see already in Greece at the time of Socrates. Thought is a new relation over against faith. The aspect of form comes into relation specifically as opposed to the substantial aspect of truth. This principle is present in the Christian religion from its outset; Christianity does, indeed, begin on the one hand from an external history that is believed; but at the same time this history has the significance of being the explication of God's nature. In accordance with the distinction that arises here at once, Christ is not only a human being who has undergone this fate, but is also the Son of God. So the *explication* of the story of Christ is its more profound aspect; this explication took place in thought and brought forth dogmatics, the church's doctrine. With it goes the requirement of inwardness or of thought. The breach between thought and faith develops further as a result. Thought knows itself to be free not only according to its form but also with regard to its content. Freedom is not, however, without authority in thought; thought has certain principles, which are of course its own and to which it reduces everything, though these principles belong to the development itself. An age has certain principles, and to that extent there is also authority present within it. The ultimate analysis, in which there are no longer any assumed principles, arrives only in the advance to philosophy.

181. *Thus L; Hu reads:* These are the three moments of the concept of religion. *An reads:* Elevation to God is knowledge; knowing of this knowing is for the first time true religion.

APPENDIXES

THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION TO THE STATE ACCORDING TO THE LECTURES OF 1831[1]

When this cultivation of subjectivity and this purification of the heart from its immediate natural state has been thoroughly elaborated and made an enduring condition that accords with its universal purpose, it is then consummated as the ethical realm, and by this route religion passes over into *ethics* and the *state.*

Thus arises the nexus that is also called the relationship of religion to the state. We have still to speak more fully about this.

1. The *state* is the *genuine mode of actuality;* in it the genuinely ethical will comes to actuality, and spirit lives in its genuineness. Religion is divine knowledge, the knowledge that human beings have of God and of themselves in God. This is the divine wisdom and the field of absolute truth. But there is a second wisdom, the

1. [*Ed.*] This material is found in both editions of *W;* our text follows W_2. Only the 1831 lectures contain a separate section on "The Relationship of Religion to the State" in *The Concept of Religion,* following the section on the cultus. In the earlier lectures this topic is taken up in association with the cultus of the specific religions. However, this new section might be considered an expansion of the cryptic remark found at the end of Sec. C of the 1827 *Concept,* namely, that "ethical life is the most genuine cultus" (above, p. 446). That is, when the subjective appropriation of reconciliation that occurs in the cultus takes on objective, ethical structure or substance, the true and universal actualization of divine-human reconciliation is achieved. In this sense the various forms of ethical life—the family, civil society, and ultimately the state—all represent extensions of the religious cultus and, in the earlier lectures, are treated under the general rubric of the cultus. Only in 1831 do they merit separate treatment, probably because of Hegel's interest in recent political events in France and Great Britain—notably the end of the Bourbon monarchy in the July Revolution of 1830, and the introduction of the Reform Bill into Parliament in 1831. Hegel's essay on the latter was his last published writing before his death.

wisdom of the world, and there arises a question concerning its relationship to that divine wisdom.

Universally speaking, religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same—they are implicitly and explicitly identical. In the patriarchal relationship and in the Jewish theocracy, the two are not yet distinguished and are still outwardly identical. However, the two are also different, and thus in due course they become strictly separated from one another; but then they are again posited as truly identical. The implicit and explicit unity is evident from what has been said; religion is knowledge of the highest truth, and this truth, defined more precisely, is *free* spirit. In religion, human beings are free before God. Because they make their will conform to the divine will, they are not opposed to the highest will but instead have themselves within it; they are free because in the cultus they have achieved the sublation of the rupture. The state is simply *freedom in the world,* in actuality. What essentially matters here is
340 the concept of freedom that a people bears within its | self-consciousness, for the concept of freedom is realized in the state, and the consciousness of freedom, as it is implicitly, belongs essentially to this realization. Peoples who do not know that human beings are free in and for themselves live in a benighted state regarding their constitution as well as their religion. There is *one* concept of freedom in religion and state. This one concept is the highest concept that human beings have, and it is made real by them. A people that has a bad concept of God has also a bad state, bad government, and bad laws.

In its detailed elaboration, the consideration of this nexus between state and religion properly belongs to the philosophy of world history. We have to consider it here only in the determinate form in which it appears to representation and there gets itself entangled in contradictions, and how the final outcome is the antithesis of the two that shapes the interest of the modern age. Hence we consider this nexus first of all in regard to

2. *how it is represented.* Human beings have a consciousness of it, although not in the way it is the absolute nexus and is known in philosophy. Instead they know it in a general way and represent it to themselves. The representation of the nexus here expresses

itself [in the claim] that the laws, governmental authority, and political constitution originate from God: in this way these forms are authorized—and indeed authorized by the highest authority available to representation. The laws are the development of the concept of freedom, and this concept, reflecting itself in this way in existence, has as its foundation and truth the concept of freedom as it is grasped in religion. What this expresses is that these laws of ethical life and of legal right are eternal and unchangeable regulations for human conduct, that they are not arbitrary but endure as long as religion itself. We find the representation of this nexus among all peoples. It can even be expressed in the form that one is hearkening to God in obeying the laws and the governmental authority, i.e., the powers that hold the state together This tenet is in one way correct, but is also exposed to the danger that it can be taken wholly abstractly, since it is not determined how the laws are explicated and which laws are appropriate for the basic constitution. Expressed formally, the tenet thus reads: One ought to heed the laws whatever they may be. Ruling and legislation are in this way 341
relegated to the arbitrariness of the government.

This relationship has come about in Protestant states and it can occur only in such states, for in them the unity of religion and the state is present. The laws of the state have both a rational and a divine validity due to this presupposed original harmony, and religion does not have its own principles that conflict with those that are valid in the state. But through fixed adherence to the formal principle a wide scope is granted to arbitrariness, tyranny, and oppression. This was particularly evident in England (under the last Stuart kings[2]), when passive obedience was demanded and the tenet was accepted that the sovereign is accountable for his actions only to God. With this went the assumption that only the sovereign even knows definitely what is essential and necessary for the state; the more precise definition [of it] lies in the sovereign's will, because his will is an immediate revelation of God's will. Through its further

2. [*Ed.*] Charles II (1660–1685) and James II (1685–1688). Hegel may have been familiar with details from the German translation of David Hume's history of Great Britain: *Geschichte von Grossbritannien* (Frankenthal, 1788).

consequences, however, this principle developed to the point that it turned over into its opposite. For the distinction between priests and laity is not present among the Protestants, and priests are not privileged to possess divine revelation; still less is there such a privilege accruing exclusively to one lay person. Against the principle of divine authorization of the sovereign, therefore, the principle of the same authorization accruing to the laity in general was posited. Thus there arose in England a Protestant sect that asserted that the way a government must be conducted was imparted to it by revelation; following such inspiration of the Lord, they incited a revolution and beheaded their king.[3] So even if it is generally established that the laws are by virtue of divine will, it is just as important to be cognizant of this divine will, and this is not the province of a specific [individual or group], but of everyone.

What the rational is, and the cognition of it, is a matter for the cultivation of thought and particularly a matter for philosophy, which can well be called worldly wisdom in this sense. It makes no difference at all what the outward appearance is in which the true laws have established their validity (i.e., whether they are wrested forcibly from the sovereign or not). The progressive cul-
342 tivation of the concept of freedom, of right, and of humanity among human beings is necessary on its own account. Thus, along with the truth that the laws are the divine will, it is particularly important that it be determined what these laws are. Principles as such are only abstract thoughts that have their truth only in their development; held fast in their abstract form, they are what is wholly untrue.

3. Finally, state and religion *can also be sundered* and have different laws. The realm of the worldly and that of the religious are different; so a distinction of principle can come in, too. Religion does not simply remain on its own proper territory but also affects the subject, furnishing it with precepts in respect to its religiosity and thereby in respect to its activity. The precepts that religion furnishes to the individual can be distinct from the basic principles of right and of ethical life that are in force in the state. This antithesis

3. [*Ed.*] A reference to the Independents under Cromwell and the beheading of Charles I. See Hume, *Geschichte von Grossbritannien* 16:30 ff., 246–247.

is expressed in the following form, that the religious demand pertains to holiness and that of the state to right and ethical life; on one side the vocation [*Bestimmung*] is for eternity, on the other it is for temporality and temporal well-being, which must be sacrificed for the sake of eternal salvation. In this way a religious ideal is set up, a heaven on earth, i.e., the abstraction of spirit over against the substantial [world] of actuality; renunciation of actuality is the basic vocation that emerges, and with it conflict and flight. Something else that is supposed to be more exalted is set in opposition to the substantial foundation, to what is genuine.

The first ethical realm within substantial actuality is that of *marriage.* The love that God is exists within actuality as conjugal love. As the initial appearance of substantial will within existent actuality, this love has a natural aspect, although it is also an ethical duty. Set up over against this duty is renunciation or *celibacy* as something sacred.

In the second place, human beings as single individuals have to *contend with natural necessity;* for each of us it is an ethical law to make ourselves independent [of this necessity] by means of our activity and understanding, for in the natural mode human beings are dependent in many respects. By our spirit and rectitude we are obliged to earn our own livelihood and so to free ourselves from that natural necessity; | that is what human integrity consists in. A 343
religious duty that has been set in opposition to this worldly obligation requires that human beings ought not to be active in this way, ought not to trouble themselves with such concerns. The whole sphere of commerce, i.e., every activity that relates to acquisition, industry, and the like, is therewith rejected, for human beings ought not to have anything to do with such aims; in this instance, however, necessity itself is more rational than are such religious views. On the one hand human activity is represented as something profane, while on the other it is demanded of people that, if they have possessions, they should not only refrain from increasing them through their activity but should give them away to the poor and particularly to the church—that is, to those who do nothing, who do not labor. Thus what is highly esteemed in life as integrity is hereby rejected as profane.

In the third place, the highest ethical life in the state rests upon the activation of rational, universal will; for in the state the subject has its *freedom,* which is brought to full reality therein. Against this a religious duty is set up, according to which freedom is not allowed to be the final goal for human beings; instead one ought to subject oneself to a strict *obedience* and to persevere in having no will of one's own. Going even further, one ought to be selfless even in one's own conscience and belief—in one's deepest inwardness one ought to engage in self-renunciation and cast one's own self away.

When religion places an embargo upon human activity in this way, it can impose upon us specific precepts that are opposed to worldly rationality. The worldly wisdom that recognizes the true in actuality has come forward against it; within the consciousness of spirit the principles of its own freedom have awakened, and there the claims of freedom have entered into conflict with the religious principles that demand this renunciation. In Catholic states religion and state thus stand opposed to one another once subjective freedom establishes itself in human beings.

In this antithesis religion expresses itself only in a negative fashion and requires of human beings that they renounce all freedom. More precisely, this antithesis is that in their actual consciousness human beings are in general intrinsically devoid of rights, that religion recognizes no absolute rights within the field of actual
344 ethical life. This is the monstrous distinction that has thereby | arisen in the modern world, so that the question of principle is whether human freedom ought to be recognized as something true in and for itself, or whether it can be repudiated by religion.

It has already been stated that there can be a harmony of religion and state. In Protestant states this is generally the case in principle (although [only] in an abstract fashion); for Protestantism requires that human beings should believe only what they know—that their conscience, being something sacred, ought to be inviolable. Human beings are not passive within divine grace; they participate in it essentially with their subjective freedom, and in their knowing, willing, and believing, the moment of subjective freedom is expressly required. In states with a different religion it can on the contrary be the case that the two sides are not in harmony, that

religion is distinct from the principle of the state. We observe this situation over a wide area, with a religion that does not recognize the principle of freedom on the one hand, and a political constitution that makes the principle of freedom into its foundation on the other. The saying that human beings are by their very nature free is a principle of infinite worth. But if we stick with this abstraction alone, no organic political constitution can emerge, for that requires an articulation in which duties and rights are delimited. That abstraction leaves no scope for the inequality that has to come in if a [social] organism, and with it genuine [social] vitality, is to come about.[4]

Principles of this sort are true but cannot be adopted in their abstract form. The knowledge that the human being is free by nature, i.e., according to the concept, belongs to the modern era. But whether or not we stick with the abstraction, it can happen that these principles are opposed by the religion that does not recognize them but considers them to be devoid of right, and regards only arbitrariness as legitimate. Therefore a *struggle* necessarily arises, which cannot be adjudicated in a genuine way. Religion demands the sublation of willing, [whereas] the worldly principle in contrast makes willing fundamental. When those religious principles are implemented, the only possible outcome is for governments to proceed by force and to suppress the opposing religion, or to treat those who belong to it as sectarians. Religion (as a church) can indeed be prudent and outwardly compliant, but then inconsistency enters | into the spirit [of its members]. The world 345
holds fast to a specific religion, while at the same time adhering to [political] principles opposed to it; insofar as we put these principles into effect, while still wanting to belong to that religion, there is a great inconsistency. For example the French, who adhere to the

4. [*Ed.*] Hegel here seems to construe a social organism on the model of a natural organism, whose vitality results from the interplay of unequal parts with distinct functions. It is true that, while the "kingdom of freedom" (the humanly constituted world) transcends in principle the "kingdom of nature," the latter remains present in the former in sublated form; for in becoming social beings we do not cease to be natural beings. But Hegel's social organism is more complex than this, since it embraces both a political constitution (which differentiates functions, so that some must give orders to others) and a religious community (which ought to embody the values of freedom, equality, and mutuality).

principle of worldly freedom, have thus in fact ceased to belong to the Catholic religion, for this religion can yield on no point but consistently requires unconditional subordination to the church in all things. In this way religion and state stand in contradiction to one another. So religion is left on one side, and is supposed to shift for itself; it counts only as an individual matter, about which the state need not trouble itself—and it is then said, furthermore, that religion is to have no involvement in the political constitution.

To posit those principles of freedom is to assert that they are true because they cohere with the innermost self-consciousness of human beings. But if in fact it is reason that discovers these principles, then, to the extent that they are genuine and do not remain formal, it has their verification only in virtue of the fact that it traces them back to the cognition of absolute truth—and this cognition is only the object of philosophy. But this cognition must be carried out fully and must go right back to the ultimate analysis, for if cognition is not consummated within itself, it is then exposed to the one-sidedness of formalism; but if it does go right to the ultimate ground, it arrives at what is recognized as the highest, or as God. So we can say, to be sure, that the political constitution ought to stay on one side and religion on the other; but in this there is the danger that our [political] principles remain afflicted with one-sidedness. Thus at the present time we see the world imbued with the principle of freedom, and this very principle is referred particularly to the political constitution. These principles are correct, but when they are afflicted with formalism they are prejudices, because cognition has not gone as far as the ultimate ground; there alone is to be found their reconciliation with what is strictly substantial.

Now the other point that needs to be considered regarding this separation is the following: if the principles of actual freedom are now made foundational, and develop into a system of right, then given, positive laws originate from it, and these receive the general form of juridical laws referring to individuals. The task of upholding
346 the legislation is committed to the courts; | whoever violates the law is brought before the court, and the existence of the whole is posited quite generally in this juridical form. Over against it, then, stands the conviction [*Gesinnung*] or inwardness that is the very

soil of religion. Thus there are two contrapuntal aspects belonging to actuality—the positive legislation, and the conviction with regard to it.

With reference to the constitution, there are here two systems. One is the modern system in which the defining conditions of freedom and its entire structure are maintained in a formal way, without regard for the conviction [of the people]. The other system is that of conviction—the Greek principle in general, which we find developed particularly in Plato's *Republic*.[5] A small number of social classes constitutes the foundation for it, and the whole otherwise depends upon the education and cultivation that are supposed to lead on to science and philosophy. Philosophy ought to be the ruling principle, and through it human beings are supposed to be guided to ethical life; all social classes are supposed to share in the virtue of σωφροσύνη [prudent self-control].

The two elements, conviction and the formal constitution, are inseparable and mutually indispensable. But in modern times there has come to prominence the one-sided view according to which the constitution is supposed to be self-sustaining on the one hand, while conviction, religion, and conscience should on the other hand be set aside as matters of indifference because it is of no concern to the political constitution what conviction and religion individuals commit themselves to. Just how one-sided this situation is, is evident from the fact that the laws are administered by judges, and everything depends upon their rectitude as well as upon their insight, for it is not the law that rules but human beings who are to make it rule. Making law effective is something concrete, and human will and insight must do their part toward that end. For that reason also, the subject's intelligence must frequently make the decision because, although the civil laws determine what is required in great detail, they still cannot touch upon each particular case. But conviction by itself is likewise one-sided, a deficiency from which Plato's *Republic* suffers. Nowadays we do not want to trust anything to insight but want to know everything in accord with positive laws instead, for we have experienced a striking example of this one-

5. [*Ed.*] See Plato, *Republic:* on social classes, 369b ff.; on education, 376e ff.; on philosophy as the ruling principle, 473c-d, 502c ff.

sidedness in the most recent contemporary history. We have seen a religious conviction at the helm of the French government,[6] of
347 the sort that held the state | to be in principle something devoid of rights and that advanced in a hostile manner against actuality, against right and ethical life. The latest revolution[7] was the consequence of a religious conscience that contradicted the principles of the political constitution, and yet according to that very constitution it is not supposed to matter what religion the individual professes. This conflict is still very far from being resolved.

Conviction does not necessarily take the form of religion; it can in large measure remain in an undefined condition. But in what we refer to as "the people" the ultimate truth does not have the form of thoughts and principles, for what is to count as right for the people can only be so esteemed to the extent that it is something determinate and particular. For the people this determinate character of right and ethical life has its ultimate verification only in the form of an extant religion. When the latter does not cohere with the principles of freedom, then there is always a split present and an unresolved rupture, a hostile relationship, which is just what ought not to obtain in the state. Under Robespierre the Terror[8] ruled in France, directed, of course, against those who did not share in the conviction of freedom because they had become suspect, i.e., their political conviction was suspect. In the same way the ministry of Charles X[9] came under suspicion. According to the formal structure of the constitution the monarch was not answerable to anybody; but this formal principle did not prevail, and the dynasty was cast down from the throne. This shows that in the formally developed constitution the ultimate sheet-anchor is still conviction, which was set to one side in the constitution, and which now, with contempt for all forms, enforces its own validity. This contradiction, and the prevalent unawareness of it, are what our age is suffering from.

6. [*Ed.*] A reference to the reign of the last Bourbon, Charles X (1824–1830), especially to the ministry of Polignac (1829–30).

7. [*Ed.*] The July Revolution of 1830.

8. [*Ed.*] The Reign of Terror, 2 June 1793 to 27 July 1794.

9. [*Ed.*] A reference to Polignac's ministry, which was destroyed in the July Revolution.

EXCERPTS FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF THE LECTURES OF 1831

by

David Friedrich Strauss[1]

INTRODUCTION[2]

The introduction will treat the relationship of philosophy to the principles of religion. Our representation of religion is that in religion we withdraw from temporality, that religion is the highest satisfaction and self-purpose. Religion is the consciousness of truth, the enjoyment of blessedness; as activity it is the glorification of God. Religion is the *point d'honneur* of all peoples.

In making this region the object of philosophical treatment, we are concerning ourselves with eternal truth. Philosophy is no less

1. [*Ed.*] On the source and background of Strauss's excerpts, see the Editorial Introduction. It should be kept in mind that the structure and contents of the 1831 lectures correspond generally to those of 1827 since in 1831 Hegel lectured from a transcript of the 1827 lectures, in which his mature treatment of the subject had been achieved. However, if Strauss's excerpts are reliable, there are in fact significant differences between the two lecture series, and these will be noted in the ensuing editorial annotations.

2. [*Ed.*] In 1831, the lengthy discussion of the relationship of the philosophy of religion to "the needs of our time" in Sec. 2 of the 1827 *Introduction* appears to be reduced to an analysis of themes common to rationalistic and supernaturalistic theology. Philosophy is opposed to both types of theology, although it agrees to the now-popular coupling of God-consciousness and self-consciousness (an allusion to Schleiermacher?), with the proviso that feeling does not of itself verify faith. The greater part of the 1831 *Introduction* appears to be given over to the "division of the subject," where significant differences emerge in the organization of *Determinate Religion* (see n. 3). However, this emphasis may be attributable to Strauss rather than to Hegel.

a service of God than religion itself, as subjective spirit's immersion in absolute spirit—but in distinctive fashion. It is now customary to oppose faith and knowledge, theology and philosophy. There are in theology two directions, the enlightened, rationalistic and the supernaturalistic, believing in revelation. As regards the *content* of religion, the two directions agree in relegating the basic dogmas, e.g. of the Trinity, to the background, with the possible exception of the person of Christ. Philosophy has accordingly free rein here; indeed it is now philosophy that protects the dogmas of church doctrine from the theologians. As regards the *form,* faith and piety now insist that the consciousness of God should be coupled in immediate fashion with self-consciousness in the spirit. And this is favorable to philosophy—namely, the stipulation that whatever claims to be truth must substantiate itself in spirit itself. The error is merely that the only verification called for in this regard is the immediate verification of feeling, while the mediated verification of philosophy is despised as purely finite.

In the Christian religion the religious content is expanded, but in the form of representation, whereas philosophy translates this
352 form into the form of knowledge. |

The *division of the subject* is as follows. It can be formulated in purely formal [logical] fashion; we consider (1) the concept of religion; (2) its primal division, i.e., the concept as it differentiates and thus posits itself in a limited manner; (3) the conclusion, i.e., the return of the concept from its limitedness to itself. However, this is also the objective development of the content. For (1) the concept of religion is the spirit that is *for* spirit. (2) But spirit is also primal division; the concept is differentiated from itself as object, is not yet adequate to itself. Here we are in the presence of limitedness, finitude, relationship, and here it is that the finite religions belong. (3) Finally the conclusion is where spirit closes with its object within itself, where the concept has become adequate to itself; this is the revelatory religion.

I. In regard to the *Concept of Religion,* therefore:

(1) It is necessary to define its *abstract concept,* namely, that religion is spirit's knowledge of itself, but in [terms of] the distinction between infinite and finite spirit.

(2) The *forms* in which this self-knowledge on the part of spirit appears as religion are *feeling* and *representation.*

(3) The individual consciousness, which in religion casts off its finitude, is also present as the consciousness of all within the *community* and is manifest in the *cultus.*

(4) It is also possible to attach to this an inquiry into the relation of religion to human *life in the world.*

II. *Determinate Religion:* The concept, the in-itself, must realize itself, and in this process its determinations separate out; but at the same time nothing emerges that was not implicitly contained in the concept of religion. However, in the course of this development, until such time as it has attained the goal, only individual moments of the concept enter upon the scene; the concept is not yet an object for itself; this latter is the sphere of the ethnic religions.

(1) The first religion is *immediate* religion, where spirit also already knows itself as essence, but does not yet distinguish itself from universal spirit as empirical.

(2) Individual consciousness and essence split apart, and | essence 353
comes to be known as *power* over the finite spirit. This power is initially (a) *substance,* in which finite things disappear. Inasmuch as there is here an ascent from the contingency of finite things to God, this is the stage corresponding to the cosmological proof. (b) However, substance acquires the determination of *causality,* in which finite things do not disappear but exist as posited by substance and as subservient to it; substance is accordingly the *Lord.* To these two forms belong the Oriental religions.

(3) God is known, third, in the religion of *beauty* and *purposiveness* as he who operates harmoniously, according to purposes. This is the standpoint of the teleological proof. God has a reality, and this is wholly determined by the concept or the purpose; here we have beauty, an immediate, natural reconciliation of spirit.[3]

3. [*Ed.*] In the 1831 lectures, the arrangement of *Determinate Religion* is once again thoroughly revised. The religions of substance include ancient Chinese religion (now removed from the category of immediate religion or magic), as well as Hinduism and Buddhism; while the religions of causality include Persian, Jewish, Syrian, and Egyptian religion. These latter are considered transitional forms to the religion of freedom, namely Greek religion, from which, finally, Roman religion is to be

III. The *revelatory* religion is reconciliation accomplished within spirit itself, consciousness of the entire, fully developed concept of spirit, in which there is no longer anything obscure or inadequate.

PART I. CONCEPT OF RELIGION

Chapter 1. General Concept[4]

In the philosophy of religion we presuppose the existence of God, yet philosophy is not supposed to accept as valid any mere presupposition. This is why natural theology took as its starting point proofs of the existence of God, and it seems as if this should be our starting point too. However, we do not, like natural theology, here consider God by himself but in conjunction with the knowledge of God in religion; so all we need to prove is that religion exists. However, this proof is not executed within the philosophy of religion but in the preceding branches of philosophy, which adduce religion as a necessary result. Admittedly God and religion, as the substantive element in human spirit, are in this respect first and foremost and not a result; by terming them a result we mean only
354 that they are mediated | and mediate themselves, but in such a way that the mediation sublates itself in *absolute* mediation. Mediation and immediacy are abstract forms, which only have truth when they are united. The truth of nature is spirit, and the truth of spirit is to free itself from its natural existence and to be and know itself in *absolute* spirit. This is what religion is, and the concept of religion is thus a *necessary* concept.

distinguished as the religion of external purposiveness. Thus in the last lecture series, Hegel interprets Judaism in the context of the other Oriental religions rather than in relation to Greek religion, as in the earlier lectures, and there appears generally to be an upgrading of the significance of the Oriental religions, which are no longer treated under the general category of the religion of nature, but rather under the categories of the cleavage of consciousness and power. For details, see the Strauss excerpts in volume 2.

4. [*Ed.*] The basic organization of *The Concept of Religion* in the 1831 lectures is similar to that of 1827, but the location of specific themes differs in interesting ways, according to Strauss at least. For example, the lengthy discussion of pantheism and atheism found in the 1827 *Concept* is missing in 1831, and is replaced by a discussion of the relationship between the concept of God and the concept of religion, which in turn picks up themes from the 1824 and 1821 lectures. God is known not merely abstractly but in and through the religious relationship.

But in what does this concept consist? First, as regards the locus, the soil of religion, it is *thought*. Everyone agrees that God can only be attained by thought and that animals have no religion because they do not think. At the same time it is partly denied that thought is the soil in which religion grows. Thought is the activity of the universal and has for its content solely the universal; to this extent it is only the abstract soil of religion, for God is not merely the universal but the concrete. This will yield the concept of religion. God is not merely substance in general but self-knowing substance or *subject*. Self-knowing contains two elements, what knows and what is known, and these form a unity as well as split asunder. If we posit one who *knows himself* as distinct from one who *is*, this means that substance is mere *knowing* without at the same time *being*—and this is *finite* consciousness. *Absolute* self-consciousness is found only to the extent that it is also [finite] consciousness; it thus splits into two, on the one side the subject remaining wholly and simply present to itself, on the other also subject, but differentiated as finite. Thus God knows himself in humanity, and human beings, to the extent that they know themselves as spirit and in their truth, know themselves in God. This is the concept of religion, that God knows himself in spirit and spirit knows itself in God. Religion inheres essentially in the concept of God to the extent that God is essentially *for himself*. This is also the meaning of the expression that God is love, i.e., knowing himself in an other of himself. In the loneliness of his being-for-self he feels himself needy and negated, and this deficiency is first overcome when he knows himself in the other. This concept of God and of religion is first attained in the revelatory religion. | 355

Chapter 2. The Single Forms of Religion[5]

(1) The first form of religion is *feeling*. From feeling derives all intuition, representation, etc. Feelings are affects in which the du-

5.[*Ed.*] It is striking that the second main section of the 1831 *Concept* is oriented not to the theme of the *knowledge* of God, as in 1827, but to "the single [or "simple" (*einfach*)] forms of religion," namely, feeling, representation, and faith. In 1827, "faith" was the first or "immediate" form of the knowledge of God; now it is the last, replacing "thought," which has already been treated in the preceding section on the "general concept."

plication into the feeling subject and the object that gives rise to the feeling has not yet taken place. I feel hardness; but if I *say,* "This object is hard," this is no longer feeling but representation. It is only with consciousness that this duplication occurs. If we speak of feelings, we are saying that a content is in us as particular private subjects. Single feelings are transient; the feeling complex, what feels continuously, we call *heart.*

Thus we are told that religion is an affair of feeling, indeed of the heart. Certainly, that of which I have a mere representation or insight may remain something alien to me; but if I have these religious doctrines in my heart, then they are identical with me, then I am permanently determined in this way. To this extent it is true that religion has to be in the feeling, in the heart.

But there are an infinite number of feelings, so that the determinateness or *content* of feeling must be distinguished from feeling [as such]. However, it is customary to believe that the mere form of feeling, of having something within the heart, suffices to justify a content, or that the truth of religion consists in having it within the heart. But the heart is the source of everything and of the most diverse manner of things; evil, hatred, and so on are also to be found in feeling. Feeling also includes the kind of religious sentiment that worshiped dogs, cows, and cats. To have the form of feeling does not suffice to justify something; it depends on the content.

(2) Because human beings are not animals, they advance beyond feeling, making the content of the feeling an object standing over against them. The second form of religion is thus *representation.* In feeling I concentrate the determinateness within myself. From this I pass over to a *dividing* [*Teilen*], a primal dividing [*Urteilen*], a duplication [*Verdoppelung*] of this content. My eye feels, is affected in a particular way; I now project this affect outside myself and see before me a paper. In like manner, in religion, feeling becomes conscious representation. Representation is the mode in which religious content impinges on the universal consciousness.
356 But it is not yet the true form of the contents; | the true form is only to be found in the concept. On the one side those who are ensnared in representation complain that when this is changed into concept the contents are lost, while on the other side the Enlight-

enment rejects not only the form of representation but also the dogma [conveyed by it]. Neither side is capable of separating the form from the contents.

(a) To representation belongs in the first place the *figurative,* in regard to which we know at once that a particular thing is not to be taken at face value but that its meaning has to be distinguished from the image it conveys; for example, "God begot a son."

(b) However, to representation belongs not only the figurative but also the *indeterminate,* the simple, whose essence is that it has not been further analyzed; for example, "God created the world," where "create" is the indeterminate expression for absolute bringing-forth.

(c) Representation is also characterized by the *historical* form. "God created the world, sent his son"—this is something that has *happened.* The necessary, inward connectedness of concepts becomes in representation the external connectedness of events.

(3) The third form of religion is *faith.*[6] In religion feeling splits into representations, and these in turn reassemble in feeling, and this feeling is *devotion.* This detour that religious feeling has to make in order to be determinate (e.g., Christian) feeling is usually overlooked, yet it is certain that unless these religious representations had been brought to us through Christian instruction we would not have this Christian religious feeling either. That we in

6. [*Ed.*] Whereas in 1827 Hegel described feeling and representation as *forms* or *modalities* of faith, now they appear in some sense to *issue* in faith. The discussion of the grounds or reasons for faith (both external grounds and internal grounds) hearkens back to a similar theme in the 1824 cultus and to Sec. D.2 of the *Ms. Concept.* Gone is the lengthy analysis of "thought" in the 1827 lectures, especially the consideration of the proofs of the existence of God in Sec. B.4.c, which are once again returned to the various determinate religions (see above, 1827 *Concept,* nn. 109, 133), although the discussion of the relationship of immediate and mediated knowledge in Sec. B.4.b of the 1827 lectures may have some echoes here. In any event, Hegel appears to want to acknowledge the legitimacy of the category of faith more explicitly than he had hitherto done—perhaps in response to the publication in 1830–31 of the 2d edition of Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube,* with its more carefully nuanced description of religious consciousness (see above, 1824 *Concept,* n. 37). Hegel continues to insist, of course, on the cognitivity of faith, and therefore seeks to overcome the rupture between faith and thought through speculative philosophy.

fact have any of these representations as something true and certain, this is *faith.* We first attain faith through *authority,* then also through *grounds* or *reasons* [*Gründe*], inasmuch as we engage in reasoning thought. However, these reasons [for belief] lead us back to another authority, the authority of God. But to the extent that we were not ourselves present when this divine authority was revealed (as when God gave Moses the laws, etc.), it itself in turn is grounded on the authority of the chroniclers. In order to give rise to faith, however, this murky mixture of reasons, thoughts, and authority requires the addition of a further important component, the witness of *our own spirit.* To the extent that the divine or
357 spiritual also appears historically, it comes to us through a | medium, and all depends on the character of this medium, the question being whether the narrators had the will and capability and the right consciousness. This is by no means self-evident but necessitates cultivation of the prosaic understanding, and this only comes upon the scene at a certain stage in a people's development. With the ancients, however, this divorce had not yet taken place between prose and poetry, between understanding and phantasy. If therefore we seek to derive the divine solely from history, we fall into the shifting and vacillating that is characteristic of all history. Accordingly, religious content cannot be appropriately grounded in history, inasmuch as copious documents do not suffice as a foundation for faith. It is only through the witness of the spirit that the subject comes together with, attains, the truly spiritual and religious content of history. In the case of faith too it is in the witness of the spirit that the autonomy of the spirit resides. This witness occurs in various forms—[e.g.,] as Platonic recollection, i.e., what I receive from outside is in fact already mine. In faith three relationships are therefore to be distinguished:

(a) The relationship *of spirit to spirit,* or the convergence of what is essential in whatever is believed with the inner essence of the believer.

(b) The truth's relationship to spirit as *particular* (this people, this age, etc.) is also particular; it is present for spirit only in determinate fashion. Faith therefore is modified from one stage in the development of spirit to another. The single spirit possesses its

substance and therewith its authority in the spirit of the people; individuals are born and brought up in the faith of their parents.

(c) That a people attains to consciousness of its *substantive* spirit is what is meant by its religion being "founded," and this is something historical. It starts from insignificant beginnings, then achieves completeness, as with the Greeks through Homer, and in some cases is also entrusted for its preservation to a distinct priestly caste. Individuals are brought up in the aura of this spirit, and the ensuing generations acquire the faith through the natural authority of those that went before. It is not possible for individuals to remove themselves from this spirit, inasmuch as it is their substantive element. But there are in fact several such religions, which enter into collision, and this has given rise to wars of religion, in that different peoples wished to uphold and extend their faith. | Such compulsion, 358
however, is gainsaid by the demand for freedom of belief. The aim here, quite irrespective of the content of belief, is only to prevent the subject from [being compelled to] subscribe to a particular belief; what is demanded is formal freedom. And this is an essential demand, on which the human consciousness of freedom is based. However, inasmuch as freedom of belief in the fullest sense means that what is true for me is also produced by me, *thought* comes into play as something independent of faith, and the rupture between thought and faith arises. But thought too is subject to the authority of its age and presupposes its principle; it is only philosophy that sets all preconceived principles aside.

Chapter 3. Forms of the Cultus

Certainty of faith at the level of sensibility is devotion, and devotion is the general characteristic of the cultus. In the cultus I raise myself to the consciousness of God, whereas at other times I am concerned with earthly purposes. However, the cultus does not consist in evoking a particular consciousness of God, but rather the consciousness of my having been *taken up into* God, and the enjoyment of having been thus taken up.

The cultus presupposes the certainty that reconciliation has been implicitly accomplished, i.e., that God wills the best in human beings and gives it to them for their enjoyment. In accord with different

circumstances,[7] this reconciliation is assumed to be a unity that either has existed from the outset or is restored, and has to be restored, following a rupture. The national spirit of each people is its protective deity, with whom it knows itself in original unity.

Now the task of the cultus is to bring forth the *consciousness*—not merely the representation but the actual enjoyment—of this unity. To this extent the cultus is festive: those engaged in it eat, drink, and dance, and enjoyment is the principal thing because their
359 cultus is essentially enjoyment. |

This enjoyment is bound up with sacrifices. This involves a negation; one gives up something and presents it to another in order to show one's devotion. But in the case of the ancients, where most of the sacrifice was consumed, it is not a renunciation, except where this giving-up benefits the subject itself. But in consuming their sacrifices the ancients were acting to the honor of God, acknowledging his power; in this feasting they impart to themselves a feeling of their union with God, and this feeling is at once supreme happiness and the highest duty.

However, this consciousness is a consciousness of union with absolute spirit as the universal spirit of a people, and in this way individual subjects become conscious of their unity with their people, knowing themselves in innermost unity with their compatriots and finding their personal enjoyment in the enjoyment of *substance.* Thus the cultus affords individuals their highest reciprocal guarantee; on it the happiness of the different peoples rests; if they neglect it, evil ensues, individuals recede into their own private consciousness, and the whole edifice falls asunder.

But the cultus also takes as its starting point the separation of the divine from the human and seeks to restore unity. Here again, however, it assumes a state of reconciledness in-and-for-itself, i.e., that God is well disposed to humankind. The separation that has to be sublated has two aspects, in the first place a *natural* separation—external misfortune, crop failure, plague, and the like—in which case substantive spirit is reconciled as the power of the nat-

7. *S originally wrote (canceled by another hand):* stages of development of the peoples

ural as well as the spiritual. "Here it is also in all likelihood assumed that the misfortune is divine punishment for evildoing."[8] Then penance and expiation are performed to prove that the evildoer is in earnest about giving up his particularity. When misfortune is regarded as punishment for evil, the underlying presupposition is that the power of nature is not merely natural but that purposes of good inhere in it. The general thought is the correct, religious one that human beings' happiness and misfortune | depend on their good 360
and evil conduct; but application to the private realm leads to misunderstandings.

In the second place, however, there is the purely *spiritual* separation of the subjective will from the divine will, the separation of good and evil. Here we are on a purely spiritual plane: evil is something spiritual, and the misfortune it brings with it can only be sublated in spirit, by human beings becoming conscious that their will is to be in the purpose of God, united with him. And this is achieved by doing penance, inwardly casting off and repudiating the evil will. The starting point here is the evil that lies in the nature of human beings themselves. The will, so it is argued, is free; but it is natural. And this natural will is represented as evil: human beings are evil by nature. And they are guilty if they do not pass beyond this natural willing. Now the thought is that this universal evil has to be sublated. We know this can be done through instruction. But what happens unconsciously through instruction is to come about here in the cultus in conscious, willing fashion. Human beings must negate the evil so as to become conscious, for their own person, of the reconciliation that is implicitly accomplished in God. They must renounce the particularity of willing, to which belong natural drives, inclinations, etc. The true element in this is that the content of these drives should be matched to the rational will. But viewed abstractly, what is demanded is that they should be extirpated, and the vitality of the will thereby extinguished. What human beings will, by virtue of their drives, includes property, what

8. *S originally wrote, then canceled:* In the second place, there is a *moral* separation, which human beings have merited because things go badly for them. Then it is necessary to restore the unity of the divine will with human purpose and happiness.

belongs to them specifically [*Eigentum*]; this they must be able to sacrifice, give up. Their free will is also part of their specificity [*Eigentümlichkeit*]; and they must make themselves consummate will. I must also be able to undo the evil actions I have done through penance, punishment; likewise, evil thoughts, etc., through repentance. Reconciliation is thus the assurance that if human beings renounce their cleavage from God, they are reconciled with him.

Chapter 4. The Relationship of Religion to the State[9]

The state is the highest and genuine mode of actuality of spirit. Among patriarchal peoples religion appears as externally identical with the state; but the two must also separate from each other as
361 distinct. | The true condition is that religion is the foundation of the state. In religion human beings are free in [and through] God, and the various religions differ according to the degree to which this concept of the freedom of spirit has come to consciousness within them. But consciousness of its freedom is what a people realizes in its state. Peoples that have no consciousness of the freedom of spirit are slaves in regard to their political constitution and religion. The connection between religious and ethical (or political) freedom comes to consciousness for humanity in the representation that laws derive from God—a representation that is to be found among all peoples. The truth is that laws are developments of the concept of freedom, which has its truth in religion.

But with respect to religion, God demands of us duties other than the duties and laws that obtain in the state, and so much is this the case as to give rise to antithesis and contradiction. On the one hand we obey God by obeying the authorities and the laws. Initially, this is purely formal, so that it does not matter what the laws and the authorities happen to be, and all is made to depend on the caprice of the sovereign, who, so it is said, has to render

9. [*Ed.*] Only the 1831 lectures add a section on "The Relationship of Religion to the State" to the *Concept of Religion* following the section on the cultus (see *Religion and State*, n. 1). Strauss's excerpts at this point may be compared with the text of the transcript of this section preserved in *W* and printed above. For historical allusions see the editorial annotations to *Religion and State*.

account to God. The presupposition here is that the sovereign, inasmuch as he comes from God, also knows what is essential in the state. This view became especially prominent in Protestant England, but then was transformed into its antithesis, namely the principle that divine authorization to rule rests with the *people.* A sect arose that maintained it had been vouchsafed to it by God how the land was to be ruled, and in consequence of this inspiration cut off the head of ˜Charles I.˜[10] The truth is that while the divine will is indeed the law, to recognize it [is] no private matter but [something] universal. It is necessary to determine which laws in fact constitute divine volition.

As has been said, however, religion and state can have different laws because their ground is different, yet because at the same time their ground is the same—namely, the subject—they can indeed enter into contradiction. Religion demands holiness, whereas the state demands ethical life. Thus over against marriage, an ethical institution, the church calls for holy celibacy; instead of an honest livelihood, indolent | poverty; and instead of rational freedom, blind 362
obedience. When religion thus calls on people to do things that run counter to the rational element in the state, rational consciousness takes up arms against them, most characteristically in the form of worldly wisdom, i.e., the recognition of what the rational element *is* in actuality and at the current moment. A religion of this kind adopts a merely negative attitude to the actual; all positive institutions of the ethical realm are then devoid of right, and human will, too, [is] not recognized as free and come of age.

In this respect there is an enormous difference between Protestant and Catholic states. In Protestant religion human beings are recognized as free and must convince *themselves* of the truth. This form of religion is thus consistent with a liberal state. In Catholic states on the other hand the principle of religion is unfreedom, and this is contrary to liberal institutions.

It is the *concept* of humanity that makes human beings free; this is a principle of infinite worth. If, however, it is left in this abstract form, no organization of the state is permitted, for organization

10. *S reads:* Charles II.

brings about inequality, whereas abstract freedom demands equality. Foundations of this kind must therefore be developed concretely. A state that is built up in accord with [these principles], however, must enter into conflict with a religion of unfreedom, which does not recognize its free institutions. A struggle ensues, but if religion gives way, an inner untruth results—as in France. It may then be maintained that the constitution need pay no regard to religion and that the principles of the state are evident from reason [alone]; but, for the *truth* of these principles, reason has no other recourse than to refer them to the ultimate, absolute truth, which is God. If state and religion are left standing on opposite sides, the basic principles of the state are undoubtedly awry because they derive from a way of thinking that is not referred back to its ultimate ground.

Another antithesis between state and religion is as follows. The state is a system of laws that are executed in legal fashion, in other words in a formal, external manner. To this external mode is opposed the inner mode, which is at the same time the proper soil of
363 religion. | Now it is the claim of the modern system to educe the whole structure constituting the various characteristics of freedom in the state in a formally juridical fashion; not so the Greek and specifically Platonic system, where everything is founded on conviction, education, and philosophy. In our times the view is prevalent that the constitution should be self-sufficient, while religion, conviction, and conscience are matters of indifference. We are told, Let law rule; but law rules through human beings, and the latter are not mere machines to be used; their insight and conscientiousness also have a role to play. On the other hand, to take conviction purely for its own sake is equally one-sided, for conviction provides us with no universal criterion for judgment as does law.

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THE ORIGINAL SOURCES

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